

PUNJAB GOVERNMENT RECORD OFFICE PUBLICATIONS

MONOGRAPH NO. I



THE LAHORE DARBAR

(In the light of the Correspondence of Sir C. M. Wade, 1823—1840)

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सत्यमेव जयते

General Editor: **G. L. CHOPRA, M. A., Ph. D.,**

Keeper of the Records of the Government of the Punjab

1950

Price : Rs. 8/4/-

The first of the series of the Punjab Government Record Office
Publications after 15th August, 1947.

General Editor,



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Printed by Gulab Chand Kapur & Sons, Delhi—134—500

FOREWORD

Seeley, in his *Expansion of England*, refers to the conquest of India by a trading corporation, the East India Company, as a romance of history. This romance was realised primarily in the first half of the 19th century which represents a period of the rapid crumbling of the old political system and expansion and consolidation of the British authority in India. By 1818, the Maratha power, which had arisen on the ruins of the once mighty Mughal Empire, had been battered beyond recovery, and John Company was well on the way to attaining India's sovereignty.

Another romance was developing at the same time in the Land of the Five Rivers. From the beginning of the century, destiny was leading an Indian soldier of fortune to a series of successive triumphs. Ranjit Singh, a daring and resourceful man of action and diplomacy, was building a kingdom for himself. Could the British and Sikh authorities, so different in their methods and outlook, though essentially based on military strength, co-exist? Did the ambitious Sikh potentate not impede the normal process of the expansion of the British power right up to India's natural frontiers on the north-west? Was the political situation in this region racing towards a crisis?

The Treaty of Amritsar of 1809 attempted to resolve and settle this situation for the time being by heading the intrepid Maharaja off his territorial ambitions to the east of the river Sutlej. Thereafter, he directed his restless energies and arms in other directions. The Kangra valley, the strategic fortress of Attock on the Indus, the kingdom of Multan and the Kashmir valley fell within his conquering grasp within a single decade. Then, came the turn of the Derajat and the Peshawar valley. The weak and divided Sind further aroused his rapacity. Its conquest would not have been a formidable affair for the organised soldiery of the Khalsa, and would have provided the Sikh dominion an outlet to the sea. But the insatiable territorial cupidity of Ranjit Singh caused increasing uneasiness

to the Company which, conscious of its own mission in India, used every kind of pressure to thwart his designs in this direction.

Fortunately for the Company, this critical period in the Anglo-Sikh relations produced several accomplished diplomats, e.g., Metcalfe, Ochterlony and Wade. The last is noted for his masterful handling of the many difficult diplomatic transactions with the Sikhs on either side of the Sutlej.

During the years, 1823-40, Wade was stationed at Ludhiana as Company's Political Agent. On that extreme outpost of her territories on the north-west, he was the normal channel of communication between his Government and the Lahore Darbar. This explains the extent to which the British relations with the Sikh dominion during that critical period depended on his prudence and conduct, and, as the present volume will show, this discreet diplomat gave a skilful channeling to Anglo-Sikh dealings, and was very largely responsible for maintaining friendship between the two powers.

The following pages represent an attempt to reconstruct the history of the Anglo-Sikh relations during the seventeen years when Wade was at Ludhiana, and are based mostly on an examination of his voluminous correspondence preserved in the Government archives at Lahore and Delhi. The material is not easy to handle, being voluminous and written in a bad hand. Moreover, many documents are moth-eaten and rendered illegible through age. Again, neither Wade nor his correspondents were writing for posterity, certainly not for students of history anxious to review and reconstruct the story of the period. It is natural, therefore, to find gaps in the correspondence or matters started but left unfinished or mere allusions which are so tantalising in the confusion they create. Therefore, to be able to weave a coherent narrative out of the stray threads of the available letters the author had recourse occasionally to other sources included in the bibliography at the end.

*The Manse,
Simla.
July 5, 1950.*

*G. L. Chopra,
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AN APPRECIATION

According to Ranké the function of historical study is to show what the past is really like. One of the essential ingredients in this picture is the record of what men actually wrote. That is why the study of records is an important part of the historian's work, for it is one of the principal means of recreating the past in the imagination and of seeing it again with contemporary eyes. Records are dull things at first sight and it is easy to fill a historical canvas by picking out only the dramatic, the picturesque or the bizarre. But properly understood and interpreted they produce a far truer picture of reality than more showy but superficial methods. Dr. Sethi has taken advantage of the records existing in the old Punjab Record Office to apply this process to the Sikh regime of Ranjit Singh. His subject is Colonel Wade, for many years the British agent at the Maharaja's court and the chief channel of relations between the British and the Sikhs.

Dr. Sethi's work is distinguished, not only by a close attention to the diplomatic record, but also by an imaginative appreciation of the personal and psychological factors involved. No document necessarily means exactly what it says, and diplomatic documents less than most. Not even in Wade's case has it been possible to penetrate behind the official documents to Wade's private thoughts. In the case of the Sikh leaders the task is even more difficult, for though we have Sohan Lal's detailed observations and Diwan Amar Nath's valuable work, the private correspondence of the Sikh Sardars is not available, even if it existed on any significant scale. Historical imagination is necessary to pierce beneath external observation and formal submissions to the inner minds of the chief actors. Dr. Sethi possesses this quality to a marked degree. Oriental courts have their conventions no less than occidental, and in this shadowy world of hints, half-truths and innuendoes he treads with deft and cautious steps. We are taken, as it were, not only to the Darbar hall, but behind the screen to the inner apartments as well.

The Sikh state of the early 19th century will long remain a fascinating field of study. The sudden emergence of a power able

to face on equal terms the all-Indian British power in its youthful vigour and confidence and its still more sudden disappearance, combine to intrigue the observer and to beset him with problems and questions. Was the Sikh state the chance result of the lucky conjunction of an adventurer of genius with a temporary political vacuum? Or was it a portent of things to come, of the birth of a modern nation transcending communal distinctions? Did Ranjit Singh's dominion carry within it the seeds of a Punjabi nationalism, which might have been a prototype of Indian nationalism itself? If such a polity could have developed, it would have solved the communal problem by integrating in one state the three major communities; it would have simplified the class problem by providing aristocratic leadership for a modernised state and uniting chief, bourgeois and peasant in a common purpose and patriotism.

The reasons for the abortive nature of the Sikh experiment can only be ascertained by a detailed and critical study of all the relevant factors of Punjab development during this period. Dr. Sethi's study throws valuable light on the diplomatic and personal side of this question. Dr. Chopra has studied the administrative aspect. Such studies prompt the hope that we may in time obtain a picture of the Punjab in the early 19th century as complete as has been achieved for England in 1700 by Dr. Trevelyan and in 1815 by Halevy. For it is as important to know why nationalism can fail to be born as how it can come to grow.

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July 21, 1950

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P R E F A C E

In his foreword, Dr. Chopra, to whom belongs the credit of proposing the subject, has defined its general scope and character admirably. My preface, therefore, is necessarily circumscribed to presenting in a succinct form its substance or contents consisting of as many as sixteen chapters. This, I should think, will be equally useful for the general reader interested in this period as a whole, and to the scholar, not anxious to wade through the entire volume, but in search of information on specific episodes and topics of Sikh history.

The first chapter, though deduced from original evidence, is of a preliminary character, intended to provide background to the events of the period commencing with Wade's posting at Ludhiana in 1823. Besides surveying the existing relationship between the British and Ranjit Singh at that time, it offers a brief sketch of Wade's earlier career.

On Wade's reaching Ludhiana, the first important problem needing settlement was Ranjit Singh's claim over certain places in the cis-Sutlej regions. The difference of opinion between him and his superior, Murray, regarding the attitude to be adopted in this matter is significant from the point of view of subsequent transactions of the two powers. The two officers represented opposing points of view, generating endless acrimony which is revealed in the second chapter.

In the next three chapters are examined in detail the somewhat complicated disputes and claims of Ranjit Singh against some of the cis-Sutlej states, and Wade's views regarding them. The prevailing Sikh customs relevant to these claims are elucidated and reasonings offered in the judgments of the Supreme Government clarified.

Chapter VI describes the historic meeting held at Rupar in October, 1831. Wade was chiefly instrumental in arranging the meeting, the underlying purpose of which is fully discussed.

Chapter VII deals with the composite subject of Burnes' mission with King William's presents to Lahore, leading to the opening of the Indus and the Sutlej to navigation. Wade's part in these matters, and particularly his untiring though futile efforts to make the new route a success, have been treated at length.

The Sind question, forming the theme of chapter VIII, is one of those episodes which strained the friendliness of the two governments almost to a breaking point. Ranjit Singh's cherished desire to occupy Sind, on the one hand, and extreme British anxiety not to allow him to extend his influence in that direction, on the other, presented one of the thorniest problems of the time. Wade's personal influence with Ranjit Singh and his masterly grasp of the whole situation helped in settling this affair peaceably.

Several attempts of Shah Shuja Durrani to regain the throne of Kabul, particularly his expedition of 1834, are described in chapter IX. Wade all along espoused the Shah's cause, advocating his restoration in conjunction with Ranjit Singh.

Chapter X is an account of the Sikh-Afghan relations, of events leading to the Sikh occupation of Peshawar in 1834, and the ignominious defeat suffered by Amir Dost Mohammad when he tried to recapture the town.

Burnes' mission to Kabul is covered by the next chapter. The mission failed because Dost Mohammad made it a *sine qua non* of an understanding with the British that pressure should be brought to bear upon the Sikh ruler to relinquish Peshawar. In the attitude adopted by Auckland he was influenced greatly by Wade. It would appear at the same time that the charge that the Governor General suffered from Russophobia in *excelesis* is well-founded. How in the beginning he was ready to use his 'good offices' with Ranjit Singh over Peshawar and how with the arrival of the Russian emissary at Kabul he refused even to consider that question make an interesting reading.

In chapter XII are revealed the details of the policy of the British Government, as largely influenced by Wade, which led to the decision to remove Dost Mohammad, "the protagonist of turmoil", and to restore Shah Shuja instead at Kabul. The merits of the policy culminating in the the ratification of the Tripartite Treaty are also discussed here.

Wade's part in creating a diversion in favour of the main army of invasion under Shah Shuja by leading Shahzada Taimur's forces and the Muhammadan contingent provided by Ranjit Singh under the Treaty through the Punjab and the Khyber Pass is explained in chapter XIII. These operations form the most striking military contribution of Wade's career to the service of the Company. These led to forcing the Khyber Pass by reducing the fort of Ali Masjid, hitherto regarded impregnable. This difficult task he achieved with such small and ill-assorted troops as to win high praise both from the Governor General and the Directors.

Wade returned to Ludhiana in November, 1839, but he was not destined to stay there for long. The episode of his removal from Ludhiana, hitherto left very obscure by historians, receives full attention in chapter XIV.

That Wade was an able, careful and accurate observer of men and events, particularly relating to the Lahore Darbar, has been brought out in the next chapter. His observations as narrated against the background of already published accounts of contemporary travellers and writers assume considerable elucidatory importance. Those in regard to Ranjit Singh particularly are the result of direct and cordial contacts, and are hence peculiarly authentic. Wade also reflected on many aspects of the military organisation of the Sikhs, and the true position of Europeans at the Lahore Darbar.


Finally, I must express my very sincere thanks to my teacher and friend, Dr. Chopra, under whose supervision this thesis has been prepared. His guidance and care in the preparation of each chapter have been of very great benefit to me in my effort and in the completion of this work in its present form.

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July 7, 1950.*

R. R. Sethi

NOTE

It is much regretted that too many printing mistakes have crept into the pages of this book, in spite of all possible effort to avoid them. The more important of these have been given in the *errata* at the end of this volume.



Publishers

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. The Anglo-Sikh Relations up to 1823

The Sikh power rose in the wake of the invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali which shattered the already tottering edifice of the Mughal Empire. The Sikhs, who had been driven into mountain defiles after Banda's execution in 1716, now re-emerged to share the spoils of the dying Empire. It was after Ahmad Shah's last invasion in 1766-67, that they settled down in different areas on both sides of the Sutlej in groups, or formations, known as the *Misls*¹.

These different *Misls*, composed largely of sturdy, militant and unruly elements, lost no time in embarking on a career of internecine strife for gaining supremacy of one over the other. This, in turn, inevitably led to the emergence of a leader of extraordinary ability among them—Ranjit Singh of the Shukerchakia *Misl*—who succeeded by the end of the century in reducing them all to his own control, and building up a strong and extensive kingdom.

The first contact between the East India Company and Ranjit Singh came off in 1800, when Munshi Yusuf Ali Khan brought presents from the Governor General to the rising Sikh Chief². This meant that the British were not unmindful of how political affairs were shaping in the then anarchic Land of the Five Rivers. This interest grew permanent after their occupation of Delhi in 1803, as between their newly established outpost and the rapidly extending boundaries of Ranjit Singh there hardly existed any natural or strong barrier.

In 1805, an occasion for a closer contact between the British and Ranjit Singh arose through Jaswant Rao Holkar's fugitive appearance at Amritsar, and Lord Lake's chasing him up to the banks of the Beas. Holkar sought to enlist Ranjit Singh's help, but the latter with all his youth and impetuosity proved too wise to identify himself

1. The most important *Misls* were :

- (i) Bhangi, (ii) Ramgarhia, (iii) Kanheya, (iv) Nakai, (v) Ahluwalia, (vi) Dalewalia, (vii) Nishanwala, (viii) Fyzulpuria, (ix) Karorasinghia, (x) Shahid or Nihang, (xi) Phulkian, (xii) Shukerchakia. (Prinsep, *Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab*, pp. 29 sqq.)

2. Amar Nath, *Zafarnama-i-Ranjit Singh*, p. 13.

with a lost cause and fall out with a power of far greater resource. Instead, he sought to establish friendly relations with the British by sending Sardar Fattch Singh Ahluwalia to Lake's camp to make a friendly understanding with him³. The Treaty of Lahore of January 1, 1806, was thus concluded, Sardars Ranjit Singh and Fattch Singh agreeing "to cause Jaswant Rao Holkar to remove with his army to the distance of 30 kos from Amritsar immediately, and never again to hold connection with him or aid him with troops or assist him in any manner." The British Government, on its part, undertook that as long as those chiefs refrained from holding any friendly connection with its enemies or from committing any act of hostility, its armies would not enter their territories, nor would it form any plans for seizing their possessions or property⁴. Holkar retired, and "a vague but friendly alliance" came now to exist between the British and Ranjit Singh.

This settlement secured Ranjit Singh, at least for some time, from English interference in his plans of conquest north-west of the Sutlej⁵. But the country south-east of that river upto the Jumna had not yet been the subject of mutual agreement, and from the point of view of both the British and Ranjit Singh was a short of no man's land to be occupied at any convenient time. It was divided among a number of Sikh chiefs, whose incessant mutual quarrels soon provided an excuse for Ranjit Singh to make inroads into it⁷.

3. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827. Despatch reproduced in Chopra, *The Punjab as a Sovereign State*, p. 312.
Sohan Lal (*Umdat-ul-Twarikh*, Daftar II, p. 59) writes that Holkar pressed Ranjit Singh for an alliance against the English, on which the Sikh Chief replied, "In this world the British are the only nation favoured by God".
4. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. I, p. 33.
5. Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 134.
6. The fact that the treaty was signed by the the East India Company with Ranjit Singh and Fattch Singh, (with whom he had exchanged turbans), shows that up to 1806 the former had not built unquestioned authority in the Punjab, but that Fattch Singh was still his equal in status. But, during the next three years, Ranjit Singh directed his attention to the subjugation of the country round about Lahore and Amritsar, and successfully carried out campaigns against the rulers of Jhang (1806), Hoshiarpur (1806), Kasur (1807), Gujrat (1809) and various other places, and, by 1809, succeeded in absorbing the central Punjab into single kingdom—Chopra, *op. cit.*, p. 15. Also Wade's report, P. G. R. Book No. 206, pp. 16—21.
7. Invitations came to Ranjit from cis—Sutlej Chiefs for active help or arbitration in some disputes. He gladly arbitrated in the disputes between Patiala and Nabha (1806) and between the Raja and Rani of Patiala (1807). He turned these occasions to his own advantage by seizing several places. He compelled the Chiefs of Patiala, Nabha, Malerkotla, Kaithal and other places to pay tribute and look for protection and guidance to him rather than to any other power beyond the Indus or the Jumna. (Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 22 *sqq.*, Amar Nath, *op. cit.*, p. 41, and Chopra, *op. cit.* pp. 33-34).

Ranjit Singh's aggressions naturally alarmed the cis-Sutlej chiefs. They had, on the one hand, no desire to accept him as their overlord, while, on the other hand, there was the danger from the English having established themselves on the Jumna. Between the lion and the wolf, they had thus to come to terms with the stronger⁹, when they decided to seek the British protection⁸. For this purpose, a deputation consisting of Raja Bhag Singh of Jind, Bhai Lal Singh of Kaithal, and Chen Singh, an agent of the chief of Patiala, waited upon Seton, the Resident at Delhi, in March, 1808⁹, to sound him as to the extent and kind of protection his Government was willing to afford them¹⁰. Seton, as instructed, put them off with vague answers at the moment¹¹.

The deputation returned only to find Ranjit Singh's agents waiting with reassurances. Foreseeing with despair the chances of their subjugation by the Sikh ruler after the discouraging reception which they had received from the British Resident, they felt now disposed to trust his clemency and opened negotiations with him to this end. The conference in which Ranjit was trying to allay their fears was still in progress when news reached of the arrival of Metcalfe, the British Envoy, at Kasur, in September 1808.

An *ex postfacto* study of the attitude of the Company's Government towards the Indian Rulers, after the time of Lord Wellesley, reveals the change in its attitude towards Ranjit Singh also. After Wellesley's recall Cornwallis was charged with the policy of non-intervention. His tenure being short-lived, he was succeeded by Barlow who, inspite of the remonstrances of Lake and other officials, followed the lines that his predecessor had indicated¹² at the instance of the Directors. Reversion or departure from the strictest interpretation of this policy came soon, however, due to a new situation in the international field. Minto, who had come out to India wedded to the policy of "imperturbable

8. The Chiefs arrived at the decision to prefer British overlordship to Ranjit's after some deliberation. To them the former appeared to be the lesser of the two evils. They compared Ranjit's domination to brain affection with its immediately fatal effects, and the British overlordship to consumption with its more gradual results. (Chopra *op. cit.* pp. 52-53, and reference there cited).

9. Griffin, *op. cit.* p. 98.

10. Idem, pp. 100—102.

11. The English were disposed to protect them, but had not yet determined how to act. The reply to the deputation was, therefore, cautiously vague.

12. Metcalfe described their policy, rather unfairly, as "disgrace without compensation, treaties without security and peace without tranquillity". (Roberts *History of British India*, pp. 263-64).

forbearance and scrupulous non-intervention¹³” felt obliged to depart from it. Once more the fear of French intrigues, which had operated so powerfully in extending the red line of British dominion on the map of southern India, was to exercise a similar influence in a new direction.

The charlatan of genius, Napoleon, in 1807, at Tilsit¹⁴, suggested his famous joint operations with Russia against *les possessions de la compagnie de Indes*, the French proposing to march through Asia Minor and Persia¹⁵. At this a fit of Franco-phobia took possession of British statesmen and “ impatient politicians ” in India sitting idle on their side of the ring-fence established by the Directors in 1805. Minto felt that the neutrality of Cornwallis and a defensive attitude could no longer be sustained, as he could not dismiss the practicability of the rumoured operations as beyond the scope of energy and perseverance of Napoleon. He thought it wise “ to act under a supposition of its practicability, and to adopt whatever measures are in our judgment calculated to counteract it, even at the hazard of injury to some local and immediate interests¹⁶”. For the purpose therefore, of “ counteracting the French demonstrations, and of throwing up barrier after barrier against the threatened expedition from the Black Sea and the Caspian¹⁷”, he sent missions to rulers of states on and beyond the north-western border of India, *viz.*, Persia, Afghanistan, Sind, and the Punjab¹⁸.

13. Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Charles, Lord Macclesfield*, Vol. I, p. 245
“ A strictly defensive system was to be maintained — not that defensiveness which is nine parts aggression, but rigid non-interference, which turns its back upon its neighbour until it receives a blow from behind.”

14. The peace of Tilsit marked the zenith of Napoleon's power. Russia was now joined to France and, in fact, with the exception of Sweden, the whole of Europe was on her side.

15. Morison, *A Survey of Imperial Frontier policy*, p. 4.

16. Lady Minto, *Lord Minto in India*, p. 102.

When towards the close of 1807, in the Council Chamber at Calcutta, Minto and his colleagues received the first definite news of the pacification of Tilsit, which “ had leagued against British, the unscrupulous ambition of the great French usurper and the territorial cupidity of the Russian autocrat ”, it was no idle terror which haunted their imagination. (Kaye, *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 239).

17. Lyall, *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, p. 277.

18. The objects of these missions in Minto's own words were “ to conciliate the princes, to obtain their consent to the passage of our troops through their country, or their admission into their territories, for the purpose of opposing a French army in their projected invasion of Hindustan, to establish such defensive engagements with these Governments as may obtain their co-operation, or at least, their friendly aid and assistance, to our military operations and to our cause generally”, and also to remove from the minds of these Princes any suspicions regarding the attitude of the British Government towards them, and to plant “ the seeds of confidence and union ”. (Lady Minto, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-49).

Almost about the same time, Minto's attitude towards the cis-Sutlej states also changed. In March, 1808, he wrote to the Secret Committee: "Although as a general principle we cordially recognise the wisdom and the justice of abstaining from all interference in the contests, disputes, and concerns of States with which we are unconnected by the obligations of alliance, and are fully convinced of the embarrassments and inconvenience of extending our protection to petty chieftains, who are unable to protect their territories from the aggressions of more powerful neighbours, yet we are disposed to think that cases may occur in which a temporary deviation from those general principles may be a measure of defensive policy, the neglect of which might be productive of much more danger and embarrassment than the prosecution of it, and that the certain resolution of the Rajah of Lahore to subjugate the States situated between the Sutlege and the frontier of our dominion would, under other circumstances than the present, constitute a case on which, on grounds of self-defence, the interposition of the British power, for the purpose of preventing the execution of such a project, would be equally just and prudent." "Runjeet", wrote Minto in another despatch, "had alone been induced to meditate the extension of his dominions over the territories between the Sutlege and the Jumna, by a manifestation of our intention not to exercise those rights of supremacy over the southern Sikhs which had been exercised by the Mahrattas. If we had not at an early period of time declared the Sikh chiefs to be entirely independent of our control; if at the time when the Rajah projected his first invasion of those territories we had declared a resolution to protect them; or even if we had attended to the united solicitation of the chiefs of these territories about the middle of last year to protect them against a second projected invasion, by announcing that resolution, no doubt can be entertained that the mere declaration of it would have been sufficient to deter Runjeet Singh from the execution of his design¹⁹".

Metcalf was sent to the Court of Lahore as English Envoy, the ostensible object of his mission being to counteract the designs of the French. Countering the aggressive policy of Ranjit Singh against the cis-Sutlej states was an additional motive for deputing the mission. Metcalf had a difficult task to do, viz., "to woo the great Rajah to an alliance, while refusing him the increase of territory on which he had set his heart²⁰".

19. Lady Minto, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-46.

20. *Idem*, p. 151.

Metcalf started upon his arduous journey from Delhi towards the end of July, 1808, and having crossed the rivers Sutlej²¹ and Beas²², came face to face with the 'Lion of the Punjab' for the first time on September 12²³. On the 22nd he detailed his proposals for an offensive and defensive alliance against the French menace²⁴. Ranjit Singh, to whom this danger appeared far too vague, had no objection to it; but he wanted his sovereignty over the cis-Sutlej chiefs recognised as the price of his support²⁵. This the Envoy declared he had no authority to grant. The negotiations came to a standstill, as the point was referred to the Government at Calcutta. Meanwhile, Ranjit set out to bring the cis-Sutlej chiefs, one by one, under his sway, perhaps, with the object of facing the British with a *fait accompli*. The Envoy protested against this conduct, but in vain, and matters drifted in this manner till December.

Then a momentous change occurred in the European background. Napoleon became entangled in the Peninsular War, and there was a marked improvement in England's relations with Mahmud II, the new Sultan of Turkey, leading to the Treaty of Dardanelles (January, 1809). The British were now no longer apprehensive of Napoleon reaching within a striking distance of India, and his menace was wearing away.

The result of this new development was noticed in the counter offensive which Metcalfe was now able to launch. The Supreme Government had already concluded that it would be better for it to have a number of small states on its frontier, rather than a single strong kingdom under a chief, whose friendship, in any case would be doubtful. In a note, dated December 12, 1808, Metcalfe had accordingly informed the Maharaja in unmistakable terms that his Government had decided to confine his territories to the Sutlej, and that he would have to return all the places occupied by him since the Mission's arrival²⁶. Ranjit's efforts to evade compliance were of no avail²⁷. The change in the European background had strengthened British hands.

21. 5/6. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, September 2, 1808. P. G. R.

22. 5/9. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, September 5, 1808. „

23. 5/10. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, September 13, 1808. „

24. 5/15. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, September 23, 1808. „

25. 5/16. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, September 24, 1808. „

26. 5/35. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, December 12, 1808. „

27. 5/42. Metcalfe to Edmonstone. December 20, 1808. „

In the middle of November, the British had decided to advance a detachment under Col. Ochterlony to the banks of the Sutlej to establish a military post there²⁸, and to support Metcalfe in his negotiations. This decision was announced to the Maharaja some time between December 22 and 26²⁹.

Ochterlony crossed the Jumna on January 16, and on February 9 issued a proclamation declaring all the cis-Sutlej states to be under British protection³⁰. On the 19th he reached Ludhiana. It was on this day that the foundation of the Ludhiana Agency was laid.

About the middle of the same month Ranjit Singh was informed that there was no need for an alliance against the supposed danger of a Franco-Russian invasion, and that the object of the British was simply to confine his territories to the Sutlej. Ranjit was thus brought to bay. He found himself soliciting the very treaty of friendship which he had previously agreed to grant only at a price³¹. He thought it prudent not to dare a conflict with the British at that stage in his career.

In the meantime, Minto and his colleagues were wondering whether it would be expedient to conclude a treaty of general friendship with Ranjit Singh which might, at some future date, embarrass their actions. Metcalfe pointed out that without a treaty Ranjit's suspicions would not be allayed, but that he would think that the British were hostile to him, and that no harm would result if the treaty was of a general character unencumbered with details³². The Government was thus prevailed upon by the young Envoy, and on March 13, he received instructions to conclude such a treaty with the Maharaja. The terms were actually signed on April 25³³. Ranjit Singh was guaranteed non-interference on the part of the English north of the Sutlej, but was definitely restrained from meddling in the affairs of the cis-Sutlej chiefs, or making any more con-

28. 6/1. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, November 14, 1808. P. G. R.

29. The exact date is not known, the despatch in question being missing. Kaye gives it as December 22, 1808—*op. cit.* p. 295.

30. P. G. R. Vol. II, Ludhiana Agency, 1808—1815, p. 55.

31. 5/55. Metcalfe to Edmonstone, February 19, 1809. P. G. R.

32. *Ibid.*

33. The treaty was ratified by the Governor-General in Council on May 30, 1809. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 34.

quests on that side of the river³⁴.

The treaty deprived Ranjit Singh of the chances of achieving the great purpose of uniting the Khalsa under his banner. A definite political cleavage being caused between the Manjha and Malwa sections of the Sikhs³⁵ by the treaty, all possibilities of his becoming a common leader of all the Sikhs were spoilt. It, however, had some advantages for the Maharaja. It gave him a *carte blanche* so far as the region north of the Sutlej was concerned³⁶. All danger of aggression or hostility from east of the Sutlej being removed, he could now leave that frontier almost unprotected, and transfer the whole weight of his arms against the principalities of the south-west, the north, and the north-east.

The Company came out of this diplomatic transaction with much gain. The sphere of its influence was enlarged from the Jumna to the Sutlej. Its north-western provinces were saved from disturbances emanating from the habitual ravages of the Sikh chieftains³⁷, including those of the trans-Sutlej area, who were soon brought under the iron rule of Ranjit³⁸. Moreover, it reaped the advantage of being surrounded by a confederacy of grateful chiefs bound to it by ties of self-interest³⁹. It could enlist a portion of their permanent forces, even without pay, in an emergency⁴⁰.

34. Kanhaya Lal (*Ranjit Nama*, pp. 256-57) gives the terms of the treaty as follows in Persian verse :—

۱. یکے آنکہ سالار پلمجاب را بجز ألف و سہر صدق و صفہ
۲. بسر کار نگرہیز باشد نہ کار بہر حال و ہر وقت و لیل و نہار
۳. ہمیشہ دو سرکار اہل ظفر مددگار باشند با یک دگر
۴. دوم آن دھیان عالی وقار کہ دارند آئروئے ستلج قرار
۵. ندارند کاری سرکار شاہ شولہ ایمن از تیغ خونخوار شاہ

35. The Manjha is the name of the Bari Doab in the neighbourhood of the cities of Lahore and Amritsar, while Malwa is the country immediately to the south of the Sutlej, stretching towards Delhi and Bikaner.

36. The British policy towards Ranjit Singh at this time is comparable to that of Bismarck's towards France. After annexing Alsace and Lorraine he encouraged France in her colonial expansion to make her forget that loss. Similarly, the British seem to have encouraged Ranjit in his conquests (after extending their own protection over the cis-Sutlej States) to alleviate his mortification at being thwarted from uniting the whole of the Khalsa.

37. Wade's Report, *ut supra*, pp. 25-26.

38. Jacquemont, *Letters from India*, pp. 98-99.

39. 6/3. Government to Ochterlony, December 29, 1803. P. G. R.

40. 10/9. Ochterlony to Adam, March 17, 1809. P. G. R.

This treaty is also significant as it influenced the trends of the future history of the Panjab. It secured the cis-Sutlej chiefs from mutual interference, and saved the three kindred states of Patiala, Nabha and Jind from extinction. It enabled Ranjit Singh to divert his restless ambition and energy to the conquest of Kashmir, Multan, the Derajat and Peshawar, and thereby dam the current of north-western invasions, drive the erstwhile invincible Afghans into their mountain defiles, and thus reverse the tide of conquest from east to west—a thing so far unknown in our history.

In view of the new relationship, it became necessary to define precisely the relations that were to subsist between the protecting power and the cis-Sutlej chiefs. The latter were full of doubts about British intentions as expressed in some of their measures. They felt uneasy at their occupying Ludhiana, and repairing and improving its fort⁴¹ Ochterlony's premature enquiries into the resources of the Protected chiefs further excited unfavourable surmises, and filled the air with distrust of British aims. All efforts made to assure the chiefs of their independence failed⁴². Accordingly, on May 2, 1809, an *Itlanama* was circulated to the chiefs guaranteeing them security against the power of Ranjit Singh, leaving them absolute in their own territories, exempting them from tribute but requiring from them every kind of assistance and co-operation in time of war.⁴³ This proclamation completed the severance of relations between Ranjit Singh and the cis-Suslej chiefs.

Freed of all danger, the cis-Sutlej chiefs began to prey upon each other *ad libitum*.⁴⁴ The absence of clearly defined boundaries of the states

41. Ranjit Singh's agents did something to feed this feeling—18/14. Seton to Edmonstone, April 3, 1809. P. G. R.

42. *Ibid.*

43. P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, pp. 99—100.

44. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, July 30, 1811. P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, p. 265.

accentuated troubles⁴⁵, for the more powerful chiefs usurped the weaker possessions; and feuds and quarrels, attended with loss of life and bloodshed, became rampant. Each day furnished a new proof of the violation of the most sacred duties and obligations⁴⁶, only to give the British a further alarm for the safety of their proteges⁴⁷. It led Metcalfe to believe that their mutual aggression would not be checked unless intervention into their internal affairs was sought, and their mutual relations were clearly defined⁴⁸. This necessitated the third proclamation issued by Ochterlony on August 22, 1811, declaring that Government would respect the previous proclamation (of 1809), but, should it become necessary, it reserved to itself the option of interference in the internal affairs of the states⁴⁹, and "demand the repayment of whatever collections may have been made from the usurped lands, together with a compensation for any injury that the lands or their inhabitants may have sustained by the

45. Griffin. *op. cit.*, p. 295.

The land could not be surveyed properly, because the people were both ignorant and suspicious, and generally thought that the survey of their territory was only a preliminary to its annexation. Phula Singh's attack on Lt. White, the Surveyer, is a clear example of the case.—(P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, pp. 148 *sqq.*)

46. Ochterlony to Lushington, December 30, 1809. (*Idem*, p. 161).

47. If not secured in their possession somehow "the oppressed would necessarily have recourse to the only other person who could use coercion with effect, *viz.*, to the Raja of Lahore" a contingency which the English could not stand after having done so much to consolidate their authority in that region. (Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 142).

48. To Metcalfe intervention into the affairs of the chiefs appeared inevitable. He wrote: "I do not perceive how this interference can be avoided without producing still greater evils than those which attend it. Yet we consider the necessity to be unfortunate, for it alarms all the Chiefs and makes them apprehensive that our interference will gradually extend itself till it reaches to every part of internal administration of their dominion." Ochterlony, on the other hand, thought the suspicion of the chiefs regarding British interference as only transient or occasional idea. He was also convinced that the interference of British Government was generally felt and acknowledged as a blessing. He maintained that if such a control existed under certain limitations it would only tend to the superior prosperity of the country and the augmentation of the revenue of the very men who deprecate its establishment.—Ochterlony to Edmonstone, July 30, 1811. (P.G.R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, pp. 265—67).

49. *Idem*, pp. 269-70.

transactions, together with a fine to an amount adopted to the circumstances of the case"⁵⁰.

This proclamation, however, was not applicable to the feudatories of Ranjit Singh. In case of their encroachments upon the British proteges, the Maharaja was to be held responsible for redress and compensation⁵¹. This declaration placed the Maharaja on a new footing with the British Government with regard to the cis-Sutlej states. Every time an atrocity was committed by his feudatories, he was called upon to explain, and *vice versa*. This dragged the two parties, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, into frequent diplomatic acrimony.

The nature of the British relationship with Ranjit Singh, with regard to the cis-Sutlej chiefs, was such that the Maharaja was not to be suffered to extend his suzerainty over the Protected chiefs, and they were to be independent of his control only to the degree which made them dependent upon the British⁵². But as most of them had their agents at Lahore⁵³, and had sworn allegiance to Ranjit⁵⁴, they were to be allowed to send independently messages of purely complimentary nature, while, in other cases, they had to get the sanction of the British authorities⁵⁵. In military matters again, apart from those who held lands on the right bank of the Sutlej, if others so chose, they were to be permitted to attend Ranjit on his military expeditions, for prohibition was likely to tend to wear an unfriendly appearance towards the Punjab chief⁵⁶. By this double-edged policy the British saved themselves from the censures of Ranjit Singh, and at the same time threw a *cordon sanitaire* round their proteges in their own favour.

A treaty of friendship had been concluded between the British and the Maharaja, but this had hardly created complete confidence between them. The cis-Sutlej settlement, brought about by a show of

50. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, July 5, 1811. (P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, p. 261).

51. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, September 27, 1811. (*Idem*, p. 272).

52. 6/14. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, April 10, 1809. P. G. R.

53. Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

54. Thompson, *The Life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe*, p. 97.

55. Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

56. Adam to Ochterlony, February 4, 1814. (P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, p. 363.)

force, had left behind it a legacy of mutual distrust. Each side tried to obtain information of the other's diplomatic and military moves through the service of spies⁵⁷. The British were assured that Ranjit had made propositions to Sindhia; agents from Gwalior, Holkar and Amir Khan continued to show themselves at Lahore for years, their object being to invite Ranjit for a united action against the strangers. The English further believed that Ranjit was anxiously trying to induce the Sikhs of Sirhind to throw off their allegiance, and to join him and Holkar against them⁵⁸. With such apprehensions in mind Ochterlony thought it prudent even to lay in supplies and throw up defensive lines at Ludhiana⁵⁹.

Ranjit's suspicions had been equally aroused⁶⁰, and his first care, therefore, had been to strengthen both his frontier posts of Phillor, opposite Ludhiana, and Govindgarh, the citadel at Amritsar, which were to serve as watch towers. But, on the whole, his suspicions were vaguely expressed, and were "rather to be deduced from his acts and correspondence than be looked for in overt statements or remonstrances."⁶¹

57. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Daftar II.

58. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 146-47.

59. Ochterlony to Lushington, December 31, 1809. (P.G.R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, p. 165). Also Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

The British officers on the frontier had been instructed to watch the proceedings of Ranjit, and to require instant redress in case of any infringement of the terms of the treaty. (Prinsep, *op. cit.*, p. 70).

60. Ranjit's suspicions appear justified when one goes through the note by the Governor General regarding the question of detachment at Ludhiana. It runs: "The propriety of manifesting a confidence in the Raja of Lahore's adherence to the faith of his engagements renders the removal of the detachment almost a necessary consequence of the conclusion of the treaty, for, the detachment having been stationed for the express purpose of guarding against the Raja's encroachments when the conclusion of treaty embracing that object was not under contemplation, its continuance would manifest a distrust of the Raja's faith now pledged by a solemn engagement to abstain from those encroachments which the detachment was intended to prevent, and although the Raja was compelled to acquiesce in its continuance, the restoration of real confidence is incompatible with that exterior indication of mistrust which the permanent establishment of a British post at Ludhiana for the purpose above described necessarily involve." Edmonstone to Seton, June 3, 1809. (P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, pp. 120-21).

61. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-48:

In this connection Ochterlony wrote to Government on December 30, 1809.

"I cannot bring myself to believe that he (Ranjit) would singly involve himself in a war with a power which, though I do not think he justly appreciates, I am persuaded he still fears". (P.G.R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, p. 164).

However, this mutual distrust subsided by degrees. In 1810, the Governor General sent Ranjit Singh a present of a carriage and a pair of horses "to signify to him that the British Government had nothing more at heart than to maintain the existing system of harmony and confidence with him"⁶². The occasion of the nuptials of prince Kharak Singh in 1812, when Ochterlony was treated with extreme cordiality at Lahore, provided a further satisfactory evidence of the change in the Maharaja's sentiment towards the English.⁶³ Henceforth, rumours of invasion of British territory by Ranjit "served to amuse the idle and to alarm the credulous without causing uneasiness to the British Government".⁶⁴

The English conduct, too, showed new signs of unequivocal friendliness towards the Sikh chief. The Gurkha overtures to effect a joint conquest of the Panjab were repelled⁶⁵; Sahib Singh was warned to abstain from taking sides with the Gurkhas⁶⁶; and all attempts to invoke British interference in Ranjit's designs against Multan were discountenanced⁶⁷.

62. Edmonstone to Ochterlony, May 29, 1810. (P.G.R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, p. 216.)

63. *Idem*.

64. Cunningham: *op. cit.*, p. 147.

65. To expunge the disgrace of his failure in Kangra and to wreak vengeance upon Ranjit, Amar Singh Thappa, the Gurkha chief, proposed to Ochterlony in 1809 a joint conquest of the Panjab. The Maharaja got apprehensive, and was prepared to meet Thappa on his own ground, when the Governor General's reply that he might not only himself cross the Sutlej to chastise the invading Gurkhas in the hills, but that he would receive English assistance in case the Gurkhas descended upon plains, gave Ranjit a conclusive proof of the friendship of the British. (*Idem*, pp. 148-49).

66. It was Sahib Singh's earnest desire to assist the Gurkhas against Ranjit with a view that such assistance would be rewarded by them by the gift of some villages belonging to the Sirmooreah chief, but the British Government did not approve of his interference, because such a procedure would bring upon them the hostility of Ranjit whose supremacy over the trans-Sutlej states was recognised by them in 1809. (10/43. Ochterlony to Lushington, December 30, 1809. P.G.R. Also 6/31. Lushington to Ochterlony, January 23, 1810. P.G.R.)

67. His attempt on Multan (1810) having failed, Ranjit suspected that Muzaffar Khan's tender of allegiance might not only be made but accepted by the British Government, so he proposed to Ochterlony a joint conquest of the territory on fifty-fifty basis. But the correspondence that followed from the English showed him that he would not be interfered with in his designs upon Multan, and that the Sutlej was to be as good a boundary in the south as in the north. (Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 151).

Munshi Abdul Nabi Khan, Ochterlony's wakil, visited Lahore in 1814, and expressed words of sympathy and consideration which peculiarly sank in the Maharaja's heart⁶⁸.

Henceforward missions of pure complimentary nature were frequently exchanged between the two powers, the Maharaja often deputed Faqir Aziz-ud-Din to Ochterlony for "strengthening the relations of friendship, unity and mutual consideration"⁶⁹ and the English reciprocated similarly. Such mutual goodwill between the two states was in the interests of both alike. Convinced that the English had no intention of encroachment, and that a defensive system of policy was the only object it desired, Ranjit Singh committed his territories along the Sutlej to its integrity, withdrew his troops that had been allotted to their defence, and diverted his energies in other directions. He conquered Multan in 1818, the Derajat in 1818-20, Kashmir in 1819, Peshawar in 1823, and thus "became master of the Panjab almost unheeded by the English."⁷⁰ The English, on the other hand, were themselves engaged in right earnest against the Nepalese (1814-16), in extirpating the Pindaris (1817), and in overthrowing the Maratha confederacy (1817-18).

Such was the background of Anglo-Sikh relationship when Wade was appointed as political Assistant at Ludhiana in 1823.

68. Ranjit had just suffered reverses in Kashmir expedition. The *Munshi* conveyed to him British sympathies, and told him : "In the expedition of Kashmir if you had asked for a *Paltan* from the 'glorious Sahibs, it could be placed at your disposal, out of friendship, to give you assistance. Henceforth, at any rate, I hope you could seek help from the Glorious Sahibs." (Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Daftar II, p. 163).

69. *Idem*, pp. 113 *sqq.*

70. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

B. The Early Career of Wade*.

Of essentially military antecedents, Claude Martine Wade was born in Bengal on April 3, 1794. His father, Lieut. Col. Joseph Wade, settled peacefully in England after a successful military career in the Bengal Army. His mother, Maria, was the daughter of Lieut.-Col. Robert Ross, another soldier of distinction in the ranks of the Company. It is interesting to note that Wade derived his first two names from General Claude Martine, a French soldier of fortune, and an intimate friend of his father.

Joseph Wade died in 1809, leaving the young Wade of barely fifteen years to look for his own future. In the same year, the lad was appointed a cadet in the Bengal Army, and forthwith sent to India to join the institution at Baraset, near Calcutta. This institution, in those days, instructed the cadets in the Indian languages, besides affording them military training. Wade passed all the requisite examinations within six months, "and received a sword in token of the approbation of government for my proficiency and the zeal and diligence with which I had endeavoured to prosecute my duties, and qualified myself, within the shortest prescribed period, for the public service"¹.

Immediately after coming out of Baraset, Wade was posted to the 15th Native Infantry. On July 29, 1812, he obtained his Commission as Ensign in the 45th Native Infantry with which he served on the Gwalior frontier in 1813, and was subsequently posted at the cantonment of Kunch, where mainly through the kindness of his officers and the unhealthiness of the place which laid low all the senior men, he found himself in command of his own corps and a detachment of artillery. In this capacity Wade acquitted himself in a manner that won him the approval of both the Governor Genral and the Commander-in-Chief. On October 20, 1815, he was honoured with a Lieutenancy. Otherwise, during this year, he was actively engaged in the operations occasioned by the aggressive movements of the combined forces of Sindhia and Holkar against the State of Bhopal, the latter being friendly with the British.

During 1815-16, the depredation of the Pindaris grew so daring as to compel Lord Hastings to adopt decisive measures. The best course,

*. The early career is largely traced from an account in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XX, pp. 411-12.

1. Wade, *A Narrative of the services, Military and Political* p. 1.

in his opinion, was to wage a relentless war against them. Wade got a chance to prove his worth, and served creditably for three years in the Pindari campaign. He also served with the Fifth Division, under General Sir J.W Adams, at the siege and capture of Chanda. On the successful termination of the campaign he was stationed at Lucknow.

During 1820-21, Wade officiated as Brigade-Major to the British troops in Oudh. But a year later, he was for the first time deputed on a political duty as bearer of a letter and presents from the Nawab of Oudh to the Governor General. On the completion of this duty, he was appointed as an Extra-Assistant in the office of the Surveyor General of India, "to examine, arrange and complete an analysis of the numerous maps and surveys accumulated in it for many years past, of which no complete description having hitherto been given, much valuable information connected with the geography of India had remained in obscurity".²

Hastings was so impressed with Wade's performance of this duty that he desired to appoint him to the Political Department. But before long he himself had to lay down the reins of his office, and recommended Wade to his successor, John Adam, who appointed him, then serving in the 23rd Native Infantry, to the office of the Political Assistant at Ludhiana on February 28, 1823³.

Ludhiana was at this time the most remote and outlying English outpost in India. About seven miles from the Sutlej, it formed the eastern boundary of the Panjab. Its proximity to the border of the Lahore Kingdom produced suspicion in the Maharaja's mind, as we have seen, and

2. Wade, *ut supra*, p. 6.

3. 23/39. Fraser to Ross, March 7, 1823. P.G.R.
Originally Ludhiana belonged to the Rani of Rai Alyas. From her Ranjit Singh snatched it in 1806-7, and handed it over to Raja Bhag Singh of Jind as a reward for his services. To further the negotiations of Metcalfe, Ochterlony, as mentioned on p. 7 *supra*, occupied it on February 19, 1809, but at that time the British Government had no intention of retaining it permanently. (Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, pp. 331 sqq.)

seriously impeded the flow of cordiality between the two states. At the same time, its great distance from the British base at Karnal, and the consequent difficulty of supporting it by timely reinforcements, in case some sudden development overtook the men stationed at this isolated place, were factors against its maintenance as a military post. The Government also knew of the jealousy which the cis-Sutlej chiefs would feel at the continuance of a British detachment in their midst after the danger from the Maharaja had ceased. Besides, the original intention of Minto was not to interfere in the mutual disputes or internal administration of these chiefs.

Ochterlony, however, took a wholly different view of the situation, and strongly urged Minto not to relinquish this advanced post, and sacrifice permanent benefits arising therefrom to temporary considerations. He reported that Raja Bhag Singh of Jind was ready to exchange Ludhiana for Karnal⁶, and urged that as an object of suspicion it would be viewed with more and more indifference every day, as forbearance and moderation of the English would become conspicuous. Particularly, "as a grand step in advance towards a European enemy, it could not be considered unimportant". Moreover, the Government had incurred expenses in repairing the fort⁷.

The Government at first adhered to its own conviction⁸. It was not until Metcalfe lent his weight in favour of its permanent retention, which he thought to be essential for controlling the chiefs and dealing effectively with the Maharaja⁹, that Ochterlony was put in military and political charge of Ludhiana, for which the Government agreed to pay a rent to the Raja of Jind¹⁰.

In April 1810, Ochterlony was appointed Agent to the Governor General at Ludhiana, in subordination to the Resident at Delhi, through

6. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, February 18, 1809. (Vol. II, P.G.R. Ludhiana Agency, 1808—1815, p. 63).
7. Ochterlony to Edmonstone, May 6, 1809. (*Idem*, p. 102).
8. 16/21, Edmonstone to Seton, June 3, 1809. P.G.R.
9. 6/19, Metcalfe to Edmonstone, June 17, 1809. P.G.R.
10. A nominal rent of Rs. 500 per mensem was promised to Raja Bhag Singh as "an ample compensation for the loss which he sustains by our occupation of the post of Ludhiana". Edmonstone to Seton, June 3, 1809. (P.G.R., Vol. II, *ut supra*, p. 120).

whom he corresponded with the Government. In 1812 and 1813, the maladministration in Patiala came to a climax, the Kabul Royal family took refuge at Ludhiana, and the Gurkha campaign began in right earnest-factors enhancing the importance of Ludhiana in British estimates. When Ochterlony took command of a column operating against the Gurkhas, Capt. Birch, his Assistant, managed the Agency during his absence.

On the termination of the campaign, Ochterlony returned to Ludhiana, and, in June, 1815, was vested with control over the territory conquered from the Gurkhas, his designation being altered to that of Superintendent of Political Affairs and Agent to the Governor General in the territories of the Protected Sikh and Hill chiefs between the Jumna and the Sutlej. Lt. William Murray was appointed his Assistant at Ludhiana, while Capt. Birch and Lt. Ross were to be his Assistants at Nahan and Subathu respectively. These changes made Ludhiana more important than ever.

Ochterlony remained at Ludhiana until October 1815, when the office of Superintendent was transferred to Karnal, where it was located until March 1822, when it was finally moved to Ambala. But Ludhiana still retained its importance. Due to the presence of the Royal refugees from Kabul it was found necessary to post an Assistant, Lt. Murray, there in November 1816¹¹.

In 1834, when the question of succession to the Jind chiefship arose, Wade pleaded that it was a good opportunity for stopping the rent. He wrote: "The importance of the acquisition to us has immeasurably increased when viewed with respect to the opening of the navigation of the Indus and the consequent resort of Europeans and others....."¹² The Government agreed, and Ludhiana lapsed to it as an escheat¹³. Of the territory so acquired by the English from Jind, the district of Ludhiana was the most important, yielding a revenue of about Rs. 85,000¹⁴.

11. P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, pp. ii—iv.

12. 101/63. Wade to Clerk, November, 15, 1835, P. G. R.

13. 109/2. Metcalfe to Clerk, February 14, 1837. P. G. R.

14. Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 380

Ludhiana, well situated on the river Sutlej, and commanding the principal northern road, had great political importance. For about thirty years after the Treaty of Amritsar, because of its unique position, Ludhiana remained the important Agency of the northward extending British power. It was through it that for such a long time the complicated relations with the cis-Sutlej chiefs, Ranjit Singh and the Afghans were kept without disruption. It was a consolidated base line of both British diplomacy and strategy.

Wade, as has already been stated, was appointed to the office of Political Assistant at Ludhiana on February 28, 1823¹⁵. But it was not till June 29, that he formally took charge of his duties¹⁶. These were of a local and miscellaneous character. He was given the charge of the exiled king, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk, and his family¹⁷, he acted as the Treasury officer and had, in that capacity, to act as paymaster to the military detachment of the station¹⁸, he collected the *Sayar* and *Abkari* duties¹⁹, he was the Deputy postmaster²⁰, and lastly, he supervised the policing of the town and the cantonment²¹. In the performance of local duties, he tackled miscellaneous cases, including murder, dacoity, theft, traffic in women, etc., which we frequently come across in his correspondence. It was Wade who persuaded the Sikh ruler to abolish the trade in slaves, and so eagerly did the former work for its abolition, that the town which was a mart of slave girls²², was freed from this obnoxious trade.

Wade afforded protection and other facilities to local merchants, with the result that Ludhiana became a place of considerable commercial importance soon after his appointment there²³. He provided people with

15. Lt. Murray who held this office since November, 1816, was then transferred to Ambala as Deputy Superintendent of Sikh and Hill affairs. (23/30, Fraser to Ross, March 7, 1823. P. G. R.)
16. 94/3, Wade to Metcalfe, June 29, 1828. P. G. R., and 94/4, Wade to Elliott, June 29, 1828. P. G. R.
17. Wade, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
18. 94/3, Wade to Metcalfe, June 29, 1828. P. G. R.
19. 94/12, Wade to Elliott, August 13, 1823, P. G. R.
Raja Bhag Singh of Jind, who had rented Ludhiana to the British, had levied an oppressive tax on grain. The sale of spirituous liquors also existed without restriction, and afforded a temptation to the European part of the detachment to indulge in orgies of drinking. At Ochterlony's proposal, Bhag Singh agreed to take the farm of the *Sayar* and *Abkari* of the town of Ludhiana for the annual sum of Rs. 2,100. (Ochterlony to Adam, January 7, 1813, P. G. R. Vol. II, *ut supra*, pp. 320-21).
20. 29/180-A, Postmaster General to Murray, August 13, 1829. P. G. R.
21. 96/164. Wade to Colebrooke, October 7, 1828. P. G. R.
22. According to Jacquemont, the distinguished French traveller, most of these girls came from the hills, where they were bought or stolen in their infancy by men who made a regular business of them. (*The Punjab a Hundred Years Ago*, p. 21).
23. *Journal of a Tour in 1832* by Shahamat Ali (*The Calcutta Monthly Journal*, Vol. III, New series, September to December, 1833, p. 275).

land for building houses. His vigilance over all kinds of local affairs led to a rapid increase in population and its amenities²⁴.

Wade was at his best in supplying firsthand information to the Government on every matter. He applied himself to collecting every sort of news regarding the Lahore Darbar, and the military moves of its ruler in various directions. He built up a regular spy-system for this purpose by posting suitable Indians at Lahore, Amritsar, Bahawalpur, Multan and to the banks of the rivers of the Panjab²⁵. It gave him an unrivalled knowledge of the economic and military resources of the Panjab.²⁶

Wade had certain social duties to perform as well. He entertained English officers, foreign visitors and the Maharaja's officers who occasionally passed through Ludhiana. For the convenience of the visitors from his Lahore, he constructed a *barahdar*²⁷. Jacquemont wrote to father, "My host, Captain Wade, is a clever, well-informed man and his society is equally profitable and agreeable to me. He is the king of the frontier, and an excellent fellow".²⁸ Hugel, the German traveller, judged him "a most courteous advocate"²⁹. Rev. John Lowrie, Secretary of the Board of

24. *Journal of a Tour in 1832* by Shahamat Ali, *ut supra*, p. 275.

25. For example, we find in his correspondence that he had appointed a man who supplied him with all information about the French officers, Allard and Ventura. This man was a friend of these officers and to him they could even show the *Parwanas* of Ranjit Singh with confidence. Wade always considered this source to be authentic, and verified the information supplied by the *Akhbars*. When the *Akhbar Nawis* at Lahore mentioned the arrival of Allard and Ventura at Phill'aur, he sent his man to find the exact state of affairs at that place. The information of the *Akhbar* was wrong. When the Agents from Bhartpur came to the Court of Lahore, the *Akhbar Nawis* wrote that they had left, while Wade, through his secret channel found that they were still there. The most important example of intelligence was one which he received from Amritsar, throwing doubts on the fidelity of British news-writer at Lahore. The march of Ranjit Singh's troops into Fateh Singh Ahluwalia's territory was the cause of the latter's flight, which was not mentioned. It was suggested that *Akhbar Nawis* had been taken in Ranjit Singh's confidence.

26. Wade, *op. cit.*, pp. 11-12.

27. 116/90. Princip to Wade, July 25, 1831. P. G. R.

28. *Letters from India*, Vol. II, p. 370.

29. *Travels in Kashmir and the Panjab*, p. 16.

Foreign Missions of the American Presbyterian Church, was accorded a cordial and friendly reception by Wade of whom he wrote, "I esteemed myself highly fortunate in having to consult with a gentleman of such enlarged and correct views, and of such general zeal for the good of the natives as were evinced by the Political Agent at Lodiana"³⁰.

To educate the Panjabi youth, Wade started a school at Ludhiana, which was taken over by Lowrie who developed it³¹. But it continued to be under the patronage of its founder until he was transferred in 1840. It was the first school in the Panjab which offered both English and a western course of study. It survives today as the Ewing High School³².

In 1827, Ranjit Singh's cis-Sutlej possessions were placed under the charge of Wade at the Maharaja's own request³³. This involved him in settling a variety of intricate disputes between British Protected Sikhstates and those of Ranjit Singh regarding the rights and interests etc., of their subjects. Though this duty was laborious, yet it was gratifying to Wade, because it gave him an opportunity of coming in closer contact with the Maharaja. This, in fact, cemented a lasting friendship between the two, and gave a decided turn to several events of historical importance.

30. *Two Years in Upper India*, pp. 138-40.

31. *Idem*, pp. 134 *seq.*

32. *Some Historical gleanings from old Mission Records* by Rev. Ross Wilson. (Journal of the Panjab University Historical Society, Vol. II, part II, p. 125).

33. Wade, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

CHAPTER II

THE CIS-SUTLEJ STATES

(The Controversy between Murray and Wade)

Before entering upon an examination of the problems of the cis-Sutlej states after 1823, it is necessary to review the relationship and difference of opinion which developed between Captains Murray and Wade. When the latter arrived at Ludhiana as Assistant to the former, both had perfectly cordial relations. But official prejudices soon developed, expressing themselves in personal conflict and animosity from 1827 onwards, and influencing in no small measure the subsequent history of the cis-Sutlej states.

Wade and Murray were appointed—the former Political Assistant, Ludhiana, and the latter Superintendent, Sikh and Hill affairs, Ambala,—on February 28, 1823. Wade reached Ludhiana on June 29, and assumed his official duties, which were of a purely local character¹. Such duties placed him under the control of the Resident at Delhi². But in all cases of emergency, and when engaged in communication with the Protected states, Wade was to act in subordination to Murray, through whose office all the former's correspondence had also to pass³.

Matters moved on, however, smoothly for some time, Wade being actively engaged during this period in impressing on Ranjit's mind the superiority of the British arms⁴. But, all this while, Wade protested

1. See pp. 19 sqq., *supra*.

2. 115/11. Metcalfe to Wade, January 14, 1826. P.G.R.

3. 23/163. Elliott to Murray, September 9, 1823. P.G.R.

4. During 1824-25, Ranjit Singh was busy seizing Afghan tracts around Bahawalpur; but the ill-success of the British in the initial stages of the war against the Burmese made him pause, and suspend his operations against the Afghans. Assembling all his troops around Lahore he got ready to avail himself of any serious British reverses by joining the insurgent Raja of Bharatpur and other chiefs disaffected with the British Government. Wade proved equal to the occasion, and dissuaded the Maharaja from any such designs. (*Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. xx, p. 412, *s. v.* Wade. Also 24/163. Wade to Murray, September 9, 1824. P. G. R. ; 94/105. Wade to Murray, October 5, 1825. P.G.R., and 94/80. Wade to Murray, September 1, 1825. P. G. R.)

against his being required to submit Lahore ' Akhbars ' through Murray's office, pleading that indirect communication was derogatory to his dignity⁵. This was the beginning of official prejudices, leading up to personal jealousy and animosity between the two, which continued for eight years, till Murray's death in 1831. But the malady was in a mild state at first. It headed towards a crisis late in 1829, when the warnings of the Governor-General repressed its unseemly growth, though it did not subside altogether.

Wade, it appears, would not lose his independence of action, or agree to play a subsidiary part. He seemed to be very jealous of his personal dignity, which he saw being injured through his subordinate office. The result was that he often laboured to make that office more important. But his fastidiousness for authority was Murray's abhorrence, his sense of self respect the latter's repulsion. This conflict of dispositions and interests resulted in frequent collisions between the two.

Wade wished an augmentation of his authority and power. An opportunity presented itself in 1826. Ever since the grant of protection to cis-Sutlej chiefs the Political Agent at Ambala had been the conduit of business between the British and Ranjit Singh, as also between the Protected chiefs and Ranjit Singh's cis-Sutlej possessions. Ranjit Singh had repeatedly expressed a desire to have his disputes settled by the Political Assistant at Ludhiana, " who is at hand instead of the Deputy Superintendent who is 50 kos away"⁶. Wade was all for this change, for its own sake⁷, possibly also as it promised an increase in the importance of his office⁸. Murray, on the other hand, thought it would make for less efficiency⁹, and opposed its adoption vehemently. He observed : " from the circumstance which have been forcing themselves on my attention for three years past, it appears that the Political Assistant came to his situation possessed

5. 23/163. Elliott to Murray, September 9, 1823, P. G. R.

6. 95/47. Wade to Metcalfe, December 3, 1826, P. G. R.

The arrangement appeared to Ranjit as inconvenient to his people who had to go to a distant place for the settlement of their disputes. The Maharaja might have apprehended also, quite naturally, a conflict of interests as the Political Agent at Ambala was charged to guard the interests of the Protected states.

7. 95/47. Wade to Metcalfe, December 3, 1826. P. G. R.

8. 115/22. Encl. Metcalfe to Stirling, July 7, 1827. P. G. R.

9. 74/184. Murray to Trevelyan, November 4, 1827. P. G. R.

with a very inadequate conception of the few simple duties which he had to perform, and that he has not strictly adhered to the responsible nature of a situation", and argued that such delegated powers would be "utterly incompatible with the conditions, habits and prejudices of the numerous Sikh chieftains by constituting a divided authority which could not exist but by the subversion of all the fundamental principles which have been laid down by the Government as the basis on which we have for a period of seventeen years regulated and conducted the affairs of these states."¹⁰

Wade's main argument was that "the Sikh states protected by Government form a charge separate from the possessions of Ranjit Singh on the left bank of the Sutlej; and if a collision of duties were liable to occur by investing the Assistant with the power of adjusting disputes of the fore-mentioned description, a similar objection might be applied to every case of public functionaries, who, in course of their official duties, though acting independently, are obliged, as a part of their duty, to communicate with each other on subjects connected with official functions."¹¹

In 1827, Wade conducted a complimentary mission from Ranjit Singh to the Governor General, Lord Amherest¹², who sent in return some presents through him to the Court of Lahore¹³. This occasion gave Wade an opportunity to give fresh force to his arguments through the instrumentality of Ranjit Singh¹⁴.

The Government had a strong desire to agree to the change, but there were certain *contretemps* in the way. The disputes between the Protected states and the Maharaja's cis-Sutlej territory were bound to occur, and if Wade was empowered to deal with such disputes, it would be tantamount to placing two masters over the Protected states, which would lead to a clash of authority¹⁵. Then, there were Murray's objections to be got over. Though while at Ludhiana he had supported the measure¹⁶, he now protested against it on grounds of inefficiency in business, and diminution of his authority¹⁷. He even hinted at his suspicion that Wade had elicited the proposal from Ranjit Singh¹⁸.

10. 73/54. Murray to Metcalfe, March 26, 1826. P. G. R.

11. 95/47. Wade to Metcalfe, December 3, 1826. P. G. R.

12. 95/86. Wade to Metcalfe, April 6, 1827. P. G. R.

13. 115/18. Stirling to Wade, May 2, 1827. P. G. R.

14. 95/110. Wade to Metcalfe, June 20, 1827. P. G. R.

15. 115/22. Trevelyan to Wade, October 27, 1827. P. G. R.

16. Murray to Elliott, June 25, 1822. P. G. R.

17. 74/184. Murray to Trevelyan, November 4, 1827. P. G. R.

18. *Ibid.*

The matter was finally settled in accordance with Metcalfe's suggestion by placing the officers at Ambala and Ludhiana in charge of distinct duties. The superintendence of Murray over the Protected states and that of Wade over Ranjit's cis-Sutlej possessions were made entirely distinct¹⁹. All disputed problems were to be settled by the two Agents through mutual correspondence, but the final decision would rest with the Resident at Delhi²⁰. Ranjit Singh and Wade were satisfied with this decision, though for different reasons. Murray, however, felt discomfited and depressed, as his hopes of gaining a dominant control over Ranjit's affairs through the subsidiary agency of Wade were lost²¹.

Another factor estranging the two officers was that Wade had been keen on the attendance at his office of authorised *vakils* from the states in the neighbourhood of Ludhiana to facilitate and aid him in solving questions concerning their territories²². Murray, while at Ludhiana, had certain persons from the surrounding states to help him, but all these (excepting *vakils* from Ranjit Singh and the Ladwa chief) had retired in the interval between Murray's departure and Wade's arrival there²³. Wade wanted to revert to the old system²⁴. Murray now opposed this plan with the observation: "the Political Assistant is desirous of creating himself into a substantive authority with attendant agents from several Sikh chieftains and a consequent participation in their concerns"²⁵.

In this matter, Murray carried his point by impressing upon the Governor General that the *vakils* attendant on him, while he was at Ludhiana, were not public functionaries, and that they had been sent by different chieftains to help him in his researches, as he was writing 'the Political and Historical Review of the Sikh States'²⁶. Consequently, Wade did not get the attendance of the *vakils* of various Protected chiefs during Murray's life-time.

19. 27/284. Colebrooke to Murray, December 9, 1827. P. G. R.

20. 115/27. Colebrooke to Wade, December 9, 1827.

21. Regarding political situation and Anglo-Sikh relationship, Ludhiana carried far more prestige than Ambala.

22. 23/159. Wade to Murray, September 18, 1823. P. G. R.

23. 65/5. Wade to Metcalfe, February 5, 1827. P. G. R.

24. 22/159. Wade to Murray, September 18, 1823. P. G. R.

25. 73/54. Murray to Metcalfe, March 26, 1826. P. G. R.

26. *Ibid.*

Murray always endeavoured to find lacunae in the proceedings of Wade²⁷ with the definite view of bringing upon him the censure of the Government for negligence in affairs on which depended the safety and mutual goodwill of the two states²⁸. He would not hesitate even to prefer charges of mal-practice, corruption²⁹ and underhand dealings³⁰ against Wade, his motive being to impugn him on the tenderest of all points in the character of a public officer. The correspondence on the cases of Fathegarh and Talwandi³¹, besides revealing the extent of differences of these two officials, illustrates how Murray was adept in the art of perverting truth and distorting facts, and seem to have ever delighted in such indulgence³². He often charged Wade with violation of principles, but his own practice did not always accord with the doctrines he preached or pleaded in condemning the conduct of his colleague³³.

Wade relied on the judgment of the Government for a full exoneration of the imputations which Murray strove to fasten to him³⁴. Recrimination, he seems to have thought, could serve no good purpose, and not in a single case did he wish to justify himself by exposing the proceedings of Murray. The latter had a better hearing and influence with the Governor General's Council³⁵, while Wade possessed "neither fortune nor patronage,"³⁶ but what he had been endeavouring to acquire with his Government during the past six or seven years by a conscientious devotion to his duty.

A detailed study of the correspondence which passed between the two shows that it is full of acrimony and unfriendly feelings, though

27. 29/280. Wade to Hawkins, November 3, 1829. P. G. R.
Wade wrote to Hawkins, "It was necessary to Murray's purpose to draw that inference in order to make me appear culpable of dereliction of duty". (*Ibid.*)
28. 97/166. Wade to Hawkins, October 3, 1829. P. G. R.
29. 76/40. Murray to Hawkins, September 27, 1829. P. G. R. And
97/115. Wade to Hawkins, October 3, 1829. P. G. R.
30. 97/26. Wade to Colebrooke, February 17, 1829. P. G. R.
31. Vide Chapter IV, *infra*.
32. 97/180. Wade to Hawkins, October 14, 1829. P. G. R.
30/6. Hawkins to Murray, January 15, 1830. P. G. R.
33. 97/183. Wade to Hawkins, October 16, 1829. P. G. R.
34. 98/8. Wade to Hawkins, December 7, 1828. P. G. R. And
97/224. Wade to Hawkins, December 7, 1829. P. G. R.
35. 98/99. Wade to Hawkins, June 23, 1830. P. G. R.
36. 98/9. Wade to Hawkins, January 11, 1830. P. G. R.

actual vituperation was spared to each other. Both used exceptional and provoking language³⁷, and yet we find Murray alone transgressing limits of decency or decorum sometimes, when, for instance, he used epithets like "puerile" for Wade's proceedings³⁸.

Murray was an ardent expansionist wishing, every time an occasion arose, to curtail the power of Ranjit Singh, and further the interest of the Company³⁹. His views were always levelled against the Maharaja. As early as 1824, he had advised the Government that "policy, justice and necessity seem to call upon us to curb the career and check the influence of Ranjit Singh in all feasible cases on this side of the Sutlej⁴⁰."

Wade, on the other hand, thought that "the officers of the Government are bound to preserve to Maharaja Ranjit Singh the integrity of his territory as much as to any other independent state."⁴¹ According to him, it could not be maintained that "the Protected states are to enjoy immunities in favour of their subjects who happen to be living within the domain of Lahore at the expense of the just authority and independence of that Power"⁴². Such a privilege was not only contrary, Wade believed, "to the acknowledged principles of international policy, but one which the Government in India had pointedly disavowed"⁴³.

The differences and controversy arising between Murray and Wade could not escape the Governor General's notice. A note of warning was issued to both by the Deputy Secretary to

37. 115/65. Hawkins to Wade, January 15, 1830. P. G. R.

38. 76/125. Murray to Hawkins, December 3, 1829. P. G. R. And
30/17. Hawkins to Murray, February 4, 1830. P. G. R.

39. 97/230. Wade to Hawkins, December 29, 1823. P. G. R. And
97/175. Wade to Hawkins, October 13, 1823. P. G. R.

40. 72/219. Murray to Elliott, November 19, 1824. P. G. R.

41. 97/180. Wade to Hawkins, October 14, 1829. P. G. R.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*

Wade's main object was to bring about and maintain harmony between the British and Sikh Governments, with this end in view he fought on Ranjit's behalf over the question of the Maharaja's cis-Rutlej possessions. Vide Chapter III, *infra*.

Government, who wrote: "The Governor General in-Council has noticed with regret and dissatisfaction, on several occasions...the unfriendly feelings existing between Captains Murray and Wade, and the tone of acrimony which pervades their correspondence. The spirit and temper in which the former officer has taken up and commented upon the proceedings of the other,.....are not such as Government can approve, and there is no doubt but that the latter.....in defending his conduct and motives and repelling the attack made upon him, has been betrayed by his feelings into the use of language, inconsistent with official decorum. Both the public interests are injuriously affected, and the character of the British administration brought into discredit by these repeated altercations and angry collisions between frontier authorities, entrusted with the joint charge of one of the most important circles of our political relations, and I am instructed, accordingly, to intimate the expectation of Government that Captains Murray and Wade will endeavour, for the future, to lay aside their feelings of personal animosity in the discharge of their public duty, and co-operate cordially and zealously for the general good. Any neglect of these injunctions will compel the Governor General-in-Council to adopt decisive measures for correcting the mischiefs which must ensue from the continuance of such unseemingly and discreditable misunderstandings".⁴⁴

Murray felt "the full force and justice of the admonition of His Lordship."⁴⁵ He instantly wrote a contrite letter to Hawkins promising that "I.....shall confine myself to simple reports to my immediate superior without risking any observations which may give pain to Captain Wade,* and where the public good requires our co-operation I can adopt myself under the instructions of the superior authority to whom we both acknowledge subordination."⁴⁶

Their relations improved for the time being, but it was not till Murray's death at Subathu in June, 1831, that Wade saw his way clear to play an important part in the Anglo-Sikh relations.

44. 30/22. Encl. Stirling to Hawkins, January 29, 1830. P. G. R.

45. 76/190. Murray to Hawkins, February 21, 1830. P. G. R.

The animosity between the two officers, however, stood both the British and the Maharaja in good stead. Wishing to foil each other's arguments they thrashed threadbare, as we shall see in the following three chapters, the complicated problems of the cis-Sutlej states from all possible angles. This fact proved of immense help to the Governor General and his Council that controlled the reins of Government from thousands of miles, to arrive at an impartial judgment.⁴⁶ It also secured the Maharaja against any unlawful usurpation of his territories on the part of either the Protected chiefs or the British Government.



THE CIS- SUTLEJ STATES AND THE ADJOINING TERRITORIES



CHAPTER III

THE CIS SUTLEJ STATES *(continued)*

(The Territorial Disputes)

The duties of the Political officers at Ambala and at Ludhiana having been separated, it became imperative that the area of their jurisdictions should also be definitely marked so as to eliminate all misunderstandings between them. The Resident at Delhi asked Wade for a detailed list of the districts which he proposed to take under his charge¹. It took Wade about a month to procure from the Lahore agent at Ludhiana a list of all those places to which the Maharaja preferred his claims². The list contained 47 distinct places³, including some which the British had already taken under its protection⁴.

Murray, when called upon to investigate the validity of Ranjit Singh's claims, forwarded two lists,⁵ one showing "the names of places on the left bank of the Sutlej appertaining to the State of Lahore and its vassals and against the validity of which no reasonable objection can be urged", and the other, detailing those places to which the claims of the Maharaja were premature and doubtful⁶. He took no objection to Wade's taking charge of districts and villages included in the first list, but cautioned the
without full

discussion, places mentioned in his second list, or else, this would "afford a plea to the State of Lahore to exercise a sovereign sway over places to which its right is at present denied and disputed by our proteges or, at any rate, to which the Raja has a dubious title."⁷ Murray stood for the prevention of "the Lahore interference and encroachment to the south of the Sutlej, for, if the southern chiefs be compelled, by their interests, to attach themselves to a neighbouring powerful state, that state may, by their aid and influence, strengthen itself against the power which it feels to be dangerous to it."⁸ Murray argued that if Ranjit Singh were allowed to meddle with the affairs of the cis-Sutlej principalities "we augment the means and replenish the resources of a competitor to whose standard the ambitious and discontented will have recourse, and we, at the same time, dilapidate the strength of the lesser states whom it is our interest to foster and protect."⁹

Wade took charge of the places mentioned in list No. 1. at the order of the Resident at Delhi¹⁰.

Murray's second list contained the following important *ilagas*:—

1. Wadni, Himmatpur, etc.,—Possessions of Rani Sada Kaur.
2. Jagraon, Naraingarh, etc.,—Possessions of Fattah Singh Ahluwalia.
3. Possessions of Hari Singh Kang.
4. Ferozepur.
5. Sialba.
6. Machiwara.
7. Anandpur.
8. Chamkour, Amarala, Toghul, etc., etc.¹¹.

Murray asserted that those in possession of these places had actually denied their dependence upon Lahore. Wade did not

7. 74/202. Murray to Colebrooke, December 18, 1827. P. G. R.

8. 75/17. Murray to Colebrooke, February 19, 1828. P. G. R.

9. *Ibid.*

10. 115/26. First Assistant, Delhi Residency, to Wade, December 20, 1827. P.G.R.

11. Vide Appendix I.

brook any delay in taking up the cases of the Ahluwalia possessions¹², the Sodhi holdings¹³, Wadni¹⁴, Ferozepur¹⁵, Sialba¹⁶, and Kalal Majra¹⁷, and in impressing upon the Resident at Delhi that an impartial reference to these chiefs would prove contrary to Murray's assertion. Moreover, he pointed out to the Government that Murray's objections were calculated to excite the apprehensions of the Maharaja. He, therefore, suggested that sooner the matter was decided, the better for the maintenance of harmony and mutual goodwill between the two states¹⁸.

12. "The Sardar depends on the Raja's authority, not only by the deed voluntarily executed by Sardar Fattoh Singh on his reconciliation with the Maharaja (March, 1827), but also by the admission of Captain Murray himself, in lately communicating to the Sardar the orders of the Resident in the case of Maha Singh, a refractory vassal of the Ahluwalia chief who holds the lands of Bhirog" (26/4. Wade to Clerk, January 10, 1828. P.G.R.)
13. "The Sodhis, no doubt, exercise a domestic authority. But in stating that the Sodhis owe obedience to no chief, Murray refers presumably to spiritual and not to temporal affairs, for, if they owe obedience to no chief, it may be asked why they should be claimed to belong to the Protected states. Sodhi Faujdar Singh of Machiwara, however, admits his vassalage to Ranjit." (*Ibid.*)
14. "Even since their reconciliation, the affairs of Government were carried on by the Maharaja's agents. No *Vakil* from Mai Sada Kaur attended at the office of the Political Agent at Ambala before the year 1822, who was not introduced in the first instance by the Maharaja's *Vakil* and acted in concert with him." (*Ibid.*)
15. "Ferozepur continued subject to the Maharaja's Government till 1823—fourteen long years after the Treaty of Amritsar." (*Ibid.*)
16. "The proprietor of Sialba is a *Jagirdar* of the Maharaja and avows himself as his vassal." (*Ibid.*)
17. "This is a village tributary to the Ahluwalia Chief, and hence could not be conferred by the Political Agent at Ambala without infringing his own principles stated in Paper B". (*Ibid.*)
18. (*Ibid.*)

Official action, however, was much delayed in this matter. The Government was engaged in looking into its archives for producing proofs of having taken under protection certain places¹⁹, while the Maharaja strove for the immediate occupation of some of them, of course, not without justification. This gave rise to immediate consideration by the Government of the following important cases.

1. Wadni.

Wadni was in the possession of one Main Noudha of the tribe of Dharewal, who held lands under the Delhi Emperors. When the Sikhs began to plunder the country and exact tribute, he occasionally made them presents of horses. In 1777, Baghel Singh seized the fort of Pattoki from Main Noudha, and retained it for several years, with the exception of Himmatpur, Wadni and three other villages which remained in the Main's possession. In 1806, Pattoki was seized by Bir Singh and Dip Singh, the Bhadaur chiefs. In 1808, Ranjit Singh sent Diwan Mohkam Chand to collect tribute from this area. The Main proposed to eject the troops of the Bhadaur chiefs from Pattoki, but the Diwan himself took the fort, and left his own garrison there. Mian Noudha, however, retained his former possessions²⁰.

In September, 1808, when Ranjit Singh had crossed the Sutlej, Rani Sada Kaur²¹ obtained from him an unconditional grant of the Wadni domain on payment of Rs. 15,000. In this way, she was put in possession of the Pattoki fort and other villages held by Mohkam Chand. On October 25, 1811, Mian Noudha was declared to be the Rani's *Zamindar* and her authority was extended over Himmatpur and Wadni also. But it was only in 1817, that the Rani actually dispossessed the Mian's son of Wadni²².

In 1820, Sada Kaur was imprisoned by her son-in-law²³ whose troops occupied the fort. The Rani appealed to the British. The

19. 115/36. Colebrooke to Wade, April 28, 1828. P. G. R.

20. 75/17. Murray to Colebrooke, February 19, 1828. P. G. R.

21. "The Rani, the mother-in-law of the Maharaja, was one of the most artful and ambitious of her sex who ever figured in Sikh history, and became the ladder by which Ranjit Singh ascended to power",—Gordon, *The Sikhs*, p. 84.

22. 75/17. Murray to Colebrooke, February 19, 1828. P. G. R.

23. It was characteristic of Ranjit Singh that no tie of kinship, no sentiment of gratitude was strong enough to stand in his way. The main cause of the dispute between him and his mother-in-law was that he desired that Sher Singh and Tara Singh, her grandsons, should each be given a separate estate by her, and this she refused to grant.—Sohan Lal, *Umdat-ut-Twarikh*, p. 290.

British Agents treated her as an independent representative of the interests of the Kanheya confederacy of the Sikhs on their side of the Sutlej, and, therefore, as having a claim on their protection²⁴. Accordingly, an English detachment ejected the Sikhs from the fort at the instance of the Agent at Ludhiana. Ranjit Singh fretted and fumed, but prudently avoided a collision with the British troops²⁵.

The orders of the Government of October 11, 1822, had declared Sada Kaur's territory to be an escheat to the British on the death of the Rani. But about the time when Ranjit Singh's claims on the cis-Sutlej lands were being taken up for consideration, the Government contemplated the restoration of the Rani's possessions to a representative of Mian Noudha from whom she had seized them²⁶.

Wade pressed the Maharaja's claim on the Rani's territory on the following grounds:—(a) that no *vakil* from Sada Kaur attended at the office of the Political Agent at Ambala before the year 1822, without being introduced in the first instance by the Maharaja's *vakil* in concert with whom he invariably acted²⁷; (b) that a reconciliation had taken place between Ranjit Singh and Sada Kaur who was desirous of relinquishing her claim to that territory in favour of her son-in-law²⁸; and (c) that Ranjit Singh had obtained Ochterlony's permission in employing a force on the left bank of the Sutlej for establishing the Rani's authority in that district. Had her territory been included in the Protected states, Ochterlony would have hardly permitted the Maharaja's military interference in lands under British suzerainty²⁹.

In view of these arguments, the British right of protection could not be maintained, and the Government withdrew all opposition to the Maharaja's claim of sovereignty in that domain³⁰.

24. Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, pp. 163-64.

25. Chopra, *The Punjab as a Sovereign State*, p. 68.

26. 115/36. Colebrooke to Wade, April 28, 1828. P. G. R.

27. 95/136. Wade to Colebrooke, December 7, 1827. P. G. R. And
96/4. Wade to Clerk, January 10, 1828.

28. 95/136. Wade to Colebrooke, December 7, 1827, P. G. R.

29. *Ibid.*

30. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828. P. G. R.

2. The Ahluwalia Possessions.

Sardar Fattah Singh Ahluwalia held territories both in the trans and cis-Sutlej areas. Towards the end of 1825, he with the whole of his family fled across the Sutlej³¹, and took refuge at Jagraon, in the cis-Sutlej area, situated about 25 miles from Ludhiana³². The Sardar sent his confidential servants to Murray at Ambala and to Wade at Ludhiana, to plead for British protection. He firmly believed that Ranjit Singh contemplated the seizure of his person, the sequestration of his trans-Sutlej possessions and the confiscation of his private property; and represented that these were the causes which induced him to secure his honour and dignity by precipitately retreating into the Protected zone³³. The Sardar desired from the British, at all hazards, a guarantee for the security of his trans-Sutlej possessions, such as had been accorded by them to the Phulkian chiefs³⁴. This, however, was impossible, without coming to an open rupture with the Maharaja³⁵. Hence all his trans-Sutlej territories were allowed to be confiscated by the Punjab Ruler.

Ranjit Singh, on his part, was surprised to find that his old friend had run into the arms of the English. This made him sober enough to express an earnest desire for a reconciliation with Fattah Singh, promising any assurances that might be desired for the security of his person and possessions³⁶. In April, 1827, Fattah Singh returned to Lahore³⁷. The British protection was extended to Fattah Singh for his ancestral cis-Sutlej

31. Fattah Singh Ahluwalia was a fast friend of Ranjit Singh from the very early years. In 1802, both these Sardars exchanged turbans as a mark of friendship and brotherhood. It was this Prince of Ahluwalia *misl* who dissuaded Ranjit from offending the British by helping the fugitive Holkar. In the Treaty of 1806, he as well as Ranjit Singh were styled by Lake as "Sardars". But the weak, yielding and unasserting nature of Fattah Singh made him subservient to Ranjit, who began to treat him as a mere vassal, commanding his services on every military adventure and insisting upon his constant attendance at Lahore. Matters at length became intolerable even to the amiable Fattah Singh, and, in 1825, he fled across the Sutlej—Punjab District Gazetteers, Kapurthala State, p. 5.

32. 94/116. Wade to Metcalfe, December 27, 1825. P. G. R.

33. 94/118. Wade to Metcalfe, December 29, 1825. P. G. R.

34. Massy, *The Chiefs and Families of Note*, p. 37. Also Griffin, *The Rajas of the Punjab*, p. 535.

35. Massy, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

36. Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

37. *Ibid.* and 74/49. Murray to Metcalfe, April 25, 1827. P. G. R.

possessions. The rule, expressed by Metcalfe in his letter of January 14, 1826, set down definitely that "whatever possessions on the left bank of the Sutlej were held by Fattah Singh, or his ancestors, previous to his alliance with Ranjit Singh and of consequence independently with regard to that Chieftain, should be confirmed to him under our protection, and this might also be extended to acquisitions on the same bank of the river made in co-operation with Ranjit Singh at a time when their conquests were partitioned on footing of equality. But with respect to any, if any there should be, held under a grant of Ranjit Singh which would imply sovereignty on his part and subordination on that of Fattah Singh, the claims of the Maharaja must be admitted"³⁸.

Now that the question of Ranjit Singh's cis-Sutlej possessions had arisen, his old nature reasserted itself, and he preferred his claims once again to Fattah Singh's possessions which consisted of 454 villages, of which 291 were held by him in sovereignty, and 163 were in possession of the *jagirdars*³⁹. The districts of Jagraon and Naraingarh had been obtained by him from Ranjit Singh in lieu of a *nazrana* prior to Metcalfe's mission⁴⁰. Wade adduced the following arguments on behalf of the Maharaja:—(a) that asked by Captain Birch to station a *vakil* with him for the transaction of affairs connected with the Sardar in his office, Fattah Singh had replied that the agency of his affairs was in the hands of the Maharaja's *Vakil*⁴¹; (b) that three years after the Treaty of 1809, Fattah Singh sent an Agent to Ludhiana for the first time, and that he was introduced by the Maharaja's *Vakil*, and transacted his business through him as occasion arose; (c) that on his reconciliation with the Maharaja in March, 1827, Fattah Singh had voluntarily executed a deed which could satisfactorily prove his dependence on Ranjit Singh; and (d) that in the case of Maha Singh of Bhirog, a refractory vassal of

38. 26/12. Metcalfe to Murray, January 14, 1826. P. G. R.

39. For a detailed statement of these villages see Appendix II.

40. 72/474. Murray to Metcalfe, January 8, 1826. P. G. R.

Ranjit Singh had granted away portions of his early conquests to the south of the Sutlej for certain pecuniary equivalents. He had then probably no other end in view than to raise an immediate supply of cash for the payment of the arrears due to his troops, and the gratification of bestowing the lands of others on the chieftains who followed his standard. The grant of Jagraon and Naraingarh in return for a *nazrana* to Fattah Singh was made similarly.

41. 96/147. Wade to Colebrooke, November 23, 1828. P. G. R.

Fatteh Singh, the Government had not considered it necessary to interfere with the Maharaja's action in directing him to desist from proceeding against Bhirog⁴².

But the correspondence between Fatteh Singh and Ochterlony from 1809 to 1813, positively averred that both of them had considered the former's cis-Sutlej possessions to be under the British protection⁴³. Moreover, in 1826, Metcalfe had assured the Ahluwalia chief of the protective guarantee⁴⁴. The mere declaration of the Chief himself at that time was regarded insufficient to release him from his allegiance to the English⁴⁵. But according to the distinction laid down by Metcalfe in his dispatch of January 14, 1826 (cited above), the districts of Jagraon and Naraingarh were declared to be amenable to the Lahore supremacy⁴⁶. Considering that the Sardar still held a high place in the service and confidence of the Maharaja, the Governor General allowed him to serve the Lahore Government⁴⁷.

3. The Kang Possessions.

Hari Singh of Kang⁴⁸, like Fatteh Singh Ahluwalia, owned lands on both sides of the Sutlej⁴⁹. By 1824, he found his service under Ranjit Singh burdensome, and fled across the river leaving behind his trans-Sutlej possessions.⁵¹ He applied for British protection⁵².

Hari Singh's ancestors were attached to the Dalewalia Misl⁵³

42. 96/4. Wade to Clerk, January 10, 1828. P. G. R.

43. 115/34. Travelyan to Wade, March 22, 1828. P. G. R.

44. 28/60. Colebrooke to Murray, March 21, 1828. P. G. R.

45. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828. Enclosure from Stirling. P. G. R.

46. 28/60. Colebrooke to Murray, March 21, 1828. P. G. R.

47. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828.

Enclosure from Stirling, P. G. R.

48. Kang is a village in the vicinity of Lohian in the Jullundur Doab near the confluence of the Sutlej and the Beas.

49. 24/215. Elliott to Murray, November 11, 1824. P. G. R.

50. 115/29. Colebrooke to Wade, January 16, 1828. Enclosure from Swinton. P. G. R.

51. 24/215. Elliott to Murray, November 11, 1824. P. G. R.

52. 115/29. Colebrooke to Wade, January 16, 1828. Enclosure from Swinton, P. G. R.

53. Dalewalia Misl was so named after the village Dala near Sultanpur, in the Kapurthala State, not far from the junction of the Sutlej and the Beas. (Massy, *op. cit.*, pp. 323-24).


under Tara Singh Gheba who died in 1807⁵⁴. The Kang Sardars were the dependants and *jayirdars* of, and belonged to the same tribe as Tara Singh⁵⁵. Dharam Singh, the uncle, and Bir Singh, the brother, of Hari Singh had interviewed Ranjit Singh at Sialkot in 1807-08, and agreed to serve him with a contingent of 100 horses and a tribute of Rs. 1,000 annually⁵⁶.

Hari Singh argued that his territories were acquired by his ancestors by sword and that they "are the gifts of God (*Dad Wali*), and that I am not dependent for them on any other except the British Government."⁵⁷ But his Diwan admitted that "his master agreed to maintain 50 horses and held the lands of Kang on feudal tenure" from the Maharaja⁵⁸. The latter was in no mood to yield over the matter, and promptly reported to the Governor General not to extend protection to Hari Singh, his refractory *jagirdar*.

Murray, who had been asked to make inquiries into the matter,⁵⁹ held that Hari Singh made a spontaneous relinquishment of his ancestral possessions on the north of the Sutlej, because the Maharaja had sent troops to occupy his villages, and had secured the ferries on the river, and had held out a threat of ejecting him from his remaining lands. As a result, the Sardar had resolved to forego all his claims in Ranjit's dominion, and to seek ease and retirement in his remaining post of

54. 74/150. Murray to Colebrooke, September 15, 1827. P. G. R.

55. Hari Singh was related to Tara Singh Gheba according to this genealogical table :—



(Massy, *op. cit.*, p. 306).

56. 74/150. Murray to Colebrooke, September 15, 1827. P. G. R.

Encl. *arzi* of Kishan Chand, Ranjit's agent.

57. *Ibid.* Encl. answer of Hari Singh to the statement of Kishan Chand.

58. *Ibid.*

59. 24/124. Elliott to Murray, November 11, 1824. P. G. R.

Fattehgarh under the protection of the British⁶⁰. Murray observed that Ranjit Singh could usurp the Sardar's estates on the north of the Sutlej, but to permit him the same privilege in regard to the Fattehgarh domain would be to encourage him to build influence and ascendancy with the Protected chiefs⁶¹. Murray's contention, in short, was that Hari Singh was a dependant of Ranjit Singh for his lands on the right bank of the Sutlej, and a Protected chieftain under the British for his territory on the left bank. He recommended that the Sardar be taken completely under British protection⁶².

Meanwhile, a *parwana* from Ranjit Singh regarding this case had reached Wade, intimating that he had no intention of treating Hari Singh with any severity, but that he certainly expected that the Sardar should discharge his obligations towards him⁶³. Wade took up cudgels on the Maharaja's behalf, and secured the Government's decision in Ranjit Singh's favour. The Government observed that "the simple fact of Hari Singh having served the Ruler of Lahore and acted as his avowed vassal and dependant for a long course of years,..... whilst up to 1824, when he found that service had become burdensome, he never held communication with the British authorities nor performed any act indicating acknowledgment of the Company's sovereignty or a wish to benefit by its protection and discharge the duties of allegiance, must deprive him of any claim to consideration personally, and the Governor General further does not discern in the statements which he has advanced any evidence so clear and decisive as would justify our asserting at this late time of day a title to supremacy over his possessions, which we have allowed to be dormant for so many years, in opposition to the case on Ranjit Singh's side."⁶⁴ After the final decision, the charge of Hari Singh's possessions was given to Wade⁶⁵.

Hari Singh died on March 26, 1828⁶⁶, leaving behind two widows who were residing at Ambala. The Maharaja occupied the entire territory of the deceased to the south of the Sutlej⁶⁷, without having recourse to

60. 72/219. Murray to Elliott, November 19, 1824. P. G. R.

61. 72/294. Murray to Elliott, February 9, 1825. P. G. R.

62. 72/219. Murray to Elliott, November 19, 1824. P. G. R.

63. 93/3. Wade to Colebrooke, January 5, 1828. P. G. R.

64. 115/29. Colebrooke to Wade, January 16, 1828. P. G. R.

65. 115/50. Colebrooke to Wade, January 22, 1828. P. G. R.

66. 75/31. Murray to Colebrooke, March 7, 1828. P. G. R.

67. 75/104. Murray to Colebrooke, June 2, 1828. P. G. R.

force or sending his troops across the river⁶⁸. He offered a provision in favour of the two widows of Rs. 5,000 a year, including the patrimonial village of Kang, or a *jagir* on military tenure, provided the ladies agreed to reside at Amritsar within his territories⁶⁹. The ladies' agents solicited British interference, but were told that they should not expect any interposition in their favour from the Government in regard to the terms on which Ranjit Singh offered them a provision⁷⁰. Thus Ranjit Singh was left the liberty of disposing of the estate as he liked⁷¹. Later, the ladies realising their helplessness came to terms with the Punjab Ruler by accepting an annual provision of Rs. 4,900, and agreeing to reside in their patrimonial village⁷².

4. Kutub-ud Din Khan of Kasur.

Kutub-ud Din Khan held lands from the Maharaja on both sides of the Sutlej in virtue of which he served him until 1826. Ranjit Singh had acquired the feudal services of the Khan by right of conquest, prior to the Treaty of Amritsar of 1809. The dispute of the Chief of Kang led the Khan to approach the British for protection. In 1825, Ranjit Singh had conferred Mumdot and Ramunuwala on the Khan on the left bank as a reward for his military services. He now made an appeal through Wade to the faith and justice of the British to recognise and enforce the Khan's submission to his authority⁷³.

Murray held that these districts on the south of the river were not under the protection of the Maharaja, and it was by a forgery that these had been conferred on the Khan⁷⁴. The Government upheld Wade and rejected Murray's suspicions. It definitely decided not to extend protection to the Khan because during the whole period of the British

68. 96/68. Wade to Colebrooke, June 3, 1828. P. G. R.

69. 96/93. Wade to Colebrooke, July 15, 1828. P. G. R.

70. 28/174. Colebrooke to Murray, July 21, 1828. P. G. R.

71. 115/30. Colebrooke to Wade, January 22, 1828. P. G. R.

72. 96/116. Wade to Colebrooke, August 14, 1828. P. G. R.

73. 95/44. Wade to Metcalfe, November 29, 1826. P. G. R.

74. 73/207. Murray to Metcalfe, October 18, 1826. P. G. R. Also

73/235. Murray to Metcalfe, November 25, 1826. P. G. R.

connection with the Sikhs, the Khan had been the avowed follower and acknowledged subject of the Ruler of Lahore. At the time of Metcalfe's mission to Lahore, the Khan was present with the army of Ranjit Singh. It could not be supposed that he became independent merely because he wished to transfer his allegiance to another power⁷⁵.

5. Sialba.

The Sialba territory, situated south of the Sutlej, was acquired in 1763, on the defeat of Zain Khan,⁷⁶ by Hari Singh (father of Dewa Singh) who retained it in his own right, free of all service, tribute etc., to the State of Lahore. The family possessions to the north of the river were held by him at the will of Ranjit Singh, those to the south under the British protection⁷⁷.

Dewa Singh was no doubt an officer in personal attendance in the Maharaja's service and high in his confidence⁷⁸, but in 1825, he had been imprisoned by his master who placed his own garrison in the Sardar's stronghold, Bagwain, in the trans-Sutlej area⁷⁹.

Wade held that the proprietor of Sialba was a *jagirdar* of the Maharaja, and considered himself his vassal, and as such the Maharaja's claim over Sialba must be upheld. But the correspondence between Ochterlony and Dewa Singh during 1809⁸⁰, definitely induced the Government to consider the latter under its protective guarantee. Therefore, the Maharaja's claim over Sialba was rejected by the Government on November 14, 1828⁸¹.

75. 26/265. Metcalfe to Murray, December 10, 1828. P. G. R.

76. Zain Khan was the Afghan Governor of Sirhind. About the end of 1762, the Sikhs had some designs of overpowering him, but were prevented from doing so by the invasion of Ahmad Shah. Later, they marched towards Sirhind, and the Court of Delhi was incapable of raising an army in support of its dependant. Zain Khan gave battle to the Sikhs in December, 1763, but was defeated and slain, and the plains of Sirhind, from the Sutlej to Jumna, passed into the hands of the victors. (Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-02).

77. 75/17. Murray to Colebrooke, February 19, 1828. P. G. R.

78. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828.

Enclosure from Stirling. P. G. R.

79. 72/355. Murray to Elliott, May 17, 1825. P. G. R.

80. 75/17. Murray to Colebrooke, February 19, 1828. P. G. R.

81. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828. Enclosure from Stirling. P. G. R.

6. Machiwara.

Sodhi Karam Singh acquired Machiwara from Tara Singh Gheba in 1772. He improved the place at much personal expense. In 1797, he died leaving behind three sons, Kharak Singh, Churru Singh and Puhar Singh. The present owner was Faujdar Singh, son of Kharak Singh⁸².

Murray maintained that these Sodhis had never performed any service for the Ruler of Lahore, and that the latter had not even the slightest concern in their affairs⁸³. On the contrary, the Maharaja pleaded that Faujdar Singh had served him⁸⁴. The Government expediently decided to transfer his allegiance to Ranjit Singh⁸⁵.

7. Anandpur.

In 1807, this place was under the supermacy of the Hindur and Singhpurian chiefs. But in the town the authority of the Sodhis was established. When Diwan Mohkam Chand took Hethawat in 1807-08, he did not interfere with the established rights of the Sodhis⁸⁶.

Murray argued that the Sodhis had had their agent at Ambala since 1809, and that all their concerns had been transacted through his office⁸⁷. Wade, on the other hand, maintained that they considered themselves under the temporal authority of the Maharaja, that a *vakil* had attended not long before at Ambala, but was recalled by them on the representation of the Lahore Ruler, and that their affairs were always transacted through the agency of the Maharaja's *Vakil*⁸⁸. Govind Jas, the Lahore agent, stated in his *arzi* that "this place was in my master's possession before the time of Metcalfe's mission and long before that a *thana* of my master's troops was stationed there, and that the entire collection of revenue and the administration of justice were carried on in his name."⁸⁹

82. 75/17. Murray to Colebrooke, February 19, 1828. P. G. R. P.G.R.

83. *Ibid.*

84. 28/140. Birch to Stirling, June 17, 1828. Encl. *Arzi* of Govind Jas. P.G.R.

85. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828. Encl. from Stirling. P.G.R.,

86. 75/17. Murray to Colebrooke, February 19, 1828. P. G. R.

87. *Ibid.*

88. 96/4. Wade to Clerk, January 10, 1828. P. G. R.

89. 28/140. Birch to Stirling, June 17, 1828. Encl. *Arzi* of Govind Jas. P. G. R.

The Governor General, after a full consideration of all the facts, decided that "the claims of the Ruler of Lahore to the Districts of Machiwara, Mokhowal and Anandpur may be expediently admitted without any further discussion, since our right in them, whatever it may amount to, does not appear to be worth maintaining, and adverting to the caste and character of their inhabitants, they will doubtless be best managed under the sovereignty of a chief of their own religious persuasion"⁹⁰

8. Ferozepur⁹¹.

The dispute over Ferozepur was not between a cis-Sutlej chief and Ranjit Singh, but strictly between the latter and the British Government which was anxious to take over the place at all costs.

This dispute presents one of those matters in which British Government's selfishness, in its relations with Ranjit Singh, superseded all other considerations. It also illustrates the Sikh Ruler's character; he gauged the extent to which the British would yield to his self-seeking demands, and when his hypocritical claims did not meet the arguments and determination of the Government he resorted to the artful method of preserving friendship by himself yielding.

90. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828. Encl. from Stirling. P.G.R.

91. *Early History of Ferozepur:*

In 1771, Gurbukhsh Singh, who had his territories to the north of the Sutlej, acquired Ferozepur. He had four sons, Dina Singh, Dhanna Singh, Gurmukh Singh and Jai Singh. About 1792, the old Sardar divided his possessions among his sons. Dhanna Singh received as his share the fort and territory of Ferozepur. Soon after his accession, Nazam-ud-Din Khan, the Pathan chief of Kasur, invaded the country, and got a half share of the seven villages comprising the Ferozepur domain. Ranjit Singh acquired Kasur in 1807, and assigned it as a *jagir* to his favourite and co-adjutor, Sardar Nihal Singh Atariwala, who soon dispossessed Gurbukhsh Singh and his three sons of their trans-Sutlej possessions in the neighbourhood of Kasur. He was invited by the Dogras of the Ferozepur territory to dislodge Dhanna Singh from his fort, but he failed to conquer it. In 1808, Nihal Singh again crossed the Sutlej with Ranjit Singh. Occupying Dulchi on the north, Bareki on the west and Khai on the south-west, he hemmed in the Ferozepurains and shared the produce of their lands equally with Dhanna Singh. In 1809, British protection was extended to this place. In 1818, Dhanna Singh died, and was succeeded by his widow, Lachhman Kaur, the daughter of Rai Singh of Buria and Jagadhri—Punjab District Gazetteers, Ferozpur District, pp. 25-28.

The growing needs of the British to have places of strategic importance for the defence of their ever expanding empire, and their desire to hem in the territory of the Maharaja by erecting a fence of posts all along the Sutlej frontier, made them look at Ferozepur covetously. Murray had reported to the Government of the military and political superiority of Ferozepur over the post of Ludhiana⁹². The latter place was distant from Lahore and was useless as a post of check or observation in time of peace or as a depot in time of war⁹³. On the other hand, Ferozepur, situated close to the boundary line of Bahawalpur, could ensure the Government an effective control over the Protected chiefs and the Nawab of Bahawalpur, and also, its occupation would enable the English to keep a vigilant watch on the Maharaja's movements towards Sind. Moreover, it had an effective appeal for commerce, being situated in such a position as to command the passage to the great ferry station of Hari-ke-pattan⁹⁴.

Accordingly, the Government instructed Wade in unqualified terms that Ranjit Singh should not be permitted to obtain possession of Ferozepur⁹⁵. Wade reported that the place had been subject to the Maharaja's control until 1823,⁹⁶ and that he claimed it because his dependants, the Kasurians, held the town conjointly with the Ferozepurians⁹⁷.

Sardarni Lachhman Kaur, in the meantime, sent a petition to Captain Ross of her claims over Ferozepur. The particulars were communicated by Murray to Ranjit Singh, and the latter restored her to her rights⁹⁸. Henceforward, Lachhman Kaur occasionally invoked the British help to control the turbulent elements in her territory. She expressed a strong desire to exchange Ferozepur for a portion of Bilaspur State under the British, which would on her demise become an escheat to the British Government⁹⁹. Murray was all for the acceptance of this arrangement, for he feared that the Sardarni, to relieve herself of the expense and worry to maintain a strong post, might cede it to Ranjit¹⁰⁰. The Government did not, however, accept the

92. See Appendix III. (Murray on the importance of Ferozepur).

93. 71/231. Murray to Elliott, December 12, 1823. P. G. R.

94. *Ibid.*

95. 115/33. Colebrooke to Wade, March 18, 1828. P. G. R.

96. 96/4. Wade to Clerk, January 10, 1828. P. G. R.

97. 103/49. Wade to Mackeson, November 17, 1836. P.G.R.

98. 75/7. Murray to Wade, January 30, 1828. P. G. R.

99. 75/66. Murray to Colebrooke, April 21, 1828. P. G. R.

100. 71/231. Murray to Elliott, December 12, 1823. P. G. R.

Sardarni's offer, as "the measure would doubtless excite alarm and suspicion in the mind of the Maharaja and perhaps not unnaturally be objected to by him as ~~an~~ encroachment on our part", but, at the same time, to exclude the Maharaja's right the Government declared that it had the best title to the sovereignty of the Ferozepur domain¹⁰¹. The plain fact of the matter was that the British were in no hurry to take possession of the town, as they did not expect trouble while Ranjit lived, and knew that Lachhman Kaur was without an heir, which would mean the automatic lapse of the place to them after her demise. The Sardarni continued to remain under the British protection.

With the exception of some occasional boundary disputes between Ferozepur and Kot Kapura (Ranjit's possession) the question of the Maharaja's claim over Ferozepur was not again brought up till 1835, when Lachhman Kaur died¹⁰². The territory lapsed to the Government and Wade took possession of the estate¹⁰³. Mackeson, a British official, had been deputed to the Lahore Court to notify the object of Wade's arrival at Ferozepur¹⁰⁴. Ranjit Singh endeavoured to impress upon this officer his feeling that the occupation by the British of so near a place to his capital was unpalatable to him¹⁰⁵. Faqir Aziz-ud-Din put forward two propositions: (i) that the fort and town of Ferozepur be levelled to the ground, and then the claims to the possession of the territory be taken into consideration; (Mackeson did not pay any serious attention to this proposition; as he thought it was more likely the result of the Faqir's art of finesse than to have emanated from the Maharaja himself) or (ii) that the British Government should accept in exchange for Ferozepur the territory of equal value elsewhere¹⁰⁶. Mackeson, however, evaded the proposition, and told the Maharaja positively that there was no utility in the latter's reviving his claim¹⁰⁷.

101. 28/326. Colbrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828. P. G. R.

102. 81/109. Clerk to Metcalfe, October 4, 1835. P. G. R.

103. 106/65. Mackeson to Wade. January 11, 1836. P. G. R.

The letter of Captain Wade simply informed the Maharaja that "I have in obedience to the orders of my Government arrived in Ferozepur for the purpose of taking possession of the estate of late Sardarni Lachhman Kaur, who was one of its dependants."

104. 106/66. Mackeson to Wade, January 15, 1836. P. G. R.

105. 142/27. Wade to Macnaghten, April 23, 1836. P. G. R.

106. 106/66. Mackeson to Wade, January 15, 1836. P. G. R.

107. *Ibid.*

The Maharaja had not so far given up the idea of urging his claim to supremacy over the place altogether, but now his hopes grew fainter, and when invited by Wade to settle the [dispute 'in accordance with amicable relations', he did not talk about his claim¹⁰⁸. The Governor General was glad that Ranjit Singh had relinquished a claim "so destitute of foundation"¹⁰⁹. But the Maharaja to whom the British intentions were perceptible would not allow them to swallow the place without making it stick in their throats. He reiterated his right and claimed Ferozepur by virtue of his success over the Kasurians (1807) who had held the town conjointly with the Ferozepurians. He also demanded it by right of conquest¹¹⁰.

Wade charged Mackeson with the duty of examining the Lahore Government's claims on Ferozepur¹¹¹. But the examination of these claims was futile, for the Government had a preconceived plan up their sleeves¹¹², and had no intention of relinquishing the town at any cost. It remained with the British. In 1838, the importance of the place was further augmented by its conversion into a military cantonment.

With the loss of Ferozepur it appeared as if a pistol had been pointed at the temple of Ranjit Singh¹¹³. He, however, swallowed this loss in a spirit of helplessness.

9. Minor Territorial Disputes.

The other cases of dispute were Rajwana, Tughal, Kulal Majra, Kot Guru Harsahai, Amrala, Chamkour and Mottewala. These cases possessed little value. As the point of lawful right in each case was more or less doubtful, the Governor General admitted the Maharaja's supremacy over these places observing that "we shall do best to desist from contesting with Ranjit Singh the question of supremacy in these several estates and villages."¹¹⁴

108. 142/27. Wade to Macnaghten, April 23, 1836. P. G. R.

109. 118/78. Macnaghten to Wade, May 23, 1836. P. G. R.

110. 103/49. Wade to Mackeson, November 17, 1836. P. G. R.

111. *Ibid.* and 107/37. Mackeson to Clerk, November 28, 1836. P. G. R.

112. 108/78-A. Mackeson to Wade, January 26, 1837. P. G. R.

113. That the loss of Ferozepur was regarded by Ranjit Singh as weakening his political influence with the neighbouring Princes is evident from the fact that as a countermove he attempted to establish a cantonment at Kasur in 1836.

114. 28/326. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1838. P.G.R.

In the end, it may be remarked that in all these cases Ranjit Singh acted by demanding something more than what rightly belonged to him, and when he got all that he really deserved, or a bit more, he rejoiced in the decision of the British Government. The British, on their part, exulted over the fact that all the intricate problems were amicably settled to the satisfaction of the Maharaja with whom they could not brook any hostility over such small matters in those critical years¹¹⁵.



115. In 1828, following a defeat, sealed by the Treaty of Turkomanchai, Persia passed into the sphere of Russian control. Thenceforth, her policy under Russian influence developed a new and sharp point aimed potentially at British India. The British could ill-afford at that time to antagonize Ranjit Singh. Vide Chapter XI, *infra*.

CHAPTER IV

FATEHGARH AND TALWANDI

The amicable settlement of Ranjit Singh's claims to places in the cis-Sutlej zone—Wadni, the Kang and Ahluwalia possessions and Ferozepur—removed, at least for some time, all causes of friction between the Governments of Lahore and Calcutta. But new circumstances arose soon afterwards, and led to the abandonment of the English attitude of non-intervention. This is exemplified through their interference in the two important cases of Fatehgarh and Talwandi*.

Fatehgarh.

It was a mere *Garhi* (mud fortress) about 25 paces square with a few huts attached to it, constituting a part of the town of Anandpur¹ which was occupied by several Sodhis and some religious recluses, as it was held holy by the Sikhs. They exercised authority over their own immediate dependants, and the general administration was vested in a *thanedar* stationed there for the last 23 years by the Lahore Government.²

*. The cases in themselves were not so intricate, rather the complications were spun and woven round them by Wade and Murray.

1. 97/149. Wade to Fraser, September 19, 1829. P. G. R.

It is interesting to note that Anandpur was composed of various divisions or *mohallas* such as Fatehgarh, and in each of these principal divisions, there were sub-divisions of property belonging either to the feudatories of the British Government or those of Lahore. There were altogether 28 estates in this town.

(97/224. Wade to Hawkins, December 19, 1829. P. G. R.)

2. 29/224. Hawkins to Murray, September 25, 1829. P. G. R. And

97/149. Wade to Fraser, September 19, 1829. P. G. R.

On August 30, 1829, Murray informed Fraser, the Resident at Delhi, that the fort and village of Fattengarh had been forcibly occupied by the Lahore troops under the command of Chait Singh, who was accompanied by Jai Karan, a *chaprassi* from the Ludhiana Agency³. He requested that the place and property be restored to the Singhpurians⁴ to whom those, in fact, legally belonged. He also stated that great excitement and alarm were created in the minds of all the neighbouring chiefs, whom he succeeded in preventing from attacking the Lahore detachment and retainers in their position at Kiratpur⁵. At the same time, he complained against Wade for having countenanced the proceedings of the Lahore Court⁶, and blamed him for having "entailed upon himself a very heavy responsibility by ejecting the troops of the Chief under the protection and guarantee of his own Government from an ancestral possession and delivering it over, without enquiry, to a foreign state to be destroyed"⁷.

3. 76/6. Murray to Fraser, August 30, 1829. P.G.R.

4. The founder of the Singhpurian family was one Kapura Singh, a Jat of the village of Fyzulpur (afterwards called Singhpur) situated in the Jullundur Doab. He was succeeded by his son, Khushal Singh, who acquired the districts of Jullundur and Amarkot and a considerable territory in the neighbourhood of Rupar and Anandpur Makhwal. In 1795, he was succeeded by his son, Budh Singh, who built the fort of Fattengarh in 1800 for the collection of rent from the neighbouring estates. Continually harassed by the searing ambition of Ranjit Singh, his pride and honour rebelled, and relinquishing all his territory in the Jullundur Doab, Budh Singh retired to the south of the Sutlej to invoke British protection. Ochterlony favourably responded to his petition, and by the order of the Government of July 11, 1810, he was vouchsafed British protection. But he could not be spared from the terror of Ranjit Singh who successfully invaded his territory in 1815, and broken-hearted Budh Singh breathed his last on September 15, 1815. In the following year, his estate was divided by Murray among his sons, the deed of distribution was duly ratified by Ochterlony in 1817. — 76/105. Murray to Hawkins, November 2, 1829. P. G. R. Also 76/249. Murray to Hawkins, May 19, 1830. P.G.R.

5. 76/6. Murray to Fraser, August 30, 1829. P.G.R.

6. *Ibid.*

7. 76/58. Murray to Hawkins, October 2, 1829. P.G.R.

Wade, who was prepared to face allegations and distortion of facts by Murray, lost no time in refuting them by maintaining that the Maharaja was compelled to launch this punitive expedition, because the persons who occupied this *Garhi* on the part of the Singpurians, had for a long time evinced a spirit of contumacy and defiance to the orders of the *Thanedar* by openly playing sympathetic hosts to thieves and offenders.⁸ Wade further contended that the order of the Government of November 14, 1828, had placed Anandpur under the supremacy of the Lahore Government⁹, and as Fattengarh formed a part of Anandpur Makhwal, Ranjit Singh could deal with it as he pleased¹⁰. Wade denied categorically that his *chaprassi* accompanied the attacking party to Fatehgarh with his authority.¹¹

Murray promptly rebutted Wade's contentions. In respect of the contiguity of Fattengarh to Anandpur, he asserted that Fattengarh was distinct from the town of Anandpur and had never been, in any way, dependent upon it or subject to the authority of the rulers

8. 97/149. Wade to Fraser, September 19, 1829, P. G. R.

Wade wrote : " It is a hard case that the peace and security of a large town should be continually disturbed, the authority of the Maharaja thwarted, because a few people inimical to him, encouraged in their hostility by the Singhpurians, happen to occupy a corner of the place."

9. 28/328. Colebrooke to Murray, December 19, 1828. P. G. R.

10. 97/149. Wade to Fraser, September 19, 1829. P. G. R.

Wade wrote: "While any doubt existed whether Anandpur belonged to Lahore or the Protected states, the officers of Ranjit Singh were afraid of taking any decisive measure to coerce the occupants of the *Garhi*, but when the Supreme authority in it was confirmed on the Maharaja, his officers, responsible for the peace of the place, felt entitled to exercise the same powers of jurisdiction in it as in any other town which acknowledged their master's supremacy."

11. 29/224. Hawkins to Murray, September 26, 1829. Encl. from Wade. P.G.R. Wade had deputed his *chaprassi*, Jai Karam, to Anandpur on January 11, 1829. On May 16, he was requested by Murray to depute a *chaprassi* to help the Ambala *chaprassi* in measuring the depth of a channel of the Sutlej. Jai Karam was ordered to execute this duty. This explains the presence of Wade's *chaprassi* in Fattengarh. Wade declared that " if he accompanied the party which took possession of the *Garhi*, I am conscientiously able to declare that he did so without any authority from me".

of that town, being under its own Chief and *thanedar*¹². He further contended that the possession of Fattehgarh for the previous fifty years by the Singhpurian Chiefs and the confirmation of it to them by Ochterlony in 1817,¹³ combined with the fact that the State of Lahore had never advanced any claim to it, appeared to him to be clear and unequivocal proofs of the undisputed right of Singhpurian Sardars.¹⁴

Wade, however, could not be reconciled to the line of argument preferred by Murray.¹⁵ He observed that whosoever possessed the sovereignty in Anandpur, to him belonged the right of jurisdiction over every place contained in it,¹⁶ and that when Ranjit Singh was required to give a list of the cis-Sutlej places which he claimed, he did not specify Fattehgarh, naturally thinking that the term Anandpur would comprehend every place within the precinct of that town.¹⁷ Great weightage was attached by Murray to the deed of distribution effected by him in 1816, and signed by Ochterlony in 1817. These signatures to a deed of distribution,

12. 76/103. Murray to Hawkins, November 1, 1829. P. G. R.

13. On the death of Budh Singh in 1815, his sons applied to Murray for the distribution among them of their father's property. Murray decided, in consultation with Ochterlony, to distribute it according to the principle of 'Chundabund'. The matter was, however, referred to the Patiala Minister for decision. His decision was finally ratified by Ochterlony in 1817. Murray considered that it was not a common deed of distribution, but a regular confirmation of Budh Singh's sons in British protection. Fattehgarh was included in the inventory of the property then divided—76/105. Murray to Hawkins, November 2, 1829. P. G. R.

14. 76/75. Murray to Hawkins, October 10, 1829. P. G. R.

15. 97/230. Wade to Hawkins, December 29, 1829. P. G. R.


16. 97/180. Wade to Hawkins, October 14, 1829. P. G. R.

Wade wrote: "Government will find that Fattehgarh's exclusion from the jurisdiction of sovereign of Lahore cannot be maintained without directly departing from its own orders regarding the cession of that district to the Maharaja and rendering them nugatory".

(97/224. Wade to Hawkins, December 7, 1829. P. G. R.)

17. 97/230. Wade to Hawkins, December 29, 1829. P. G. R.

Lt. NICHOLL'S MAP OF FATEHGARH



Wade considered, nothing more than a simple act of attestation which could not confirm the sovereignty of Fattehgarh to the Singhpurians.¹⁸

The question at issue was whether Fattehgarh was a distinct fort and village, as stated by Murray,¹⁹ or it was included within the natural limits of Anandpur, as represented by Wade.²⁰ The latter suggested to the Government to depute an officer of the topographical survey for the *eclaircissement* of Fattehgarh.²¹ Thereupon, ordered by the Government to ascertain the exact position of Fattehgarh in relation to Anandpur, Wade with Dr. Murray²² and Lt. Nicholl of the Horse Artillery visited the spot,²³ and prepared the sketch map (reproduced here), which showed beyond doubt that Fattehgarh was a component part of the town of Anandpur.²⁴



91/196-A. Wade to Hawkins, October 25, 1829. P. G. R.

Wade held that "Fattehgarh has never been confirmed to the Singhpurian chiefs 'by the local British authorities in 1817,' as assumed by Captain Murray.....for if the mere signature of Sir David Ochterlony to the deed of distribution was to be considered a confirmation of the sovereignty of Fattehgarh to the Singhpurians, in like manner might a claim be started by Captain Murray to the supremacy of the two villages specified in the 'taqsimnamah' and situated across the Sutlej..... an act to which no British authority could give his confirmation without an infraction of the Treaty between the two States."

19. 76/103. Murray to Hawkins, November 1, 1829. P. G. R.

20. 97/180. Wade to Hawkins, October 14, 1829. P. G. R.

21. 97/185. Wade to Hawkins, October 17, 1829. P. G. R.

22. A Surgeon in the British Indian Army, about the end of 1826, was sent to attend Ranjit Singh, who was laid with sickness and had sought the aid of European skill—Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 186.

23. 97/230. Wade to Hawkins, December 29, 1829. P. G. R.

24. 115/65. Hawkins to Wade, January 5, 1830. P. G. R.

Hawkins wrote, "The sketch appears to furnish the conclusive evidence that the fort of Fattehgarh must be considered as forming part of the town and subject to the jurisdiction of the power which exercises the supreme authority therein." —30/22. Hawkins to Murray, February 18, 1830. P. G. R.

The British Government gave its verdict that the Singhpurian chiefs were Sodhis, and held their possessions within the limits of Anandpur on the same tenure and footing as other Sardars of the same class²⁵, and that "the fort was fairly liable to be preserved or demolished at the pleasure of Ranjit Singh."²⁶

A sense of defeatism overpowered Murray at this settlement, but he made a further inquiry into the matter, and despatched to Delhi a long report on the Singhpurians, and the tenure under which they held their lands. He pointed out that they were of Jat extraction, and were in no manner connected with the Sodhis, who were Khattris and the priests of the former.²⁷ Therefore, he argued that the Ruler of Lahore could not claim supremacy over them even under the order of the Government of November 14, 1828.²⁸ The Governor General accepted his new plea, because the assumption upon which the merit of the Fattehgarh case was in part founded had fallen to the ground.²⁹

The Government was disgusted with the manner in which facts had been differently represented by their functionaries, but finally resolved not to disturb the arrangement by which Fattehgarh had been admitted to be under the jurisdiction of Ranjit Singh,³⁰ because by overhaste Wade had already communicated the former orders of the Government to the Maharaja.³¹ But it regretted that Murray did not bring these facts to light before the relinquishment of the English claims to supremacy over the place. Wade was censured for his ignorance of the fact that the Singhpurians were not Sodhis.³² He tried to

25. 30/22. Hawkins to Murray, February 18, 1830. P. G. R.

26. 30/6. Hawkins to Murray, January 15, 1830. P. G. R. Encl. from Stirling.

27. 76/190. Murray to Hawkins, February 21, 1830. P. G. R.

28. 115/68. Hawkins to Wade, April 27, 1830. P. G. R.

29. *Ibid.*, Encl. from Stirling.

30. 30/80. Hawkins to Murray, October 5, 1830. Encl. from Swinton. P. G. R.

31. 30/38. Hawkins to Murray, April 26, 1830. Encl. from Stirling. P. G. R.

32. *Ibid.*

clarify his position by submitting that the Singhpurians being Khattris or Jats was of little consequence so long as Fattahgarh formed a part of Anandpur.³³

Murray all the time felt that grave injustice had been done to the Singhpurians. The Governor General had proposed, in one of his minutes, to bring about an exchange or conciliation between the two parties.³⁴ Murray made use of this proposal, and suggested that a compromise might be effected by conferring the district of Bulolpur³⁵ on the Singhpurians for their loss in this case. But the Governor General refused to resort to this exchange, for it would set a precedent for Ranjit Singh's further moves to concentrate his authority in one place instead of having disjointed possessions in the cis-Sutlej area.³⁶

The Maharaja, on his part, was ready to reinstate the Singhpurians in their rights and privileges in that place provided they submitted to his local authority, and conducted themselves as other inhabitants of Anandpur.³⁷

33. 98/99. Wade to Hawkins, June 23, 1830. P.G.R.

Wade wrote: "When I consider, however, the altered view which is taken in Deputy Secretary's letter of the 3rd of April in reference to the case of Fattahgarh, the reason which is assigned for that alteration and the blame which is consequently attached to my proceedings, it appears to me to be very expedient that I should submit some observations on the subject to satisfy His Lordship in Council that the circumstance of the Singhpurians not being Sodhis does not alter the original feature of the case, nor lessen, according to the system of policy pursued by the British Government and acknowledged by the Law of Nations, the liability of those people to the jurisdiction of the State in which the sovereignty of Anandpur happens to be vested for the property which they possess within that town."

34. 30/36. Hawkins to Murray, April 26, 1830. Encl. from Stirling.

35. Bulolpur was one of the southern districts held by Lahore, and a little distant from the main territory of the Singhpurian Chiefs.
(76/247. Murray to Hawkins, May 19, 1830. P. G. R.)

36. The policy of exchange might have led Ranjit Singh, as suggested to him by his diplomatic minister, Faqir Aziz-ud Din, to give Lachman Kaur some other cis-Sutlej territory in exchange for her right in Ferozepur, a place so much coveted by the English.

106/66. Mackeson to Wade, January 15, 1836. P. G. R.

37. 98/99 Wade to Hawkins, June 23, 1830. P. G. R.

The position of the Protected chiefs *vis a vis* Anandpur was clarified by the orders of the Government which said that "Fattehgarh is actually within the town of Anandpur Makhowal while the domains held by the hill Raja of Bilaspur, the Sikh chief of Sialbah and the widow of Sobah Singh Nihang, are described to be in the vicinity thereof, and hence there was no room for any such predicament to occur in their cases."³⁸

Murray, who had striven to disturb Ranjit Singh in the possessions admitted to belong to him,³⁹ could not, for the time being, acquiesce in the judgment of the Government, for he felt it unjust to the Singhpurians.⁴⁰ The Government, however, in spite of his elaborate arguments remained adamant.

Talwandi.

While the Fattehgarrh case was still being considered by the Governor General, another dispute, that of Talwandi, arose to provide fresh fuel to Captains Murray and Wade to exhibit their mutual antagonism.

The fort of Talwandi was situated in the domain of the Protected states.⁴¹ It was originally held by one Mangu Khan, but was seized by Sudda Singh of Dhanaura, the Rajgarhian chief. In 1803, it was forcibly seized by the Kang chief, but

38. 30/38. Hawkins to Murray, April 26, 1830. P. G. R. Enclosure from Stirling. Also 115/68. Hawkins to Wade, April 27, 1830. P. G. R. Enclosure from Stirling.

39. 97/230. Wade to Hawkins, December 29, 1829. P. G. R.

40. It is interesting to note that after obstinately persisting in his pleadings regarding Fattehgarrh for a year and a half, Murray, in the long run, yielded to concur with Wade and the Government. He wrote: "The orders of Government under date September 16 last have set at rest the claims of Singhpurian Chiefs to the fort of Fattehgarrh. I have now seen the spot and sense of right to the State of Lahore, and justice to your self compels me to declare that Fattehgarrh is a component part of the town of Anandpur under the authority of the Ruler of the Punjab."

(115/105. Murray to Wade, January 3, 1831. P. G. R.)

41. 76/89. Murray to Hawkins, October 23, 1829. P.G.R.

after long drawn out hostilities for two years, it was recovered by Sodhis Jai Singh and Surjan Singh (who were related to the Rajgarhian family) with the help of the neighbouring Sikh Sardars, and especially of Fatteh Singh, the Ahluwalia chief.⁴² It then descended to Mai Sukhan, the widow of Sudda Singh, the last of the Rajgarhian family.⁴³ In 1808-09, British protection was extended to it by Ochterlony.⁴⁴ On the demise of Mai Sukhan in 1824, Sodhi Uttam Singh appealed to Murray for succeeding to her share. But his claims were set aside, and the place was given over to Mata Raj Kaur, the widow of Sodhi Tilok Singh, and her brothers, Didar Singh and Diwan Singh. Thus the Sodhis who held many villages of an eleemosynary tenure from the Protected states did neither hold this fort nor receive any protection from Ranjit Singh.⁴⁵

All the evils attendant upon the weak rule of a lady appeared in the Talwandi domain. Her rival claimant, Uttam Singh, with the help of Kabula Singh, the *thanedar* of Talwandi, turned the opportunity offered by the dissensions prevailing in the family to his own advantage, and seized Talwandi in July, 1828⁴⁶. At the request of Mata Raj Kaur, the British Government intervened, and restored her domain to her⁴⁷. But the troubles did not end at that, some time later Raj Kaur's officers rebelled against her and attempted a *coup d'état*⁴⁸. This time she solicited Ranjit Singh's help for the restoration of her authority in the place. The Maharaja ordered his officers in Kot Kapura to reinstate her in her rights.⁴⁹ Ranjit Singh had intervened, it appears, to make an end of the trouble, but it proved, as will be seen, a beginning of the end of Raj Kaur's independence.

42. 115/68 Hawkins to Wade, April 27, 1830. P.G.R.

43. 30/86. Hawkins to Murray, April 5, 1830. P.G.R. Enclosure from Stirling.

44. 76/89. Murray to Hawkins, October 23, 1829. P. G. R.

45. *Ibid.*

46. 115/68. Hawkins to Wade, April 27, 1830. P. G. R.

47. 97/222. Wade to Hawkins, December 5, 1829. P. G. R.

48. 97/209. Wade to Hawkins, November 23, 1829. P. G. R.

49. 97/202. Wade to Hawkins, November 3, 1829. P. G. R.

In September, 1829, Murray informed the Resident that the Lahore troops had captured the fort of Talwandi⁵⁰. Murray 'lamented', that Wade should have given the order, which the Lahore Agent stated in his representation to have been received five or six months back, for the fort to be violently taken by the Lahore troops⁵¹. Murray held that this territory was never dependent on the Lahore Darbar, that Ranjit Singh did not include it in the list of places to which he advanced claims and that "from its extent and celebrity His Highness and his advisers cannot, with any shadow of propriety, now allege that it escaped their memory."⁵² He also accused the employees of the Ludhiana Agency for having accepted bribes from the Lahore Court⁵³.

Wade admitted that the fort of Talwandi had been captured by the Lahore troops⁵⁴, but he positively denied the other charge, and challenged Murray to name any official of his office who could be proved guilty of bribery⁵⁵. He also stated that some time back the Lahore Agent presented to him a petition from Mata Raj Kaur complaining to the Maharaja that her officers in Talwandi had rebelled, and requesting him to re-establish order in her territory⁵⁶. It was clear from the petition that Raj Kaur was a subject of Ranjit Singh⁵⁷. He further stated that the Sodhis had been declared to be under Lahore supremacy by the order of the Government of November 14, 1828⁵⁸. According to "the plain sense and spirit of this order," Wade held, the sovereignty of Talwandi belonged to Lahore. and hence he did not deem it proper to interfere in the affair⁵⁹.

50. 76/40. Murray to Hawkins, September 27, 1829. P. G. R.

51. 76/89. Murray to Hawkins, October 23, 1829. P. G. R.

52. 76/111. Murray to Hawkins, November 12, 1829, P. G. R.

53. 76/40. Murray to Hawkins, September 27, 1829. P. G. R.

54. 29/255. Hawkins to Murray, October 17, 1829. P. G. R. Encl. from Wade.

55. 97/175. Wade to Hawkins, October 13, 1829. P. G. R.

56. 29/255. Hawkins to Murray, October 17, 1829. P. G. R. Encl. from Wade.

57. 97/175. Wade to Hawkins, October 13, 1829. P. G. R.

58. 97/202. Wade to Hawkins, November 3, 1829. P. G. R.

59. *Ibid.*

Murray was 'astonished' by the assertion that Raj Kaur was a Lahore subject. He contended that as Talwandi was never dependent on, and had never had the least connection with, the Lahore dominion, Raj Kaur could not be ranked among the subjects of Ranjit Singh⁶⁰. Wade, however, was firm in his assertion that supremacy over the place belonged to Ranjit Singh⁶¹.

Both Wade and Murray had been beating about the bush, and maintaining divergent views. In spite of their best efforts to place their viewpoints on reason they could involve no agreed and equitable decision on behalf of the Government. The latter had, therefore, to institute a further enquiry, under Murray, into the affair⁶², though, instead of facilitating a decision, it complicated the problem still further. Mata Raj Kaur affirmed that Talwandi was taken violently without her knowledge, while⁶³, on the other hand, the Persian documents, alleged to be those of the Mata and produced by Ranjit Singh in his defence, seemed to show that he had interfered in the matter at her own explicit request⁶⁴. Wade pleaded that the Mata was compelled to falsify her letters which she had addressed to Ranjit Singh for the restoration of her authority over Talwandi, by threats and intimidation and at the dictation of Murray⁶⁵.

60. 76/89. Murray to Hawkins, October 23, 1829. P. G. R.

61. Wade tried to show up Murray as possessing scanty information on the subject by saying : " Murray first prefers a complaint of the capture of a fort which he claims and admits to belong to the widow of Sodhi Tilok Singh, not in alms, but by inheritance. He then says, 'I am astonished to hear the widow of Tilok Singh ranked among the subjects of the Ruler of the Punjab.' It is now stated that she is alleged to be a subject of Lahore and the fort was wrested from Sodhi Uttam Singh. Mata Raja Kaur is artfully made at one time to deny her own acts and complain that the Maharaja's troops have taken her fort and when the place and property are restored to her it is asserted that the place was not wrested from her but from Sodhi Uttam Singh."—97/209. Wade to Hawkins, November 23, 1829. P.G.R.

62. 76/125. Murray to Hawkins, December 3, 1829. P. G. R.

63. 69/64. Translation of a letter received by Murray from Mata Raj Kaur on October 2, 1829. P. G. R.

64. 97/209. Wade to Hawkins, November 23, 1829. P. G. R.

65. 98/8. Wade to Hawkins, January 11, 1830. P. G. R.

While the case was still pending before the Governor General a petition was presented to Wade by Sodhis Didar Singh and Diwan Singh of Anandpur⁶⁶. It showed that other persons also were interested in the Talwandi fort besides Uttam Singh and Raj Kaur. New complications thus cropped up.

Ranjit Singh, on his part, ordered the restoration of the fort to the rightful proprietor⁶⁷.

The Government was in a fix, and as a temporary arrangement asked Murray on December 28, 1829, to depute a person to take charge of the place⁶⁸. Wade was directed to co-operate with him in the proper execution of the task, and to deliver the fort of Talwandi and any property that might have been taken from there over to Murray's Agent⁶⁹. In January, 1830, Chuhar Lal (of Lahore Government) handed over Talwandi to Ram Parshad, a *chupnassi* of the Ambala Agency⁷⁰.

Thenceforward, Wade supported the claims of Ranjit Singh, Raj Kaur, Didar Singh and Diwan Singh,⁷¹ whereas Murray pleaded for the claims of Uttam Singh⁷². Wade recommended to the Government that justice would be done to both parties, only if the case was properly investigated at the Resident's office at Delhi⁷³.

After a full consideration of all the statements submitted by Wade in support of Ranjit Singh and his dependants, and by Murray on behalf of Uttam Singh, the Governor General concurred with the view of the former, and admitted for the time being the claims

⁶⁶. 29/294. Hawkins to Murray, November 30, 1829. P. G. R. Enclosure from Wade.

⁶⁷. 29/299. Hawkins to Murray, December 4, 1829. P. G. R.

⁶⁸. *Ibid.*

⁶⁹. 29/309. Hawkins to Murray, December 28, 1829. P.G.R. Encl. from Wade.

⁷⁰. 98/8. Wade to Hawkins, January 11, 1830. P. G. R.

⁷¹. 76/125. Murray to Hawkins, December 3, 1829. P. G. R.

⁷². 76/111. Murray to Hawkins, November 12, 1829. P. G. R.

⁷³. 98/8. Wade to Hawkins, January 11, 1830. P. G. R.

of Raj Kaur, Didar Singh and Diwan Singh over Talwandi⁷⁴. But it was provided that the place would be held under British protection subject to the possibility of Ranjit Singh succeeding in proving his own supremacy over the place⁷⁵.

The Government had further enquiries made with a view to finding, if possible, whether the parties in possession of Talwandi at the time of the Treaty of 1809 were independent of Ranjit Singh or held that place under him⁷⁶. Murray opined that the Sodhis were then independent, and owed allegiance to no body⁷⁷. The Government dismissed this view as unwarranted by evidence⁷⁸. Wade contended that the fact that Ranjit Singh had assisted the Sodhis in 1803-04, lent colour to the view that he would not have done so, had he not been acknowledged as their superior, and that, therefore, the Sodhis were not independent⁷⁹. Murray refused to subscribe to the views of Wade arguing that "the succour granted on emergent occasions by friendly powers to each other cannot, on any known principle of International Law, be construed into an admission of fealty on the part of one or the other"⁸⁰. But the Government waived aside this plausible but inconclusive argument.

74. 30/38. Hawkins to Murray, April 26, 1830. P. G. R. Encl. from Stirling.

Also 115/68. Hawkins to Wade, April 27, 1830. P. G. R. Encl. from Stirling.

75. 30/38. Hawkins to Murray, April 26, 1830. P. G. R.

Hawkins wrote : "The general impression on the mind of the Governor General is by no means adverse to the validity of the Maharaja's claim."

76. 30/80. Hawkins to Murray, October 5, 1830. P. G. R.

77. 76/327. Murray to Hawkins, October 11, 1830. P. G. R.

78. 30/36. Hawkins to Murray, November 22, 1830. P. G. R.

79. *Ibid.* Encl. from Wade.

80. 76/350. Murray to Martin, December 13, 1830. P. G. R.

Murray's death in June, 1831, resulted in the slackening of interest in the controversy, and the case remained undecided by the Government for some time. In 1835, Wade brought the case into prominence again,⁸¹ and two years later, the Governor General when partitioning the Jind State finally gave his decision in favour of Ranjit Singh⁸².



81. 102/45. Wade to Clerk, July 25, 1835. P. G. R.

Wade pointed that "Government should be apprised of the expectation of parties for a decision, for while it is deferred, not only is the Maharaja kept in suspense as to the ultimate intention of Government, but the revenue of the villages which has hitherto been collected by the Sodhis is withheld from them."

82. 106/45. Clerk to Wade, August 17, 1837. P. G. R.

CHAPTER V

JIND CHIEFSHIP

The disputes now to be examined are such wherein Ranjit Singh, the British and the Raja of Jind¹ were the interested parties. These afford glimpses into the true nature and extent of British relationship with the Ruler of Lahore and the cis-Sutlej chiefs. How far the English stood by their Proclamations of 1809 and 1811 made to the Protected chiefs,² and to what extent their recently created connection with those chiefs was affected by their Treaty of friendship of 1809 with the Maharaja, will be revealed in this chapter.

The Aitiana Dispute.

Aitiana, situated 15 miles from the Ludhiana cantonment³, was one of those places over which Ranjit Singh had preferred his claims in his long list of 47 possessions of the cis-Sutlej region.⁴ It was held by one Baba Ram Singh, who was claimed by Ranjit Singh as his vassal, but the British had yet to examine this claim.⁵

Ram Singh petitioned to Wade that he had been obliged to quit his village in consequence of some violent demonstrations from

1. The Lahore and Jind families were on very good terms even before the English appeared in the Punjab. Raj Kaur, Ranjit Singh's mother, was a daughter of Gajpat Singh, the founder of the Jind family. In his early years, Ranjit Singh often bestowed on his maternal uncle, Bhag Singh of Jind, many *jagirs* as a mark of appreciation for his willing help and co-operation during his cis-Sutlej expeditions. Later, Raja Sangat Singh (grand son of Bhag Singh) paid a number of visits to Ranjit Singh who seems to have taken a liking for him and bestowed on him many presents and *jagirs*.—Griffin, *The Rajas of the Panjab*, pp. 322 sqq.

2. Vide pp 9-11, *supra*.

3. 96/66. Wade to Colebrooke, May 31, 1828. P.G.R.

4. Vide Appendix I,

5. 96/84. Wade to Colebrooke, May 25, 1828. P.G.R.

Raja Sangat Singh's subjects.⁶ Wade learnt the very next day that Sangat Singh's men had actually seized the place on the plea of a grant from Ranjit Singh.⁷ He informed the Resident about this incident, expressing his own inability to check the unlawful aggression because no *vakil* from Jind was in attendance at Ludhiana.⁸ At the same time, he urged Murray to impress upon the Jind Chief that if he or his people had any cause of dispute with Ram Singh, they should refer their complaint through the constituted authority rather than create trouble by occasional aggressions, whether justifiable or otherwise.⁹

Murray, on his part, denied to Ranjit Singh any right over Aitiana, because it had not yet been admitted.¹⁰

When called upon to explain his conduct, Sangat Singh produced before Colebrooke papers "purporting to be the copies of a grant from Maharaja Ranjit Singh and of a counterpart engagement from him to the Lahore Chief for the village in question, and two other villages, Rajoona and Joghul (also situated on the south bank of the Sutlej), for a *nazarana* of Rs. 30,000, a female *sowaree* elephant, and a horse of high price."¹¹

Ranjit Singh's conduct in granting a village which did not belong to him, and of Sangat Singh in accepting or purchasing villages from a foreign power while under British protection, was considered by the British as reprehensible.¹²

The Maharaja denied having executed any deed of gift of the village of Aitiana in favour of the Jind Chief.¹³ The evidence on both sides was conflicting, and it was after a laborious journey through the quagmire of 'interests' that the Government arrived at a decision.

6. 96/54. Wade to Colebrooke, May 25, 1828. P. G. R.

7. 96/66. Wade to Colebrooke, May 31, 1828. P. G. R.

8. 96/54. Wade to Colebrooke, May 25, 1828. P. G. R.

9. 96/56. Wade to Murray, May 26, 1828. P. G. R.

10. 75/109. Murray to Colebrooke, June 9, 1828. P. G. R.

11. 115/37. Colebrooke to Wade, June 14, 1828. P. G. R.

12. *Ibid.*

13. 115/38. Colebrooke to Wade, June 23, 1828. P. G. R.

Sangat Singh was directed to restore the villages without delay. He was administered a severe rebuke for entering, without the knowledge or permission of the Government, into negotiations with Lahore. He was required henceforth to give up that connection of allegiance which he was forming with Ranjit Singh, because that directly impinged upon the protection which the Company had guaranteed him in 1809.¹⁴

The Raja had no choice but to obey, and surrendered Aitiana to the lawful proprietor (Ram Singh), who was also paid the value of the property plundered, and allowed to retain the other two villages.¹⁵ The Maharaja obtaining Ram Singh's attendance in his presence confirmed him in the possession of Aitiana afresh.¹⁷

An inconspicuous matter in itself, the Aitiana dispute is of real significance. As this matter was clearing up towards the end of 1828, another of a much greater weight arose, viz., whether the Protected chiefs should be prohibited from accepting any similar grant from the Maharaja in the future or not.¹⁸ The continuance of this system, though of advantage to the Protected chiefs, foreboded perpetual conflicts between the two States.¹⁹ The Government, therefore, decreed that the Protected chiefs were not to enter into any such correspondence or negotiation with the Lahore Government,²⁰ and that they were to abstain from interfering in the affairs of the Maharaja and his feudatories without intimating the local British Agent.²¹

14. 115/37. Colebrooke to Stirling, June 12, 1828. P. G. R.

15. 28/210. Colebrooke to Murray, August 19, 1828. P. G. R.

16. 96/90. Wade to Colebrooke, July 5, 1828. P. G. R.

17. 96/118. Wade to Colebrooke, August 15, 1828. P. G. R.

18. 115/38. Colebrooke to Wade, June 23, 1828. P. G. R. Also
96/80, Wade to Colebrooke, June 19, 1828. P. G. R.

19. 115/39. Colebrooke to Wade, June 24, 1828. P. G. R.

20. 115/40. Colebrooke to Wade, July 29, 1828. P. G. R.

21. 96/90. Wade to Colebrooke, July 5, 1828. P. G. R.

The British Government had by the Treaty of 1809 effected a political cleavage between the Sikh chiefs on either side of the Sutlej. This mandamus further widened the gulf between them.

In July, 1829, Raja Jaswant Singh of Nabha, as unscrupulous and grasping a chief as any other in the cis-Sutlej area, had been to Lahore,²² the object of his visit, according to well informed belief, being the securing of a *jagir* from the Sikh Ruler.²³ When called upon by Wade to interfere, the Governor General refused to do so, as he was not, in any way, authorised to restrain the Maharaja from making grants of *jagirs* to the Sikh chiefs.²⁴ But at the same time, for future guidance, His Lordship declared that "the chiefs on this side of the Sutlej, i. e., the cis-Sutlej chiefs.....who stand in a feudatory relation to the British Government are not at liberty to accept territorial grants from a foreign Prince tending to involve them in connections and to create intrests eventually incompatible with the duties of allegiance to the Paramount Power without their knowledge and sanction."²⁵

This unqualified assertion of exclusive British control formed a logical supplement to the Government's directive in the case of Aitiana, and proved a big stride forward towards the building up of British ascendancy over the Protected chieftains.

Case of Dheri and Shujatwala.

The Aitiana dispute arose between the Rulers of the two States of Lahore and Jind, with the British acting as mediators. The present case was between the subjects of two villages lying in those two States.

22. ".....the acknowledged feudatories of the British Government are not allowed to enter into correspondence or negotiations with a foreign state—yet the Protected chiefs continued this practice in prosecution of their several designs without reference to the channel of communication and in direct opposition to the declared order"—

97/28. Wade to Colebrooke, February 20, 1829. P. G. R.

23. 97/113. Wade to Colebrooke, July 27, 1829. P. G. R.

24. 115/63. Colebrooke to Wade, September 16, 1829. P. G. R.

25. *Ibid.*

Dheri was situated in Jind State while Shujatwala belonged to the feudatories of Lahore.²⁶ The boundaries of the two villages being contiguous, affrays between their occupants arose inevitably. In 1828 boundaries were demarcated and differences settled.²⁷ But matters did not work smoothly for long, for in the following year, the *zamindars* of the two villages staged an open fight resulting in some loss of life to the Dheri inhabitants.²⁸ Ranjit Singh's Agent, Desa Singh, threw the *zamindars* of Shujatwala in confinement.²⁹ However, Wade, before whom they had pleaded not guilty, referred the case to Murray, and requested him to investigate it and settle it promptly.³⁰ The investigations led to no conclusion, so that Wade had to suggest the 'fair and equitable method' of arbitration for settling the dispute.³¹ The arbitrators' testimony confirmed the plea of the Shujatwala *zamindars* that the villagers of Dheri had been the first to provoke quarrel by using insulting gestures and taunting language towards them.³² Wade urged Murray to call upon the Raja of Jind to take preventive measures against repetition of such affrays.³³ Murray, on grounds of justice, hesitated to act on Wade's suggestion.³⁴ The Government concurred with Murray and censured Wade for instigating the former to interfere in the internal affairs of the Protected State which might have resulted in the disaffection of the Chief concerned.³⁵ The facts of the case remained as decided by the arbitrators.

26. 97/76. Wade to Colebrooke, April 25, 1829. P. G. R.

27. *Ibid.*

28. 97/79. Wade to Murray, April 27, 1829. P. G. R.

29. 97/83. Wade to Murray, April 29, 1829. P. G. R.

30. 97/79. Wade to Murray, April 27, 1829. P. G. R.

31. 97/114. Wade to Murray, July 27, 1829. P. G. R.

32. 97/170. Wade to Murray, October 7, 1829. P. G. R.

33. 97/170. Wade to Murray, October 7, 1829. P. G. R. Wade sent a similar request to Desa Singh, Ranjit's Agent, to remonstrate with the Jind Raja.

34. 76/86. Murray to Wade, October 19, 1829. P. G. R.

Murray contended that "we are only the conservators of peace and mediators between the chiefs of those districts."

35. 29/263. Hawkins to Murray, October 23, 1829. P. G. R.

Succession to the Jind Chiefship.

Raja Sangat Singh of Jind passed away suddenly at the premature age of twenty-four on November 3, 1834,³⁶ and left no lineal heir to succeed him.

The principality, according to Sikh custom, might justly have been treated as an escheat to the Suzerain Power, the British Government³⁷. But for some time no action was taken either by the Government or the collateral relations of the deceased. Mai Sahib Kaur, mother of Sangat Singh, and Regent during his minority, carried on the administration,³⁸ as directed by the Political Agent at Ambala, Clerk.³⁹

This reticence of the British Government made the heirless *Gaddi* the bone of contention between several claimants. Sangat Singh's nearest relations were three second cousins: Sarup Singh, Sukha Singh



36. 80/196. Clerk to Fraser, November 16, 1834. P. G. R.

37. The Phulkian chiefs had been subjects of the Mughal Emperors at least nominally and in theory, and the British Government, which assumed towards them precisely the same position which the Mughal Government had held, was entitled to the benefits of all escheats in return for protection. Moreover, in 1832, the Phulkian chiefs had refused to pay tribute to the British Government in exchange for the right of succession to heirless estate. (82/44. Clerk to Metcalfe, March 23, 1836. P. G. R.)


38. 80/196. Clerk to Fraser November 16, 1834. P. G. R.

39. On Murray's death in 1831, G. Clerk was appointed as the Political Agent at Ambala.

and Bhagwan Singh—the Sardars of Badrukhan and Bazidpur who had for long been separated from the Jind branch of the family.⁴⁰ The Raja of Nabha advanced his claim through Munshi Isar Singh, his Minister, as being the descendant of Tilok Singh, the grand-father of Gajpat Singh.⁴¹ But this mythical claim was not admitted.⁴² Then there were the widow claimants—three widows of Sangat Singh and two of his father.⁴³ Another invalid claim was preferred by Rani Bhag Bhari, a widow of Partap Singh (son of Bhag Singh).⁴⁴ The Raja of Patiala, who was seemingly a supporter of Sarup Singh, also preferred a feeble claim.⁴⁵

The Governor-General declared that the descendants of Hamir Singh (Nabha House) and Bhup Singh (the Bazidpur and Badrukhan House) had no claims whatever to the chiefship, as they had been separately provided for.⁴⁶ The Political Agent, however, maintained

40. *The genealogy of the Jind family.*



Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

41. 82/110. Clerk to Metcalfe, June 24, 1836. P. G. R.
42. 82/107. Clerk to Metcalfe, June 20, 1836. P. G. R.
43. 81/34. Clerk to Fraser, February 26, 1835. P. G. R.
44. 82/104. Clerk to Metcalfe, June 15, 1836. P. G. R.
45. 106/9. Fraser to Clerk, February 2, 1835. P. G. R.

that the fact of Bhup Singh having set up a dynasty independent of the Jind chiefship, could not have invalidated the claims of his successor, Sarup Singh, on account of the traditions of that family.⁴⁶ The rights of the widows other than those of Raja Sangat Singh were preposterous, and could not be admitted.⁴⁷ The widows of the lately deceased Rajas had, undoubtedly, according to Sikh Law, a valid claim to inherit. But they were all very young, the eldest being only twenty-three, and it was felt that it would be risky to entrust so important a principality to such hands.⁴⁸

The question before the Government was of a wider nature, viz., whether it was more expedient, in compensation for the expense incurred in protecting estates, to resume the Company's right of jurisdiction when chiefships lapsed, or to receive a fixed tribute, and leave a vacant chiefship to be occupied by an adopted child or by a collateral. Against the first alternative the arguments adduced were the remoteness of the estates, their poverty, their scattered position which would entail trouble and solicitude. Therefore a tribute scheme was considered more convenient.⁴⁹

If the right of collateral succession was admitted by Government, Sarup Singh had the best claim. He was the son of Karam Singh, elder son of Bhup Singh, and as such, had a preferential right to Sukha Singh and Bhagwan Singh, who were of the younger branch, the rule of primogeniture having been affirmed to prevail in Jind.⁵⁰ But it was felt

46. 82/44. Clerk to Metcalfe, March 23, 1836. P. G. R. Clerk suggested that Sarup Singh's "claim should not be resolved by the laws of inheritance applicable to ordinary property..... Should the distinction be lost sight of which hitherto has been deemed expedient to observe between rules of succession to private property among *Jats* and the regulation of Chiefships, it is not the British Government whose authority and resources would thereby become curtailed..... The universal decision of landed property, which would rapidly ensue, would in a brief space of time, compel the supreme Government to undertake the entire management of these territories to the utter annihilation of all Sardaris or chiefships." *Ibid.*

47. Griffin, *Law of Inheritance to Chiefships*, p. 83.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

49. 106/91. Clerk to Metcalfe, March 23, 1836. P. G. R.

50. 82/180. Clerk to Metcalfe, November 30, 1836. P. G. R.

that Sarup Singh should be assigned only those places which belonged to Raja Gajpat Singh, through whom he based his claim. The remaining portion of the Jind territory acquired after the death of Gajpat Singh belonged of right either to Maharaja Ranjit Singh or to the British Government. Which portions belonged to the Maharaja and which to the British Government was a question which took a very long time to decide, and the controversy continued from 1834 to the beginning of 1837, when the Government gave its final decision.

The Government adopted a just attitude, which was, that those of the Jind possessions which were undoubtedly granted by the Maharaja after the Treaty of 1809, should be handed over to him.⁵¹ Accordingly, the supremacy of the Maharaja was recognised over Halwara, Talwandi and parts of Mudki and Ghyaspura.⁵²

A rumour that the Government was going to resume the lapsed State of Jind, brought the Maharaja's *Vakil* to Wade at Ludhiana. Wade told him that there was no cause for alarm, and that the Government would take a "deliberate view of all the bearings of the subject before it decided."⁵³ The *Vakil* was also asked to supply a list of the places around Ludhiana which were granted by the Maharaja after 1809.⁵⁴ Wade had been informed by the Government that the question of the future management of Jind estate would be decided after it had been determined "what parts of it belonged to the Maharaja and what to the Honourable Company."⁵⁵

But the Maharaja seemed determined to take the fullest advantage of his friendship with the British Government. He wanted to know their intention regarding the *jagirs* granted by him before the Treaty of 1809 to the Jind family, and expressed a hope that the reply will be consistent with the friendship existing between them.⁵⁶ The British reply

51. 118/125. Macnaghten to Wade, June 16, 1836. P. G. R.

Wade was also asked to supply the Government with a list of such places.

52. 106/45. Clerk to Wade, August 17, 1835. P. G. R.

53. 141/76. Wade to Government, August 23, 1835. P. G. R.

54. *Ibid.*

55. 118/42. Macnaghten to Wade, September 14, 1835. P. G. R.

56. 141/85. Wade to Macnaghten, September 17, 1835. P. G. R.

to this was that he should send a list of the places, and the grounds on which he based his claims on them.⁵⁷ But the Maharaja advanced from claim to claim, and now he made a novel demand. His first demand was for territories granted *after 1809*, then for those granted *before 1809*, and now for *the entire Jind territories*, ancestral as well as the granted ones.⁵⁸

A perusal of the Maharaja's letter leaves one convinced that deep down in his heart he believed that his claim was not very strong. That is why he refers so often to the friendship existing between the two States. After many professions of that friendship, he goes on to say, "I am reminded of the proverb that hearts mutually reflect the secrets of each other, therefore there appears no necessity to enter into a detail of my claims relative to Jind affair and inform you of the proofs of them..... (The hint was clear that he wished to draw on his friendship rather than on any legal claims.) "But out of caution and a due regard for the dignity of the two States it is proper that I should transmit my claims". But this seemed to him a secondary thing. He pinned his faith in the friendship, and he was, as he said, "convinced that whatever happened will be consistent with subsisting relations". His chief argument seems to be that "according to the customs of the country and the *Shastras*, when there are no grandsons, the inheritance descends to the nephews."⁵⁹

Even Wade was taken aback by the Maharaja's demand and wrote to the Government: ".....novelty of it and flexibility with which the Maharaja has advanced first from a demand to that portion of territory granted after the Treaty and when that was attained to that which was granted before, and now to the whole, will scarcely escape the surprise of the Government."⁶⁰

57. 118/49. Macnaghten to Wade, October 12, 1835. P. G. R.

58. 141/104. Wade to Government forwarding the Maharaja's letter, December 27, 1835. P. G. R.

59. *Ibid.*

60. 141/104. Wade to Government, December 27, 1835. P. G. R.

Wade, after discussing the relation of Ranjit Singh with the late Raja Sangat Singh,⁶¹ observed that the Treaty concluded with the former in 1809, gave him no claim on the ancestral possessions of the Sikh chiefs on the left bank of the Sutlej. It merely confirmed to him (1) his conquests before his last irruption ; and (2) the services of those who held possessions, in *jagir*, from him on the British side of the river, without interfering with those chiefs who had sought and obtained the protection of the British Government. Wade's views were that as soon as the Sikh chiefs obtained British protection they were absolved from their dependence on the Ruler of Lahore.

"A maternal nephew," Wade wrote, "may succeed to an inheritance in virtue of his hereditary claim, but I am not aware of a single instance in which Ranjit Singh has recognised such a principle of succession in the case of lapsed estates of his feudatories." He further pointed out that the Maharaja was connected by descent with some other chiefs also, and if his claims were recognised in this case, might he not in future advance more claims on the strength of this precedent. He ended up by saying : "Whatever attention may therefore be due to the pretensions of the Maharaja founded on his connection with the Jind family according to the *Shastras*, it does not appear that a concession to them is required either by the terms of the Treaty established between the British Government and himself in 1809, or that it would be compatible with the rights acquired or the obligations contracted by the protection which we have extended to those states in consequence of that Treaty."⁶²

After these cogent arguments of Wade, whatever strength was left in the Maharaja's contention based on the *Shastras*, was destroyed by the reply from the Government to the above letter of Wade. It laid down that "the Hindu Law of inheritance does not certainly appear to be based upon any solid foundation, as the succession to principalities is not governed either in law or usage by the ordinary rules of inheritance which are applicable to the property of individuals." It further

61. "His Highness is the *nawassa* or maternal nephew not of the late Raja of Jind but of his grand-father, Raja Bhag Singh, whose sister was married to the Maharaja's father, and the affinity between him and Sangat Singh, the lately deceased Raja, appears, therefore, to be that of a second cousin."—

141/104. Wade to Government, December 27, 1835. P. G. R.

(See the genealogy of the Jind family, p. 68, *supra*.)

62. 141/104. Wade to Government, December 27, 1835. P. G. R.

stated : "it does not appear certain that the Maharaja can claim the reversion of lands absolutely granted in free gift, or in other words, completely ceded without conditions, whether before or after the Treaty. On the left bank he cannot claim it as an escheat in virtue of his being Lord Paramount; nor is there any law or custom of which the Governor General-in-Council is aware that would warrant the resumption of land by the donor—the donor being a private individual—on the death without heirs of the donee."

But at the same time the Maharaja was not to be displeased. Macnaghten wrote to Wade: "The Governor General-in-Council is nevertheless disposed to treat the claims which the Maharaja may advance with the most liberal consideration, regarding His Highness as an old friend, with whom we have never had any difference, and, therefore, entitled to the most cordial attention."⁶³

Wade now received a letter from the Government for the Maharaja informing him that one Sarup Singh had appeared as a claimant to the Jind territories, and that his claims were ordered to be investigated. But Wade did not forward that letter to Lahore forthwith as he, meanwhile, heard of the rebellion of the *Zamindars* of Ballawali, and thought that the knowledge of the British Government's sentiment with regard to Sarup Singh might encourage it.⁶⁴ The rebellion was, however, soon quelled, and the letter was transmitted.⁶⁵

Ranjit Singh realised fully well what the friendship of the British meant to him, and the prestige which he derived from it. When he learnt that a deputation of some cis-Sutlej States had gone to Calcutta, his *Vakil* at Ludhiana at once asked Wade if it would be successful. If there was any chance of the success of the deputation, then the Maharaja wished to be informed beforehand, so that it might appear to have been sent in consultation with him, in order that he might

63. 118/62. Macnaghten to Wade, February 1, 1836. P. G. R.

64. 142/15. Wade to Government, March 21, 1836. P. G. R.

65. 142/30. Wade to Government, May 2, 1836. A brief account of the rebellion follows this account of the Jind question. See pp. 77-78, *infra*.

preserve the good opinion of those who were connected with him by marriage. He also said that he had not taken any step so far, and that Rani Sahib Kaur had reproached him for not having used his influence with the British Government on her behalf. Wade, of course, knew nothing of the deputation, and appreciated the Lahore Darbar's attitude in not having taken any action so far⁶⁶.

Wade now came forward with his distinction of the chiefs *indigenous to the south side of the Sutlej* and those *indigenous to the Punjab*. His argument was: those who were taken under protection of the British in 1809, were indigenous to the south side of the Sutlej, and the integrity of their possessions, as they then stood, was naturally recognised by the Treaty. It was in acting on this view that the officers of Ranjit Singh, on the conclusion of the Treaty, "withdrew the connection from such places as had been conferred by their master on these Chiefs, and the officers of the British Government assumed the political control over them as over the ancestral possessions of their owners. On the other hand, with regard to the territory held from the Maharaja on the left bank of the river by Chiefs indigenous to the Punjab, his officers exercise a controlling authority over them independent of our officers." Wade, therefore, thought that if the Treaty of 1809 was construed as not placing the chiefs indigenous to the left bank of the Sutlej exclusively under the British supremacy for their possessions on that side of the river, then it would be putting a construction on the Treaty in favour of His Highness. Places granted after 1809 were presumed to have been granted with the knowledge and consent of the British Government, and they did not "affect the absolute allegiance of the Chiefs on whom they were conferred to the British Government." "If the Protected Chiefs," wrote Wade, "are declared not to be at liberty to form tributary connections with the Sovereign of the Punjab after the Treaty, the presumption seems to be that they were absolved from all such connection with him on the conclusion of that engagement. Otherwise cases might arise in which it would be impossible for them to discharge their duty to one party without compromising themselves with the other".⁶⁷

66. 142/30. Wade to Government, May 2, 1836. P. G. R.

67. *Ibid.*

Wade expressed his view-point with such clarity that in return he was asked by the Government to furnish a list of the chiefs whom he considered indigenous to the Punjab,⁶⁸ and ultimately when in January, 1837, the Government's decision was given, Wade's view seems to have prevailed to a great extent. The Government recognised Sarup Singh's claims to succeed to the possessions of his great-grandfather, Gajpat Singh, through whom he derived his title.⁶⁹ To him were to be assigned the tracts of the country which had belonged to Gajpat Singh, these being the *parganahs* of Jind (with the exceptions of nine villages lately annexed to Delhi territory), Sufidon, Assundh, Salwan, Ballawali, Sumgrai, Bhowki, Samout and Mhelum.⁷⁰ The possessions granted by Ranjit Singh after the Treaty of 1809 were to be returned to him.⁷¹ The territory which

68. 118/79. Government to Wade, July 4, 1836. P. G. R.

69. 120/1. Macnaghten to Wade, January 16, 1837. P. G. R.

70. 83/25. Clerk to Metcalfe, June 28, 1837. P. G. R. Vide Appendix IV.

71. 120/1. Macnaghten to Wade, January 16, 1837. P. G. R.

Macnaghten desired that while communicating to Ranjit Singh the decision of the Governor General regarding the disposal of the Jind territories, Wade should apprise him that "His Lordship-in-Council has been actuated in forming it by a due regard to the interests of Ranjit Singh."

An unbiased examination of the entire case would show that the British handled Ranjit Singh rather leniently those days. After all, on what solid grounds did the Maharaja reclaim his grants made to the Jind chiefs either before 1809 or subsequent to it? The Treaty of 1809 had absolved all Sikh chiefs claiming British protection from their dependence upon the Ruler of Lahore. Sangat Singh's grandfather had received *cis-Sutlej* territories from Ranjit Singh, not as grants on military tenure, but in the form of a share of spoils in recognition of services rendered by him to Ranjit Singh during the latter's expeditions on the south of the Sutlej. Moreover, even as a donor, on what authority of the Hindu Law could Ranjit Singh claim his grants from the descendants of the deceased donee? During the period subsequent to 1809, the British Government had always shown itself decidedly opposed to grants being conferred by the Maharaja upon chiefs under its control on terms incompatible with their dependence upon it. Hence the Maharaja had no legal right to claim those territories back whether granted before or after 1809. Still we find the Governor General saying that he would be favourably "disposed to treat the claims which the Maharaja may advance with the most liberal consideration, regard-

lapsed to him consisted of Halwara, Talwandi and a moiety of Mudki and Ghiaspura. Ludhiana and all other possessions acquired by the descendants of Gajpat Singh subsequent to the death of that Chief and before the year 1803, were to devolve as an escheat to the British Government.* A subsistence allowance was stipulated for the widows of Sangat Singh which was to be paid in part by the English and in part by Sarap Singh.⁷²

This case illustrates as to how the prevalence of anomalous and conflicting rules and customs of succession in Sikh estates, encouraged many a pretender to hazard their shaky claims to a vacant 'Gaddi'. It offered the Governor General an opportunity to propound a general principle regarding the question of succession in the Protected states. After quoting from Murray's paper on the rules and customs of the Sikhs—"the rules of succession to landed property in the Sikh states are arbitrary and variously modified in accordance with the usage and interests and prejudices of different families,...nor is it



(Continued from page 75)

ing His Highness as an old friend, with whom we have never had any difference, and, therefore, entitled to most cordial attention." — See p. 73, *supra*.

The reason for this attitude of the British Government towards Ranjit Singh is not far to seek. The sense of Russian menace was too strong in those days, and both the Whig Government in England and their representative in India, Lord Auckland, were anxious to retain Ranjit Singh's friendship at any cost. Auckland's subsequent conduct in plunging into a futile and ignominious war with Afghanistan, but not jeopardizing Anglo-Sikh friendship by pressing the Maharaja to evacuate Peshawar for Dost Mohammad, was in keeping with this general attitude,

* The English acquired Ludhiana, Morinda, Chuhal, Bassia, 1/2 Mudki, Jandiala, Dialpurah and various other scattered villages. (Vide Appendix IV). Of the territory thus acquired the district of Ludhiana was the most important, yielding a revenue of about Rs. 85,000, the remaining acquisitions together yielding a like amount.—Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 380. (Vide p. 18, *supra*).

practicable to reduce the anomalous system to a fixed and leading principle"—the Governor General laid down that, ".....every consideration of justice, usage and policy seems to require that as regards the four principal Chiefships of Patiala, Jind, Kythai and Nabha, the rule ought to be that the estate should devolve entirely to the nearest male heir, according to the Hindu Law, and to the exclusion of females. With regard to other Sikh estates, the custom of the family must be ascertained in each instance by the best evidence procurable."⁷³

These general principles always influenced the determination of all subsequent disputes of a similar character.

The Ballawali Rebellion.

The *Zamindars* of Ballawali, situated near Bhatinda and about one hundred miles to the west of Ambala, had been notorious for their unruly character.⁷⁴ They had never paid their revenues to Jind officials. After Raja Sangat Singh's death they passed under the rule of the British and were called upon to pay revenue. This they considered an encroachment on their ancient privileges.⁷⁵ They rose in rebellion in March, 1836. It was thought that they were encouraged by hopes of support from Mai Sahib . Kaur,⁷⁶ the Regent, whom the rebels must have known as feeling dissatisfied with the Government in connection with her claims on the Jind territories. Their leader was one Gulab Singh Gill. One night the rebels effected entrance into the fort through the apartments of Mai Sul Rai, the widow of Kanwar Partap Singh, the uncle of Raja Sangat Singh.⁷⁷ They rescued their followers from the *thana* lately established there by Clerk, obliged his assistant to quit it with the loss of his baggage, and seized his men present in the fort.⁷⁸ But they could not hold the fort for long. The Maharaja ordered his officials at Kot Kapura to take care

73. 109/2. Metcalfe to Wade, February 14, 1837. P. G. R.

74. 142/15. Wade to Government, March 21, 1836. P. G. R.

75. Griffin, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

76. 142/15. Wade to Government, March 21, 1836. P. G. R.

77. 142/21. Wade to Government, April 15, 1836. P. G. R.

78. 142/15. Wade to Government, March 21, 1836. P. G. R.

that none of the *Zamindars* of that place nor the Akalis of Siri Mukatsarji were allowed to join the Ballawali insurgents, but that they should render all possible aid to the British officers in supressing the rebellion.⁷⁹

Gulab Singh Gill, the leader, was killed and many of his followers were captured including their accomplice, Mai Sul Rai.⁸⁰ The insurrection was thus easily quelled.



79. 142/19. Wade to Government, April 11, 1836. P. G. R.

80. 142/15. Wade to Government, March 21, 1836. P. G. R. And
142/21. Wade to Government, April 15, 1836. P. G. R.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUPAR MEETING

Of the neighbouring Princes with whom the British made alliances in 1809 against a possible Franco-Russian invasion of India, the Ruler of the Punjab proved to be the most faithful and steadfast.¹ Even though suspicious, in the beginning, of the nature of its fruits, Ranjit Singh was always "anxiously watering this sapling of friendship to see it rise into a thickly foliaged tree yielding luscious fruit and cool shade to both the parties."² His policy of conciliation and compromise towards the English was sustained throughout his career, as it was largely inspired by the dread of their power. Besides, it kept the turbulent Sardars as well as the independent chieftains surrounding the Sikh kingdom in constant awe of the Sikh lion's resources. The English, on the other hand, becoming equally convinced of Ranjit Singh's sincerity developed a spirit of forbearance and concession towards him. They valued the presence of a strong friendly power on their north-western frontier, which secured protection to their empire without expense against the turbulent elements from beyond the Indus. Both parties sought to maintain and improve their mutual relations through frequent exchange of presents and compliments.³

Ranjit Singh, having sufficiently consolidated his power over a wide domain, grew eager to meet Lord Amherst, the Governor General,

1. The Treaty with Afghanistan did not prove of much worth, because soon after its ratification Shah Shuja was driven out of his dominion. The Shah of Persia, after vacillating for a time between the British and the Russians, broke off with the former at Turkomanchai (1828). The Amirs of Sind were luck-warm right uptill the extinction of their principalities in 1843.
2. 137/17. Wade to Prinsep, enclosing the Maharaja's letter to the Governor General, June 19, 1831. P. G. R.
3. Osbornæ, *The Court and Camp of Ranjit Singh*, p. xixvii.

when the later came to Simla in 1827.⁴ But he was advised by Dr. Murray and his own physicians not to undertake a long and arduous journey for the purpose.⁵ He then wished to send one of his sons, Kharak Singh or Sher Singh, but they happened to be engaged in distant expeditions.⁶ Finally, he deputed Dewan Moti Ram⁷ and Faqir Imam-ud-Din⁸ to lead a mission to Simla.⁹

The mission arrived at Ludhiana on April 6, 1827, having been met by Wade on the river Sutlej. He conducted it further to Simla where it was received with much distinction by Amberst. The envoys felt gratified in every way,¹⁰ and departed on their homeward journey on May 6.¹¹

The Governor General, on his part, returned this compliment by deputing two British officers to the Maharaja's Court, Captain Wade being one of them¹² and Captain Pearson, an Aide-de-camp to the Governor General, being the other. Mr. Surgeon Gerard went with them as medical officer.¹³ A troop of cavalry escorted them from Karnal and a company of infantry from Ludhiana.¹⁴

4. 95/86. Wade to Metcalfe, April 6, 1827. P. G. R.
5. 95/88. Wade to Stirling, April 10, 1827. P. G. R.
6. Wade to Stirling. Letter reproduced in Chopra, *The Punjab as a Sovereign State*, pp. 281—83.
7. Dewan Moti Ram, the eldest son of Dewan Mohkam Chand, served as Governor of Kashmir for seven years from 1819—1826. Details of his career during this period are described in Chopra, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
8. Imam-ud-Din, the brother of Faqir Aziz-ud-Din, remained for many years in charge of the fort of Gobindgarh in which the bulk of the Lahore treasures lay. Like his brother, he sometimes acted as a channel of communication between the English visitors and Ranjit Singh.—*Idem*, p. 179.
9. Wade to Stirling. Letter reproduced in Chopra, *op. cit.*, pp. 281—83.
10. 95/97. Wade to Metcalfe, May 9, 1827. P. G. R.
11. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827. Letter reproduced in Chopra, *op. cit.*, pp. 283—329.
12. Wade was selected for this job on the strong recommendation of Metcalfe as the fittest person on the frontier.—Wade, *A Narrative of the Services, Military and Political*, p. 87.
13. 115/28. Stirling to Wade, May 2, 1827. P. G. R.
14. *Ibid.* Enclosure, Stirling to Major-General Commanding the Sirhind Division.

The Maharaja being much gratified, detailed Jawala Singh, one of his principal Sardars, to meet the mission at Phillaur. At Amritsar, where the Maharaja was at that time, it was received with great liberality in the Rambagh where much feasting and festivity marked its stay. Messages of mutual friendship and concord repeatedly passed between the parties. Ranjit Singh conferred high honours upon the British envoys and further *jagirs* on the members of his own mission which had prompted this one in response.¹⁵

Though merely formal and friendly in all outward appearance, this exchange of missions proved the first of a series which followed subsequently, and is therefore of some significance. Henceforward the sluice gates of such friendly intercourse were thrown open still wider, leading to more frequent exchange of thoughts and sentiments existing between the two powers. Moreover, to the curious and far-seeing British agents this mission provided a valuable opportunity for gaining direct information about the Maharaja's country, the strength of his army, the state of his court, and the attitude towards him of neighbouring chiefs, especially of Peshawar.¹⁶

The year 1831 is again marked by a profuse exchange of compliments between the two Governments. By this time the fame of Ranjit Singh had spread far and wide, and his friendship and goodwill were coveted alike by several distant and neighbouring rulers. In 1829, envoys from Baluchistan had brought horses to him in the hope that the frontier posts of Harrand and Dajal (westward of the Indus), which his feudatory of Bahawalpur had usurped, would be restored to its Ruler.¹⁷ Likewise Shah Mahmud of Harat was in communication

15. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827. Letter reproduced in Chopra. *op. cit.*, pp. 283—329.

16. *Ibid.*

17. 97/87. Wade to Colebrooke, May 3, 1829. P. G. R. Also 98/76. Wade to Hawkins, April 29, 1830. P. G. R.

Harrand was once a place of repute. The Bahawalpur Memoirs show that the Nawab was aided by the treachery of others in acquiring it. The place had to be retaken by General Ventura, when Bahawal Khan was deprived of his territories west of the Sutlej—Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 195.

with him.¹⁸ In 1830, he was invited by Baiza Bai of Gwalior to honour with his presence the nuptials of the young Sindhia.¹⁹ It was at this juncture that the British suspected him to have opened correspondence with Russia,²⁰ the potential gate-crasher of the Indian frontier.

Early in 1831, Ranjit Singh, following the precedent of 1827, sent a fresh mission consisting of Dewan Moti Ram, Sardar Hari Singh and Faqir Aziz-ud-Din,²¹ to enquire after the Governor General's health and the prosperity of his Government.²² Eagerly looked after by Wade on the way,²³ it was received with close attention at Simla. The message and presents having been delivered, and the formal professions of mutual good-will reiterated, the mission left Simla on April 29.²⁴

The Governor General could not send a return mission soon owing to the oppressiveness of the season. He, however, directed Wade to proceed to Ranjit Singh's Court with a letter. It is interesting to know that the Governor General was inspired in this move by two objects. One, which was kept on the surface, was to explain to the Maharaja that a return mission was not sent for some genuine reason, and not out of any sense of indifference towards him.²⁵ The real and

18. 97/8. Wade to Colebrooke, January 21, 1829. P. G. R. And 98/136. Wade to Martin, December 3, 1830. P. G. R. Also Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

19. 98/57. Wade to Hawkins, April 7, 1830. P. G. R.
The Maharaja declined the invitation, saying Sindhia was not at Lahore when his son was married. (Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 195.)

20. 98/14. Wade to Hawkins, August 24, 1830. P. G. R.
But the Maharaja effectively repudiated the charge.

21. Court, Translation of *Sikhan de Raj di Vikhia, or History of Sikhs*, p. 72.

22. 98/144. Wade to Martin, January 17, 1831. P. G. R.

23. 115/74 and 75. Prinsep to Wade, April 16, 1831. P. G. R.

24. 98/163. Wade to Martin, May 7, 1831. P. G. R.

25. 115/76. Prinsep to Wade, April 28, 1831. P. G. R.

ulterior purpose, however, was to ascertain if Ranjit Singh wished and was prepared to propose a personal interview with the Governor General.²⁶

Wade forthwith set out for the Punjab. At Phillaur he was received by Jagat Singh, a Sardar of Atari, and Fapir Shah Din, son of Aziz-ud-Din, who conducted him to Adinanagar where the Maharaja was recouping his health.²⁷ Making close observations about the territory through which he passed, Wade reached that place on May 22, to receive a rousing reception at the hands of the Maharaja.²⁸

Wade presented the letter from the Governor General, which dilated upon the friendship existing between the two States in very eloquent terms: "the flowers of the garden of friendship and affection will be adorned with the verdure of perpetuity and cordiality, and mutual good understanding will always be cultivated with augmented care, and I personally shall continually make it my study to increase the subsisting friendship, and tie closer the bonds of amity, so that the appearance of difference or alienation or estrangement or separation of interests shall no where find entrance....." and so on.²⁹ He then explained the reasons which had prevented the Governor General from sending an immediate

26. 115/76. Prinsep to Wade, April 29, 1831. P. G. R.

On this letter there is a note in pencil (which has almost completely faded) written by Wade himself, which says: "Though no official instructions were issued to me to promote a meeting between the Governor General and Ranjit Singh, in consequence of His Lordship's desire that the subject should emanate from the Maharaja, the Governor General communicated to me privately his wish that such an object should be effected."

27. 137/5. Wade to Prinsep, May 12, 1831 P. G. R.

28. 137/11. Wade to Prinsep, May 22, 1831. P. G. R.

(I have reproduced in Appendix V Wade's letters in which he has made close observations about the territory through which he passed and the persons he met during this visit).

29. 115/76. Prinsep to Wade, April 28, 1831. P. G. R.

The frequency of the exchange of complimentary letters between the two Governments during this period has induced me to reproduce this letter in full, by way of a specimen, in Appendix VI.

return mission. At this, the Maharaja observed that "it did not signify."³⁰ "The subject", wrote Wade to Prinsep, "seems, however, to have previously laid hold of the Maharaja's mind, for the news-writer reported that the Maharaja being perplexed to account for the delay had early that morning sent Rs. 1,100 to the Kartarpuria *Granth* and directed Shankar Nath Gorshu to send an offering of Rs. 125 to the shrine of Jawalamukhi, Kangra and Permendel, and consult the aspects of the stars."³¹

The perusal of the Governor General's letter and Wade's explanation restored the Maharaja's confidence³², and when on June 7, Wade left his Court, he gave expression to his friendship for the British by saying : "I expect that you will assure the Governor General that I am actuated by the most cordial sentiments of attachment for him and his Government and that I have nothing more at heart than the desire of improving and perpetuating the relations which exist between me and the British Government."³³

While on his way to Alinanagar, Wade had learnt of Lieut Burnes' commercial mission* stranded up the Indus, and had informed the Governor General that he would strain every nerve to keep Ranjit Singh free from the hostile influence of the Amirs of Sind. The Maharaja did exactly what Wade wished him to do, and Burnes was allowed to proceed through Hyderabad unmolested.³⁴ Further, Ranjit Singh appointed

30. Ranjit Singh, it appears, made this observation with mental reservation, for when Wade at his subsequent visit to Lahore broached the subject of an interview with the Governor General he insisted that a return mission should be sent before the meeting. See pp. 87-88, *infra*.

31. 137/11. May 22, 1831. P. G. R.

32. *Ibid*.

33. 137/17. Wade to Prinsep, June 19, 1831. P. G. R.

*. Discussed at length in the following Chapter.

34. 137/10. Wade to Prinsep, May 21, 1831. P. G. R.

About the time that the Amirs objected to the passage of Burnes up the Indus the Maharaja had sent a large force under Ventura against the western frontier of Bahawalpur for exacting tribute. It was then advanced to Dera Ghazi Khan, where its proximity to the Sindhi territory of Shikarpur induced the Amirs to allow Burnes to pass.

Dewan Ajudhia Parshad to receive Burnes at Multan, and directed the Nazim of that place to make all necessary arrangements for the mission.³⁵ All this gave much satisfaction to Lord William Bentinck.³⁶

A word here regarding the nature of Burnes' mission. This mission is of special importance inasmuch as with it began the English attempts to retard and ultimately stop the threatened extension of Ranjit's authority in the direction of Sind. Apart from a wish to acquire better knowledge of the political and geographical nature of the country through which the mission was to pass, the English had a deeper design at heart—to secure the easiest passage for munitions to Herat or other frontier posts against the rumoured Russian move.³⁷ This ulterior purpose and its being a mission of espionage through Sind came to the surface later during the Afghan War.

Having thus arranged matters amicably, Wade returned to Ludhiana on June 19³⁸, to report to the Governor General his entire satisfaction with friendly sentiments evinced by Ranjit Singh.³⁹ Wade felt that he had paved the way for broaching the subject of the meeting between the heads of the two States.

Meanwhile, Burnes was nearing Lahore with a present of five horses and a coach from the King of England for the Maharaja.⁴⁰ Ranjit

35. Sohan Lal, *Umdat-ut-Twarikh*, Daftar II, p. 406.

36. 115/83. Prinsep to Wade, May 27, 1831. P. G. R.

37. The Treaty of Turkomanchai (1828) between Russia and Persia proved to be of immense significance in the development of British policy on the north-west frontier. Persia jumped off the cosy lap of Britain to rest in the inviting-by-threatening arms of Russia, harassing thereby the English at Herat. Moreover, by virtue of this Treaty and that of Adrianople with Turkey (1829) Russia obtained a hold on the entire Caucasus. Thus threatened, the English began to strengthen their frontier outposts.

38. 137/17. Wade to Prinsep, June 19, 1831. P. G.

39. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Daftar II, p. 40.

40. 137/21. Wade to Prinsep, July 21, 1831. P. G. R.

Singh very much wanted Wade to be present on Burnes' arrival as the latter would be unacquainted with the Sikh customs.⁴¹ The Governor General readily allowed Wade to leave for Lahore.⁴² He reached the Sikh Capital in time for receiving Burnes on July 18.⁴³

The formal exchange of presents and *Kharitas* being over, the conversation developed into a discussion on the possibility of (i) opening up of the Sutlej and the Indus for commercial purposes, and (ii) arranging an interview between Ranjit Singh and William Bentinck in accordance with conditions agreeable to the latter. These conditions were: first, the place of the meeting was to be on the Sutlej, which, without causing inconvenience to the Sikh Ruler, would enable the Governor General to proceed to Karnal without unnecessary delay. Rupar was the place actually suggested, and the time was to be as near October 25 as possible. Secondly, the first visit was to be made by the Maharaja and he was to be received at the frontier line by a select deputation of officers who would conduct him to the meeting-place. His Lordship would accord His Highness *istagbal* upon his approach. The Commander-in-Chief would not attend the function. Thirdly, the Maharaja's visit was to be returned the following day and the same ceremonies were to be observed in respect to His Lordship's visit. Fourthly, no return mission for the one sent by the Maharaja in April was to be sent by the Governor General.⁴⁴

Ranjit Singh acquitted himself very vivaciously on the first issue, that is, opening of the Sutlej and the Indus to navigation. The

41. 137/14. Wade to Prinsep, June 5, 1831. P. G. R.

42. 115/14. Prinsep to Wade, June 30, 1831. P. G. R.

Apart from gratifying the Maharaja the Governor General had two definite motives in sanctioning Wade's departure: (i) Wade, together with Burnes, would be able to negotiate successfully with the Maharaja the scheme for the navigation of the Indus and the Sutlej, and (ii) Wade would arrange the preliminaries of a meeting between Ranjit Singh and the Governor General in a manner as would not detract from the prestige of the British.—115/89. Prinsep to Wade, July 4, 1831. P. G. R.

43. 137/21. Wade to Prinsep, July 21, 1831. P. G. R.

44. 115/89. Prinsep to Wade, July 4, 1831, P. G. R.

second task was of considerable difficulty, for though the Maharaja from his intercourse with Wade might have every dependence on the good faith and feeling of the British, yet he had never seen enough of them to enable him fully to understand their character, and, he observed that though the 'Kaptan Sahib' (as Wade was usually called) might be a good and honest man to whom he might safely trust himself, yet others might be inclined to take advantage of his crossing the boundary. Besides, his Sardars and followers were averse to the step, and dreaded still more than himself the operation of disguised and selfish motives.⁴⁶ At the same time, Ranjit Singh felt that he would gain by the interview which would strengthen his authority by making the Sikh public believe that his dynasty was acknowledged as the proper head of the Khalsa by the predominant English power.⁴⁷

Nevertheless, Ranjit Singh felt that he could not have the interview on the above-mentioned conditions. He wanted the Governor General to pay him the first visit. "This is a point", wrote Prinsep. to Wade, "quite impossible for His Lordship to concede and it may be said to be already settled by the two precedents of Lord Amherst's and the present Governor General's arrival at Simla, on both which occasions the first deputation of compliment was sent by His Highness His Lordship anticipates that a stand will not be made on this point in the face of these precedents, but if contrary to expectation His Highness should persist in requiring the first visit, the negotiation must at once be broken off."⁴⁸

Ranjit Singh conceded this point with some reluctance, but he persisted in his desire of receiving a formal return mission before the

45. 137/21. Wade to Prinsep, July 21, 1831. P. G. R.

46. M'Gregor, *The History of the Sikhs*, Vol. I, p. 109.

47. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

48. 115/89. Prinsep to Wade, July 4, 1831, P. G. R.

interview. The Governor General was averse to doing this immediately before the meeting, for "it would have the appearance in the eyes of the world, of being sent to supplicate, or induce the Ruler of the Sikhs to come to the interview, whereas the rank and position of the Head of the British Government required that the honour of a personal conference with him should be sought."⁴⁹ Wade was, therefore, to argue that "when meetings are arranged between the Rulers of States, the functions of ambassadors and the intervention of representatives of any kind cease of necessity, and the mutual friendship that prevails is displayed at the interview. Missions are necessary when a personal meeting is impossible, and in such a case supply its place, but in a less perfect degree. An interview in person has been proposed in the present instance in lieu of one through third parties and representatives as before agreed to, on which account His Lordship considered the mission of representatives to be superseded, and with respect to the appearance of the neglect of this ceremony before the world, every body must see from the frequency of the missions deputed heretofore to His Highness as well as from the present arrival of Lt. Burnes, Mr. Leckie and yourself with presents from the King of England as well as from the Governor General that the British Government has spared no observance to cultivate His Highness's friendship and promote his honour and exaltation."⁵⁰

It is clear from the Governor General's conditions that the interview would be used to give out to the outside world that the Governor General had the higher dignity. A shrewd diplomat like Ranjit Singh could not easily be brought round to agree to this. The task of Wade was thus one of extreme difficulty. The initiative in the whole business had been of the Governor General, and yet Wade was to win Ranjit Singh over to conducting the interview in such a manner as if it had been arranged at the Maharaja's explicit request. Wade proved equal to his task, and had every term of the Governor General agreed to by the Maharaja. Rupar was the place, and October 25 the date fixed for the interview. The Governor General was of course much pleased at the prospect of a willing and personal meeting with the Sikh Ruler.⁵¹

49. Prinsep, *Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab*, p. 160.

50. 115/92. Prinsep to Wade, August 8, 1831. P. G. R.

51. 137/31. Wade to Prinsep, October 6, 1831. P. G. R.

The triumph of Wade was strikingly noteworthy. He had every justification in claiming that "had it not been for the personal influence which I was enabled to exert on the Maharaja, His Lordship's wish of holding an interview with him would, there is no doubt, have been disappointed, for when Ranjit Singh found that it could not take place on his own terms, he was disposed to break off the negotiations and would have done so had I not used my endeavours to renew his desire for it, after he had been strongly advised against the measure by his Sardars. In their ignorance and inexperience of European manners and customs, they regarded such a meeting as humiliating to his dignity, and dangerous in its consequences to the independence of his country. He said that every one of his Sardars was opposed to it."⁵²

All the preliminaries having been settled by Wade in perfect conformity with Bentinck's views and wishes, preparations now began on both sides.⁵³ A temporary boat-bridge having been erected on

52. Wade, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

In this connection Amar Nath (*Zafarnama-i-Ranjit Singh*, p. 205) says:

کہ اگر ایں خواہودارا دربان لاٹ ۱۱ نوکر کمپلی ۱۱ کہیں ۱۱ چاکر شاہ
افغانستان قرار دادئے..... بدین تقدیر افجلا ساسجبل
سورت ہے پا سرداری آئیں سے طب جاوہ گر نشو
اگرچہ لاٹ بوم از وخشور از شاہ افغانستان دستوری بہارہد ۱۱ آئیں
شاہ افغانستان آنکہ: — ہر چلد از دست و زبانش ہر آید حرف را نشاہد
ہر چہ ایجاب و اختراع سازد باقم'ل شاہ افغانستان موافق آید۔ لباً علیہ
منادی سرکار کمپلی حکم ندارند و از شاہ ظاہراً افسانہ نمیدانند۔

The Sardars were opposed to the proposed meeting between the Governor General and the Maharaja "as Lat Sahib was the servant of the Company and the Company was subordinate to the Sovereign of England, so it did not behove the exalted position of the Princely Ruler (Ranjit Singh) to meet the Governor General on footing of equality."

The Maharaja, however, took the view that "though the Governor General received his orders from the King of England yet according to the English law the Governor General was authorised to do whatever he wished and whatever he did was approved by the King."

53. 115/95. Prinsep to Wade, September 12, 1831. P. G. R. Aslo

137/29. Wade to Prinsep, September 22, 1831. P. G. R.

the ferry of Rupar and other preparations completed,⁵⁴ Fakir Aziz-udDin went to Ludhiana to bring Wade to Amritsar for accompanying the Maharaja to Rupar.⁵⁵ The Sikh Ruler who "was looking forward with great anxiety to the gratification of the approaching interview with the Governor General" allowed the Chiefs of Ladhwa, Kaithal, Nabha and Jind to add pomp to the occasion by their presence.⁵⁶ The deep interest which the Maharaja took in European drill and mode of warfare led the heads of Governments to make special arrangements for a display of as great a variety of troops as possible.⁵⁷

The Governor General reached the place on October 22, and Ranjit Singh entered his camp on the opposite bank of the Sutlej on October 25, and the first meeting between the two took place on October 26. During the days that followed great pomp and ceremoniousness were displayed on both sides and numerous presents exchanged. During one of the several talks with the Governor General Ranjit Singh sought for and obtained a written assurance of perpetual friendship.⁵⁸ The entire ceremony came to a close on the first day of November. Such was the pomp displayed at the meeting that the occasion has come to be styled as the Indian "Field of the Cloth of Gold."⁵⁹

Throughout the ceremonies, Wade's mediation imposed upon him a delicate and arduous task which he succeeded in accompli-

54. 137/29. Wade to Prinsep, September 22, 1831. F. G. R.

55. 137/31. Wade to Prinsep, October 6, 1831. F. G. R.

56. 137/33. Wade to Prinsep, October 9, 1831. F. G. R.

The list of persons comprising the suite of the Maharaja is given in Appendix VII,

57. Court, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

58. Vide Appendix VIII,

59. For a detailed account of the meeting see Prinsep, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-167.

thing to the utmost satisfaction of both the parties⁶⁰ Ranjit Singh wanted to "mark his sense of the part that Wade had acted in promoting the friendship of the two States" by conferring upon him a *jagir* of Rs. 15,000, but he declined it very politely,⁶¹ and yet the very fact of its having been offered was an eloquent tribute to Wade's great ability and charm as a diplomat and a negotiator.

Ranjit Singh returned to Lahore⁶² deeply impressed by the British and confirmed in his views that their resources and organisation, particularly in the artillery branch, were superior to his own. Military observers in the British camp were confident that "should this upstart Maharaja and his swaggering soldiery ever try conclusions with the invincible Anglo-sepoy army, a march to Lahore would be a series of field-day operations."⁶³

An inquisitive and searching reference on the part of Ranjit Singh to affairs of Sind gave a political tinge to the otherwise friendly meeting of the heads of the two Governments. Ranjit Singh's mind was not at ease about Sind on which he had long cast a covetous eye. He tried at the meeting to sound the Governor General as to his real intentions, and even hinted at his readiness to join in a combined attack on the Amirs. But the Governor General would not divulge to his wily guest and ally, the tenor of propositions already on their way to the Amirs, confessedly, lest he should endeavour to thwart the peaceful negotiations shortly to be opened by Lieut. Col. Pottingar with the Amirs.⁶⁴

60. Wade, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

61. 137/35. Wade to Prinsep, November 15, 1831. P. G. R.

62. Wade accompanied the Maharaja up to Phagwara—Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part I, p. 103.

63. Thorburn, *The Punjab in Peace and War*, p. 15.

This view was demonstrably belied by the bloody encounters of the Sikh Wars.

64. Cunningham *op. cit.*, p. 197.

The designs of Ranjit on Sind were displeasing to the English whose views with regard to Sind were becoming political as well commercial. The political object had some reference to the Russian designs, with Persia as the region threatened. The result was this political activity in the garb of commercial designs. Vide Chapter VII, *infra*.

Politically, the immediate result of the Rupar meeting was the Governor General's decision to forestall the Maharaja in Sind. By lulling the Sikh Ruler to sleep by false verbal assurances he stole a march upon him and brought Sind under the English sphere of influence. The resultant Anglo-Sindhian Treaty of 1832 naturally made Ranjit Singh apprehensive for a time, and though he did not raise his voice of protest aloud against the manner in which he had been hoodwinked by the Governor General, he made no secret of his resentment to Wade.⁶⁶

All the same, the Rupar interview, to all outward appearance, reaffirmed the long-standing alliance, friendship and cordiality between the two States. From this date, Ranjit Singh began to express, more loudly than ever, his sentiments of the most cordial friendship towards the English,⁶⁶ and henceforward the manner in which he received British visitors at his Court and the frank and unsuspecting tone of his communications in all political and military discussions grew more free and friendly.⁶⁷ It was this promotion of friendship which helped Wade in negotiations for opening the navigation of the rivers Indus and Sutlej even though the Maharaja was really suspicious of the whole project. At a subsequent date (January 1835) a treaty was concluded between the two Governments by which moderate tolls were established upon the Indus and the Sutlej, in conformity with the Treaty of 1832.⁶⁸

65. 138/3. Wade to Government, February 1, 1832. P. G. R.

Ranjit told Wade plainly that the commercial measures of the British hindered the attainment of his military measures.

66. In 1834, the Maharaja offered his aid to the British Government against Jodhpur where there was some trouble. The offer was declined, but it was considered as a proof of his good-will. (140/84. Wade to Macnaghten, October 15, 1834. P. G. R.).

After the assassination of Mr. Fraser at Delhi, the Maharaja wrote to suggest that the European functionaries should go about with a personal escort. (118/32.

Wade to Macnaghten, April 18, 1835. P. G. R.)

67. Ranjit requested the British Government to supply him copies of the pay and revenue regulation of the British army with the purpose of placing his own pay and revenue system on a more efficient basis. His wish was complied with. (141/66. Wade to Macnaghten, July 27, 1835. P. G. R.) Towards the close of 1836, Ranjit asked the British Government for a supply of muskets and pistols, and also for the exemption of the surcharge of 50 per cent. (107/40. Macnaghten to Wade, December 19, 1836. P. G. R.)

68. Vide Chapter VII, *infra*.

On that 'sapling of friendship' now shot out tender sprouts, discernible in the form of frequent complimentary *Kharitas* which passed between the two States. In February, 1835, Ranjit Singh sent a mission to Calcutta with presents for the King of England.⁶⁹ It was led by Sardar Gujar Singh Majithia,⁷⁰ and was accorded a "kindly and flattering reception."⁷¹ In the beginning of 1837 the Maharaja invited the Governor General (Lord Auckland), the Governor of Agra (Sir Charles Metcalfe) and the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Henry Fane) to be present at the nuptials of his grandson, Nau Nihal Singh. The last one alone was able to attend and returned completely satisfied.⁷²

In 1838, as his last days were drawing near, the Sikh Ruler showed a keen desire to meet Lord Auckland. The latter, who, in the beginning seemed readily agreeable to the proposal, began to harbour doubts about Ranjit's "real desire and feeling in this matter."⁷³ An after-thought of some gain coming out of the meeting induced him, however, to agree to the proposal though it could not materialise immediately.⁷⁴

69. The formal acknowledgment of the presents sent by the Maharaja for the King of England had not been received even so late as May, 1838. The Governor General attributed the delay to the "unfortunate death of King William IV and the rapid succession of domestic events by which men's minds have been occupied." (122/2. Terrens to Macnaghten, May, 15, 1838 P. G. R.)

70. It is interesting to learn that at Calcutta Gujar Singh became infatuated with the charms of a European lady so much that the Maharaja learnt that he was prepared to become a *fakir* and desert his place in the mission. Ranjit was naturally anxious to prevent this, being desirous of preserving his own credit as well as that of the Sardar's family from the shame which such an act was likely to produce.—141/85. Wade to Macnaghten, July 20, 1835. P. G. R.)

71. 102/10, Wade to Chester, February 7, 1835. P. G. R.

72. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

73. Macnaghten wrote to Wade, "It is possible that the Maharaja may even not be cordially desirous of this meeting or that he may look to it as an opportunity for pressing all his pretensions in pertinacious and unaccommodating spirit." (121/4. January 6, 1838. P. G. R.)

74. Macnaghten wrote to Wade, "His Lordship would be far from desiring the absence of the Maharaja from his capital, or from the army, if it were possible that advantage should be taken of such absence for the disturbance of peace or for aggression upon any part of his dominions." (*Ibid.*)

Their meeting ultimately took place on November 30, 1838, at Ferozepur,⁷⁵ where the British army was assembled prior to the invasion of Afghanistan.⁷⁶ Earlier, in May, a deputation having been sent by Ranjit Singh to escort a mission from Simla,⁷⁷ the Government resolved to send one in the persons of Macnaghten (Political Secretary to Government), Wade (Political Agent, Ludhiana), Osborne (Military Secretary to the Governor-General), M 'Gregor (A. D. C., to the Governor-General) and Dr. Drummond (Surgeon to the Governor General) to "impress upon Ranjit's mind the satisfaction of the British Government with his past conduct," and to endeavour "to place our alliance with Ranjit on a more secure and decided footing than had hitherto been the case". This mission was successfully brought to a conclusion by Macnaghten's ability and the concord between the two States was more firmly renewed than ever.⁷⁸




75. Osborne, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

76. For an account of this meeting see Gordon, *The Sikhs*, pp. 109-110.

77. 121/52. Macnaghten to Wade, May 7, 1838. P. G. R.

78. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp. iii-iv.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPENING OF THE INDUS & THE SUTLEJ
AND
ANGLO - SIND & SIKH - SIND RELATIONS

CHAPTER VII

THE NAVIGATION OF THE INDUS

The inception of the project of studying the possibilities of navigating the Indus may be traced back at least to some time during the second decade of the 19th century. It was in a sense the outcome of the Treaties of 1800 which had brought the British power into direct contact with the self-ruling principalities of northern and north-western India. These Treaties enabled the English to learn and appreciate the importance of such a project.

In 1819 William Moorcroft, of the Company's Stud Department, accompanied by G. Trebeck, the son of a Calcutta lawyer, undertook a journey to the countries beyond the Indus, gathering much useful information for the British about the commerce and politics of these regions. His adventure gave further impetus to the idea of such a project. He wrote: "the navigation of the Indus, although little known to Europeans, as it had not been attempted by them is perfectly practicable for boats of considerable burden."¹ The Company's servants, including Wade, soon began to entertain high hopes of capturing the markets of Central Asia by the Indus route, provided the navigable qualities of the river could be proved beyond any doubt. Sir John Malcolm minuted in the records of the Government in August 1830: "The navigation of the Indus is important in every point of view; yet we have no information that can be depended upon this subject, except of about seventy miles from Tattah to Haidarabad. Of the present state of the Delta we have native accounts, and the only facts which can be deduced are that the different streams of the river below Tattah often change their channels, and that the sands of all are constantly shifting, but notwithstanding these difficulties, boats of a small draft of water can always go up the principal of them. With regard to the Indus above Haidarabad there can be no doubt of its being, as it has been for more than two thousand years, navigable far up."² Again, wrote Wade: "The object of the Government is to

1. *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan and the Punjab*, Vol. II, p. 338.

2. Quoted in Mohan Lal, *Life of Dost Mohd. Khan*, Vol. II, p. 42.

open a regular commercial intercourse with the countries beyond the Indus, i. e., between India and Candhar and Cabul, the *entrepot* of trade with Herat and Bokhara.....when a mart at that place (Mithankot) comes to be established, we may expect to see a great part of the trade which passes through the Punjab directed into that channel to escape from the high exactions to which it is now liable.”³

Two other important political reasons determined the actual shaping of the scheme. In the first place, the Treaty of Turkomanchai, concluded in February, 1828, after the humiliating defeat of Persia by Russia, established the latter's ascendancy at the former's court and Russia extended her frontiers further eastward. It was said that Persia was “delivered and bound hand and foot to the court of St. Petersburg”. Persia certainly became a tool of the Russian policy which was calculated to threaten the internal security of the Indian Empire. “Not only in Khorassan itself, in Afganistan and Toorkistan, but in the bazaars of Bombay, was the advance of the confederate armies of the two states into Khorassan, and thence upon Herat and India, generally discussed and believed”⁴ This fear of ever-growing Russian influence was equally entertained by English statesmen in England and in India. The mission from Fateh Ali, the Persian Ruler, concerning the marriage of his daughter to the son of the Amir of Hyderabad was understood in terms of Russian efforts at aggrandizement. Wade observed: “If the negotiations for marriage should take effect, an alliance will be formed between Sindh and Persia which may probably lead to an identification of interest between these two states, and Sindh may become, as Persia now is, subservient to the policy of Russia.”⁵ To counteract this growing menace, it was thought desirable that every intelligence should be collected regarding the frontier States of India, and the nature of defence offered by the Indus in particular. Further,

3. 101/31. Wade to Mackeson, July 17, 1834. P. G. R.

It was generally believed that the Indus had been the highway of commerce between upper India and Central Asia, and had only fallen into disuse recently because of the unsettled conditions of those tracts.—115/2. Prinsep to Wade, December 31, 1831. P. G. R.

4. Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, pp. 151-56.

5. 37/23. Wade to Prinsep, August 5, 1831. P. G. R.

the suspicion that Russia had a commercial influence in Bokhara and the adjoining Khanates indicated to the necessity of establishing similar influence by the British in Sind and Central Asia by opening the Indus to commerce. Wade emphatically expressed this necessity on behalf of his Government: "The Secret Committee of the Hon'ble Court of Directors have expressed great anxiety to obtain the free navigation of the Indus with a view to the advantages that must result from substituting our influence for that derived by Russia through her commercial intercourse with Bokhara and the countries lying between Hindustan and the Caspian Sea, as well as because of the great facilities afforded by this river for the disposal of the produce and manufacture of the British Dominions both in Europe and in India"*

Secondly, the English were daily growing apprehensive of Ranjit Singh's designs on Sind. These had lately come to be revealed when the Sikh Ruler set forth to demand tribute from the Amirs—tribute which they had formerly paid to the Afghans—arguing that since he had acquired the major portion of the Afghan possessions in India, he had *ipso facto* succeeded to their rights and privileges as well.⁷ The English, therefore, felt that the conquest of Sind by the Sikhs would carry the frontiers of their kingdom to the very limits of the Arabian Sea from where the Sikh Ruler would establish contact with the outside world.⁸ The only effective way of checking or preventing this was, in Cunningham's word, "to open the Indus to the navigation of the world,"⁹ and to effect commercial treaties with the Amirs. Such treaties would be tantamount to taking Sind under partial protection.

The opportunity for starting the exploration of the scheme came conveniently after 1828. A year earlier Amherst had received from the Sikh Chief some presents, including a shawl-tent, for the King of England, and the Governor General had carried them home

6. 98/181. Wade to Pottinger, October 22, 1831. P. G. R.

This important letter is reproduced *in extenso* in Appendix IX.

7. 137/8. Wade to Government, May 18, 1831. P. G. R.

8. Vide Chapter VIII, *infra*.

9. *A History of the Sikhs*. p. 198.

on his retirement in 1828. It was then determined to send from England a return present, and "a very extraordinary selection was made, upon whose advice has not transpired. It was resolved to send Ranjit Singh, on the part of His Majesty, a team of cart-horses, four mares and one stallion, upon some conception that in his love for horses Ranjit Singh must be a breeder of the animal, and would be well pleased to have mares of large size to cross with the breeds of the Punjab."¹⁰ The transmission of this present was to be made a means of obtaining information in regard to the Indus and the facilities it might offer for navigation. Sir John Malcolm, the Governor of Bombay, received the horses and forwarded them to Cutch after adding the present of a carriage. Munshi Mohan Lal, a member of the mission which accompanied the presents to Lahore, explains the addition of the carriage thus: "He (Lt. Col. Pottinger, Resident in Cutch) suggested it might allay the fears of Sind Government if a large carriage was sent with the horses, since the size and bulk of it would render it obvious that the mission could then only proceed by water. This judicious proposal was immediately adopted by the Government." Further, "if the Mirs of Sind, however, should happen to object to this measure, and should say that they will permit the horses to pass by land, Sir Alexander Burnes was to reply that the carriage, by a long journey on an uneven and irregular road, will be worn out and reduced to pieces, and that, therefore, he must go by water."¹¹

10. Prinsep, *Origin of the Sikh Power in Punjab*, p. 153.

11. *Life of Amir Dost Mohd Khan*, Vol. II pp. 41-43.

[It was not for the first time that the present of a carriage was being sent to the Sikh Ruler. Twenty years earlier Lord Minto had sent such a present by road (see p. 13, *supra*). But now it was thought that the carriage could only be transmitted by water.]

Metcalf in a minute written in October, 1830, observed that the scheme of surveying the Indus, under the pretence of conveying a present to Ranjit Singh, "is a trick unworthy of our Government, which cannot fail, when detected, as most probably it will be, to excite the jealousy and indignation of the powers on which we play it." (*Selections from the Papers of Lord Metcalfe*, edited by Kays, p. 211).

This mission was put in charge of Lieut. Alexander Burnes. He had been in the Quarter-Master-General's department, and was then Assistant to Lt. Col. Pottinger and in political charge of the Cutch district and of British relations with Sind. Burnes was judged to be qualified in every respect for the duty, and was instructed to obtain information "about the depth of the water in the Indus, the direction and breadth of the stream, its facilities for steam navigation, the supply of the fuel on its banks, and the condition of the Princes and the people who possess the country on it."¹²

Malcolm thought that the most politic course would be to send the mission without previous notice or correspondence with the Amirs of Sind, thinking the necessity they would thus be under of deciding suddenly would be likely to contribute to the success of the expedition.¹³ But the propriety or even the expediency of such an action was doubtful because it would have certainly put the Amirs in an embarrassing situation. Such unbecoming tactics necessarily caused delay later in obtaining a passage up the river. Considering the subterfuges contemplated by the British, the suspicions of the Amirs with regard to the former's real designs and the obstacles the latter placed in the progress of the mission were natural enough.

Pottinger sent an agent to Hyderabad to endeavour to overcome the repugnance shown by the Amirs to the passage of the Indus, but the latter gave evasive answers by stating that the way was difficult, that no boats were procurable, and the like.¹⁴ The argument of the bulky carriage was next put forward by Pottinger, and was met by the Amirs through reference to the clause in their Treaty with the British that no European would enter Sind. In fact, the Amirs'

12. 115/11, Martin to Wale, January 11, 1831. P. G. R. And Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara*, Vol. III, pp. 4-5.

13. Prinsep, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

14. 98/115. Wade to Martin, March 11, 1831. P. G. R.

main objection came finally to be based on this ground.¹⁵ Prolonged negotiations followed, and at one stage Wade was informed by the Secretary to the Governor General that "the Amirs of Sind have finally determined on refusing to allow Lt. Burnes to proceed up the Indus with the dray-horses for Maharaja Ranjit Singh" and that "they have further behaved with much incivility towards Burnes." Wade was enjoined to explain the *contretemps* to the Maharaja and to help the mission up the Indus. Wade, realising that the Amirs viewed the expedition with the utmost distrust and alarm, and as a precursor of the British army, met the situation adroitly through "a demonstration of His Highness' force, under General Ventura, from the neighbouring Sikh frontier of Dera Ghazi Khan, together with the personal expostulations of Ranjit Singh with the envoys of the Amirs of Sind, then present at his Court, induced these Chiefs, as they afterwards avowed, to withdraw their opposition, and allow Burnes a free passage by the river through their territory."¹⁶ The reason for the Maharaja acting so readily on the behest of Wade was his eagerness to seize any opportunity for coercing the Amirs, particularly if that could be done in co-operation with the British, for he had "schemes of his own in that quarter."¹⁷

Burnes arrived at Bahawalpur in the first week of June, 1831, and received much attention and civility from Nawab Bahawal Khan, the Daudputra Chief. Burnes mentions that "Nawab Ghulam Kadir Khan who had been sent to receive the British mission, and who had travelled forty miles for their reception, declared that the mission shall pass through his country free of expenses. He has furnished indeed our whole party with necessary and even luxury of life since we entered his territory. His liberality has amounted to munificence and his hospitality quite exceed all bounds.....His munificence has not been coupled with a single request or wish on his part for any favour from the Government, which he says, since the time of Mr. Elphinstone, he considers the best and only friend of his country."¹⁸

15. 137/12. Wade to Government, May 25, 1831. P. G. R.

16. Wade, *A Narrative of the Services, Military and Political*, pp. 15-17.

17. 137/34. Wade to Government, October 19, 1831. P. G. R.

18. 115/25. Burnes to Martin, June 6, 1831. P. G. R.

Wade was allowed by the Governor General, in compliance with the Maharaja's wish to be present at Lahore at Burnes' arrival and during his stay there.¹⁹ Burnes reached the Sikh capital on July 18,²⁰ while Wade, accompanied by Dr. Murray had come three days earlier.²¹ Burnes' progress had been slowed since entering the Ravi owing to the tortuousness of that river.²² The Maharaja had sent a party to meet him at Syedwala, 25 kos away from Lahore.²³

On July 20 Burnes had his introductory visit to the Maharaja. The latter received him and the complimentary letter and the presents²⁴ with marked distinction in an open hall situated in the old royal palace of Lahore, which was then his residence. The Maharaja felt greatly flattered by so distinguished a mark of honour from the King of a nation for whom he had high respect, and whose superiority he acknowledged in every respect.²⁵

Ranjit had several conversations with Burnes in which he dwelt vivaciously on the navigation of the Indus.²⁶ Thereafter, Burnes proceeded to Simla to submit to the Governor General his observations.²⁷ Their gist was to the effect that the river Indus was "much better adopted

19. 115/93. Prinsep to Wade, June 31, 1831. P. G. R.

20. 137/21. Wade to Prinsep, July 21, 1831. P. G. R.

21. 98/169. Wade to Martin, July 21, 1831. P. G. R.

22. 137/20. Wade to Prinsep, July 6, 1831. P. G. R.

23. *Ibid.*

24. A word regarding the presents from His Majesty to the Maharaja. Thousands of horses were conveyed to and from India through the Punjab every year, and there was not a station in northern India where vehicles of various kinds were not kept. The mares were forthwith sent to graze, and the dray-horse was dressed up like an elephant and stationed in front of Ranjit's palace, where after a year he died.—Hugel, *Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab*, pp. 325-26.

25. 137/21. Wade to Prinsep, July 21, 1831. P. G. R.

26. *Ibid.*

27. 137/24. Wade to Prinsep, August 16, 1831. P. G. R.

to every purpose of commerce, and more navigable, and had a greater and more uniform depth and less opposing current than any of the rivers of India further east."²⁸ It was in pursuance of these observations and other political reasons which have already been stated, that the Governor General made his decision to open the river Indus to navigation.

Accordingly, Pottinger was despatched promptly to negotiate with the Sind Amirs about the navigation of the lower Indus. Ranjit Singh was not told about this move. The basis of the negotiations with the Amirs was to be "to obtain guarantees against the levy of irregular duties or wanton obstruction of any kind to boats and merchandize, to offer a guarantee against loss of revenue to the Sind Government from the adoption of the scheme, and so to procure that the river Indus should become again the channel for extensive commerce and be frequented securely by the craft and vessels of all the adjoining districts and even of Europe."²⁹ The Amirs, however, were not to be coerced into the treaties, on the other hand, their consent was to be obtained, at first, by conciliatory methods. They were to be made to realize that their people would flourish by increased opportunities of trade and their states would derive extreme benefits, and that they would augment their revenues by increased duties on expanded commerce. In case, any Ruler persisted in refusing to agree to the scheme, Pottinger was to say that having control over only a part of the river, that particular Amir had no right to deprive all other states and people inhabiting on that river from an advantage which nature had given to them all. It was to be declared that such an act would be against the spirit of the international law, especially when the passage was going to be innocent and attended with no danger to the Province.³⁰

28. 98/181. Wade to Pottinger, October 22, 1831. P. G. R. Vide Appendix IX.

29. Prinsep, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

30. 98/181. Government to Pottinger. October 22, 1831. P. G. R.

It may be noted that these instructions were issued to Pottinger just four days before the Rupar meeting.

The Amirs, who already had looked upon Burnes' mission to Lahore with much doubt and suspicion, could hardly be expected to receive Pottinger with any marked degree of civility or hospitality. They tried to make all sorts of excuses and put all types of obstructions in the progress of negotiations. After long and protracted discussions, however, Pottinger did succeed in concluding two treaties, one with Rustam Khan, the Amir of Khyrpur, on April 4, 1832, and the other with Mir Murad Ali of Hyderabad sixteen days later. By these treaties the roads and the rivers of Sind were thrown open for trade to the merchants of India, provided that "(i) no person shall bring any description of military stores by the river Indus or road; (ii) no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river; and (iii) no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Sind."³¹ These clauses indicate clearly the real basis of the distrustful attitude which the Amirs adopted, and the true nature of the fears which they felt regarding the projected "commercial" activities of the British. They knew that the *Kothis* or factories would soon become *Chaonis* or military cantonments, the commercial roads the roads for the transport of munition; and that the ships for merchandize would be used as men-of-war.³² Therefore, they naturally had such clauses inserted in the treaties, and the British could not possibly refuse to include them. The future was to show how true their apprehensions proved when each one of these clauses was violated without justification or scruple.

A supplement to the Treaty with Mir Murad Ali was signed on April 22, by which the final decision regarding the fixation of duties to be levied by the Government of Hyderabad on foreign goods passing through its country, was virtually placed in the hands of the British Government.³³

31. At this time Hyderabad was ruled by Mir Murad Ali, the only surviving brother of the '*char-yar*'. -Mir Rustam Khan ruled independently in Khyrpur, the capital of Upper Sind. Duplicate treaties were therefore necessary, one with Rustam and the other with Murad. For details see Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. VIII, pp. 318-321,

32. Gough and Innes aptly say: "that a mighty military power should view mere commerce as an end in itself, without ulterior designs of conquest, is a conception quite foreign to the oriental mind. The mere knowledge that the Indus was being, so to speak, officially investigated, aroused in the minds of the Punjab and other chiefs suspicions to which the whole history of the Honourable East India Company gave a good deal of colour"—*The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars*, p. 38.

33. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 321-22.

The project of navigation expanded further. The original scheme was merely to open the Indus from its mouth upto Mithankot, i. e., where the Sikh country began. But it was now decided to have "the free navigation of the Sutlej in continuation of that of the lower Indus."³⁴ Accordingly, towards the end of 1831, Wade was deputed to explain to Ranjit Singh the object of Pottinger's mission and to remove from his mind "any suspicions that the British Government under the cloak of commercial objects is desirous of extending its influence, and prosecuting views different from those of commerce."³⁵ A *Kharita* from the Governor General to the Maharaja, in which the objects of the scheme were given, was sent through Wade. The means of intercourse between His Highness's territories and those of the British Government by the route of the Indus were to be improved, and the rivers Indus and Sutlej were to be made a channel for commerce, thus making the Punjab as accessible to the merchants as if it were on sea-shore.³⁶

Ranjit Singh, on being informed of the proposed mission, displayed as great a sensitiveness as the Amir had done, though for different reasons. To show that Wade was not welcome, the Maharaja deputed a Sardar of inferior rank than usual to receive him at Phillaur, when he crossed the Sutlej on January 13. Kishen Chand, His Highness's agent, enquired about the probable duration of Wade's visit saying that the Maharaja intended to proceed to the Derajat after he had taken leave. In other words, the Maharaja wanted Wade's visit to be as short as possible. Wade attributed this attitude to "a distrust of the objects of my journey, and a desire that his well known designs in respect of Shikarpoor should be proclaimed before I announce the nature of the communications with which I am charged."³⁷

34. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

35. 115/102. Prinsep to Wade, December 19, 1831. P. G. R.

36. 115/102. Prinsep to Wade, December 19, 1831. P. G. R. enclosing letter from the Governor General to Ranjit Singh.

37. 138/2. Wade to Prinsep, January 13, 1832. P. G. R.

In these circumstances it was with a mind full of misgivings that Wade reached Lahore on January 25, and delivered the *Kharita* to the Maharaja. Ranjit Singh was not satisfied with this communication, and remained full of doubts. He feared correctly that by contracting a commercial treaty with him the British wanted to check his expansion in the direction of Sind. This, he thought, was in contravention of the Treaty of 1809 by which he could be checked on the left bank of the Sutlej only; and that limit, he believed, ended as soon as the Sutlej merged with the Indus.³⁸ He wrote about his apprehensions in a round about way to the Government, saying that he had no objection to the opening of the Indus to navigation provided nothing was done to disturb the Treaty of 1809.³⁹ Wade assured the Maharaja in most distinct terms that his Government had no political designs at all in that sphere, and had no idea whatever of interfering with the existing treaty. This put Ranjit's fears at rest to some extent. In this way Wade succeeded and secured his consent.⁴⁰ He returned to Ludhiana on March 12.⁴¹

Wade's task had been much more difficult and his achievement correspondingly greater than that of Pottinger. In the first place, the Maharaja was a much more able and shrewd diplomat than any of the Amirs; secondly, he could not easily be overawed with force, and thirdly, Wade's mission, coming so soon after the voyage of Burnes, had been viewed by the Sikh courtiers with the greatest distrust and jealousy.

The Government now proposed making arrangements for opening the Sutlej also to navigation. Letters to this effect were despatched both to Ranjit Singh and Bahawal Khan. The Nawab, much afraid

38. See Chapter VIII, *infra*.

39. 138/4. Wade to Prinsep, February 3, 1832. P. G. R.
Enclosing Ranjit Singh's letter to the Governor General.

40. 138/41. Wade to Prinsep, March 7, 1832. P. G. R.

41. 138/16. Wade to Prinsep, March 21, 1832. P. G. R.

of the Sikh Chief, considered it a boon to join hands with the British in any scheme, and readily consented, though he desired that the matter should be settled by a regular treaty as in the case of the Sind Amirs.⁴²

In September, Wade went to settle with the Maharaja and Bahawal Khan the preliminaries of the treaties for opening the Sutlej and the Indus to navigation. He was also instructed to proceed to Mithankot for the purpose of surveying the course of the former river.⁴³ In order to exalt Wade in the eyes of the Chiefs he was raised to the status of Political Agent,⁴⁴

Wade planned to go to Bahawalpur and from there to proceed to Lahore. But fearing that the Maharaja might take umbrage at this he changed the original plan,⁴⁵ and proceeded with unusual alacrity towards Pind Dadan Khan where the Maharaja agreed to see him. In the opinion of Wade Ranjit's object in wishing to see him at that place, which was a centre of salt trade, was to consult him as to the best mode of regulating the trade in that article.⁴⁶

Ranjit wished to know in detail the utility of the scheme and the advantages which would accrue from its execution. In answer to this, Wade referred to the old trade that was carried on through the Indus and observed, "What are the causes of the former prosperity and the latter decadence of the Punjab? Nothing but the elimination of trade from the rich land of the Punjab because of the prevailing chaos and state of insecurity after the dismemberment of the Kingdom of Kabul.....The output of the Kashmir has declined both in quality and quantity. Again, why has the entire trade centred in the hands of a few Marwaris? Because

42. 138/37. Wade to Macnaghten, August 7, 1832. P. G. R.

43. 116/23. Macnaghten to Wade, September 19, 1832. P. G. R.

44. 116/21. Swinton to Wade, July 30, 1832. P. G. R.

45. 138/54. Wade to Macnaghten, October 15, 1832. P. G. R.

46. 99/53. Wade to Mackeson, October 25, 1832. P. G. R.

all the routes of trade with Amritsar, the commercial capital of the Punjab, are dangerous and infested with predatory tribes. A diversion from these unsafe routes to the more secure channels, as proposed by the British Government, would encourage the Punjab trade."⁴⁷ These "forceful arguments and redoubtable logic" of Wade convinced the Maharaja regarding the utility and need of opening the rivers Indus and Sutlej to navigation. Ranjit now only wanted to know about the duties to be levied on the Sutlej. Wade assured him that none could deny him the right to levy such duties, provided they were fair and equitable so as to promote the success of the scheme. As to the full details he would let the Maharaja know when the Tariff Report that was being prepared by Trevelyan was completed.⁴⁸

Not long afterwards, Wade received Trevelyan's Tariff Report which emphasised that a system of tariff was to be established only to check arbitrary exactions. To render the Indus a highway of commerce more attention was to be paid to the protection and encouragement of merchants than to profits. For effective functioning of the machinery it was necessary that the posts existing in the present system of collection be abolished pending a settlement by the Government. Trevelyan proposed that a duty of 12½ per cent on all articles which came under the description of cloth and metals, and 5 per cent on every thing else, would be fair. Further, it was natural that each Ruler would share the duty fixed upon for the whole of the trade of the Indus and the Sutlej in proportion to the length of the river in his dominions. It was also suggested that if the British share in the duties by virtue of its territorial right on the left bank of the Sutlej was not kept in the background, the Government would be regarded as an unauthorised intruder. Ferozepur was suggested as the station where the share of the feudatory chiefs, Ranjit Singh and Bahawal Khan should be collected, and a similar post for the Amirs was to be fixed at the mouth of the Indus. It was considered necessary that Wade should be posted at Ferozepur for superintendence and that the boats between the two stations should not be liable to detention.⁴⁹

47. 138/60. Wade to Macnaghten, October 27, 1832. P. G. R.

48. *Ibid.*

49. 116/39. Macnaghten to Wade, November 15, 1832. P. G. R.
(Enclosing Trevelyan's Tariff Report).

After long drawn out arguments, Wade was successful in obtaining the Maharaja's consent to open the Indus and Sutlej to commercial navigation.⁵⁰ All that now remained was to negotiate a treaty on the model of the one signed by Pottinger with the Amirs of Sind. The treaty was ultimately signed at Lahore on December 26, 1832.⁵¹

The proposal of the transfer of Wade to Ferozepur caused anxiety to the Maharaja who feared that it might cause deterioration in his relations with the British. Therefore, he requested the Government to keep him at Ludhiana and allow him to continue in his former duties.⁵² The Government acceded to his request.⁵³

As a part of the course of the river Sutlej was through the territory of Bahawal Khan, it was necessary to secure his assent also to the arrangement. Wade, accordingly, left for Bhawalpur on January 5, 1833.⁵⁴

The Nawab sent a party of men under Nawab Ghulam Qadir to receive the Political Agent when he entered the Bahawalpur territory at Asowala, but Wade, on his arrival there, was informed that the party would wait upon him the next day. Offended at this Wade replied that he had no time to wait for them as he wanted to see their master without any delay.⁵⁵ They had, therefore, to apologize to Wade.⁵⁶ On February 8, Wade reached Bindrawala Ghat, three miles from Bahawalpur. The next day he was conducted to the presence of the Nawab, who felt greatly

50. Ranjit Singh made it quite clear to Wade that he had agreed to the scheme of opening the Indus to navigation though some of his Sardars were opposed to it on account of his good relations with the British,—128/75. Wade to Macnaghten, December 31, 1832. P. G. R.

51. For treaty see Aitchison, *op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 36—38. The Persian text of the original treaty is preserved in Punjab Government Record Office, Lahore.

52. 139/2. Wade to Macnaghten, January 23, 1833. P. G. R.

53. 117/1. Macnaghten to Wade, February 4, 1833. P. G. R.

54. 139/2. Wade to Macnaghten, January 29, 1833. P. G. R.

55. 139/10. Wade to Macnaghten, February 25, 1833. P. G. R.

56. *Ibid.*

embarrassed.⁵⁷ To add to the difficulties of Wade the Sind vakils at Bahawalpur came forward and began to dissuade the Nawab from having any intercourse with the foreigners.⁵⁸ Such efforts, however, proved abortive. With his charming manners Wade was in a short time able to persuade the Nawab to sign a commercial treaty on lines similar to those with Ranjit Singh.⁵⁹

Having concluded the treaty Wade pushed forward in order to complete the survey of the river and reached Mithankot on March 5⁶⁰. Thence he turned back to Ludhiana and arrived there on April 12.⁶¹

The treaties that Wade had negotiated with the Maharaja and the Nawab were agreed to by the Governor General with certain insignificant modifications⁶² which were accepted by the parties concerned.⁶³ The Governor General very much appreciated Wade's conduct in successfully negotiating them. His patience, his knowledge of eastern potentates' character and his becoming manners—all these had contributed to this highly creditable achievement.⁶⁴

With the signing of the treaties the first phase of the scheme was completed. Efforts were now made to make it a success. Wade planned to send an experimental cargo from Ludhiana to Mithankot to encourage the merchants to follow this route.⁶⁵ The mercantile community of Ludhiana and Amritsar readily joined with two boats at Harike Pattan.⁶⁶ Wade promised them immunity

57. 139/9. Wade to Macnaghten, February 14, 1833. P. G. R., See p. 106, *supra*.

58. 139/10 Wade to Macnaghten, February 25, 1833. P. G. R.

59. *Ibid*.

60. 139/12. Wade to Macnaghten, March 7, 1833. P. G. R.

61. 99/84. Wade to Clerk, April 12, 1833. P. G. R. And
139/21. Wade to Macnaghten, April 12, 1833. P. G. R.

62. 117/7. Macnaghten to Wade, April 23, 1833. P. G. R. Also
117/8. Macnaghten to Wade, April 30, 1833. P. G. R.

63. 105/17. Mackeson to Wade, July 14, 1833. P. G. R. And
139/55. Wade to Macnaghten, August 24, 1833. P. G. R.

64. 117/29. Macnaghten to Wade, September 13, 1833. P. G. R.

65. 139/2. Wade to Macnaghten, January 19, 1833. P. G. R.

66. 139/24. Wade to Macnaghten, April 23, 1833. P. G. R.

from taxes and secured similar concessions from the Amirs. This adventure, however, did not meet with much success because of the Amirs' jealousy towards the merchants in disposing of their cargo at Shikarpur.⁶⁷

All this was discouraging for the Government, but Wade who knew the character of the people on the Indus thought that this jealousy on the part of the Sind authorities was natural in the early stages, but would disappear eventually as was the case with Ranjit Singh a year and a half earlier.⁶⁸

By 1834 the British had examined the tables of duties sent by the Maharaja and the Nawab, and found that the scale of *ad valorem* duties on the different description of merchandise would not work well, as the people of these countries were inexperienced in the system of levying such duties.⁶⁹ So it was thought desirable to substitute a fixed toll instead of levying duties. The revised scheme fixed the entire amount of toll from the sea to Rupar to be Rs. 570 per boat irrespective of its size; weight or value of the cargo, out of which a sum of Rs. 240 was to be given to the Amirs of Sind,⁷⁰ Ranjit Singh was to receive Rs. 155/4/8, Bahawal Khan Rs. 106/12/3, and the balance of Rs. 67/15/1 was to be given to the feudatory chiefs holding land on the left bank of the Sutlej.⁷¹ By this fixed toll the merchants were to pay a uniform rate of duty and this tariff was to be applicable only to goods which were in actual transit upon the line of the Indus and not on any other goods.⁷² To bring about the change, the consent of the parties concerned was deemed essential. Wade came again to negotiate with the Maharaja and the Nawab.

67. 139/24. Wade to Macnaghten, April 23, 1833. P. G. R.

68. 139/46. Wade to Macnaghten, July 21, 1833. P. G. R.

69. Wade, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

70. 117/42. Macnaghten to Wade, June 9, 1834. P. G. R.

71. "No mention is made (in the Governor General's letter of June 9, 1834) of the share of the feudatories of the Lahore and British Governments whose territories lie on the left bank of the Sutlej, whereas their right to share is fully recognized by the Governor General's letter of November 15, 1832, as well as by the Trevelyan's Report to be Rs. 67/15/1". — 140/70. Wade to Macnaghten, September 5, 1832. P. G. R.

72. 101/31. Wade to Macnaghten, July 17, 1834. P. G. R.

As it was anticipated that the modifications suggested would be repugnant to the Maharaja, Wade was urged to assure him that the proposed change had been devised to confer the greatest possible benefit on the parties to the scheme. He was directed to impress upon the Maharaja the disinterestedness of the Government which could be shown by the fact that it had lately declined to participate in the profits arising from the scheme.⁷³

When Wade sent a draft of the supplementary treaty, the Maharaja expressed a desire to exclude the feudatory chiefs from a share of the monetary benefit, which share he himself wanted to grab. He further wished to be a party to the scheme for a period of three years only as he expressed his fears that the revised scheme would diminish his revenues. But Wade prevailed upon him to waive his objections and on November 29, 1834, he signed the new treaty as originally presented to him.⁷⁴ This was ratified by the Governor General on January 23, 1835.⁷⁵

The Nawab of Bahawalpur, though he signed the new treaty without a hitch, said that he was doing so only out of regard for the Government. He wrote to Wade: "My esteemed friend, although in the former treaty it was proposed to levy the duties on merchandise, and now, in contradiction to that, it is proposed that the duty should be levied on boats, nevertheless as submission and dependence on the British Government and preservation of friendly relations with yourself have always been my object..... I have, therefore, signed..... the supplementary treaty."⁷⁶ Wade answered Bahawal Khan's objection by saying that "a reference to the 6th article of the former treaty will show that the fixing of the principle (regarding duties) then proposed depended upon future deliberations. When, therefore, it was found after due consideration

73. 117/42. Macnaghten to Wade, June 9, 1834. P. G. R.

74. For treaty see Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 39-40.

75. 118/4. Macnaghten to Wade, January 23, 1835. P. G. R.

76. 105/65. Mackeson to Wade, August 11, 1834. P. G. R.

(Enclosing translation of a letter from Bahawal Khan).

that that principle involved loss and distress to merchants and endless reclamations between the different Governments, it was changed to a toll on boats, and this change I cannot but consider favourable to your interests."⁷⁷

Wade had been urging upon his Government for some time the necessity of stationing British officers at some places on the line of the navigation. In the first place, several powers were concerned in the scheme, and from the enmity which existed between the Sindhians and Doadpotras on the one hand, and between them and the Sikhs on the other, it was feared that in the absence of a British agent it might tend to obstruct its progress. It might cause loss and annoyance to the merchants arising from the liability to frequent impediments and examinations.⁷⁸ Secondly, the Maharaja intended to convert Mithankot (on the line) into a mart for the produce of his province, and it was feared that in the absence of an impartial observer there, his interests might clash with those of the Sindhians and Doadpotras.⁷⁹ Thirdly, the British officers were necessary as the real object of the Government in inaugurating the scheme was political in the guise of commerce.⁸⁰ Fourthly, as the most disturbed tract on the whole line from Ludhiana to the sea was below Mithankot, particularly between that place and Shikarpur,⁸¹ it was felt that unless a British representative was present to see to the safety of this tract, the trade would completely rest on the mercy of the Amirs whose hostility to the scheme was well-known. Wade was convinced that unless British observers were appointed at key places half the objects of the scheme at least would be rendered nugatory. He recommended that Mithankot would be the most suitable place for the residence of one such officer whose duty would be to watch over the trade, regulate the amount which each state would be entitled to collect, and see that the cargoes corresponded with the bills of loading.⁸²

77. 140/70. Wade to Macnaghten, September 5, 1834. P. G. R.

78. 101/31. Wade to Mackeson, July 17, 1834. P. G. R.

79. 140/70. Wade to Macnaghten, September 5, 1834. P. G. R.

80. 101/31. Wade to Macnaghten, July 17, 1834. P. G. R.

81. 105/11. Mackeson to Wade, April 19, 1834. P. G. R.

82. 139/10. Wade to Mackeson, February 25, 1833. P. G. R.

"Mithankot.....as it was near that spot where the territories of the three powers, viz., Lahore, Bahawalpur and Khyrpur came in contact with each other and united river of the Punjab joined the Indus." (*sic*.)

The Government appreciated the soundness of Wade's arguments and accepted his suggestions but to carry them out was not quite easy. The Amirs strongly objected to the stationing of a British agent in Sind. Wade was informed that "the Amir (of Hyderabad) was tormented hourly and momentarily by Mr. Dick,⁸³ who gave him headache daily and that that was an additional reason for refusing to allow another gentleman (i. e., the English agent) to come to reside in Sind."⁸⁴ Their continued refusal led to much unpleasantness and bitterness, and Pottinger, who had to negotiate with them, wrote to the Government: "Should the Hyderabad Amir refuse in however civil terms and on whatever pretence to ratify one of the treaties now in his possession, I hope that I shall be excused for saying that I look upon all further amicable negotiations to be utterly unprofitable..... The progress, moreover, of his intercourse with us, from the hour of his father's death has been unblushing tissue of chicanery and falsehood and is strongly corroborative of the character which I heard of him and recorded when in Sind, that is, 'that he had no tie save his fears', and they must be worked on before he will be brought to understand our power and rights.....We must change our requests to demands and support those demands by increasing the force in Cutch and blockading the ports of Sind till everything we wish for is fully acceded to."⁸⁵

On receiving a letter from Pottinger, the Amir remarked: "Let the British Government resort to force if it likes. I have agreed to nothing. We are soldiers and we shall see the results".⁸⁶ Therefore, the situation for the time being seemed critical and though the Amirs ultimately signed the revised treaty,⁸⁷ such remarks and such an attitude

83. A European officer in the service of the Amir.

84. 105/75. Pottinger to Wade, October 14, 1834. P. G. R.

85. 105/75. Pottinger to Wade, October 14, 1834. P. G. R. (Enclosing a copy of his letter to Government).

86. 105/78. Macnaghten to Wade, November 17, 1834. P. G. R.

87. When all means of achieving the end by friendliness and consent failed, the British acceded to modify the demand according to the wishes of the Amirs, and the appointment of a native agent instead of a British officer was agreed.—106/12. Pottinger to Wade, February 15, 1835. P. G. R.

on the part of the parties concerned boded ill for the success of the scheme for which so much pains were being taken.

The arrangements as finally settled were that the lower part of the Indus and the whole of the Sutlej were thrown open to commercial navigation. A British agent was stationed at Mithankot on account of its proximity to that spot at which the territories of Sind, the Punjab and Bahawalpur coincided, and the united rivers of the Punjab joined the Indus. A total of Rs. 570 was fixed as the toll per boat from Rupar to the sea, irrespective of the size of the boat and the weight of the value of its cargo, out of which a sum of Rs. 240 was to go to the Amirs, Rs. 155/4/8 to the Maharaja, Rs. 106/12/3 to the Nawab and Rs. 67/15/1 to the feudatory chiefs on the banks of the Sutlej.⁸⁸ Lieut. Mackeson was posted as the "British Agent for the navigation of the Indus and Sutlej" at Mithankot,⁸⁹ and Syed Azimud Din Hussan was appointed the "British Native Agent" at the mouth of the Indus. Apart from collecting Rs. 240/- from each boat and paying the sum over to the Amirs, the British native agent had to perform other duties also. He was informed that : "disputes will, of course, sometimes arise amongst the merchants and their servants and the boatmen, and coolies, and about the *bunders*.....It will be your duty to settle these.....and when the subjects of the Sind Government are parties in them you will do so in concert with the Amirs' officers, otherwise you will do it alone." Besides, he was warned not "to demand or receive or allow any other person to demand or receive a single rupee in the shape of a present under any pretence." Any infringement however slight of this rule was to subject him to instant dismissal.⁹⁰

Munshi Jeth Anund, British native agent at Hyderabad, was also to perform similar duties and the following additional instructions were issued to him; "You are to see that no one molests or stops the boats on any pretence from the time they quit the salt water *bunders* till they pass the Sind frontier and you are from time to time to obtain orders from all the Amirs who have territories on the bank of the river to their *thana-dars* and other officers to protect the boats passing up and down and to allow no persons to make any demand however small from them.

88. 101/31. Wade to Mackeson, July 17, 1834. P. G. R. See p. 110, *supra*.

89. 102/8. Wade to Pottinger, February 5, 1835. P. G. R.

90. 106/12. Pottinger to Wade, February 15, 1835. P. G. R.

"Should any boat either going up or coming down meet with an accident or be detained from any cause within Sind, you are to proceed yourself to the spot and render her every assistance in your power and to apply for the same to the Amirs and their officers whether within the Hyderabad or Khyrpur districts, in case in which you think it desirable.

"Should a boat be plundered or attacked, or her crew in any way misused during her progress, you are to hasten to the place and to call on the nearest officers of the Government in whose territories (Hyderabad or Khyrpur) the outrage may have occurred to aid you in taking the depositions of the boat people and in securing the accused."⁹¹

Could there be nobler intentions than these? Could the interests of the merchants have been guarded in a better way?

The rivers had been opened to navigation but the route could not be made popular and the scheme worked in a sluggish and haphazard manner. In order to accelerate trade by the new route the Government adopted several measures. Burnes was sent on a mission to Kabul to make known to the merchants residing beyond the Indus the steps that had been taken to re-establish the trade formerly carried on by that river. Wade directed Mackeson to meet Burnes at Mithankot,⁹² and requested the Maharaja to send there one agents,⁹³ and also invited several merchants of Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur,⁹⁴ "for the purpose of devising a convenient point on the Indus for the establishment of an *entrepot* and annual fair like those of Leipsic and Novgorad."⁹⁵ Yet with all these elaborate plans and with the 'best will in the world' on the part

91. 106/12. Pottinger to Wade, February 15, 1835. P. G. R.

92. 142/18. Wade to Macnaghten, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

93. 143/72. Wade to Macnaghten, April 14, 1837. P. G. R.

94. 143/58. Wade to Macnaghten, May 7, 1837. P. G. R.

95. 142/18. Wade to Macnaghten, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

of the promoters, the scheme commercially at any rate fizzled out. An intensive examination of the records reveals the defects inherent in the scheme, and other causes which led to its failure. The main defect was in the scheme itself. The revised system of tolls was pregnant with many shortcomings. It precluded the exportation of all the cheap and bulky raw products, such as grain especially gram and salt that could bring profit from the Bombay market. The toll on these commodities being the same as on costly articles, there was no inducement for the merchants to trade in them. They deceived the Government by building boats of larger size as all boats were subject to equal amount of toll. This reduced the income of the Governments considerably. In order to remedy this defect a supplementary treaty was signed with Ranjit Singh on May 19, 1839.⁹⁶ But that came too late. Much had happened by then to ensure the utter collapse of the project. Moreover, the Maharaja's death soon after, and the transfer of Wade from Ludhiana not much later, removed the only supporters of the scheme from the scene. Any hope of its success that remained also disappeared then and the scheme soon fell into abeyance.

One large factor which contributes to the success of any such project is the reciprocal zeal and mutual co-operation of the parties concerned, and these were missing in this particular case. The English were the only party which took pains to make the scheme a success. But even their real objective had been the surveying of the Sind area, and thereby devising suitable methods for checking the expansionist ambitions of Ranjit Singh and also for counteracting the growing influence of Russia in Persia. So when the survey was done, Ranjit Singh was checked and the Russian menace began to be counteracted in different and more effective way in Afghanistan, they too lost much of their keenness. But even if they had sustained their interest the scheme could not have succeeded as other parties never took any genuine interest in it.

96. 104/86. Clerk to Maddock, May 19, 1839. P. G. R.

For treaty see Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. pp. 45-46.

Bahawal Khan, as he himself said, had signed the treaty not because he himself wanted it, but just out of deference for the English. Ranjit Singh, too, was never completely without suspicions regarding the English designs in Sind. He all along felt that their commercial activities had abridged his political power.

The attitude which mattered most in this case was that of the Amirs of Sind. They had all along looked upon the project with the eye of fear and distrust and had tried to hinder its progress. They had striven to poison Ranjit Singh's ears, dissuade Bahawal Khan from signing the treaty, and had themselves made excuses to delay its execution. They had particularly resented the stationing of a British agent in Sind, and the situation, as we have seen, had indeed become critical when Pottinger had found it almost impossible to persuade them to agree to this move, and had even to threaten them with force. Naturally his domineering attitude was incompatible with a commercial treaty that was to be based on terms of equality. Even after the treaty had been signed the English were thinking of dictating terms to the Amirs. Pottinger wrote to Wade on August 30, 1835 : "I have assumed as a matter of course our full right to *dictate* such terms as we conceive best suited to promote the traffic by the Indus, so long as such rules are no infringement of the terms of the treaties."⁹⁷ If such was to be the attitude of British officers, to follow the letter and not the spirit of the treaty, no wonder then that the Amirs always endeavoured to wreck the scheme.

At the initial stages boats were detained by the Amirs at the mouth of the Indus,⁹⁸ and the English had to threaten them with the subjection of the "ports" of Sind to a blockade, should they refuse to comply with the demand made by Col. Pottinger for the immediate release of the boats."⁹⁹ Yet the boats were detained for over two months at

97. 106/48. Pottinger to Wade, August 30, 1835. P. G. R.
(Enclosing a copy of his letter to the Government),

98. 102/50. Wade to Mackeson, August 17, 1835. P. G. R.

99. *Ibid.*

Bahawalpur waiting for the permission to enter Sind.¹⁰⁰ Even after entering Sind the merchants were maltreated and their boats were again detained at different places.¹⁰¹ What could possibly be the result of such molestations and detentions ?

A treaty, and particularly a commercial one, where monetary interests are involved must be amicably and logically executed. It cannot be forced on an unwilling party without bringing failure in its train. The success of a project, where doubt and suspicion remain, where hatred and fear linger on, and where one party has decided to dominate the other regardless of its interests, pride or position, is well nigh impossible.

If there was any man who was honestly and diligently interested in the whole project it was Wade, and he deserves praise for his persistence. No doubt he too had his exaggerated notions about the Indus trade but there is no denying the fact that once having decided upon his course he pursued it with his usual patience and thoroughness. He was given the job of "cracking the hardest nut"—that of bringing round Ranjit Singh to agree to the treaty to which he was so averse in the beginning. But in spite of his great reluctance and misgivings, Wade succeeded in convincing him with such a remarkable degree of success that he was the only partner who felt some interest in the scheme till the very end. The Governor General acknowledged Wade's efforts in successfully negotiating these treaties with the Rulers of Lahore and Bahawalpur.¹⁰² Again, even when Pottinger was despaired of the success of the scheme and suggested to the Government that either it should altogether abandoned or made independent of the Amirs,¹⁰³ it was Wade who urged the Governor General to persevere in the project.¹⁰⁴

Finally, it may be remarked that though the scheme as such ended in smoke, it led to far reaching results. By the establishment of Mackeson's office at Mithankot, the British Government obtained "a

100. 106/51. Mackeson to Wade, September 9, 1835. P. G. R.

101. 106/67. Mackeson to Wade, January 17, 1836. P. G. R.

102. 117/29. Government to Wade, September 13, 1833. P. G. R.

103. 105/75. Pottinger to Wade, October 14, 1833. P. G. R.

(Enclosing a copy of his letter to the Government).

104. 149/69. Wade to Macnaghten, December 13, 1833. P. G. R.

considering influence in the countries on the Indus, which proved of great use to us in opening and improving an intercourse with them, without which it is universally admitted that we could not have subsequently made those preparations in Upper Sind which ensured the peaceable progress of our expedition to Afghanistan."¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the scheme put an obstacle in the way of Ranjit Singh towards Sind which he could never surmount, besides affording the British an opportunity for making a complete survey of the country, which, in turn, helped its annexation in 1843.



105. Wade, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SIND TANGLE

The story of the contacts of the British and Ranjit Singh with Sind, and the diplomacy of the two powers in outbidding each other in the matter of extending their own exclusive influence or control over that country, will provide the theme of this chapter. It has two distinct phases, the first, relating to the development of the Company's and Ranjit Singh's connections with Sind until 1831, and the second, their mutual entanglement over this question in the subsequent period.

I. Sind Till 1831.

Sind was conquered by Akbar in 1591, and remained a province of the Mughal Empire till 1737, when the Kalhoras, a tribe of wandering mendicants, established themselves as its rulers. The Kalhoras were soon (1740) subjugated by Nadir Shah, who forced tribute from them. On his assassination in 1747, his authority passed to Ahmad Shah Abdali, the founder of the Durrani Empire, then to Taimur Shah and Zaman Shah, and still later to Shah Shuja in the beginning of the 19th century. Then the province was theoretically under the suzerainty of Afghanistan, but the Sindhian Chiefs often withheld the payment of the tribute.

In 1783 the Kalhoras had made room for another Baloch tribe known as the Talpurs under their leader Mir Fateh Ali Khan. The Mir and his three brothers, Ghulam Ali, Karam Ali and Murad Ali had established themselves at Hyderabad,¹ while their uncle, Sohrab Khan, and their cousin, Thorra Khan, had installed themselves at Khyrpur and Mirpur respectively, thus breaking the Mughal province of Sind into three principalities of which Hyderabad was the biggest.²

1. The four brothers agreed to rule conjointly and from their cordial relations acquired the appellation *Char Yar* (four friends) from their subjects.
2. The English missions of 1803, 1809 and 1820 to Sind negotiated with the Rulers of Hyderabad who were considered the most important and most powerful. — Postans, *Personal Observations on Sind*, pp. 156 *sqq.*, Burnes, *Narrative of a Visit to the Court of Sind*, pp. 20 *sqq.*, and Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. VIII, pp. 291 *sqq.*

The Mir died in 1802, leaving his territory to his three brothers who divided it. Ghulam Ali died in 1811, and Karam Ali and Murad Ali two in 1828 and 1834 respectively. After the death of the *Char-Yar*, their sons succeeded them and governed Hyderabad. Mir Rustam Khan, son of Sohrab Khan, ruled Khyrpur, and Shir Mohammad, grand-son of Thorra Khan, governed Mirpur till the annexation of the province by the British in 1843.³

In the first quarter of the 19th century the tottering Durrani Empire of Afghanistan coupled with quick changes in succession offered a rich territorial feast to its neighbouring rulers. The Amirs, who had acknowledged the overlordship of the Afghan rulers since 1747, and suffered many invasions on that account,⁴ became independent. In 1824, after the death of Mohammad Azim Khan, the Amirs took possession of Shikarpur by sheer trickery.⁵

By reason of its natural geographical position, Shikarpur had developed into a big commercial centre. Trade routes from Sind through Bolan Pass to Kalat and Afghanistan and also to the rich valley of Khorasan, Turkistan and Central Asia ran through it. Apart from its commercial value, Shikarpur was strategically important being connected by a direct route to Afghanistan.⁶ The acquisition of this town by the Amirs was an event of some significance. Ranjit Singh realizing its importance had long cast covetous eyes on it, and continued doing so even against much diplomatic pressure of the British. To the Amirs, as we shall see later, Shikarpur proved to be an onerous responsibility which ultimately cost them their independence.

3. See *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 522.

4. There had been constant strife between Sind and Afghanistan during this period because the former ever plotted to cast off its allegiance, and the latter ever put forth its strength more closely to rivet the chains. (Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 93).

5. Between 1747 when it fell into the hands of the Afghans and 1824 when the Amirs seized it, Shikarpur was ruled by Governors appointed by the Durrani monarchs (Burnes, *op. cit.*, p. 79).

6. 108/73. Report of Burnes on the commerce of Shikarpur and Upper Sind, May 6, 1837. P. G. R. Also 107/4. Mackeson to Wade, forwarding the Journal of Munshi Mohan Lal, April 26, 1836. P. G. R.

The British intercourse with Sind began as early as 1758, as usual, through the merchants. In that year the Company was gratified at securing a *parwana* which was granted to Mr. Sumption by Ghulam Shah Kalhora for establishing factories, stating that "bestowing of favours and continuing friendship with the English is desirable." The *parwana* contained exemptions from customs, and stated that only one and a half percent duty would be paid on all purchases made by Mr. Sumption for export. It further said that "should Mr. Sumption either buy or build a house.....my people are to give him all the assistance they can so that it may cost him only a reasonable price."⁷ These concessions by themselves were not substantial, yet they provided scope for contacts, which, in turn, disclosed to the English the weak state of the Sindhian Government, and the possibilities of developing commerce through the Indus.

In 1761, Mr. Erskine arrived at the Court of Sind as agent of the Company. He succeeded in securing a further *parwana* confirming the previous one, and evincing strong friendly disposition of the Sindhian Government towards the English. This is clear from the language: "that besides the English, no other Europeans shall either import or export goods.....or come and go upon that account within the dominions of Sind."⁸ These commercial relations continued uninterrupted as long as Ghulam Shah Kalhora lived, but his son Sarfraz Khan distrusted the motives underlying the British trade, and began so to act as to compel the Company to withdraw their factories in 1775.

Towards the close of the eighteenth century Lord Wellesley made some effort to restore commercial relations with Sind with the ostensible object of furthering trade, but with the real aim of counteracting the designs of the French and particularly of Tippu Sultan who had styled himself as Companion of the Faith, and raised the cry of "Islam in danger" against the new conquering *kafirs*

7. Aitchison *op cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 304-5.

8. *Idem.* pp. 308-9.

(infidels). Accordingly, Mr. Nathan Crowe, of the Bombay Civil Service, was sent in 1798 to renew the commercial and political intercourse with the recently established power of the Talpurs. He succeeded in obtaining a favourable order containing several concessions issued under the seal of Mir Fateh Ali Khan,⁹ but the document remained a dead letter. The jealousy of the native traders and the intrigues of Tippu had already caused the British Agent to suffer humiliation and experience much trouble in his journey. This was followed by a fresh order from the Mir requiring him to quit the country within ten days. Crowe departed in 1800, thus sealing the fate of British influence in Sind for some time.¹⁰

The Treaty of Tilsit (1807) revived the danger of a Franco-Russian invasion through Asia Minor and Persia.¹¹ Spurred by the instinct of self-preservation, Lord Minto, as we have seen, embarked on a new Asiatic policy in the following year by sending different embassies to four foreign powers—Persia, Afghanistan, the Punjab and Sind. Captain David Seton was sent to Sind, and concluded an offensive and defensive treaty of seven articles with Ghulam Ali Talpur.¹² It is interesting to note, however, that the British Government shrank from ratifying the treaty for fear of being committed to too close a connection with the Sind Government.¹³

9. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 311.

10. The most commonly accepted reason for this treatment on the part of the Mir was an order from Zama Shah, the Afghan monarch. This reason was afterwards given by the Sind Government. But in the words of Postans it "may be traced to the result of Tippu's intrigues". (*op. cit.*, p. 290).

11. Vide pp. 4 sqq. *supra*.

12. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 292-93, f. n.

13. The clause of the treaty to which exception was taken by the British Government was: "Article 2. When the assistance of troops is required by either of the parties, it shall be granted when asked". This clause had been included in the treaty by Seton without any authority from his Government.

The Amirs believed that this clause entitled them to British assistance to emancipate themselves from the yoke of Kabul, a stipulation to which the British Government would not be a party. It, therefore, did not ratify this agreement and recalled Seton. (Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII pp. 292-93, f. n., Kaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94. And 3/59. Seton to Secretary to Government, October 26, 1809. P. G. R.)

To ratify this mistake, Mr. Nicholas Hankey Smith was sent to negotiate another treaty with the Amirs which was concluded on August 22, 1809. It was a brief and simple stipulation of only four articles,¹⁴ and yet, in the context of subsequent development of Anglo-Sind relations, it may be judged to have sown the seeds of the English empire in Sind, of which the harvest was reaped by Sir Charles Napier thirty four years afterwards.

The Treaty of 1809 stood in good stead to the British for eleven years, when it was replaced by another which was concluded with Mirs Karam Ali and Murad Ali, the two surviving brothers of the Char-Yar.¹⁵

The Treaty of 1820 had four clauses also like that of 1809. The first two provided for eternal friendship and mutual intercourse through *wakils* between the two Governments. By the third the Amirs agreed "not to permit any European or American to settle in their dominions," and that "if any of the subjects of either of the two States should establish their residence in the dominion of the other and should conduct themselves in an orderly and peaceable manner.....they will be allowed to remain in that situation." By the fourth article the Amirs undertook to "restrain the depredations of the Khosas and other tribes and individuals within their limits and to prevent the occurrence of any inroad into the British dominions."¹⁶

Matters stood thus between the two Governments for another eleven years. Only two events of note occurred during this period, viz., a

14. In terms "singularly brief and dry" the Amirs, *inter alia*, promised to prevent the "tribe of French" from settling in Sind. (Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 317).

15. In 1819 the British finally occupied Cutch, and the Anglo-Sind frontiers thus became contiguous. Disputes often arose regarding the predatory activities of the people on the common border. In order to end these frontier forays a fresh treaty was concluded on November 9, 1820.

16. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 318.

visit of Dr. J. Burnes (brother of Sir Alexander Burnes), the Residency Surgeon, who was invited by the Amirs for medical assistance, and a demonstration of the British troops in Cutch in 1825 to awe the Amirs into maintaining their treaty obligations lest they should take any undue advantage during the engagement of the British against Bharatpur and Burma.

Though the aforementioned treaties professed to have established friendly relations between the British and the Amirs, yet it must be borne in mind that the latter were not at all desirous of keeping to such relations. Ever since the final occupation of Cutch by the British in 1819, the Amirs had anxiously felt their proximity and apprehended the extension of their influence across their borders, and so the relations came to be viewed with suspicion and distrust by the Amirs, while the former lay low and unconcerned for some years.

As for Ranjit Singh, the first political event of any consequence concerning his relations with the Amirs occurred in 1809. The Amirs seemed anxious to have a defensive alliance with the rising Sikh Chief against the British, whereby "each state was to assist the other with troops in the event of its being attacked by the English."¹⁷ To effect this purpose messengers were sent to Ranjit Singh on September 29, 1809.¹⁸ But he was too far-sighted to encourage these advances and thereby risk hostilities with the English. He had already formed friendship with them at Amritsar earlier in the year, and any understanding with the Sind Rulers so soon after would have been inconsistent with it. Moreover, Ranjit had yet to conquer and absorb the formidable principality of Multan intervening between his kingdom and Sind.

After the conquest of Multan in 1818, Ranjit's appetite with regard to Sind was quickly sharpened. The Amirs also were alarmed as "the capture of Multan was the signal to them to conciliate the goodwill of their potent neighbour."¹⁹ But it was not until 1823 that the

17. 3/59. Seton to Government, October 26, 1809. P. G. R.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Political Proceedings, No. 70, October 20, 1831, quoted in Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 105.

Maharaja led an expedition in the direction of Sind, ostensibly to punish the Balochis who had attacked his troops near Multan, but in reality to invade and occupy Shikarpur.²⁰ The village of Buttee was reduced, and the Baloch and other jagirdars were made to pay tribute.²¹ He then returned to his capital.²²

The progress of the Sikh forces nevertheless alarmed the Amirs to such an extent that they sent envoys to Ranjit's Court with presents. This was the beginning of a regular intercourse between the Lahore Darbar and the Amirs.²³ In the ensuing year, Ranjit Singh demanded an annual sum from the Amirs on pain of invasion. The Amirs detained the Lahore *wakil* at Hyderabad for several months, after which they sent their own *wakil* to accompany him with some presents to Ranjit Singh.²⁴ In the meantime (after the Dussehra of 1825), the Maharaja had marched on Sind, but returned when he learned that the country was suffering from famine. He abandoned the project and reached Lahore on November 24, 1825.²⁵

So far as Shikarpur was concerned, the Sikh Ruler considered the Amirs as mere usurpers, arguing that, having succeeded to the greater

20. 94/11. Wade to Elliott, August 7, 1823. P. G. R;
 94/15. Wade to Elliott, August 24, 1823. P. G. R;
 94/17. Wade to Elliott, September, 7, 1823. P. G. R. And
 94/18. Wade to Elliott, September 11, 1823. P. G. R.
21. Prinsep, *Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab*, p. 140.
22. Cunningham, (*A History of the Sikhs* p. 165) attributes the abandonment of the expedition against Shikarpur to the fact that Ranjit's plans were not yet matured. But it is more probable that the withdrawal was ordered because at this time the Sikh forces were required to be concentrated in the north-west to deal with the serious rebellion of the turbulent tribes on either side of the Indus above Attock.
23. 94/15. Wade to Elliott, August 24, 1823. P. G. R.
24. 72/424. Murray to Resident, Delhi, November 8, 1825. P. G. R.
25. Latif, *History of the Punjab*, p. 433.

portion of the fallen Suddozai Empire, he had a better right to that place.²⁶ In 1823, he told the Sindhian *wakils* that since he had acquired the greater portion of the Afghan possessions in India, he should be deemed to have succeeded to all the rights that attended the Afghan supremacy and he, therefore, was entitled to the Amirs' homage which they previously owed to the Afghans, and also to the tribute which they were paying to them.²⁷ The envoys disputed this principle, and the Maharaja did not press his demand, as for the moment his attention was diverted to more serious happenings.²⁸

To sum up the attitude of the English and the Sikhs towards Sind until this time, it may be said that the former had not yet felt politically interested in that region. Their treaties with the Amirs had so far been the direct outcome of European and Central Asian politics, and as soon as danger from beyond the north-west of India receded these fell into a virtual suspense, only to be renewed if similar situations ever recurred. Moreover their attention was fully absorbed until 1826 in meeting other problems of political and military nature nearer to the vital centres of their Indian dominion. They, however, carefully watched the movements of the troops of Ranjit Singh right from 1823—the year of Wade's taking over charge of the Ludhiana Agency, but otherwise sustained a policy characterised by outward indifference.

26. 108/78. Mackeson to Wade, January 15, 1831. P. G. R.

27. 137/8. Wade to Government, May 18, 1831. P. G. R.

28. There appeared on the Peshawar frontier a formidable foe in the person of the fanatic Syed Ahmad who occupied the Maharaja's whole attention till the former's death in 1831.-137/7. Wade to Prinsep, May 17, 1831. P. G. R. And 137/8. Wade to Metcalfe, May 18, 1831. P. G. R.

Though the Syed was finally defeated and killed, he had indirectly provided a respite to Sind for four years, and finally saved it from falling into the hands of the 'infidel Sikhs'. In 1831, when Ranjit Singh recovered from the shock, he found that the English were no longer mere silent spectators of the game.

The Maharaja, on the other hand, was very anxious to seize Shikarpur, which, apart from other considerations, would provide his kingdom an outlet to the sea.²⁹ He repeatedly talked of his claims against the city but never enforced them because of other and more insistent demands on his attention and resources. His designs became more pronounced after the disappearance of the danger from Syed Ahmad in 1831. But by then his friends and rivals, the English, were well into the field.

II. Sind After 1831.

With the year 1831 we enter upon a period of intense diplomatic activity which continued unabated for several years. Henceforth the respective policies and designs of the British and Ranjit Singh cease to follow two distinctly different courses but these freely react, at times are made to coincide, but more often collide with each other.

Ever since the limits put to his ambitions regarding the left bank of the Sutlej in 1809, the Maharaja had been consolidating his power in the north-western direction. When he seriously thought of giving shape to his designs on Sind, he found that the British had cast off their indifference. It was either through intuition or because of certain vague rumours which had reached him early in 1831, that Ranjit Singh felt a definite change in the attitude of the British towards Sind. Burnes' mission of 1831, in spite of its friendly character, created misgivings in his mind, and he now seems to have made up his mind to know definitely the English views before making a serious attempt on Sind.³⁰

29. Wade had written to the Government as early as September 11, 1823: "It is the Raja's design to extend his power to that part of India with a view..... perhaps it is hardly chimerical to suppose... of attempting to secure a maritime intercourse in that direction". (94/18. P. G. R.)

30. We have it on Jacquemont's testimony that Ranjit Singh while conversing with him in March 1831 made the following observations:

"What would be the good of my taking Tibet? It is rich countries that I want. Could I not take Sind, it is said to be very rich? But what would the British say?" (*The Punjab a Hundred Years Ago*, p. 39).

In May 1831, when Wade visited Ranjit Singh at Adinanagar in connection with the Rupar interview³¹, the latter mentioned how he had asked Ochterlony (while both drank together) about the desire of the British for extending its territory still further, but had got the reply: "No, the Company is satiated." He inquired of Wade whether the British attitude was still the same. Wade's reply was *in nubibus*.³²

While escorting the Maharaja to Rupar Wade wrote at his persuasion to the Government from Amritsar that before any negotiations were started with Sind, it would be desirable to secure the Maharaja's co-operation as he exercised great influence at the Courts of the Amirs, and was desirous of acting in concert with the Government.³³

Again, during the meeting at Rupar, the Maharaja plainly hinted of his own schemes by saying that the Amirs were very rich, that they had no efficient army, and that they could not be well-disposed towards the English, for had they not thrown impediments in the way of Burnes while proceeding up the Indus? He went even to the length of proposing a joint expedition against them.³⁴ Bentinck evaded giving a straight answer. He had already deputed Pottinger to Sind to negotiate with the Amirs a treaty for opening up the Indus to the commerce of Europe and

31. Vide p. 83, *supra*.

32. 137/13. Wade to Prinsep, May 25, 1831. P. G. R.

33. Wade wrote to Prinsep: "Considering the relations which exist between His Highness and the Amirs of Sind, I beg leave to suggest that the great influence which the Maharaja can exert in the promotion of any political objects which His Lordship may have to carry with those Chiefs, and the importance on that account of securing, before such negotiations be carried out into effect, the co-operation of an ally who has schemes of his own in that quarter, and whom, I believe, to be desirous of acting in concert with Government, is sufficiently of an advantageous nature".—137/34, October 19, 1831. P. G. R.

34. Hugel. *Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab*, p. 408.

India. He did not divulge the tenor of negotiations to the anxious Maharaja lest he should counteract them,³⁵ but merely kept reticent.³⁶ No wonder that the Maharaja returned from Rupar disappointed in the matter of Sind though well pleased in all other matters.

The truth is that Bentinck well knew that the navigation scheme would be viewed with disfavour by the Maharaja "inasmuch as he may think that it will connect our interests and power with those of Sind, and thus create an obstacle to his design of future aggression upon the Amirs, —a design which he frankly acknowledged to Lieut. Burnes."³⁷

Wade was, therefore, directed by Bentinck a little later to proceed to Lahore, and to remove from the Maharaja's mind "any suspicions that the British Government under the cloak of commercial objects was desirous of extending its influence."³⁸ To keep the Maharaja quiet and to secure his co-operation the Governor General declared exactly contrary to what was the real purpose of the Company's policy.

At the end of 1831 the Maharaja was in a great fix. He had completed his plans to attack Shikarpur but could not do so openly as that would lead to a rupture with the English which he least desired. So he abandoned his designs for the time being and waited for some suitable opportunity in the future.

We now come to a series of important incidents which apparently owed their origin to the commotion created by the Mazaris on the Sikh frontier beyond Multan.

35. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-97.

36. Cunningham aptly comments that "it would have better suited the character and position of the British Government had no concealment been attempted." (*Idem*).

37. 98/181. Prinsep to Pottinger, October 22, 1831. P. G. R.

38. 115/102. Prinsep to Wade, December 19, 1831. P. G. R.

The Mazaris were a tribe of free-booters which lived on the south-west of Mithankot at a distance of a few miles. Their principal stronghold and the residence of their Chief, Behram Khan, was Rojhan. They carried their incursions alike into Sind, Lahore and Bahwalpur territories.³⁹ Though they were nominally under the suzerainty of the Amirs yet as their territory was a sort of 'no man's land' between the Punjab and Sind, it was not possible for the Amirs to keep them under proper control. This provided the Maharaja with an excuse for advancing his designs on Shikarpur.⁴⁰

As the raids of the Mazaris had become frequent, and they had refused to pay the usual tribute to the Sikh Government, Dewan Sawan Mal, the Governor of Multan, sent on November 9, 1834, Sardar Hari Singh, the *thanadar* of Mithankot, to demand tribute from Behram Khan. The latter curtly refused to pay it.⁴¹ Sawan Mal thereupon marched in person against Behram who took to his heels and sought refuge in the territory of the Bugtis. Marching from Mithankot on January 28, 1835, the Dewan laid waste the country about Rojhan.⁴² The Mazaris had committed grievous outrages by setting fire to many houses. Mackeson requested the Dewan on his return to take more drastic steps to extirpate the Mazaris.⁴³ Sawan Mal sent a force to Amarkot where Behram was cornered and forced to submit. The Mazari Chief "presented the Dewan with a tribute of 60 camels, and 21 pairs of bullocks—the produce of the Nari district near Bhag which is famous for that kind of cattle—together with other presents, and formally signed and sealed his allegiance to the Lahore Government on the condition of an annual tribute."⁴⁴ There

39. 106/27. Mackeson to Wade, May 14, 1835. P. G. R.

40. 141/84. Wade to Macnaghten, September 16, 1835. P. G. R.

41. 106/27. Mackeson to Wade, May 14, 1835, P. G. R.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*

44. 141/49. Wade to Macnaghten, May 27, 1835. P. G. R.

Sawan Mal made a report to Ranjit of the settlement that he had effected, and sought the Maharaja's permission for establishing a garrison at Rojhan, but his request was turned down.—*Ibid.*

was, however, a fresh outbreak of trouble from the Mazaris in the ensuing year. About the middle of 1836, the Mazaris resumed their depredations on a larger and more organised scale, being led this time by an implacable fanatic, Nasur-ud-Din, who pretended to be a relative of Syed Amad⁴⁵. The Maharaja, seeking an excuse for attacking Shikarpur, accused the Amirs of conniving at the acts of these free-booters. There was some truth in this charge, for the Amirs had given a tangible assistance to the Mazaris.⁴⁶ The Maharaja sent Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh to Multan with a view to creating alarm among the Sindhians.⁴⁷ The *kardars* of Mithankot and Multan were directed to rally their troops under the Kanwar's banner. A sum of Rs. 60,000 was placed at his disposal, and he was to co-operate with Dewan Sawan Mal in exterminating the Mazaris.⁴⁸ At the same time the Maharaja instructed Kanwar Kharak Singh, who had been sent to check the fresh aggressions of the Mazaris,⁴⁹ to despatch his officers in advance towards Shikarpur, so that the "honour of conquering Shikarpur might fall to his lot."⁵⁰ General Ventura too was sent at the head of five battalions to assist the Kanwar.⁵¹ Wade thought that the main reason of the Maharaja sending troops so expeditiously, despite the inclemency of the weather, was to forestall Shah Shuja whom the Amirs had invited to Shikarpur.⁵²

Early in April, 1836, before the Khalsa army could reach Multan, the Mazaris raided Mithankot and returned with considerable booty. Sawan Mal with whatever force he had at his disposal engaged them in a skirmish which resulted in the death of Dost Ali Khan, the son

45. 142/20. Wade to Macnaghten, April 29, 1836. P. G. R.

46. 142/70. Wade to Macnaghten, October 5, 1836. P. G. R.

47. 142/42. Wade to Macnaghten, July 7, 1836. P. G. R.

48. *Ibid.*

49. 142/54. Wade to Macnaghten, August 2, 1836. P. G. R.

50. 142/58. Wade to Macnaghten, August 19, 1836. P. G. R.

51. *Ibid.*

52. *Ibid.* Vide Chapter IX, *infra*.

of Behram Khan.⁵³ He next reduced Rohjan.⁵⁴ The Sikh troops made a detour towards Badauni whither Behram had retired⁵⁵ returning thence to Ken, another Mazari stronghold, which fell⁵⁶ after a stubborn resistance offered by its 'Sindhian garrison.'⁵⁷ The Maharaja demanded two lacs of rupees for the evacuation of the fort.⁵⁸ This defeat broke the back of the Mazaris.

After having thus cleared the Mazari menace, Ranjit Singh turned his attention towards the Amirs whom he had, from the very beginning, accused of clandestine dealings with them. He demanded the cession of Shikarpur from their *wakils*.⁵⁹ A month later, he reiterated his demand for a tribute.⁶⁰ The *wakils* prevaricated by pleading that "the intercourse between the two States had hitherto been confined to the interchange of presents only," and that no tribute had ever been paid by the Amirs to the Maharaja.⁶¹

53. 107/7. Mackeson to Wade, August 4, 1836. P. G. R.

54. *Ibid.* and 142/59 Wade to Macnaghten, August 21, 1836. P. G. R.

55. 142/76. Wade to Macnaghten, October 15, 1836. P. G. R.

56. 107/25. Mackeson to Wade, October 23, 1836. P. G. R.

57. 107/19. Mackeson to Wade, October 10, 1836. P. G. R.

58. 142/102. Wade to Macnaghten, December 13, 1836. Enclosing Mackeson's letter of November 23, 1836. P. G. R.

59. 107/5. Pottinger to Wade, July 1, 1836. P. G. R.

60. *Akhbar-i-Ludhiana*, November 26, 1836. No. 100.

خبر غیور شہید ایم کہ لالہ آسانند و محمد فریش و کلائی فاطمان سددہ
کہ بخندست وائی لاہور مامور سے باشد بہر کلاں خون عرزد شعلہ کہ سہاراجہ
دنجوت سنگہ بہادر وائی لاہور بہ بندہ ہا ارشاد فرمود کہ باقیان خون مطالع
شوند کہ پانچ لاکھ روپیہ و پنجاہ اسب بطریق نذرانہ گذارند۔

(News from Khyrpnr. It is learnt that Lalla Asa Nand and Mohd. Darvesh, the *Wakils* of the Amirs of Sind at the Court of the Ruler of Lahore, have told their masters that Maharaja Ranjit Singh had asked them to inform their masters (the Amirs) to send five lakhs of rupees and fifty horses as tribute).

61. 142/28. Wade to Macnaghten, August 19, 1836. P. G. R.

The Sikh expeditions again the Mazaris and the ever increasing flow of reinforcements in the direction of Multan could not but excite the Amirs' apprehensions.⁶² As a measure of safeguard they despatched a *vakil* to Amir Dost Mohammad of Kabul, and also wrote to another Afghan chief, by way of Kohat, for help. At the same time they prepared themselves to answer force with force, being particularly goaded to this decision by the Sikhs' capturing the village of Rukhan,⁶³ belonging to the Chief of Khyrpur. They then withdrew their *vakils* from Lahore,⁶⁴ and mustered an army estimated at 10,000 horse and 45 pieces of artillery at Shikarpur. The Khalsa army under Sawan Mal and Sardar Mangal Singh, on the other hand, comprised seven to eight thousand foot, three to four thousand horse and four guns.⁶⁵ The Amirs felt confident that their military preparations would deter the Sikhs from aggressive action,⁶⁶ but when an open rupture seemed imminent⁶⁷ they seem to have lost heart. They inwardly wanted peace, as they fully knew the strength of the Sikhs.

62. 107/25. Mackeson to Wade, October 23, 1836. P. G. R.

63. 107/28. Pottinger to Wade, October 29, 1836. P. G. R.

64. *Ibid.*

65. 108/78. Mackeson to Wade, January 15, 1837. P. G. R.

66. 107/28. Pottinger to Wade, October 29, 1836. P. G. R.

Mir Mohrab Khan Birol, the Chief of Kalat, and other Beloch tribes of the hills had made common cause with the Sindhians. (107/29. Mackeson to Wade, November 7, 1836. P. G. R.)

67. *Akhbar-i-Ludhiana*, November 26, 1836. No. 100.

یقیناً کہ ہرگز قتل مقامیہ فوج . لہذا ہر ہر چاہا سلسلہ ہوا وقوع خواہد آمد

(It is certain that in a short time a clash would occur between the forces of Ranjit Singh and those of the Sindhians).

68. 107/29. Mackeson to Wade, November 7, 1836. P. G. R.

The Amirs sent their envoys to Dewan Sawan Mal "proposing that the Sikhs should confine themselves to Rojhan which was held by Behram Khan Mazari, and that Ken which was ten *kos* from Rojhan and Shah Walli which was four *kos* from Ken should be restored to the Amirs". The Dewan replied "that his business was with the limits of the Mazari territory, that to whatever place they extended he would keep possession of it, and demanded a *nazrana* of two lacs of rupees as the condition on which the Sikh force should be withdrawn". The Amirs would not agree to pay the *nazrana*.—107/35. Mackeson to Wade, November 23, 1836. P. G. R. Also 107/41. Mackeson to Wade, December 23, 1836. P. G. R.

At this critical juncture they invoked the British mediation by sending a message to Pottinger to help them out of the difficulty,⁶⁹ and recalled the envoy they had lately sent to Kabul apparently with the object of conciliating the Sikh Ruler.⁷⁰

The British, too, did not relish these demonstrations on the part of the Maharaja on the borders of Sind, because they themselves were now interested in the political future of that country, partly for its own sake, and partly because it would provide, if need be, a convenient base for military action against the extension of Russian influence beyond the Perso-Afghan border. At any rate, they were determined to prevent the expansion of Ranjit Singh's authority over Sind. In their execution of this purpose, they had to take the delicate step of instructing Pottinger "to effect a closer union with the Amirs."⁷¹ This step, indeed, was fraught with peculiar dangers. The Sindhians were incapable of any serious resistance, and what was worse, were likely to acquiesce in any prompt action of the Sikhs. Again, the English move might quite likely precipitate Sikh advance into the Sind territory, and thus be the cause of provoking immediate conflict between Ranjit Singh and themselves. That would mean something for which Auckland was not prepared, for his intention was that the British influence in Sind should be gained "by the pursuit of commercial and peaceful objects alone."⁷²

69. 140/66. Wade to Macnaghten, September 13, 1836. P. G. R.

70. 107/29. Mackeson to Wade, November 7, 1836. P. G. R.

71. The letter of instructions to Pottinger is interesting as showing the real motives of Auckland's Government. The Amirs were to be told without reserve that the British Government was sensible of the dangerous position in which they stood, and that it was essential, "not to their interest only, but to their very existence", that the ties by which they were connected with the British Government should be strengthened. — 107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

72. *Ibid.*

By intervening for the protection of Sind, the Government expected to gain certain advantages. Auckland authorised Pottinger to promise the Government's mediation in all disputes between the Amirs and the Lahore Government, but for making such intervention effective the Governor General insisted that (a) a British agent should be stationed at Hyderabad, (b) all negotiations of the Sindhians with Lahore should in future be conducted solely through the medium of the British officers, and (c) a British force should be quartered temporarily in Sind at the Amirs' expense.⁷³

Pottinger reached Hyderabad on November 22, 1836, and was received with the "utmost kindness and respect" by the Amirs.⁷⁴ On November 30, he informed the Government that he had entered into a provisional agreement with Nur Mohammad, the Chief of Hyderabad, and sent a copy of the agreement for His Lordship's approval. By this engagement the Hyderabad Chief agreed to receive a British agent who would be the medium of communication between him and the Lahore Darbar. The Government was to protect the territory of the Amirs who agreed to withdraw their *bakils* from Lahore.⁷⁵

Nur Mohammad continued receiving guidance from Pottinger regarding relations between Sind and Lahore.⁷⁶ Rustum Khan of Khyrpur also expressed friendship to Pottinger whom he solicited for a similar treaty as with the Ruler of Hyderabad. He, too, was assured by the British Agent that he would be considered a party to whatever engagement would be concluded with the Ruler of Hyderabad.⁷⁷

73. 107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

74. 107/36. Pottinger to Wade, November 25, 1836, P. G. R.

75. 107/39. Pottinger to Wade, November 30, 1836. P. G. R.

76. 108/5. Pottinger to Wade, February 14, 1837. P. G. R.

77. 108/7. Pottinger to Wade, March 13, 1837. P. G. R.

Though quite willing to accept British protection against the Sikh monarch, yet it is clear from the records that the Amirs disliked the prospect of keeping the British Resident in their territory.⁷⁸ Pottinger was, therefore, advised by Auckland to make it clear to the Amirs that unless this point was conceded, the Government would not be able to exert its influence with the Maharaja for the abandonment of his designs.⁷⁹ When this and all other means failed to bring round the Amirs, they were threatened that the 'Lion of the Punjab' would be let loose, perhaps aided, to work his pleasure in Sind. Thus fear of war with the Sikhs, and not any real liking for the British, procured the treaty of 1838.⁸⁰

This treaty, concluded with the Hyderabad Amirs (Mir Nur Mohammad and Mir Nasir Khan) on April 20, consisted of two articles only. By the first, the Governor General agreed "to use his good offices to adjust the present differences... between the Amirs of Sind and Maharaja Ranjit Singh, so that peace and friendship may be established between two States". By the second, it was agreed that "an accredited British Minister shall reside at the court of Hyderabad, and that the Amirs shall also be at liberty to depute a *Vakil* to reside at the court of the British Government, and that the British Minister shall be empowered to change his ordinary place of residence as may from time to time seem expedient and be attended by such an escort as may be deemed suitable by his Government."⁸¹

Looked at from the British point of view, this treaty was an important diplomatic gain both over the Amirs and Ranjit Singh.

78. In a private conference of the Amirs when Nur Mohammad tried to convince Subadar Khan to agree to the reception of an English agent in Hyderabad as a return for British mediation between Sind and Lahore Governments, the latter remarked, "I know you are giving away Sind to the *Firingees*" (108/9. Pottinger to Wade, May 12, 1837. P. G. R.)

79. 119/60. Macnaghten to Wade, October 2, 1837. P. G. R.

80. Napier, *The Conquest of Seinde*, Part I, p. 48.

81. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. VIII, p. 328.

The Maharaja, ever eager to further his designs on Sind, was equally anxious to know the British reactions to every step that he contemplated taking. On Kanwar Kharak Singh writing to him from Mithankot to allow him to proceed to Shikarpur, he forbade him to do so just then, and asked him to wait.²² He wanted to sound the British. But the wisdom of this delay was doubtful as the English attitude would further gain time to crystallise. Ranjīt Singh, however, seemed to have been confident that the British would have no objection to his designs for he had planned to march towards Shikarpur personally.²³

In July 1836, before starting operations against the Mazaris, Ranjīt Singh had made an indirect attempt to ascertain the Government's attitude by approaching Wade through his Agent, Lala Kishan Chand, for permission to bring fire-arms up the Indus, i.e., through the heart of Sind. Wade apprised the Government that the purpose of the application was to ascertain whether they would insist on preserving the restriction which existed in the treaty with the Hyderabad Chief to the

22. *Akhbar-i-Ludhiana*, October 15, 1836. No. 24.

عرضی گذور کھڑک سنگھ از نظر نداشت کہ ہندو معہ عساکر - و چونکہ خود متصل کورت مقیم بمقام موضع جام پور فرو داشت اگر ارشاد شود - عازم تسخیر شکر پور گردن - شقہ بجوابش حاضر گشت کہ بالانعال بدستور بمقام خود دایر باشند بعد دسپتہ فوج بالصبور سامور کردہ حکم نامہ خواہد شد -

(Kanwar Kharak Singh's letter was presented which said that he along with the troops he had was encamped at Jampur near Mithankot. If he were permitted he intended to march against Shikarpur. An order was sent in reply that he should stay at his place for the time being, and after Dussehra the armies would be despatched in that direction, and then the instructions would be sent).

23. *Akhbar-i-Ludhiana*, October 22, 1836. No. 26.

خبر لاہور - عرضی دروان سوان مل بملاحظہ گشت کہ ہندو باقبل حضور بمقتاق گذور کھڑک سنگھ شکر پور بہ تصریح خود خواہد آورد - سر در توجہ آہوب فرمائید

(News from Lahore. Dewan Sawan Mal's letter was presented which said that His Highness need not come to that side personally, as he with Kanwar Kharak Singh will be able to bring Shikarpur under his control.)

passage of fire-arms by the Indus; or allow him to take his own measures to introduce them by that route — a reply which he would deem tantamount to a license to prosecute his designs on Shikarpur.⁸⁴ Wade was directed to inform the Maharaja that the Governor General could not encourage any project which would virtually infringe the treaty relations between the British and Sind Governments, and that the 3rd Article of the Treaty of 1832 clearly prohibited the use of the Indus for the conveyance of military stores of any description.⁸⁵

Ranjit Singh sounded the English in another way also. He asked Wade for the services of a British doctor skilled in galvanic art and in making artificial teeth. Wade told the Government that the real object was to use the doctor for political purposes.⁸⁶ A doctor⁸⁷ was provided, but Wade was at the same time instructed that, in case the Maharaja proceeded on any expedition contrary to the expressed wishes and policy of the Government, all officers bearing commission from the Company were to be withdrawn from the Sikh Court.⁸⁸

Ranjit Singh had yet another device up his sleeves. He started negotiations with Shah Shuja. The Shah could possibly lay a claim to Shikarpur, and besides, the Amirs had recently made overtures

84. 142/68. Wade to Macnaghten, September 13, 1836. P. G. R.

85. 107/8. Macnaghten to Wade, August 2, 1836. P. G. R.

In 1836, the same Governor General without any qualm of conscience decided to inform the Amirs that the clause of the Treaty of 1832 which closed the Indus to the passage of war materials "must necessarily be suspended during the course of operations undertaken for the permanent establishment of security to all those who are parties to that Treaty." (Parl. Papers, Correspondence relative to Sind, 1838—1843, p. 16). Vide p. 103, *supra* and Chapter XII, *infra*.

86. Wade wrote to Macnaghten: "His Highness is desirous of employing him (the doctor) in the first instance on a campaign. He wishes to make a political use of him by showing to his fearful and simple-minded neighbours that he was sanctioned in his mediated expedition by the presence of British Officers."—142/60. August 30, 1836. P. G. R.

87. Dr. Driver lately in the service of the Begum Sombre.

88. 107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

to him. On the Shah's returning after his discomfiture at Kandhar,⁸⁹ Ranjit Singh offered to restore him to his lost throne, provided he in turn would relinquish all claims to Peshawar and Shikarpur. The Shah's hopes being revived he agreed to these terms.⁹⁰ But both Ranjit Singh and the Shah desired Wade to be a party, or at least a witness, to this stipulation—the Shah because he did not trust Ranjit Singh, and the latter because his claim to Shikarpur would be settled in his favour once and for all. Wade, however, saw through the game, and refused to sign the agreement.⁹¹ Further, the Shah was distinctly told that he would leave Ludhiana on pain of losing his asylum there and his maintenance allowance for ever.⁹²

On August 22, 1836, Wade received instructions to use his influence, by way of friendly remonstrance with the Sikh Ruler to abandon hostile intentions against the Amirs' territories.⁹³ On September 26 he was further directed to use every means in his power "short of actual menace to keep His Highness at Lahore, and to prevent the further advance of his army."⁹⁴ Wade, if he considered it necessary, was to proceed to Lahore to discuss the matter with Ranjit Singh, and tell him frankly that the Governor General could not but view with regret and

89. Vide Chapter IX, *infra*.

90. 142/61. Wade to Government, September 5, 1836. P. G. R.

91. *Ibid.*

92. 107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

93. 107/8. Macnaghten to Wade, August 22, 1836. P. G. R.

94. 107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

This important letter on British attitude towards Sind and Ranjit Singh's designs in that direction is reproduced in full in Appendix X.

Wade had on September 13, 1836, suggested that it would be beneficial if the Maharaja was made aware of the dissatisfaction with which the Governor General in Council regarded the aggressive policy which he continued to follow towards his neighbours. Wade had expressed the opinion that it would awaken him to the line of policy which Government was determined to adopt for the spread of commerce, the establishment of a state of peace and those friendly relations with foreign powers by which reciprocal benefits could best be secured. (142/66. P. G. R.)

disapprobation any hostile design on his part against Sind.⁹⁵ Wade was further instructed that if the Maharaja urged that he had received provocation from the Amirs, he was to be told that the Amirs had formally placed themselves under British protection, and that the Government was ready to interpose its "good offices for an equitable settlement of all matters of difference between the two states."⁹⁶

Thus the British policy towards Sind grew more concrete and definite in the last four or five years, and was now unmistakably expressed by Macnaghten : " The Government of India is bound by the strongest considerations of political interest to prevent the extension of the Sikh power along the whole course of the Indus."⁹⁷ Again, the Government could not " view with indifference any disturbance of the existing relations of peace between the several states occupying the banks of that river."⁹⁸

Wade was empowered to explain to the Maharaja that the Government had no objection to the repression of the Mazaris, but what it highly prized was the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the Indus route.⁹⁹ There is no doubt that Auckland also desired peace in the interests of commerce, for he rightly thought that the first effect of hostilities between Lahore and Sind Governments would be to postpone for a period the rendering of the Indus a channel of safe and extensive commerce. Wade

95. 107/8. Macnaghten to Wade, August 22, 1836. P. G. R.

96. 107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

97. *Ibid.*

Macnaghten also wrote to Pottinger in the same strain: "His Lordship in Council cannot view with indifference the extension of the Sikh Power throughout the whole course of the Indus to the borders of our Bombay Government."—*Ibid.*

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Ibid.*

was, therefore, to assure the Maharaja definitely that the Government wished to "scrupulously adhere to all its pledges of totally abstaining from interference in regard to his acknowledged dominions"¹⁰⁰

Before proceeding personally to Lahore Wade had written to the Maharaja to gauge the intensity of his reactions to the statement of the British policy with regard to Sind. He in reply put forward his claims on Shikarpur on the following grounds: First, he asserted the right of every sovereign state to protect its territory from aggression and to resent the conduct of any of its neighbours who might wantonly insult its dignity. Taking stand on this ground, he dwelt at length upon the inroads of the Mazaris which had mainly been incited and aided by the officials of the Sind Government, and asked whether "after such glaring instances of aggression and plunder on the part of the Mazaris and others, was it not incumbent on him for the well-being of his country to punish these people?"¹⁰¹ Secondly, he argued that Shikarpur was a dependency of Peshwar, and, therefore, it belonged to him by right of conquest. Thirdly, he contended that in conformity with the Treaty (of 1809) subsisting between the two States his movements towards Shikarpur could not be restricted as it was situated "beyond the Sutlej."¹⁰²

100. Under this heading the instructions to Wade were: "It will be the spirit of your negotiations that the British Government thinks itself entitled to ask from His Highness that he will show to neighbouring States with which it is intimately connected, the same tenderness by which His Highness is well aware that it is itself uniformly guided in the conduct of its external relations."—107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

101. 142/70. Wade to Macnaghten, October 5, 1836, forwarding the Maharaja's reply. Wade, commenting on this argument of the Maharaja of self-defence and retaliation, observed that it was convenient for Ranjit to have recourse to it, but it came with a bad grace from one to whom the mere love of conquest had always afforded a sufficient plea for violating the integrity of neighbouring States. (*Ibid.*)

102. *Ibid.*

Ranjit's contention, in short, was that by the terms of the Treaty of 1809 the British Government could *only* restrict his relations to the countries south of the Sutlej.

Macnaghten wrote to Wade: "It is not the first occasion in which Ranjit has assumed the barrier of that river (Sutlej) to extend ■ the ocean and to himself the liberty of pursuing

(Continued on next page.)

These arguments provide ample testimony to Ranjit's diplomatic ability in spite of his illiteracy. The Government had necessarily to admit the losses which his subjects had suffered on account of Mazari's depredations into his territory;¹⁰³ but it would not accept his title to Shikarpur as a dependency of Peshawar.¹⁰⁴ Further, the Government surprised Ranjit with the interpretation it inferred from the terms, "this side of the Sutlej." Wade was told to make it clear to the Maharaja that the Government, according to the Treaty, had no concern with countries north of the Sutlej, but for the countries to the west of that river, it had given no pledge.¹⁰⁵ Hence if it interfered in his disputes with the Amirs, it was no violation of the letter and spirit of the Treaty.

(Continued from page 142.)

whatever measures he pleased with the countries beyond it sometimes earnestly, sometimes in jest, inculcating the idea that such was a fair construction of the Treaty." (107/31. November 14, 1836. P. G. R.)

103. 142/70. Wade to Macnaghten, October 5, 1836. P. G. R.

104. Macnaghten wrote to Wade: "The title of Shikarpur as assumed by the Maharaja had no validity as a dependency on Peshawar it may with equal justice be claimed by the King of Persia and the Chiefs of Kabul as having been at different times in dependence upon their dominions, By the Treaty of 1809, it seems clear that the words "to the northward of the Sutlej" cannot be construed as conferring whatever may be to the westward of the Indus."—119/10. March 2, 1837. P. G. R.

105. Macnaghten wrote to Wade: "It would appear that the Maharaja regards the British Government having restricted (by the Treaty of 1809) its relations to the countries south of the Sutlej, whereas in point of fact nothing more was stipulated in the Treaty above referred to as regards the British Government than that it should have no concern with the countries to the north of that river. Of countries to the westward of the Indus no mention was made.....It is of great importance that this misconception on the part of His Highness be delicately but clearly pointed out to him."—107/33. November 14, 1836. P. G. R.

The above argument, though expressed with so much force and unambiguity, cannot bear a close scrutiny. It was just advanced, and was perhaps an afterthought.

Having failed by arguments to convince the adamant British of his claims on Shikarpur, Ranjit Singh next resorted to flattery, as is shown by a fable written by him to his Agent who repeated it to Wade thus : Some friends held a consultation privately at night on some business. Perchance the king of the country appeared at the spot in disguise. They asked him who he was and were told he was one of them. The king identified himself with them. They claimed that each was pre-eminent in his own vocation—one as master of a particular art, another of some other art, and so on. The king said that he could effect any purpose by a mere move of his head. In the morning the king, who knew the persons of the night's meeting, called them to his presence and interrogated them. One recognised the king and hoped that it was a good opportunity for realising the object of every one by an inclination of the king's head. The king graciously did what they wanted. After narrating this fable the Maharaja continued, "as the Captain is charged with the conduct of the relations of the two States and is the promoter of them, and the affair of Shikarpur is easy of attainment, were he to give his assent it might be accomplished at once."¹⁰⁶ But the recitation of the fable failed to yield the desired result.¹⁰⁷

Wade continued exerting his influence with the Maharaja who ultimately issued orders for cessation of hostilities, and requested that the Sindhian agent be asked to enter into a treaty with him,¹⁰⁸ and wanted the British to be a party to it.¹⁰⁹ This

106. 102/103. Wade to Macnaghten, December 16, 1836. P. G. R.

107. Wade wrote : "The Maharaja had ascribed to me a power of gratifying him which I really did not possess, that even if I did, it was not always the part of a true friend to yield indiscriminately to the inclinations of those who claimed the good offices of friendship, that as I could not satisfy my solicitude for his welfare by coinciding in opinion with him on the present occasion, it would be far from friendly on my part to encourage a step which might prove more injurious than beneficial to his interests." (*Ibid.*)

108. 142/84. Wade to Macnaghten, November 2, 1836. P. G. R.

109. 142/85. Wade to Macnaghten, November 3, 1836. P. G. R.

the Government had never desired. Wade was, therefore, instructed to proceed to Lahore and to discourage the Maharaja from entertaining any such notion.¹¹⁰ Wade reached Lahore on the Christmas eve, 1836.¹¹¹ The need for reconciling the Maharaja had by this time become all the more essential, for alarming news of Russian designs was reaching India.¹¹² He found the Maharaja most perturbed on account of the negotiations of Pottinger with the Amirs and the suspected designs of the Government in deputing Burnes to Kabul.¹¹³ He formed the opinion that Ranjit's unwillingness to give up his pretensions on Shikarpur and abandon all hostility towards Sind arose "both from a suspicion of our ultimate designs, and a loss of reputation if he agrees to do anything that may compromise the position he had assumed in that quarter."¹¹⁴ He had, therefore, to be very cautious in tackling the very delicate task of thwarting his ambitious designs on Shikarpur, and at the same time maintaining his friendship unimpaired. He strove with extreme caution to impress upon his mind the impropriety of going against the wishes of his powerful allies, and succeeded by slow degrees in persuading him to abandon his projects against Shikarpur.¹¹⁵ Ranjit's courtiers fretted and fumed and still urged him not to yield, but he silenced them by asking what had become of the two hundred thousand spears of the Marathas.¹¹⁶

110. 107/33. Macnaghten to Wade, November 14, 1836. P. G. R.

111. 142/107. Wade to Macnaghten, December 27, 1836. P. G. R.

112. 119/1. Macnaghten to Wade, January 2, 1837. P. G. R.

113. 142/107. Wade to Macnaghten, December 27, 1836. P. G. R.

Vide Chapter XI, *infra*.

114. 142/107. Wade to Macnaghten, December 27, 1836. P. G. R.

115. It is interesting to note how gradually Ranjit came down from polite refusal to complete submission.

Sohan Lal, *Umdat-ut-Twarikh*, Vol. III., Part II. p. 345. 1st *Maghar*, 1893, Samat Bikarmi (December 13, 1836), Ranjit inquires from Wade about the English attitude towards Shikarpur. p. 354. 10th *Maghar*, 1893 (December 22, 1836), Ranjit disagrees with the English objections to his right to capture Shikarpur. p. 354. 10th *Maghar*, 1893, (December 22, 1836), Ranjit asks Wade to request the British Government not to interfere in the matter of Shikarpur. p. 359. 26th *Maghar*, 1893 (January 7, 1837), Ranjit submits :

سرکار دولتمدار فرمودند کہ آنچه رضا مند، صاحبان عالی
شان سے باشکست و از حق مقدم و واجب و معتزم است

(His Highness said that whatever was the will of the exalted Sahibs (the English) it was proper, prior and superior to everything else).

116. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 211, and references there cited.

The Maharaja agreed to let his relations with the Amirs stand on their old footing. He wished to destroy the fort of Ken and continue to occupy Rajhan and the Muzari territory.¹¹⁷ But for the time being he recalled all his troops.¹¹⁸ Thus ended the first great crisis in the Anglo-Sikh relations since that of 1809.¹¹⁹ And yet the Maharaja hoped that some opportunity might still arise in the future to annex Shikarpur to his dominions.¹²⁰

117. Wade to Government, January 3, 1837. Quoted in Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

118. 145/22. Wade to Macnaghten, December 13, 1836. P. G. R.

119. The success with which Wade persuaded the Maharaja to abandon his designs on Sind is as remarkable as the Maharaja's sagacity in bending before his mighty friends.

120. Sohan Lal records that in 1839 when Macnaghten and Wade went to Lahore to negotiate the Tripartite Treaty (Vide Chapter XII, *infra*), they hinted to the Maharaja that he might relinquish his claims on attention about Shikarpur finally because the British were determined to keep that area under their influence, that this agitated the mind of the Sikh Ruler who reminded them (through Kishan Chand) of the Rupal meeting regarding which Sohan Lal records that "when we enquired about Bannu, Tank and Shikarpur the 'Lat Sahib' replied that when the treaty was mutually ratified, there was no need of making enquiries again and again, and he also added that the territory of Shikarpur belonged to the Princely Ruler (Ranjit Singh), and that he could establish his sway there, or exact *nazarana* from it, as he had full authority over it." Moreover, Shah Shuja had also recognised the Maharaja's control over Shikarpur by the Treaty of 1833. (Vide Chapter IX, *infra*). The Maharaja also asserted that he had certain letters in his possession in which the English had clearly stated that they had nothing to do with the area to the west of the Sutlej. At this Faqir Aziz-ud-Din, the most talented of the Maharaja's advisers, urged him to acquiesce and not to press the matter. Thereupon Ranjit Singh told Osborne that he should tell Lord Auckland that he had agreed again to relinquish his claim over Shikarpur out of regard for the British Government. (*op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part IV, p. 534 *sqq.*)

CHAPTER IX

SHAH SHUJA'S BID FOR HIS THRONE

Beyond the north western borders of the Sikh dominion lay Afghanistan—a country bounded on the north and east by immense mountain ranges, and on the south and west by vast tracts of sandy desert. Occupying the north-eastern portion of the arid Iranian plateau with central Asian depression on the north, with most waterless deserts of Baluchistan on the south, with a gentle slope from north-east to the south-west, intersected by deep ravines and surrounded by steep mountains it possesses natural defences of a formidable character.¹

The history of Afghanistan had for a long time been one of political intrigue and dynastic revolution. Towards the end of the 18th century the Durrani Empire, founded by Ahmad Shah, had developed these maladies through the indolence of Timur Shah (1773—1793), the cruelty of Zaman Shah (1793—1800) and the incompetence of Mahmud Shah (1800—1803). By 1803, the sceptre had passed into the hands of Shah Shuja who too could not stem the rot.²

Even while the Elphinstone mission (1809) was still at Peshawar after concluding a treaty with Shah Shuja, news of the capture of Kandahar by the latter's brother, Mahmud Shah (whom Shah Shuja had supplanted earlier) came. Soon after Mahmud Shah defeated Shah Shuja at Neemla and expelled him from the kingdom.

This was followed by a prolonged civil war in Afghanistan, at first between the members of the Sadozai family, then between the Sadozais and the Barakzais who ultimately came into power, and parcelled out the country among themselves. Dost Mohd., the ablest of the Barakzais,

1. Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 1.

2. See *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V. pp. 483 *seq.*

thus came to possess both Kabul and Ghazni, Kandhar came under Kohin Dil Khan and Peshawar under Sultan Mohd., The last named had to submit to a nominal suzerainty of Ranjit Singh.³ Only Herat remained in the hands of the Sadozai family under Mahmud Shah who however was succeeded by his son, Kamran.⁴

Shah Shuja, after his discomfiture at Neemla, was reduced to lead the life of a roving adventurer, seeking his fortune as a fugitive in the neighbouring country of Kashmir, and later at Lahore under the avaricious eye of his custodian, Ranjit Singh, till 1816, when he escaped from the clutches of the Sikh Ruler⁵ to find a more hospitable asylum in the English outpost at Ludhiana.⁶ Provided with an ample allowance of Rs. 50,000 per annum by the British,⁷ the Shah in his leisure hours indulged in his pleasant dreams of recovering his lost throne.

3. 144/44. Wade to Macnaghten forwarding Burnes' report. P. G. R.

4. With this exception the Sadozai dynasty founded by Ahmad Shah in 1747 fell in 1818. Vide Chapter X, *infra*.

5. At Lahore the Shah was shamefully treated by Ranjit, who, to gain possession of the celebrated *Koh-i-Noor*, harrassed and starved him until he contrived to escape. (See Sykes, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 389).

6. Sir Alexander Burnes sketches the chequered career of Shah Shuja from 1809 to 1816, based on a little work written by the Shah himself which is not now traceable. He writes: "Few monarchs and few men have been subjected to greater reverses of fortune than Shuja-ul-Mulk, and we find our sympathies enlisted in his cause by a knowledge of his misfortunes"—Ferrier, *History of the Afghans*. Translated by Captain William Jesse, pp. 143-45.

7. The Shah wanted this stipend to be paid to his wife, Waffa Begum, rather than to himself. He also desired it to be styled as *Kharch-i-Zanana*, that is, herem expenses. The reason for it, as told by Mulla Shakoor, the confidential servant and preceptor of the Shah, to Lt. Murray was that the deposed monarch had, or imagined to have had, a strong party in his favour at Kabul. His intentions were to keep alive in that party the prospect of

(Continued on next page).

At the British outpost of Ludhiana he was not too unfavourably situated, being able to keep frequent correspondence with the northern countries, and maintain contacts with his real and pretended adherents. Besides, he could ingratiate himself with Wade whom he converted into his staunch supporter.

During the Barakzai rebellion of 1818, after the death of Feteḥ Khan—a Nana Farnvis of the Afghan history—Shah Shuja found an opportunity of making a bid for his throne. He was invited by Muhammad Azim Khan of Kashmir to accompany him to Afghanistan. But his haughty and arrogant behaviour annoyed Azim Khan who deserted him. Shah Shuja was forced to fly towards Sind where he made futile attempts to raise an army. He returned to Ludhiana in 1821, but never gave up the idea of recapturing Khorassan.

In the middle of 1826, some communication passed between Ranjit Singh and Mahmud Hussain, the Shah's old servant, with a view to opening a correspondence and inviting the Shah to make another attempt to regain his throne with the Maharaja's help. Some three years earlier, Mahmud Hussain on his way from Peshawar to Ludhiana had been detained at Amritsar. From there he had written to the Shah about Ranjit Singh's views, viz., that he regretted his past unfriendly conduct, that he wanted to assist him in his enterprise and that should he be disposed to make another effort for regaining his country, the Maharaja would be happy to assist him to the utmost of his means.⁸ The Shah apprised Wade of this matter by sending him Mahmud Hussain's letter in original, and seeking his advice about the overtures of the Maharaja in whose sincerity he himself placed little reliance.

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his speedy return. He wished to impress upon them that he had not arrived at Ludhiana to seek a continued asylum, or to remain there on a fixed pecuniary allowance, but that he had come there to induce the British to help him.—92/3. Murray to Ochterlony. November 10, 1816. P. G. R.

8. 95/29. Wade to Metcalfe, July 25, 1826. P. G. R.

The reply given by Wade is noteworthy as reflecting the British policy towards the Shah for the next ten years. Declining to give any advice, Wade observed that the only reasons actuating the Government to grant him protection were hospitality and commiseration. Wade further remarked that no restraint would be imposed upon his inclinations either in quitting or in staying at Ludhiana, and that he should make his own decision. The Shah sent no reply to the Maharaja or to Mahmud, and a few days later, when Mahmud himself arrived in Ludhiana he at once informed Wade of it.

However anxious the Shah might have been to try his fortune by committing himself to Ranjit Singh, he did not like to relinquish the ease and safety of his asylum at Ludhiana. No consideration whatever could weigh, after the vicissitudes of fortune he had suffered, to make him sacrifice something definite for what was quite uncertain. He tried in several ways to extract Wade's opinion as to the course he should adopt. But the latter acted with circumspection, avoiding any expression that might tend to influence the Shah's personal judgment or raise hope in his mind which might never be realised.

Mahmud remained at Ludhiana even though the Maharaja, growing impatient about the Shah's reply, wrote to him about it. Shah Shuja was keen to secure the British mediation in any engagement into which he might enter with Ranjit Singh, but Wade gave a frank refusal.*

The question arises whether Ranjit's proposal was a trick for obtaining possession of Shah's person and making him subservient to his own plan of conquests, or was intended as a likely gesture to tempt the British to espouse the Shah's cause.

The divided and unruly condition of the Afghans had often been a source of anxiety to the Maharaja. Since he found that he himself should not attempt alone to subdue the countries across the

9. 95/29. Wade to Metcalfe, July 25, 1826. P. G. R.

Indus, he wanted the Afghans to be brought under the sway of one of their ex-princes of his own acceptance. This would enable him to consolidate his own position as well as secure the peace and tranquillity of his neighbouring districts. With the exception of Dera Ghazi Khan and its dependent districts which the Maharaja had assigned to the Nawab of Bahawalpur for an annual rent of six lacs, he could be said to possess no territory beyond Attock. A present of a few horses was all that he had hitherto been able to obtain as tribute from Peshawar, and that too was seldom secured without negotiation. The part of the Punjab on the left bank of the Indus extending from the Attock fort to the bounds of Rawalpindi was occupied by the turbulent race of Eusefzais. These had never been completely subdued, had scarcely ever ceased attacking his troops and were a constant menace to him. Towards Dera Ismail Khan too, the Maharaja's authority was precarious. A trifling tribute accrued but only through the presence every year of a military force which actually collected it.

Whatever the real motive behind Ranjit's proposal was, the British did not care to involve itself in it either directly or indirectly. Mahmud got no definite reply from the Shah who later, accompanied by a small retinue, went away on a pilgrimage to Sirhind and Panipat.¹⁰

To think that the Shah was disheartened at this indifferent attitude of the Government is to misjudge him. He sent a deputation to the Governor General at Simla,¹¹ and received the following reply in July, 1827: The Government could not afford assistance in any attempt which he might make to recover his lost dominions. This precluded them from involving themselves, either by guarantee or otherwise, in his negotiations. They, however, had no objection to an alliance between him and Ranjit

10. 95/35. Wade to Metcalfe, September 27, 1826. P. G. R.

11. 95/84. Wade to Kennedy, Principal Assistant, Sebatthu. P. G. R.

Singh for the purpose of re-establishing him in his kingdom, or to any attempt which he might make on the invitation of Afghan chiefs without Ranjit Singh's aid, but in either case he must simultaneously relinquish their protection on a distinct understanding that they would not be under any obligation to renew it in the event of failure.¹² This reply deterred him for the time being.

In 1829, the Shah's hopes were revived by the favourable turn of affairs in Peshawar consequent upon Syed Ahmad's ascendancy. In March, he sent an agent to the Maharaja with the proposal that "if the Princely Ruler (the Maharaja) helped him in acquiring possession and sway over the countries of Peshawar and Kabul, one lac of rupees and some swift-footed horses would be presented to him through the agency of the British."¹³ The Maharaja in order to amuse the ex-King listened to his overtures and sent him back rich presents.¹⁴ On June 1, the Shah informed the Government regarding his proposed alliance with the Ruler of Lahore having for its object his restoration to his throne¹⁵. Meanwhile, Wade exerted his influence to enlist the Government's sympathies.¹⁶ But the Governor General first on May 19,¹⁷ and then on June 12,¹⁸ repeated his warning. The matter was once again dropped.

In 1830, Shah Shuja sent complimentary presents to Ranjit.¹⁹ The real motive of Shah is shown by Ranjit Singh observing to the *Vakil* of Sultan Mohd. Khan, the Sardar of Peshawar, that the

12. 115/19. Lt. W. Hilson, Asstt., Delhi Residency, to Wade, July 7, 1827. P. G. R.

13. Sohan Lal, *Umdat-ut-Twarikh*, Vol. II, p. 338.

14. *Idem*, p. 339.

15. Political Consultation, June 12, 1829. No. 20. I. R. D.

16. 97/81, 97/87, 97/92, 97/97. Wade to Colebrooke. May 2, 3, 13 and 17, 1829. P. G. R.

17. 115/59. Colebrooke to Wade, May 19, 1829. P. G. R.

18. 115/62. Encl. Sterling to Colebrooke, June 12, 1829. P. G. R.

19. 98/53. Wade to Resident, Delhi, June 7, 1830. P. G. R.

Shah had engaged to give him 105 horses, 2 Persian swords, a lakh of rupees and several jewels if he would place him in possession of Peshawar and Kabul.²⁰ But Wade thought that as the Shah had denied having made such proposals, it was a stratagem on the part of the Ruler of Lahore to frighten and deceive the Chiefs of Peshawar.²¹ Regarding Ranjit Singh's real attitude, Wade opined that he was just trying to amuse the Shah as he (Ranjit Singh) was well aware that the British had declined to interfere in his attempts to recover his throne. Ranjit Singh's move, Wade argued could, therefore, be regarded as nothing else but a more courteous profession of good will.²²

Whether Wade's remarks were merely an expression of his own wishful thinking, or whether in reality there was no design behind these negotiations just then, cannot be said with certainty. But one thing is definite, that towards the middle of 1831, the Shah was again writing to Ranjit Singh in the following strain: "Peshawar and other countries which are under the Maharaja's subjection belong to him. If His Highness will confer the crown of the remaining countries on me, the Maharaja's name will become famous throughout the world.....If His Highness will perform the friendly act required, and continue to treat me with liberality, my successors will recollect his deeds. Let the Maharaja, therefore, state his propositions, article by article."²³ To conciliate the Maharaja further the Shah wrote that whatever had happened to him in the past he considered as proceeding from adverse fate and not from His Highness.²⁴ This undoubtedly shows that negotiations had been going on for sometime.

20. 98/98. Wade to Hawkins, June, 21, 1830. P. G. R.

21. *Ibid.*

22. 98/120. Wade to Hawkins, September 29, 1830. P. G. R.

23. Wade to Prinsep, November 21, 1831. Encl. Translation of a note presented to Maharaja Ranjit Singh by Qazi Mohd. Hussain, Agent of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk. Letter No. 1 (Indian Papers, 1839, Extracts from Despatches relative to the expedition of Shah Shuja into Afghanistan in 1833-34).

24. *Ibid.*

Ranjit Singh in reply expressed his readiness to assist him to recover his throne if the latter would sign a treaty with the following terms: "1. that if proper, according to the Treaty of friendship established between the two Governments (the British and Sikh), let the Shah come with confidence to the Maharaja at either Amritsar or Lahore, and meet His Highness in the manner that they met at Rawalpindi, Kushab and Lahore; that the Shah enter into a treaty with the Maharaja agreeably to his desire, ratifying it by his oath and seal, that no treachery be practised towards His Highness' troops; that when the Maharaja may move in the direction of Peshawar the Shah shall come to meet him; 2. that the heir-apparent of the Shah shall always attend His Highness with a force, having also his family along with him, that he shall be treated with distinction, and expected to accompany the Maharaja in all his journeys; 3. that the Shah shall disclaim, both for himself, his successors, and all the tribe of Suddozai, every right and title to the countries which have been acquired by His Highness, his dependents, and tributaries of every kind, for instance, to the city of Peshawar with its territory and customs, Kohat, Hastnagar, Usafzai, Khyber, Kashmir, Multan, Mankera, Kalabagh, Bootehee, Serai, Tenouls, territories farmed by Bhawalpur, the two Ketehees north of the Sutlej, Tank, Sengher, Gherang, Fort of Rulien, Gooldhere, Akora, territory of Khattak, the seat of Payandah Khan's family, Darband, Terbelah and Payendah Khan's place of abode; 4. that the Maharaja's passion for horses is well known, and the Shah shall send him 102 horses of the finest description every year, 25 Persian mules, 11 Persian swords, and 200 maunds of fruit, consisting of grapes, besides some Persian silk cloaks, etc., etc., half the presents to be delivered at Nou Roz and half at Dusserah; 5. that the Shah shall at once give three lacs of rupees worth jewels, such as those for which His Highness negotiated through Mian Lemedjoo, for the expenses of the army; 6. that whenever the Maharaja may be in want of troops, the Shah shall send his own army to him with one of his sons; 7. that the friends and enemies of one shall be friends and enemies of the other; 8. that when any of His Highness's people shall proceed to Kabul to purchase fruit or horses for the Maharaja, they shall be well treated, and allowed to pass through the country in safety; 9. that should any European gentleman be coming from Persia with His Highness' sanction, or be proceeding to Ludhiana, they are according to the Treaty subsisting between

the British and Sikh Governments, to be allowed to pass without molestation, and to be treated with respect; 10. that the abomination of killing kine shall never exist in the territory of Kabul or in its armies, nay, let a proclamation be issued that no one shall commit the act; 11. that the portals made of sandal, which have been carried away to Ghazni from the temple of Jugamaut (it should be Somnath) shall be delivered to the Maharaja when the Shah's Government is well established; 12. that whatever property in money, jewels, or cannon, be taken from the Barakzais in Kabul, Peshawar and Jalalabad, shall be divided equally between His Highness and the Shah; 13. that if the Shah's officers infringe any of the above-mentioned articles, the army of the Maharaja shall have liberty to correct them; 14. that His Highness will send the Shah presents worthy of his acceptance consisting of the productions of Kashmir and Multan; and 15. that should the Barakzais attend the Maharaja to Kabul, His Highness and the Shah shall agree to make a suitable provision for them."²⁵ These terms, however, were too arbitrary and dictatorial, and appeared to the Shah, though prostrate with misfortune and failure, humiliating."²⁶ Hence the negotiations fell through once again.

25. Wade to Prinsep, November 21, 1831 L. letter No. 2. (Indian Papers, 1839 *et supra.*) cf. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part I, p. 70.

26. Shah Shuja's answer to some of the stipulations of the proposed treaty is worth quoting:

"Regarding the attendance of the Shazada (condition No. 2), it is improper because the world will consider him in the situation of an hostage.....If the Maharaja will take one of the Lords of the Court, it is well.

"Regarding a prohibition against the slaughter of kine (condition No. 10), let His Highness consider that notwithstanding the territory in which I am residing ■ that of the Sikhs, the British Government and the Maharaja being connected by the ties of amity, the practice in question ■ permitted in the British cantonments and camps. Is it just that it should be prohibited in Kabul and Peshawar, which are Muh.-mmadan countries?

"Regarding the demand for the portals of sandal at Ghazni (condition No. 11), a compliance with it is inadmissible in two ways, firstly, a real friend

Continued on next page

In 1832, an unconfirmed report was current that Abbas Mirza of Persia was near Mero Shahjahan for helping Russia in subjugating Khiva. He was further believed to have brought Mero under his sway²⁷. It was admitted that with the aid of Russia, he was bent upon extending his father's dominions. This rumoured advance of the Persians gave an impetus to Shah Shuja to pursue his designs. Having failed to raise money on the pledge of his jewels, he looked up to the British for pecuniary assistance. He wished to exploit the fear which they were then supposed to entertain as regards the Russian advance. He wrote to them that the Persian Prince was bent upon capturing Herat, that his military strength was enough to crush Kamran (the ruler of Herat) unless the Shah himself proceeded with reinforcements, and that Kamran would, out of sheer desperation, ally himself with Abbas if he failed to receive any help in time.²⁸ And then it would be no wonder if Abbas advanced towards Afghanistan particularly when the negotiations for a matrimonial alliance between the Persians and the Sindhians had been going on.²⁹ The people of Afghanistan, Shah Shuja added, were tired of the tyrannous rule of Dost Mohd., and would help Abbas if the Shah did not reach there. He considered the occasion favourable for acquiring his lost kingdom.³⁰ He was confident of saving Afghanistan from the Persian clutches, if only he were able to procure the British help. In return, he promised to make the Afghans

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is he who is interested in the good name of his friend. The Maharaja being my friend, how can he find satisfaction in my eternal disgrace? To desire the disgrace of one's friend is not consistent with the dictates of wisdom. Secondly, there is tradition among all classes of people, that the forefathers of the Sikhs have said that their nation shall, in the attempt to bring away the portals of sandal, will advance to Ghazni, but having arrived there, the foundation of their empire shall be overthrown."—Wade to Prinsep, November 21, 1831. Letter No. 4. (Indian Papers, 1830, *ut supra*.)

27. 138/12. Wade to Government, March 9, 1832. P. G. R.

28. 138/20. Wade to Government, May 11, 1832. P. G. R.

29. 37/23. Wade to Prinsep, August 5, 1831. P. G. R. See p. 96, *supra*.

30. 116/35. Macnaghten to Wade, October 19, 1832. P. G. R.

friendly towards the British interests, and make them enter into an alliance with the Government by receiving its agent in their country. He also applied for the loan of military officers to train his levies, and sought the continuance of his pension to his family after he had proceeded on his expedition.³¹

All this caused, it must be noted, a distinct change this time in the British approach towards Shah Shuja. They now looked upon his efforts to regain his throne with a benevolent, though, for the moment, a neutral interest.

The attitude of the Amirs of Sind towards the Shah had always been sympathetic though they had personal motives of their own. In 1830, they, judging that Ranjit Singh would not let them retain Shikarpur, considered it politic to hand it over to the Shah. A year later, the impending arrival of the English Envoy for commercial negotiations caused much consternation to the Amirs, and they encouraged the tenders of their titular monarch still further.³² As they had no confidence in the good faith of the English either, they extended an invitation to the Shah for obtaining an ally for themselves by promising him material help in his projected invasion of Afghanistan.³³ They even proposed to conclude a treaty with him offering their assistance, if he would relinquish all claims to the sovereignty of Shikarpur and his supremacy over them. The Shah agreed to restore Shikarpur and to acknowledge their independence, if he succeeded.³⁴

At about the same time, some Afghan nobles of consequence offered their aid to the Shah if he led an expedition into Afghanistan. Successive revolutions and continued unsettled affairs, they informed him, had caused discontent among the Afghans who looked up to him to restore

31. 116/35. Macnaghten to Wade, October 19, 1832. P. G. R.

32. 137/27. Wade to Prinsep, September 9, 1831. P. G. R.

33. 108/23. Mackeson to Wade, October 12, 1831. P. G. R.

34. 116/29. Government to Wade, September 20, 1832. P. G. R.

peace there. Mehrab Khan, the Chief of Baluchistan, also was deeply attached to the Shah's cause.³⁵ Still the Shah wavered.³⁶

To return to Abbas of Persia. A report got currency that one of his sons was to marry a daughter of Kamran, but that when he sought a passage through his territory, Kamran opposed him with force.³⁷ Through his servant (Ibrahim), Kamran informed Wade that he was determined to oppose the impending Persian attack on Herat, and hinted that that was the first move in a projected big Russian plan of advance upon India. Ibrahim acquainted Wade that his master had deputed him to establish friendly relations with the Government.³⁸

These sensational reports had a sudden effect on the Shah. His indecision vanished. He decided on an expedition, and once again started negotiations with Ranjit Singh for help, offering in return the acquittance of Koh-i-noor and acknowledgment of Sikh sovereignty on the right bank of the Indus.³⁹

To this the Maharaja wished to know the precise reactions of the British, and, therefore, proposed that the British and Lahore Governments should have an understanding about the Shah's movements, that if he advanced, it should be with the consent of both, but that if he

35. 138/20. Wade to Macnaghten, May 11, 1832. P. G. R.

Wade, discussing the reasons for those offers of help to the Shah, wrote : " In considering these matters it ought to be remembered that oriental nations are not moved by the same springs of action which regulate those of European nations on such occasions. The former have a reverence for royalty, the name and authority of those who have ruled over them." (*Ibid*).

36. Wade wrote to Macnaghten : " Notwithstanding these demonstrations (of support) the Shah has not, in my opinion, come to the resolution of undertaking the expedition....."—138/50. September 15, 1832. P. G. R.

37. 138/34. Wade to Macnaghten, August 2, 1832. P. G. R.

38. 138/53. Wade to Macnaghten, October 11, 1832. P. G. R.

39. 138/68. Wade to Macnaghten, December 13, 1832. P. G. R.

was to be prevented from advancing that also should be with their joint consent,⁴⁰ the Maharaja having no confidence in the Afghans.⁴¹ The Governor General replied that, in view of the Company's neutrality, "this Government, though it did not feel justified in prohibiting the movement of the Shah, has indirectly refused to afford him the assistance which he has repeatedly solicited in aid of his undertaking, and consistently with this view of the question, the British Government could not enter into any negotiation, either with the view of encouraging, or preventing, the designs of Shah Shuja", but that the Maharaja was at liberty to adopt any measures for his own security.⁴²

The Maharaja then agreed to advance the Shah money but on the condition that he should divide Sind with him, which offer the ex-King declined on the plea that he was not in possession of that country, and that it did not become of him to make a division of what belonged to another.⁴³ Wade was right when he wrote that nothing would induce the Shah to have a divided interest in Sind with Ranjit Singh as that would alienate the Sindhians. Ranjit Singh next offered even to instal the Shah at Kabul, but he being sceptical refused such offers. Thus the negotiations once again fell through.

About this time, the Company received friendly proposals from Dost Mohd., Wade criticised these adversely as he was somewhat partial to the cause of the Shah. A favourable consideration of Dost Mohd's proposals, opined Wade, would naturally throw the project of helping

40. Fraser to Macnaghten, February 21, 1833. Letter No. 22 (Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*).

41. Wade to Government, December 31, 1832, quoted in Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

42. Macnaghten to Wade, March 5, 1833. Encl. reply to Fraser. Letter Nos. 21 and 24. (Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*).

43. 139/17. Wade to Macnaghten, March 27, 1833. P. G. R. Also 139/19. Wade to Macnaghten, April 9, 1833. P. G. R.

the Shah to the throne of Kabul into the background. Further, he argued that in case of Shuja's success, any disposition which they might now show to cultivate an alliance with Dost Mohd. would be embarrassing to the Government, but should the Shah unfortunately fail in his project, it might be impolitic to repel altogether Dost's overtures, as that would deprive them of the means thus presented of acquiring an influence in Afghanistan, which they might not hereafter have an opportunity of securing.⁴⁴ While agreeing with Wade, the Governor General pointed out that the British policy towards the parties in Afghanistan was one of perfect neutrality, but at the same time there could be no objection to their cultivating the most friendly understanding with them all.⁴⁵ Thus the Government, at this time, was following a "safe" policy in respect of Afghanistan, though in the end, as we shall see, it resulted in the disastrous consequences of the First Afghan War. The best course for them, under the circumstances, would have been to discourage Shah Shuja in attempting the recovery of Kabul and to welcome openly Dost Mohd's overtures for he had been able to hold his own for the last seventeen years. By doing so they would have nipped in the bud what is known as the Peshawar imbroglio.⁴⁶

In the meanwhile, the Shah had applied to the British for an advance of six months allowance.⁴⁷ As the British view-point had already changed, he was sanctioned Rs. 16,000, i. e., about four months allowance, and no warning was given against his returning this time.⁴⁸ Bentinck even "suffered Shah to raise an army of invasion under the shadow of

44. 139/1. Wade to Macnaghten, January 17, 1833. P. G. R.

45. 117/5. Macnaghten to Wade, March 19 1833. P. G. R.

46. Vide Chapter X, *infra*.

47. 133/83. Wade to Macnaghten, November 11, 1832. P. G. R.

48. 116/44. Macnaghten to Wade. December, 13, 1832. P. G. R.

British flag",⁴⁹ though Wade was instructed to declare that the British policy was one of complete indifference towards the project.⁵⁰

To secure Ranjit's tacit consent and pecuniary aid, the Shah offered to relinquish (in writing) all his claims to the territory north of the Indus, then actually under the Sikh Ruler.⁵¹ But the latter considered the Shah's prospective restoration without his help fraught with adverse consequences, for the Afghans, once consolidated under him, would try to retrieve what had been lost to the Sikhs.⁵² Hence Ranjit did accept to sign a treaty with Shah Shuja on March 12, 1833.⁵³ It was a modified version of the one proposed by him in 1831.⁵⁴ It finally became the basis of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838.

According to the terms of this treaty of 1833, the ex-Amir recognised Ranjit Singh's sway on the right bank of the Indus over the Kabul territories he had already conquered. Regarding Shikarpur and the

49. Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 78, and reference there cited.

Durand (*The First Afghan War*, p. 18) says: "Such an act would not fail in the East of being construed into a material aid and effectual countenance of the Shah's designs."

50. Macnaghten to Wade, March 5, 1833. Letter No. 24, (Indian Papers, 1833, *ut supra*).

51. 139/5. Wade to Government, February 8, 1833. P. G. R.

52. Apart from the object of strengthening his position on the right bank of the Indus in the event of Shah Shuja's success, Ranjit had another motive. He wanted to forestall any exclusive views that the British might have about Afghanistan. "From the journey of Lieut. Burnes into Afghanistan and his subsequent correspondence with the Chiefs that he hoped to renew intercourse with them, as also from the interest of the British in Afghan affairs, Ranjit surmised that the British were contemplating political relations with that country, and he wished to establish a claim for himself in anticipation of any steps that the British might take to secure that object"—Political Proceedings, December 2, 1834, No. 60, quoted in Sinha, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

53. 140/42. Wade to Macnaghten, June, 17, 1834. P. G. R.

54. See pp. 154-55, *supra*.

territory of Sind lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah undertook to abide by whatever might be settled through Wade as right and proper.⁵⁶

The Shah left Ludhiana with only a small force but soon its strength increased, and by September, 1833, it swelled to 10,000 men.⁵⁷ He paid his troops liberally and regularly and took great pains in disciplining them.⁵⁷ His plan was to assemble them at Shikarpur, and to receive there whatever assistance the Amirs would render him. From that place he hoped to march towards Kandhar where he expected his Afghan adherents to muster.⁵⁸

He set off to Shikarpur towards the end of 1833. The Amirs placed the city at his disposal provided he would not retain it for more than 54 days. They promised to pay him Rs. 50,000 on the condition that he would make no further demands after the conquest of Kabul.⁵⁹

But once the city was under the Shah both sides began to distrust each other. The Shah did not consider himself to be bound by any

56. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. I, pp. 4-6, foot-note. Also Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*, pp. 31-32.

This treaty, although drawn up on March 12, 1833, was not ratified by Ranjit Singh till August of the same year. It was artfully kept from the knowledge of Wade till June, 1834, when its provisions became for the present nugatory. Wade pointed out both to the Shah and Ranjit the impropriety of introducing his name without consulting the Government—140/47, Wade to Macnaghten, June 17, 1834. P. G. R.

Ranjit Singh did not insist upon obtaining from Ghazni the sandal wood gates of Somnath, he did not even insist on the prohibition of the slaughter of kine in Afghanistan. The stipulation that the Shah's heir apparent should always attend the Maharaja with a force was also waived. See p. 155, foot-note 26 *supra*.

57. 105/20. Mackeson to Wade, September 4, 1833. P. G. R.

58. *Ibid.*

59. 138/53. Wade to Government, October 11, 1832. P. G. R. Also Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pt., II, p. 163.

59. 139/50. Intelligence from Bahawalpur, August 4 1833. P. G. R.

obligation or time limit regarding his stay at Shikarpur, and is reported to have said : "I consider the country of Amirs as my own, and it is my intention to fortify myself here so that when I move on to Kandhar and am successful, so much the better. But if I should be unsuccessful I have this place to return and reside in as my own home."⁶⁰ When the Amirs heard this "they at last thought it better to break with him at once than to put their means into his hands for their own more assured destruction."⁶¹ At the same time, a *vakil* arrived from Kandhar to ascertain whether the Sindhians intended to join the Shah or whether in accordance with the long friendship subsisting between them and the Barakzai Sardars, they intended to unite with them in repelling him.⁶² The Amirs asked the *vakil* in private whether in the event of a struggle Kohin Dil Khan (Ruler of Kandhar) would fight the Shah, or accept him as the lawful sovereign. The *vakil* replied, "You are aware of the deadly feuds existing between the Sardars and the descendants of Timur Shah since the latter took the life of Fattah Khan ; besides the country of Khorasan is as necessary to the Barakzai Sardars as the country of Sind is to the Amirs, and as they (the Barakzais) have ruled it as kings for the last fifteen years they will not hesitate to defend their right by swords."⁶³

The answer shook the Amirs. They were virtually between two fires, while the Shah's attitude steadily stiffened. He refused to evacuate Shikarpur. The matters came to a head, and fighting took place between him and the Sindhians.⁶⁴ The Shah, after success, firmly established

60. 105/20. Extract of a letter from Shikarpur. P. G. R.

61. Wade to Government, August 25, 1833, quoted in Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 203.

62. 105/20. Extracts of a letter from Shikarpur. P. G. R.

63. *Ibid.*

64. A severe battle was fought at a place seven kos from Shikarpur on January 9, 1834, in which the Amirs lost thirteen hundred and seventy horses and foot besides sixty other chiefs of Mir Rustam and the Hyderabad Amir, and loss on the Shah's side was also considerable.

(105/29. Mackeson to Wade, January 18, 1834. P. G. R.)

himself at Shikarpur, and seized the whole territory dependent on it. This broke the back of the Amirs' resistance and they submitted. They begged that he "should give up Shikarpur to them for an annual tribute of six lakhs of rupees on the condition that if he conquered Afghanistan, they would continue to pay him a tribute of seven lakhs of rupees yearly, but should he fail in doing so, the first six lakhs should be considered as a donation from them, and that they would not give him a farthing after that."⁶⁵ A treaty, accordingly, was signed with the Amirs which replenished the empty military chest of the Shah who next proceeded towards Kandhar with greatly enhanced prestige and with his soldiery in high spirits. His success now was thought to be a foregone conclusion.⁶⁶ The Amirs on their part, lamented their discomfiture, more especially because their weakness became apparent to the foreigners (the British) who would act more boldly in the matter of the Indus trade project.⁶⁷ This episode undoubtedly illustrated the pusillanimity which formed so prominent a feature of the character of the Amirs. They, at first, tried to bully the Shah into quitting Shikarpur, but when he, knowing the people he was dealing with, showed firmness they made an abject submission.

The Shah left Shikarpur on his expedition against Kandhar on March 6, 1834. Leaving him on his marches we now turn to affairs in Afghanistan.

65. 105/33. Mackeson to Wade, March 12, 1834. P. G. R. Also

140/25. Wade to Government, April 1, 1834. P. G. R.

66. 105/39. Mackeson to Wade, April 19, 1834. P. G. R.

67. For this disaster the Amirs had none but themselves to blame, "it was] on their invitation that Shah Shuja commenced his expedition and having invited and allowed him to remain in Shikarpur their best policy would have consisted in giving the sum of money that he at first demanded to enable him to move on Kandhar, by which the Amirs would have got rid, at a moderate price, of a visitor whose continued presence and warlike preparations could not but be pregnant with danger to them."

(140/7. Wade to Macnaghten, February 1, 1834. P. G. R.)

As early as June, 1832, news had reached Kabul of the Shah's intention to sally forth from Ludhiana,⁶⁸ and the people had risen in his favour, and several chiefs had thrown off their allegiance to Amir Dost Mohd.⁶⁹ The Amir who at that time laboured under certain difficulties was filled with anxiety. He had little money to raise the troops and bear the expenses of war.⁷⁰ Then there was no unanimity among the Barakzai brothers. To quote but one example: "He wrote to Sultan Mohammed Khan of Peshawar to join him to consult the means of meeting the threatend invasion of the Shah. Sultan Mohammad's reply was that he had often solicited his brother Dost Mohammad Khan to assist him in resisting the encroachments of the Sikhs, but he had always withheld his support and now he might extricate himself from his own difficulties in the best way that he could."⁷¹ As a matter of fact, Sultan Mohammed and his brothers at Peshawar looked to Ranjit Singh for refuge.⁷² Thus the Amir had at a time three to contend with—Shah Shuja, his own Peshawar brothers and the Sikhs. At the same time, he suspected that the Shah was moving under the sanction, if not with the support, of the British whose zealous friend, Nawab Jubbar Khan, lived in the city of Kabul itself.⁷³ Sardar Mehar Dil Khan was under this Nawab's influence, and Sultan Mohammad Khan and Rahim Dil Khan were ready to follow his lead.⁷⁴ In these circumstances, the Amir thought of humouring the British. On November 15, 1832, he told Mir Kiramat Ali, their news-writer at Kabul, that he wished with all his heart to be on terms of friendship with them. If they required, he would attend at Ludhiana with four or five thousand men and serve them with all his might. He also wrote to Wade expressing his desire to form an alliance with

68. Masson, *Narrative of Various Journeys*, Vol. III, p. 87.

69. 139/36. Wade to Macnaghten, June 9, 1833. P. G. R.

70. Masson, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 88.

71. 139/45. Wade to Macnaghten, July 15, 1833. P. G. R.

72. *Ibid.*

73. 139/30. Wade to Macnaghten, December 12, 1832. P. G. R.

74. 140/6. Wade to Macnaghten, February 1, 1834. P. G. R.

the Government.⁷⁵ He invited the King of Bokhara and the Chief of Kunduz also to form a friendly alliance with him.⁷⁶

Leagued together for his ruin, his brothers were urging him towards the close of the year 1833 to march to Kandhar, to oppose Shah Shuja who had not yet left Shikarpur.⁷⁷ Dost Mohammad knew that their real purpose, in case he left Kabul, was to afford the Chiefs of Peshawar an opportunity of moving upon the city. Hence he decided not to go to Kandhar, but to strike first where it was most necessary. On December 31, 1833, he marched on Jalalabad and replaced his nephew, Mohammad Zaman Khan, the Chief of that place, by his favourite son, Mohammad Akbar Khan.⁷⁸ This created an open schism between Dost Mohammad and his brothers which was further widened by one of the brothers being killed in a skirmish. The Barakzai brothers had hitherto never shed the blood of any of their family but that tradition was now broken.⁷⁹ At any rate, the possession of Jalalabad was a serious set-back to his brothers' machinations. About this time, too, the Amir deprived the Sayeds of Koonor of their possessions. All this redounded to his unpopularity, it being universally suspected, that he intended depriving every proprietor of his estate.

On the other hand, the Shah made rapid marches to Kandhar. A party of troops from Shahzada Kamran approached for his help,

75. 139/30. Wade to Macnaghten, December 12, 1832. P. G. R.

76. 139/45. Wade to Macnaghten, July 26, 1833. P. G. R.

77. 140/27. Wade to Macnaghten, April 10, 1834. P. G. R.

78. 140/14. Wade to Macnaghten, March 5, 1834. P. G. R. Also

108/89. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 3, 1837. P. G. R.

79. 140/30. Wade to Macnaghten, April 23, 1833. P. G. R.

80. *Ibid.*

so that the Sardars of Kandhar were alarmed by this two-sided invasion.⁸¹ Dost Mohammad, having heard of the Shah's progress, returned to Kabul. At his back, Haji Khan Kakar, ever ready to change sides, deserted him and joined Sultan Mohammad Khan.⁸² All was not smooth at Kabul either. Nawab Jabbar Khan, having formed a party for Dosts' overthrow, was in communication with the Shah. He had also sounded Wade that in case the British sympathised with the Shah's venture, he, too, would completely fall in with him.⁸³ Dost Mohammad also enquired from Wade if Shah Shuja was being supported by the British. The Political Agent replied significantly enough that the Government had taken no part in the expedition, but that the Shah had its best wishes.⁸⁴

Kohin Dil Khan and other Sardars of Kandhar, having collected 81,000 horsemen, had advanced to the Pishin valley to confront the Shah on the way, but, finding themselves deserted by the bulk of their men, retreated to Kandhar.⁸⁵ Shah Shuja invested the place while the Kandhar Chiefs sent frantic messages to Dost Mohammad for help. On April 15, the latter had received the following letter from them: "Come as quickly as you can, if you cannot come yourself immediately, send one of your sons with one or two thousand *sawars*, for there is no delay in Shah Shuja's

81. 140/27. Wade to Macnaghten, March 5, 1834. P. G. R.

82. *Ibid.*

83. 140/36. Wade to Macnaghten, May 17, 1834. P. G. R.

84. Mohan Lal, *Life of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan*, Vol. I, pp. 157-58. Also Ferrier, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-201.

It was an impolitic action on the part of Wade who certainly exceeded his powers in writing such a reply.

85. 140/32. Wade to Macnaghten, May 7, 1834. P. G. R.

approach."⁸⁶ Summoning his troops from Jalalabad, the Amir asked the Peshawar brothers for assistance. At the same time, he assured the Kandhar Sardars that his son, Mohammad Akbar Khan, would leave Kabul with 2,000 *sawars* and four pieces of artillery for their help.⁸⁷ The Peshawar brothers, however, had neither the power nor the will to assist him.⁸⁸

Dost himself marched from Kabul on April 17,⁸⁹ and reaching Qila Azim Khan, situated about five *kos* from Kandhar, halted to study the situation. Concluding that his safety lay in engaging his antagonist without delay,⁹⁰ he opened an attack on June 30, and was joined by the Kandharis the next morning. A severe action resulted in Shah Shuja's utter rout. As Dost Mohammad triumphantly put it, the Shah then became a wanderer in the wilderness of adversity.⁹¹

Shah Shuja intended to try his fortune once again with Kamran's help, and escaped towards Herat.⁹² Many men of influence there promised even to depose Kamran in his favour. While at Ladakh, the Persians invited him to Tehran with promises of help. But Kamran's help failed to come up to the Shah's expectation. Hence he had to return to Shikarpur, reaching there in Januray, 1835.⁹³ There he entered into an agreement with the Amirs, promising to abandon all claims to Shikarpur, and they bearing his expenses back to Ludhiana.⁹⁴

86. 104/36. Wade to Macnaghten, May 17 1834. P. G. R.

87. *Ibid.*

88. They had not the will, because they were jealous of him, not the power, because Ranjit-Singh's pressure had made itself felt at Peshawar,

89. 140/36. Wade to Macnaghten, May 17, 1834. P. G. R.

90. 140/60. Wade to Macnaghten, July 25, 1834. P. G. R.

91. 140/61. Wade to Macnaghten, July 27, 1834. P. G. R.

92. 140/60. Wade to Macnaghten, July 25, 1834. P. G. R.

93. 141/11. Wade to Government, January, 12, 1835. P. G. R.

94. 106/13. Pottinger to Wade, February 25, 1836. P. G. R.

Looking into the circumstances of the Shah's discomfiture, it appears that, in spite of his known personal incapacity, the result was a surprise to all the parties. He himself ascribed it to the impetuosity of his disciplined Hindustani infantry which gave up their place of vantage in their anxiety to engage the enemy.⁹⁵ The fugitives who arrived at Ludhiana soon after, ascribed it to the defection of the Durrani zamindars who had earlier joined the Shah, and to the shortage of munitions.⁹⁶ The various contemporary accounts also show that "Shah Shuja yielded his antagonist a victory without suffering defeat. He seemed to have made up his mind to lose the battle before he commenced it,"⁹⁷ fleeing and leaving his equipage to his amazed victors. Be it as it may, one thing is certain, viz., that the resourcefulness and spirit which he displayed at the commencement of his expedition deserted him in the hour of his trial, when a little intrepidity and self-possession would, in all probability, have secured him success.

95. 140/86. Wade to Government, October 21, 1834, enclosing a letter from the Shah after his defeat. P. G. R.

In this connection the account of the battle given by Latif is interesting, according to which "it was the Shah himself who from his elephant ordered Mr. Campbell to 'Chapao', or rush forward to the attack. The latter remonstrated and represented that the circumstances required a bold stand and steady fighting, and that it was no time for breaking the ranks. The Shah, however, was headstrong, and rashly repeated the words 'Chapao ! Chapao !', but to the astonishment of all, with the same breath that he urged his troops forward, he gave the order to his *mahabat* to turn his elephant round, which having been done he fled panic stricken".—*History of the Punjab*, p. 463.

The brunt of the battle was borne by the two battalions of Hindustanis commanded by Campbell. Dost Mohd. was so pleased with his gallantry and of his men that he employed him and other survivors in his own service—140/63. Wade to Macnaghten, August 13, 1834. P. G. R.

96. 140/73. Wade to Macnaghten, September 17, 1834. P. G. R.

But this seems to be no explanation as it is believed that the Shah had ample resources and that his army was well equipped.

97. 141/11. Wade to Government, January 12, 1835. P. G. R.

RUSSIA MAP ILLUSTRATING ANGLO-AFGHAN
AND SIKH-AFGHAN RELATIONS.



CHAPTER X

THE SIKH-AFGHAN RELATIONS

In 1809, the tottering Durrani monarchy received a death blow at Neemla, where Shah Shuja was defeated by the combined forces of Mahmud Shah and his able minister, Fateh Khan. After Shah Shuja's exit from Afghanistan, Fateh Khan set to the task of restoring peaceful conditions and governing the turbulent tribesmen in the name of his voluptuous master. The touch of his strong hand was soon felt, for the Amirs of Sind and Baluchistan returned to his allegiance, and even the unruly Hazara tribe was reduced to obedience.¹ Fateh Khan determined to crush the opposition from Kashmir which, though a part of the Afghan dominions since 1750, had, of late, ceased to acknowledge the authority of Kabul. Ata Mohammad Khan, who had been appointed the Governor of the province by Shah Shuja, did not submit to the new Ruler.² But before Fateh Khan could act in this matter, trouble arose in another quarter and needed his attention.

The British had set a limit to Ranjit Singh's penetration towards the east and the south, the only direction left to his adventures being the north-western region. By 1810, he had extended his dominions up to the banks of the Indus, and by 1812, the year when Fateh Khan decided to lead an expedition to Kashmir, Ranjit's plans also matured against that valley. Jammu and the sub-montane principalities south of Kashmir had already been reduced by the repeated Sikh encroachments. Thus the plans of Ranjit and the Kabul Wazir came into conflict. Both realised that, if they ranged against each other, the prize of Kashmir could not be won by either of them. They, therefore, made a pact for joint expedition,³ the Sikh Ruler promising to supply 10,000 Sikhs to the Afghan

1. Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 389.

2. Kanhaya Lal, *Ranjit Nama*, p. 284.

army in return for a promise of nine lakhs of rupees. This resulted in success in so far as the valley was reduced. But Fateh Khan then refused to pay the stipulated sum and thereby provided Ranjit Singh with an excuse to encroach upon other Afghan territory. In 1813, he succeeded in occupying Attock by intrigue and bribery.⁴ He thus secured the gateway through which the Afghan hordes often poured into the Punjab. It commanded the difficult country around and along the upper course of the river Indus. Fateh Khan fretted and fumed, and later, leaving his brother, Azim Khan, in charge of Kashmir, himself marched towards Attock and laid siege to it.⁵ The Sikh Ruler sent Mokham Chand for its relief. A fierce action was fought at Huzro on June 26, 1813, in which both sides lost heavily, but the Sikhs emerged victorious. This was the first real victory of the Sikhs over the Afghans and was of utmost significance as the power of the latter collapsed altogether on the eastern side of the Indus which Ranjit Singh consolidated under his own rule.⁶

In 1818, the kingdom of Kabul relapsed into confusion. This happened as the result of the assassination of Fateh Khan at the hands of Prince Kamran, son of Mahmud Shah. Kamran, who had grown jealous of the minister's unbounded influence over his father, formed a conspiracy and seized the person of Fateh Khan at a banquet, blinded him and subsequently flayed him alive.⁷ Thus a masterful personality was removed

3. According to Kanhaya Lal, (*op. cit.*, p. 288) the pact was made at the initiative of Fateh Khan. He says :—

وزیر نے فتح خان بلند اقتدار کے بد پرہیزہ کاہنہ اختیار
 سفیر نے دربار نزدیک شاہ پہنچائی کہ دوست دوست دوست

(The Vazir, Fateh Khan, of lofty rank who wielded a great influence over the ruler of Kabul sent an envoy to the King (Ranjit Singh) thus finding a way into the pavilion of friendship).

4. Burnes, *Travels into Belkhan, etc.*, Vol. II, pp. 301,3.

5. Kanhaya Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

6. Burnes, *op. cit.*, Vol. II pp. 303-4.

7. Soban Lal, *Umdat-ul-Twarikh*, Daftar II, p. 227.

from Afghanistan. The atrocious outrage shocked everybody. The Barakzai brothers raised the standard of revolt, and were joined by the tribesmen in their thirst for vengeance. Mahmud precipitately fled to Herat.⁸ The Sadozai dynasty thus practically came to an end.

Taking advantage of this commotion in Kabul, Ranjit Singh conducted his first campaign on the right bank of the Indus, advanced to Peshawar and installed his old ally, Jahandad Khan, as its governor.⁹ According to Sohan Lal, Dost Mohammad expressed willingness to hold Peshawar as a dependency of Lahore, but the Maharaja did not agree. Soon after, Yar Mohammad and Dost Mohammad occupied the city, but Ranjit did not attempt any immediate measure of retaliation.¹⁰

The Maharaja next occupied Darband and Mankera on the Indus border.¹¹ In 1821, he took possession of Dara Ismail Khan. His aim was to occupy the border towns before annexing Peshawar—a wise plan suggested to him by the French officers. In 1822, he possessed himself of Dera Ghazi Khan, and placed the Beloch inhabitants under the rule of Ventura and later of Sawan Mal. By 1825, he occupied Bannu, Tank and the Marwat region, and thus came to command one of the most direct roads to Kabul from which he could threaten its ruler. In November, Fakir Aziz-ud-Din advanced to Peshawar and exacted tribute from Yar Mohd. Khan. This brought down from Kabul, Mohd. Azim Khan Barakzai, who was in power there at the time. The Sikh and the Afghan armies met at Naushera in March, 1823.¹² The Sikhs won the

8. Burnes, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 307-8.

9. 144/69. Wade to Government, October 7, 1837. P. G. R.

The territory of Peshawar comprised, besides the city, some districts which were inhabited by tribes called the *Arbabs*, who were hostile to the Sikhs. Its net annual revenue was a little less than five lakhs of rupees. (*Ibid.*)

10. *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 238-39.

11. 144/70. Wade's notes, pp. 291-304. P. G. R.

12. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 301-4.

day, Kaye thinks, solely by means of bribery.¹³ Azim Khan took to his heels, but not until the desperate resistance of the Afghans had caused consternation among the Sikhs.¹⁴ Like that of Huzro, this battle also proved of far reaching consequence. Whereas Huzro established the Sikh supremacy eastward of the Indus, the victory at Naushera extended it beyond the river to Peshawar.¹⁵

From 1823 to 1826, when Dost Mohd. became supreme in Kabul, the relations between the Sikhs and the Afghans saw no change. During this period, Ranjit watched intently the progress of British troops in Burma, while Dost Mohd. endeavoured to consolidate his authority at Kabul. Before the battle of Naushera, Peshawar was held jointly by Dost Mohd. and Yar Mohd. After this event the Maharaja entrusted the city solely to the latter, on a promise of sending 15 horses and other chief products of Peshawar annually. But this tribute was seldom forthcoming without military action. In fact, the Maharaja's hold over Peshawar remained nominal until its further subjugation and annexation in 1834. He viewed the distracted state of the Afghans as favourable to the consolidation of his own dominions, and promoted their dissensions by restoring Peshawar though twice conquered.¹⁶

In 1827, a serious danger to the Maharaja's authority over the trans Indus area grew in the insurrection of the adventurer, Syed Ahmad, at Attock. Instigating the inhabitants to declare a religious

13. *History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 117.

14. 140/33. Wade to Macnaghten, May 10, 1834. P. G. R.

15. 108/88. Mackeson to Wade, November 16, 1837. pp. 441.42. P. G. R.

16. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827. (Quoted in Chopra, *The Punjab as a Sovereign State*, pp. 282.309).

war against the Sikhs,¹⁷ the Syed challenged the authority of Yar Mohd., and in 1830, even occupied Peshawar. It became necessary for the Maharaja to counter his growing influence, and he sent an army under Generals Hari Singh Nalwa and Ventura¹⁸ for the purpose. A regular and prolonged campaign had to be waged until his adherents were induced to desert him and he himself was slain in a smart engagement in 1831.¹⁹

In spite of the French officers and the Sardars frequently urging the Maharaja after 1823 to take Peshawar under his direct administration, the latter refrained from taking this step until 1834, as he distrusted his ability to maintain his hold over that distant country and its fierce population between whom and the Sikhs there existed proverbial antagonism. An appeal from the Afghan ruler of Peshawar or Kabul, or a *fatwa*, (spiritual mandate from a priest), was sufficient to inflame the tribe into revolt or a *Jihad*.²⁰ The shrewd and politic Maharaja would, therefore, proceed warily in this matter, even though he must ultimately subjugate and hold Peshawar effectively. He did not choose to do so till he felt sure of his strength or ability.²¹ This was after 1834, when the fortunes of Durrani monarchy underwent a further change.

17. 96/69. Wade to Metcalfe, March 3, 1827. P. G. R.

18. 98/116. Wade to Hawkins, September 13, 1830. P. G. R.

19. Prinsep, *Origin of the Sikh Power in the Punjab*, pp. 145 sqq.

20. 140/37. Wade to Macnaghten, May 19, 1834, P.G.R.

21. After the decisive battle of Noushera in March, 1823, Ranjit Singh returned to Lahore leaving Hari Singh Nalwa with 12,000 men to command on the frontiers from his head-quarters at Haripur (Hazara). Beyond this show of authority, the Maharaja stayed his hands for the time being, and left the control of Peshawar with Sultan Yar Mohammad Khan and his brothers.

The disgrace of having submitted to the Sikhs at Naushera preyed upon the mind of Azim Khan, and he died broken hearted charging his son to wipe off the disgrace from his name by carrying fire and sword into the territories of "the infidels."²² But Habibullah Khan inherited none of his father's mettle, thus allowing a period of discord and anarchy to ensue.²³

It was now the turn of Dost Mohd. to seize power at Kabul, Ghazni and Jallalabad, together with the major portion of the vast treasures left by Azim Khan. Another of the Barakzai brothers, Sher Dil Khan, established an independent chiefship at Kandhar., while the three others, Sultan Mohd. Khan, Pir Mohd. Khan and Said Mohd. Khan, retained power as vassals of Ranjit Singh in Peshawar and the adjoining country. Herat was still held by Kamran, son of Mahmud Shah, and a direct descendant of Ahmad Shah Abdali.²⁴

This distracted state of the Durrani Empire induced Shah Shuja to form fresh plans for the recovery of his ancestral throne. As we saw in the last chapter, he was invited to Kabul where he met with a miserable failure.

Before embarking on his expedition, the Shah had entered into an alliance with Ranjit Singh. By one of its articles he had relinquished his right to whatever territory the Maharaja was in possession of on either bank of the Indus.²⁵ Ranjit Singh, on his part, grew apprehensive that Shah Shuja might set aside that alliance after his success

22. Burnes *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 315-16.

23. Kaye, *op. cit.*, Vol. I. p. 119.

24. 144/44. Wade to Macnaghten, forwarding Burnes report, P. O. R.

25. Vide p. 161, *supra*.

against Dost Mohd.²⁶ In fact, the Shah himself is said to have remarked that "agreements are of no use, it is power that matters, that the document would remain in his pocket and he would certainly take back the Koh-i-noor from Ranjit Singh and wear it."²⁷

So the Maharaja resolved to forestall Shah Shuja in regard to Peshawar. The Maharaja was equally sceptical about the loyalty of the Barakzai brothers there. He concluded that the right course would be to seize Peshawar before the tributary Sardars, Sultan Mohd., Pir Mohd., and Syed Mohd., could tender their allegiance to the victor,²⁸ whether it would be Shah Shuja or Dost Mohd. Besides, Dost Mohd. then being involved with Shah Shuja in Kandhar, there was little likelihood of the Barakzai Sardars of Peshawar getting help from Kabul.

Accordingly, the Maharaja sent an army under the nominal command of his grand-son, Kunwar Nau Nihal Singh, while the actual direction lay with Sardar Hari Singh and the French Generals Ventura and Court.²⁹ The Lahore army took up a position at Chamkani early in April, 1834. The Barakzai Sardars, scenting

26. Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 204.

27. Amar Nath, *Zafarnama-i-Ranjit Singh*, quoted in Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 80.

28. Political Consultations, December 2, 1834, No. 68. Wade to Macnaghten, January 17, 1834. I. R. D.

Peshawar was tributary of the Maharaja since 1823, and about this time was ruled by Sultan Mohammad Khan, Pir Mohammad Khan and Syed Mohammad Khan.

29. 140/33. Wade to Macnaghten, May 10, 1834. P. G. R.

Wade's account is corroborated by Sohan Lal who writes: "Nau Nihal Singh was made to leave for Peshawar (March 1, 1834) after the grant of a robe of honour, and pieces of jewels.....he was instructed by the Sarkar to conduct the affairs of the place in consultation with Sardar Hari Singh and Ventura Sahib." *op. cit.*, Daftar III, Part II, p. 197. (This was the first command entrusted to the Prince, when he was 14 years of age.)

danger, had already sent their families away to Michni, and were prepared to evacuate the town should it become necessary.³⁰ The excuse for the expedition was found in the delay in securing payment of the usual tribute by Sultan Mohammed.³¹ Now Ranjit Singh demanded an enhanced tribute or the entrance of his troops into Peshawar.³² Curiously enough, the plea urged for the increase of the tribute was the presence of Kunwar Nau Nihal Singh for the first time at the head of the army.³³

This demand was complied with, but Hari Singh Nalwa had definite instructions to seize the town. Accordingly, he sent word to Sultan Mohammed to leave Peshawar and retire to the garden of Ali Mardan Khan, as Prince Nau Nihal Singh desired to pay a visit to the city. The Barakzai Sardar, who already had sent his family away and was keeping his horses ready to be saddled at a moment's notice,³⁴ left the town, and fled to Sheikhan, a village at the foot of the hills on the Bara river. The Barakzais put up no defence and except, perhaps, for a little skirmishing with the party covering the retreat of Sultan Mohd. and Pir Mohd., the Sikhs had to do no fighting. They occupied Peshawar on May 6, 1834.³⁵ The Maharaja entrusted its administration to the Nalwa Sardar and the French officers.³

30. 140/37. Wade to Macnaghten, May 19, 1834. P. G. R.

31. Sohan Lal : *op. cit.*, Daftar III, Part II, p. 197.

32. 140/30. Wade to Macnaghten, April 23, 1834. P. G. R.

33. 140/37. Wade to Macnaghten, May 19, 1834. P. G. R.

34. Latif, quoting an eye witness, writes : "It was ridiculous, about twice or thrice a day, to see the servants (of the Barakzai Sardars) running out with the saddles on their heads and returning when they discovered that the alarm which had been given was a false one".—*History of the Punjab*. p. 468

35. 140/33. Wade to Macnaghten, May 10, 1834. P. G. R. Also
140/38. Wade to Macnaghten, May 22, 1834. P. G. R.

36. 140/33. Wade to Macnaghten, May 10, 1834. P. G. R.

In order to know the British reaction, the Maharaja, resting his action on his treaty with Shah Shuja,³⁷ informed Wade of his brilliant success. The British had no justification in protesting against this conquest, and yet Wade was allowed to offer congratulations only in his personal capacity, but was to add nothing on behalf of the Government.³⁸

The news of the loss of Peshawar stung Dost Mohd. so badly that he flung his troops desperately against the Shah's forces. Shah Shuja was completely routed,* and Dost's mortification at the loss of Peshawar was partially soothed. In the first flush of victory, he issued challenges to the Sikh Ruler in the most vaunting language,³⁹ and called upon him to yield Peshawar in return for a tribute, or else he would march upon that city with a united force of all the Afghans, and retrieve the insult that had been inflicted upon them by driving the Sikhs to the other bank of the Indus.⁴⁰

37. 140/38. Wade to Macnaghten, May 22, 1834. P. G. R.

38. 117/43. Government to Wade, June 27, 1834. P. G. R.

* See p. 168, *supra*.

39. 140/46. Wade to Government, June, 15, 1834. P. G. R. Also Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part II, p. 216

40. Kanhaya Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 485.

دوبړه پشاور سپرد، بیا	مگر از راه لطف و وحدت سخا
دساند بدوگاه شاه جهان	که هر سال نذرانه سلطان خان
نهارک مهراجنه اهل هوش	وگر از غضب القاسم بگوش
شوم خار تر صحن گلزار او	بندم کمر بهر بهر پیکر او
که بجز دادن جان نپارند ید	کنم جمع لشکرز اهل جهاد
قیامت نمودار هر جا کنم	بهر چار سو فتنه بر پا کنم

(If by way of favour, benevolence and generosity you (Ranjit Singh) will surrender Peshawar to us again, then we will send to the court of the ruler of the world (Ranjit Singh) the tribute of Sultan Khan (which he used to pay). If out of haughtiness the wide-awake Maharaja does not pay heed to my request I (Dost Mohd.) will gird up my loins for battle against you and be a thorn in the court-yard of your rose garden. I will muster an army of the crusaders who know nothing except fighting unto death. I will create tumult on all sides and it will present a scene of resurrection everywhere.)

Continued on next page.

Ranjit, Singh, however, was not the man to be cowed down by such threats. In a bold reply he wrote that "if the Barakzais flushed with their late victory over the Shah entertain any hostile designs against Peshawar, by the blessing of God, they would greatly repent of their presumption and witness such a battle as they have never yet seen."⁴¹

This reply was highly mortifying to the Amir, who, in turn responded, on September 18, 1834, with a declaration of war. The Maharaja followed with an equally defiant rejoinder, warning Dost to prepare himself for a "warm reception" from the Sikhs, and reminding him of the fate of his elder brother.⁴²

Dost Mohammed made great preparation for measuring his strength with the Sikhs.⁴³ But his resources were too limited to admi

Continued from page 178.

Dost Mohd. also wrote threateningly from Kandhar to Nau Nihal Singh at Peshawar: "Please God as soon as we have arranged the administration of affairs here, joined by all our brothers, and attended by our troops and artillery, scattering thunder, we shall proceed to Kabul and then settled such points with you as require explanation" (140/61. Wade to Macnaghten, July 27, 1834 P. G. R.).

41. 140/65. Wade to Government, August 17, 1834. P. G. R. Also Kanhaya Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 486,

سر سرکشان را شکستیم ما عدو را به زنجیر بستیم ما
اگر دوست خواهی از حرس و هوا که گردن بدی فوج جنگ آزما
بیاید که ما هم بد اسرویم بهیدان بدستمن مقابل شوم

(Ranjit Singh's reply: We have broken the heads of the refractory chiefs and have often fettered the foes. If Dost (Mohd.), out of avarice and greed desires to give battle with the small force he has, let him come as we also proceed in the direction to face the enemy in the battlefield).

42. 140/81. Wade to Macnaghten, September 25, 1834. P. G. R.

43. *Ibid.*

of any large expansion of his forces. His ingenuity rose with the difficulty of his situation, and he planned to give to the struggle the character of a religious war or 'Jihad,'⁴⁴ as that would muster the largest numbers under his banner. To prosecute a holy war the leader must be able to read the 'Khutba' and strike coin in his own name.⁴⁵ Accordingly, his counsellors urged him to proclaim himself a king. But this he would not do, partly because of the fear of the opposition of his brothers, and partly due to the lack of means for keeping up the title. Indeed, Sultan Mohammed was so jealous that he left Kabul at the mere mention of the assumption of royalty by Dost.⁴⁶

On the evening of December 4, 1834, Mir Vaiz, the chief Mulla of Kabul, proclaimed Dost 'Amir-ul-Mominin' (the leader of the Faithful) in the presence of chiefs and citizens.⁴⁷ The next day he assumed the proud title of "Ghazi", and struck coin bearing the inscription :

امیر دوست محمد باعزم جنگ جهاد کمر بسته . نبرد سکه - نصیرش حق باد
which means, 'Amir Dost Mohammed, having formed the resolution of fighting for his religion, has struck the coin. May God preserve him'.⁴⁸

44. Mohan Lal, *Life of Amir Dost Mohd. Khan*, Vol. I, p. 168.

45. 141/6. Wade to Macnaghten, February 3, 1835. P. G. R.

46. Mohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 169.

47. 141/6. Wade to Macnaghten, February 3, 1835. P. G. R.

Harlan's version is that at first the title was mere Amir, and 'Ul Mominin' was added afterwards, as "the title of Amir is simply political, but as politics always forms a part of the religion of Mohammadans, the Prince's flatterers soon added to the semi-royal distinction 'Ul Mominin,' and he became, in colloquial acceptance, "Commander of the Faithful", as they euphoniously style the Khalifa or Chief of the Muhammadan world". (*A Memoir of India and Afghanistan*, p. 123).

48. 141/6. Wade to Macnaghten, February 3, 1835. P. G. R.

The coin of Kabul since the change of dynasty was struck in the name of *Sahib-i-Zaman*, that is the Ruler of the day.—Harlan: *op. cit.*, p. 123.

Thus all preliminary conditions of carrying on 'Jihad' against the Sikhs were completed, and served their purpose so well that "a number of fanatics joined him."⁴⁹ His expense increased with the influx of *ghazis*, and he feared it might rise beyond his means in case they swelled to 100,000 men or more.⁵⁰ Indeed, the Amir's sources were extremely limited.⁵¹ He had to resort to the "good old rule" of the Afghan princes of imposing a rough and arbitrary levy.⁵² He extorted a loan of a lakh and a half of rupees from Shikarpur merchants at Kabul,⁵³ and ordered the Governors of the districts to grab money from other wealthy men. The country was thus made to look "an appalling picture of extortion and torture,"⁵⁴ as the widespread spoliation included both the "infidels" and the Muslims alike. Sebaz Ali, the Suni merchant of Kabul, had to forfeit his life under torture, and Nazir Ullah had to run to Kunduz to escape confiscations.⁵⁵ All this enabled the Amir to build a treasure of 12 lakhs.⁵⁶

While collecting money in his own state in this manner, he had applied to the neighbouring states for support in troops and money.

49. Political Consultations, May 18, 1835. No. 51. Wade to Government, April 30, 1835. I. R. D.

50. Political Consultations, August 7, 1835. No. 36. Masson to Wade, (Encl.) April 30, 1835. I. R. D.,

51. Political Consultations, May 18, 1835. No. 51. Wade to Government, April 30, 1835. I. R. D.

52. Kaye, *op. cit.*, Vol I, p. 133.

53. Political Consultations, May 18, 1835. No. 51. Wade to Government, April 30, 1835. I. R. D.

54. Mohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol, I, pp. 171-72.

55. Political Consultations, May 18, 1835. No. 51. Wade to Government, April 30, 1835. I. R. D.

56. 141/6. Wade to Macnaghten, February 3, 1835. P. G. R.

There is some vagueness about this amount, as in his letter of April 28, 1835, Masson wrote to Wade that the amount of money raised by the Amir to meet his expenses was expected to be three lacs and a half only, one lac in cash and two and a half lacs in premises—141/39. Wade to Macnaghten, April 28, 1835. P. G. R. Enclosing Masson's report.

But he received nothing but refusals and evasive replies.⁵⁷ Mohammad Murad Beg of Kunduz replied: "I take no interest in your affairs."⁵⁸ The Kandhar Chiefs whom he had recently delivered from Shah Shuja's menace said that they could lend him no support while the Shah was wandering in the vicinity of Kandhar and while Kamran's attitude was likewise threatening.⁵⁹ The Amirs of Sind were also approached, and their reply was that "they were ready to pay the annual tribute for the country of Hyderabad as fixed by Fateh Khan on conditions that Amir Dost Mohammed Khan should send them an *ahad nama* (written promise), engaging that in the event of success he would be content with the amount of tribute as fixed by the Vazir, that he would respect the integrity of Sind, that in case of Sind being invaded he would furnish them with *koomak*."⁶⁰ Dost, however, had the wisdom to see that these demands were meant merely to amuse him. He had despatched letters to various chiefs of Bangash and Derajat and to the Khan of Bahawalpur. From these, of course, he had little to expect. The only chiefs who responded favourably were Mir Alam Khan of Bajore and Fateh Khan Yusafzai of Panjshir, the former hoping to be able to lead five to six thousand men, and the latter actually mustering 10,000 men, all eager for the fight.⁶¹

Before using the arms of the Faithful, however, the Amir tried to secure his objective through British intervention. On January 17, 1833, he had already proposed an alliance with the British at the time when Shah Shuja was making his preparations for advancing towards Kandhar.⁶² The British reply had been that "its policy towards the different chiefs contending in Afghanistan was one of perfect neutrality."⁶³ Now,

57. Pol. Cons., May 18, 1835, No. 52. Masson to Wade, February 20, 1835. I. R. D.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*

61. *Ibid.*

62. 139/1. Wade to Macnaghten, January 17, 1833. P. G. R. See pp. 159-60 *supra*.

63. 117/44. Macnaghten to Wade. March 19, 1833. P. G. R.

when confronted with another foe Dost tried again to invoke their intervention. At the end of 1834, he wrote letters to Wade and the Governor General, complaining of the seizure of Peshawar by the Sikhs, declaring his resolution to wage a religious war against them and applying for the British support.⁶⁴

Nawab Jabbar Khan's son, Abdul Ghias Khan, who had been sent to Ludhiana ostensibly to receive the benefit of English education, but in reality to serve as a means of communication with the Government, was made an intermediary for negotiation. The Amir tried to prejudice the British authorities against the Sikhs by urging that his nephew who was their guest had been ill-treated by the Sikhs on his way through the Punjab. It was alleged that the Sikhs designed to risk his life by giving him an unstable boat for crossing the Indus at Attock.⁶⁵ Mir Karamat Ali, the British news-writer at Kabul, also wrote in a tone which was considered objectionable. He exhorted the Government to reduce the Sikhs "to the position dogs."⁶⁶ The Amir referred to the passage of the letter

64. 141/1. Wade to Government, January 4, 1835. P. G. R.

65. The Amir wrote to Wade : "On his (Abdul Ghias Khan's) arrival at Peshawar the authorities stationed there on the part of Ranjit Singh obliged him to wait on them at their camp, and when crossing the Indus provided him with a damaged boat so that his life might be risked. He passed, however, with only the loss of some of his horses and baggage, and a man who was drowned in the river. When he reached Lahore the Maharaja himself extorted three horses and took a *razinama* from him." But Wade's comments were that Abdul Ghias Khan made no mention of the alleged attempt and he (Wade) could not get reparation from Ranjit Singh for an act the intention of which he could not prove.—Political Cons. March 23, 1835. No. 25. Wade to Macnaghten, January 4, 1835. 1. R. D.

66. Karamat Ali seems to have involved himself in Afghan politics and was dismissed from his post. Messon was appointed in his place.—Wade to Macnaghten, March 19, 1835. P. G. R. Also 141/24. Wade to Macnaghten, March 20, 1835. P. G. R.

It was later on known that it was Karamat Ali who had fabricated the story of the rotten boat to Abdul Ghias Khan, otherwise why should the *chobdar* and other servants of Nau Nihal Singh have crossed the river in the same boat ? (141/26. Wade to Macnaghten, April 2, 1835. P. G. R.)

addressed to him by the Governor General some time ago to the effect that "His Lordship would give him a proof of the interest which he took in his welfare when the necessity and occasion arose."⁶⁷ "I write this letter", wrote Dost Mohammad, "to remind His Lordship that the time has now arrived, should he come to our aid, he will make us from generation to generation the well-wishers of the British Government". The shrewd Afghan did not miss the opportunity to play on the British fears of Russia. He reminded the Governor General that the Russians were approaching Afghanistan, and that the Persians were trying to conquer Herat and said that he was capable of rendering a great service by checking their progress which it was impossible for the Sikhs and the people of Hindustan to do, owing to the severity of the climate and the mountainous nature of the country.⁶⁸

This approaching danger from Russia, Wade was led to view with increased concern. The Shah of Persia was thoroughly Russian in views and the scheme of seizing Herat was hatching. Wade appreciated the critical and embarrassing situation of the Afghan ruler, and on the basis of information supplied to him by Masson, proposed that the Government should take advantage of the situation. It was, he wrote, a unique opportunity for the British to extend their influence in Afghanistan.⁶⁹

67. Political Consultations, March 23, 1835. No. 25. Wade to Government, January 4, 1835. I. R. D.

68. *Ibid.* (Encl.)

69. Wade wrote to Macnaghten: "Assuming that it is the desire of the Government to establish a friendly connection with Afghanistan, the present is one of those opportunities of securing our object which we ought not to neglect. Whether advertent to the designs of Russia or the commercial advantages expected from the navigation of the Indus, the British Government had a direct interest in availing itself of the first opportunity that may be afforded whether by Shah Shuja, Barakzai or Ranjit Singh of extending our influence to that quarter."—141/9. February 13, 1835. P. G. R

Wade, however, knew that the Maharaja would resent British intervention because he considered his sway over Peshawar a right gained by conquest. He, therefore, suggested that the Government should not intervene immediately to settle the question of Peshawar, though he felt at the same time that the Maharaja could not possibly object to an alliance between the Amir and the Government. And once such an alliance had been cemented with Dost Mohd., argued Wade, an attempt could be made to terminate the Sikh-Afghan dispute without giving umbrage to either party.⁷⁰

Wade's fertile brain provided several reasons to convince the Maharaja that the conquest of Peshawar was futile for Sikh interests.⁷¹ He argued that the city had been conquered in the hope that success would attend the Shah's arms, and that its annexation would silently be passed over, but his failure entailed troubles for Ranjit Singh. Again, the Maharaja's authority in the city was limited,⁷² and its possession by the Sikhs was regarded by the Afghans a threat to their national existence. Hence the Maharaja might escape anxiety and hostility attending its occupation. In the event of Dost Mohd.'s success, it could be anticipated, that the Muhammadan subjects of the Maharaja would make common cause with the Amir and raise the standard of revolt there. Finally, the climate of the country did not suit the Sikhs and insubordination prevailing in the ranks might result in a disgrace.⁷³

The British influence in Afghanistan could be strengthened, observed Wade, by recognising Dost Mohd., as the only chief in Afghanistan. The British might, therefore, accede to Dost Mohd.'s wishes in so far as to declare the intention of deputing an officer

70. 140/96. Wade to Macnaghten, November 21, 1834. P. G. R.

71. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 545.

72. 144/80. Wade to Government, September 21, 1837. P. G. R.

73. *Ibid.*

to him, previously intimating this to Ranjit Singh and inviting him to become a party to his recognition. Thus a confederation would be formed for preventing the introduction of foreign influence in Afghanistan.⁷⁴ Such a mediation would not be offensive to the Maharaja because it would save his reputation with Dost Mohd., who was at Jallalabad inciting the neighbouring tribes to attack the Sikhs.⁷⁵

All that Wade strove for was such an understanding with the *de facto* sovereign of Afghanistan, be that Shah Shuja (in 1834 or 1838), or Dost Mohd., as would prevent the introduction of foreign influence in that country and predispose him to adopt British interests in case of remote contingencies, without in any way sacrificing the friendship of the Sikh Ruler, which the Political Agent considered of the utmost importance.

But the Governor General did not accept Wade's suggestion of sending an officer to Kabul. He was asked not to hold any particular correspondence with one of the contending parties which might give umbrage to the other. The suggestion of British mediation in the then state of affairs between the Sikhs and the Afghans was also rejected as it would inevitably lead to consequences of the most seriously embarrassing nature.⁷⁶

One might be allowed to offer a conjecture that if Wade's proposals were then accepted, the British might have secured permanently the goodwill of the Amir without losing that of "the old and faithful ally", Ranjit Singh, for Dost Mohd. had not yet made the restoration of Peshawar to him a *sine qua non* (which he did later after his ignominious defeat at the hands of the Maharaja resulting in implacable enmity between the two nations) of a settlement with the British. Ground would

74. 141/9. Wade to Macnaghten, February 13, 1835. P. G. R.

75. 141/25. Wade to Macnaghten, April 15, 1835. P. G. R.

76. 118/14. Macnaghten to Wade, April 20, 1835. P. G. R.

thus have been prepared to encounter the "Russian Bear" with the help of Dost Mohd. and the futile First Afghan War might have been averted.

Wade was asked to communicate to Dost Mohd., in reply to his solicitations, that he should cast off all those false illusions which he might have entertained to the effect that the Government was at his back.⁷⁷ He was, however, not to discontinue negotiations but "to cultivate a friendly understanding with the Afghan Chief and people."⁷⁸ This was in keeping with the *safe* policy pursued by the British at the time towards Afghanistan. Wade's replies to the Amir's letters were henceforth written in a vague language, so that he continued hoping all the time.⁷⁹

If Dost Mohd. was entreating the British for help, the clever Sikh monarch, too, was not at all idle in the game of diplomacy. To frighten the Barakzais, he used his trump card by asking Shah Shuja to send his agent to Lahore and directed his grandson, Nau Nihal Singh, to write to Dost Mohd. that if he would not desist from hostile designs, the Maharaja would send an expedition to place Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne.⁸⁰ Wade was right in thinking that the Maharaja was merely bluffing and using the Shah as a scare-crow to frighten the Barakzais, and as such it might have caused great uneasiness in the mind of Dost Mohd., and that was what Ranjit Singh wanted.⁸¹

77. 118/14. Macnaghten to Wade, April 20, 1835. P. G. R.

78. 118/11. Macnaghten to Wade, March 23, 1835. P. G. R.

79. Wade wrote to the Amir : "His Lordship's letter expresses the sincere desire of the British nation to cultivate a close friendship with the Afghans and, in fact no question in which your nation and the exercise of mutual friendship are concerned is without its interest to him...., 'whomsoever seekth shall find'... You have every reason to confide in the profession made by my Government of its disposition to promote amicable relations between the two nations..... It remains with you to give effect to them. You may rest assured that no exertions shall be wanting on my part in the promotion of this object...." (142/36. Wade to Government, June 7, 1835. P. G. R.)

80. 141/31. Wade to Macnaghten, April 17, 1835. P. G. R.

81. *Ibid.*

Ranjit Singh hastened his military preparations. Dost's movements had greatly alarmed him and he had sent a force of about 25,000 strong towards Peshawar. In the middle of April, 1835, the two hostile forces stood arrayed against each other on their respective borders and their engagement seemed a matter of time.⁸² Both sides hesitated to take the offensive but with different motives. Dost Mohd. was awaiting a reply from the English; while Ranjit Singh made for delay, because he preferred to gain his end, if it all possible, through diplomacy "a sphere in which he was always at his best."⁸³ The latter deputed Harlan, the American adventurer in his service, and Fakir Aziz-ud-Din, apparently to negotiate with the Amir, but actually for bribing his Sardars. This proved a good stroke of policy by which Dost Mohd. was completely taken in. Apart from Ranjit Singh finding time to join his camp, Harlan and Aziz-ud-Din succeeded admirably in seducing Sultan Mohd.⁸⁴ who had found refuge with his brother, at Kabul at the time when Peshawar was occupied by Hari Singh eight months earlier. The Amir's design of seizing the envoys themselves was thwarted by Sultan Mohd. to whose care they had been committed.⁸⁵

In the meantime, Ranjit had despatched Gulab Singh and Avitabile towards Kohat, while Ventura had come to join the Maharaja at Attock. It was then that some detachments were pushed forward to surround Dost Mohd. from the remaining sides to bring his camp within

82. 141/25. Wade to Macnaghten, April 15, 1835. P. G. R.

83. 141/36. Wade to Macnaghten, April 25, 1835. P. G. R.

84. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

"The ejected tributary", observes Cunningham, "listened the more readily to the Maharaja's proposition of a fat *jagir* as he apprehended that Dost Mohammad would retain Peshawar for himself, should Ranjit Singh be beaten".

85. A detailed account of this plot is given in Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 249 *seq.*.

the range of the Sikh artillery,⁸⁶ and to leave him no option but to fight or retreat into the tribal hills. The Amir and his men already depressed by Sultan Mohd's defection decided on the latter course on the night of May 11, 1835, taking along with them the whole of their force and baggage.⁸⁷ Thus was the great expedition, so promising at the outset, brought to an infructuous close. The political intrigue of the Sikh Ruler causing treachery in the domestic circles of the Amir resulted in the breaking up overnight a vast concourse of the Afghans, which was being viewed by the Sikh rank and file with so much dismay.⁸⁸

Ranjit Singh gained a bloodless victory which greatly enhanced his prestige. Dost Mohd., on the other hand, was so shaken as to abandon temporarily his worldly ambition and immerse himself into the study of the Koran.⁸⁹ His flight without striking a blow humiliated him a great deal in the eyes of the Afghan chiefs, particularly when he had adopted the title of Amir-ul-Mominin. He lost much following as his conduct was looked upon as a national disgrace.⁹⁰

Sultan Mohd. and his brothers, Pir Mohd. and Syed Mohd., now entered into an engagement with the Maharaja whereby they relinquished

86. 141/44. Wade to Macnaghten, May 19, 1835. P. G. R.

87. *Ibid.*

88. The Amir ascribed his discomfiture to three causes :

(a) His *ghazis* unaccustomed to the report of guns wavered when they heard the discharge from the Sikh artillery ;

(b) His brothers betrayed him ; and

(c) He had no money.

(Wade to Macnaghten, January 7, 1836. Political Consultations. Enclosing Dost Mond's letter of October 31, 1835, I. R. D.

89. Sykes, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 397.

90. 141/95. Wade to Macnaghten, November 11, 1835. P. G. R.

all claims on Peshawar and agreed to pay him a tribute in return for the districts of Hashtnagar, Kohat and Nakko which the Maharaja granted them.⁹¹ They engaged to ascertain Dost Mohd's future plans.⁹² Leaving Peshawar in the charge of Ventura with a large force the Maharaja returned to Lahore.⁹³

It took Dost Mohd. some time to overcome his remorse and to be up and doing again in organising his military and other resources. The Sikhs, on the other hand, employed this respite in strengthening their newly won position beyond the Indus. Towards the middle of 1836, they were completing a fortress at Shabkadar, which would give them command of one of the most practicable routes across the mountain ranges for transport of artillery from Peshawar to Jallalabad. Soon after, the construction of another fort at Jamrud, at the very mouth of the Khyber Pass, was undertaken by General Hari Singh Nalwa, who had all along advocated a forward policy towards Kabul. It was a constant eyesore to the Afghans who were always on the look out to destroy it.

In the beginning of 1837, the year of Nau Nihal Singh's marriage, one Mr. Fast, previously in the Company's service, passed from Jamrud on his way to Jallalabad to see Mohd. Akbar Khan, the Amir's son. He saw the condition of the fort, and instigated this chief to attack Jamrud where the Sikh defences were weak yet awhile.⁹⁴ In April, Akbar Khan, gathering around his banner the distinguished Afghan elements from near Ali Masjid, made ready for attack. The actual quarrel was picked up by preventing the Sikhs from taking water from a stream near the fort.⁹⁵ It soon developed into the historic engagement of April 30, 1837.⁹⁶ The sanguinary fight

91. 141/47. Wade to Macnaghten, May 23, 1835. P. G. R.

92. 144/81. Wade to Macnaghten, September 2, 1837. P. G. R.

93. 141/47. Wade to Macnaghten, May 23, 1835. P. G. R.

94. 108/89. Mackeson to Wade, November 15, 1837. P. G. R.

95. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Prat IV, p. 393.

96. 143/7. Wade to Macnaghten, May 18, 1837. P. G. R.

which took place between the Sikhs and Afghans resulted in heavy casualties on both sides.⁹⁷ Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa, one of the greatest Sikh commanders, was fatally wounded,⁹⁸; an almost equal number of trophies in the form of guns and other sinews of war fell into the hands of both parties, and yet it is clear from the records that victory lay with the Sikhs as their adversaries could not hold the field, but had to retire precipitately into the hills. The fort and its surroundings were left completely in Sikh hands.⁹⁹

This was the last battle which the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh were destined to fight with the Afghans. The Sikh rule was now firmly established throughout the Peshawar valley. The beginning had been made by the occupation of the Attock fort in 1813, and the annexation of the trans-Indus area was completed twenty years later. The frontier of the Sikh kingdom was pushed to the furthest limit up to foot of the hills where it was inexorably fixed by this victory of 1837.

The relations between the Sikhs and Afghans after this date are interwoven with Anglo-Afghan and Anglo-Sikh relations, and will be studied in the following chapters in the new context, of which the culminating phase was the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838.

97. 143/7. Extracts from Lt. Wood's letter to Wade enclosed in the latter's despatch to Macnaghten, May 18, 1837. P. G. R.

The number of Sikhs killed and wounded was 6,000 out of a total of 12,000. The number of the Afghans killed and wounded amounted to 11,000 out of 32,000.

98.

چو آگاہ زنی قصہ شد شهر یار ز فرط الم شد دلش بے قرار
شد از دیدہ جان و دل اشکریز بیاک هری سنگھ اہل ستیز

Kanhaya Lal, *op. cit.*, p. 501.

(When the king (Ranjit Singh) became aware of this news, his mind became upset with the excess of grief. He shed tears from the eyes of soul and heart in the memory of Hari Singh, the veteran warrior).

99. 143/7. Wade to Macnaghten, May 18, 1837. P. G. R. Also Sohan Lal, *op. cit.* Vol. III, pt. IV, p. 400.

CHAPTER XI

THE ANGLO-AFGHAN RELATIONS

Until 1834, as we have already seen, the policy pursued by the British Government towards affairs in Afghanistan had been one of neutrality. Advances from Dost Mohd. for friendly alliance were declined, and no more interest was taken in Shah Shuja's enterprise of 1834 either than advancing him a third of his annual stipend. Nevertheless, a closer interest on the part of the British in the affairs of that region grew increasingly necessary after 1834. For Dost Mohd. too, the need of an understanding of some kind with them became imperative after the capture of Peshawar by the Sikhs. The loss of influence which he suffered, rankled deeply in his mind,¹ and he felt he could not rest content until he retrieved that loss.² The recovery of Peshawar, in fact, became the primary end of his subsequent policy.³ Mistrusting his own strength at this juncture, he was turning his thoughts towards foreign aid and the British naturally

1. 141/44. Wade to Macnaghten, May 10, 1835. P. G. R.

2. 141/1. Wade to Macnaghten, January 1, 1835. P. G. R.

3. In insisting upon the relinquishment of Peshawar by Ranjit Singh, "Dost Mohd. was giving expression to the most deliberate convictions and sentiments of his countrymen. Peshawar was the 'graveyard of their forefathers', hence a land of sacred memories. Its subjection to the Sikhs remained to them a symbol of national dishonour. The Sikh rule was a system of tyranny, *Bang* was prohibited, *Granth* was placed in Muslim mosques, cow was proclaimed a sacred animal, and the soldiery indulged in disgraceful excesses. Their presence was a thorn in the hearts of the Afghans, and constantly reminded them of their humiliation at the hands of the *Kaffirs*"—Memorandum on the Political Power of the Sikhs beyond the Indus. (Parl. Papers, 1859, Correspondence of Sir Alexander Burnes with the Governor General of India during his mission to Kabul in 1837-38. Ungarbled edition).

appeared to be the one power towards whom he could reasonably turn.⁴ There existed several *contretemps* in his way, among which the existence of "the old pretender" at Ludhiana, and the close friendly understanding between the English and Ranjit Singh were the foremost. His circumstances, however, warranted his attempting to surmount these obstacles, even though, as McNeill said, they must deter him from seeking British friendship. His earlier disappointment over his unfruitful effort to win such friendship had been keen, and it was further intensified when following the Sikh capture of Peshawar a series of letters which he addressed to Wade inviting British mediation invoked little response.⁵ Though he did not relinquish the pursuit of his objective of a British alliance, their aloofness constrained him in September, 1835, to pose that he was turning towards Persia.⁶

That this was a mere diplomatic feint was well understood in English circles. As McNeill pointed out, it would require an unaccountable credulity on Dost Mohd.'s part to suppose it possible for Persia to afford him protection from the Sikhs and "to believe that the Shah (of Persia) can sincerely desire" to strengthen his power.⁷ Therefore, Wade judged rightly that the underlying intention was to "stimulate British jealousy which in turn might create a new interest in his affairs."⁸ At all events, in May, 1836, Dost Mohd. addressed a letter to Lord Auckland congratulating him on his assumption of the office of Governor General, and soliciting his mediation in the Sikh-Afghan dispute.⁹

4. 119/22. McNeill to Macnaghten, January 2, 1837. P. G. R.

5. 142/36. Wade to Macnaghten, June 7, 1835. P. G. R.

6. 142/11. Masson's report of September 20, 1835, enclosed in Wade's despatch to Macnaghten of February 13, 1836. P. G. R.

7. 119/25. Macnaghten to Wade, June 12, 1837. P. G. R.

8. 145/50. Wade to Macnaghten, October 28, 1837. P. G. R.

9. 142/48. Wade to Macnaghten, May 16, 1836. P. G. R.

Auckland took up the reins of office at an 'inauspicious moment'. Like their predecessors a generation earlier, the English politicians of the day were nervous about the influence of a foreign power in Persia. This time it was not France but Russia, which was steadily gaining influence in Persia. Russian land hunger had already brought her into conflict with Persia in 1811, and the uneven war between them had terminated in the Treaty of Gulistan (1813), "by which Persia ceded to Russia all her acquisitions on the south of the Caucasus and agreed to maintain no naval force on the Caspian Sea."¹⁰ Persia after suffering this humiliation entered into a close alliance with the the British by the Treaty of Tehran (1814). It committed the British to furnish Persia with men and money in case she was invaded by any European power.¹¹ From the Treaty of Gulistan up to the year 1826, when Dost Mohammed emerged as an all powerful ruler of Kabul, there was at least outward observance of peace between Russia and Persia. But in 1826 hostilities again broke out between them. Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, not being in favour of helping Persia, put forward the excuse of her having been the aggressive party and allowed her to suffer a defeat. The result was the Treaty of Turkomanchai, signed in 1828, by which Persia ceded to Russia the Khanates of Erivan and Nakhichevan, besides accepting her frontier line as dictated by Russia. The Persians now concluded that their interests would best be served by cultivating the friendship of the Russian Emperor whose main object was to use Persian resources overtly for furtherance of his own ends, without bringing himself into collision directly with other Powers. Conscious of its weakness, Persia yielded to this influence, and, in due course, became inevitably a facile tool in Russian hands. Consequently, during this period the English influence declined seriously at the Persian Court. It soon became

10. Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol. I, p. 140.

11. *Idem*, pp. 144-45.

apparent that the Persian encroachments upon the countries between her frontiers and India, instigated as they were by the Russian Government, were calculated to threaten the security of India.

In 1835, Palmerston sent Ellis as Ambassador to the court of Tehran, his mission being to "warn the Persian Government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war against Afghans."¹² Ellis's reports excited greater fears for he wrote: "the Shah (Mohd. Shah) has very extensive schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan, and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that the right of sovereignty over Herat and Kandhar is as complete now as in the reign of the Saffavid dynasty."¹³ His next report was that the Shah would undertake expeditions in the spring against Herat, Kandhar and the Baluchis.¹⁴

In the beginning of 1836, it became fairly certain that the Shah of Persia was meditating an attack upon Herat.¹⁵ Ellis sounded a warning note and affirmed that Persia's progress to Herat was "tantamount to advancement of Russia to the very frontiers of our Indian Empire."¹⁶

12. Palmerston to Ellis, July 25, 1835. Letter No. 10 (Indian Papers, 1839, Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan).

13. Ellis to Palmerston, November 13, 1835. Letter No. 11, (*Idem*).

14. Ellis to Palmerston, December 24, 1835. Letter No. 12. (*Idem*).

15. Ellis to Palmerston, January 15, 1836. Letter No. 15. (*Idem*).

16. Memorandum of Ellis. (*Ibid*).

Strategically situated in the west of Afghanistan, Herat has been with abundant justification known to be "the gate of Afghanistan", lying in the only flat and comfortable road across Central Asia to the Indian frontier, it has been with no less justification regarded as [the first stage in an invasion of India. (Burnes to Macnaghten, October 20, 1837. Memorandum on the commercial views of Russia in Central Asia—Parliamentary Papers, 1859, *ut supra*).

At the time Herat was ruled by Mirza Kamran, the last of the Badozais, who after having been ejected by the Barakzais from Kabul and Kandahar had maintained his precarious hold on the city.¹⁷ But his feuds with the Barakzais had never ended and both the families were always planning each other's destruction.¹⁸ If at all an excuse was needed by Mohd. Shah to attack Herat, it was furnished by Kamran's cruel and impolitic action in selling his Shiah subjects as slaves. The Shiah Emperor led his forces on Herat about the middle of 1836,¹⁹ though after proceeding some distance towards the city he postponed his move until next year.²⁰

Dost Mohd., as we have seen, had already leaned towards Persia and now Kohin Dil Khan, the Chief of Kandhar, who was constantly threatened by Kamran,²¹ also followed suit.

Ellis reported that Kabul²² and Kandhar²³ were seeking Persian alliance. The Secret Committee getting alarmed at these reports sent a despatch on June 25, 1836, urging the Governor General to endeavour to enter into commercial and political relations with Afghanistan, and to adopt "any other measures that may appear to you to be desirable in order to counteract Russian influence

17. Burnes to Macnaghten, February 7, 1836. "Memorandum on Herat" (Parliamentary Papers, 1859, *ut supra*.)
18. Leech to Burnes, without date. "Notice on Kandhar" (*Idem*).
19. McNeil to Palmerston, September 12, 1836. Letter No. 31. (Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*).
20. McNeil to Palmerston, December 12, 1836. Letter No. III (*Idem*).
21. 142/14. Wade to Macnaghten, March 9, 1836. P. G. R.
22. Ellis to Palmerston, February 25, 1836. Letter No. 18. (Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*).
23. Ellis to Palmerston, April 11, 1836. Letter No. 19 (*Idem*).

in that quarter."²⁴ Though in the form of a suggestion this despatch laid down the policy for Auckland clearly and squarely,

In 1834, the Persian King prepared to lead a new expedition. In June, McNeill declared his conviction of Russia's concurrence in the design to have been confirmed by "all the Persians with whom I have conversed, including the Prime Minister."²⁵ An urgent need had, therefore, arisen for the British to check this menace as best as it could. But Palmerston's representations to St. Petersburg²⁶ and McNeill's in Tehran²⁷ failed alike in checking the enterprise. Ghorian capitulated on November 30, 1837, and the Shah's army advanced to invest Herat. The study of large scale maps, assured by Nesselrode to be an infallible cure for "British Nervousness and Russian Herattitude," was meanwhile a poor consolation for Palmerston. The course deemed necessary by the British Government to meet its responsibility had so far failed to realize its end.

We now turn to a different scene of parallel efforts which during all these years was being enacted by the British authorities in India. Lord Bentinck in his time had gone so far as to appoint Kiramat Ali and Mason as news-writers at Kabul.²⁸ Besides, he had left an important minute on the Russian menace. After admitting that the state of Afghanistan of that time presented no cause for alarm, he had

24. Secret Committee to Governor General, June 25, 1836. Quoted in Colvin, *John Russell Colvin*, pp. 86—88.

25. 119/47. McNeill to Palmerston, June 1, 1837. P. G. R.
This important letter of McNeill establishing the truth of an assertion made in his despatch No. 119 of 1836, that the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary had urged the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat, which fact was denied by Nesselrode, has not yet been published. Its omission from the Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*, cannot be explained.

26. Palmerston to Earl of Durham, January 16, 1837. Letter No. 34 (Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*).

27. McNeill to Palmerston, February 24, 1837, enclosed in 119/25, Macnaghten to Wade, June 12, 1837. P. G. R.,

28. Mohan Lal, *Life of Amir Dost Mohd. Khan*, Vol. I, p. 248.

pointed out the growing influence of Russia over Persia thus : " From the days of Peter the Great to the present time the views of Russia have been turned to the obtaining of the possession of that part of Central Asia which is watered by the Oxus and joins the eastern shores of the Caspian." He further wrote : "the line of operations of Russo-Persian army to advance upon Herat is short and easy. From that point, Russia may proclaim a crusade against India, in which she would be joined by all the warlike and restless tribes that formed the overwhelming force of Timur. The distance between Herat and Attock is 1,032 miles. The Afghan confederacy, even if cordially united, would have no means to resist the power of Russia and Persia. They probably would make a virtue of necessity and join the common cause, receiving in reward for their co-operation the promises of all the possessions that had been wrested from them by Ranjit Singh, and expecting also to reap no poor harvest from the plunder of India. But however this may be, it will be sufficient to assume the possibility that a Russian force of 20,000 men fully equipped, accompanied with a body of 100,000 horse, may reach the shores of the Indus."²⁹ These were the views of Bentinck in 1835, when the only danger apprehended was the establishment of Russo-Persian influence in Afghanistan by forcible means and when the alliance between Persia and the Barakzais was a danger wholly unforeseen. Wade visualized the gravity of the situation if Herat fell, for then Persia could and would extend her influence over Kabul and Kandhar, thus aggravating the danger. But it could be warded off. Wade had an ingenious suggestion up his sleeves . " the British Government had in its power at any time by the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul in concert with Ranjit Singh, and the establishment which would ensure of a confederacy of the states on the Indus to counteract any designs inimical to its interests from westward."³⁰ He urged that the Maharaja had often

29. Minute of Bentinck, March 13, 1835. Reproduced in Boulgor, *Lord William Bentinck*, pp. 174 *sqq.*,

30. 142/36. Wade to Macnaghten, June 7, 1836. P. G. R.

expressed his readiness to join such a league, and the Amirs of Sind had already invited the Shah to try his fortune, which showed that they too would not be averse to his cause under the British auspices.³¹ Wade thus indicated the policy which was actually followed two years later, but the Governor General, at this time, did not pay any serious attention to it and contended himself with merely obtaining full information about affairs beyond the Indus.

Ranjit Singh, meanwhile, was busy extending his dominions across the Indus. He occupied Tank and Bannu in the middle of the year, 1836,³² and, a month later, Dera Ismail Khan,³³ thus completing the line of authority on its right bank.³⁴ Commenting on the capture of these places, Wade expressed a fear that "considering the turn which events have taken since the overtures of Dost Mohammed Khan inviting us to interfere in his quarrel with the Sikhs, should nothing occur to strengthen the present government of Kabul and the life of the Maharaja be prolonged another year, it will not surprise me to find, bold as the attempt may be regarded, that the Sikhs have reached Ghazni and fulfilled the prophecy of their law-giver in recovering the sandal portals which Mahmud (of Ghazni) despoiled from the temple of Som Nath."³⁵ Wade was averse to Sikh expansion towards Afghanistan, for he felt, that it was neither in the interest of Ranjit nor of his Government to provoke Dost Mohd. too much at the time when he was trying to form an alliance with his Western neighbours.

At Kabul, Dost Mohd. had grown impatient of the delay in receiving a reply to his overtures to Auckland. He sent for Masson, and complained that "the Government at Calcutta consider-

31. 142/36. Wade to Macnaghten, June 7, 1836. P. G. R.

32. 142/42. Wade to Government, July 7, 1836. P. G. R.

33. *Ibid.*

The Maharaja's officers alleged that Sher Mohammed Khan, the tributary Chief of Dera Ismail Khan, was having treasonable correspondence with Shah Shuja, and that a letter from the former to the latter had fallen into their hands. Wade, however, considered this letter to be a forgery.

34. 142/46. Wade to Government, July 13, 1836. P. G. R.

35. 142/46. Wade to Government, July 13, 1836. P. G. R.

ed him unworthy of their notice, that he could not account for their neglect of him, that he had done all on his part to come to an understanding with them, but had received not the slightest encouragement from them, and that he had only one wish that the business be brought to a close."³⁶ Masson informed the Governor General of Dost Mohd.'s impatience.

On August 22, 1836, the Governor General, at long last, sent his reply to Dost Mohd. in which he declared interference in the internal concerns of other states to be against the practice of the Government, but apprised the Amir of his intention "ere long to depute some gentleman to your court to discuss with you commercial topics, with a view to our mutual advantages."³⁷ This was just one more stone in an edifice whose foundation had been laid in 1832, when the scheme for opening the Indus to commerce was initiated by treaties with Sind and the Punjab. But the influences to which such a mission would from the start be subject appeared strong enough to transmute its alleged purpose into one definitely political. These were in essence—the Russian spectre, Persia's Herat campaign, the Sikh-Afghan feud, and Dost Mohd's apparent leaning towards Persia and his repeated applications for British mediation.³⁸

36 142/48. Wade to Macnaghten, July 19, 1836. P. G. R.

37. 107/10. Governor General to Dost Mohd., August 22, 1836. Letter sent through Wade. P. G. R.

38. 107/13. Macnaghten to Wade, September 5, 1836, P. G. R.

Though Auckland was so anxious to emphasize the commercial nature of the mission, it becomes evident from subsequent events that his intention from the beginning was to make commerce a cover for politics.

Mohan Lal rightly says ; " the disguised word for politics is commerce, and commerce is the only thing which expands the views and policy of territorial aggrandisement". (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 300-1)

Trotter observes regarding this mission : " The project of a commercial mission to a country which had no commerce worth mentioning, which was shut off from India by mountain-ranges guarded by war-like and plunder-loving tribes, was meant to cover some ulterior, though possibly, harmless design" (*The Earl of Auckland*, p. 37)

Continued on next page

Having decided on a mission to Dost Mohd, Auckland looked round for the proper man. Reputation won by Burnes by his recent travels into Bokhara recommended him. Whilst employed on a mission to Hyderabad, he received instructions to make his way up the Indus to Kabul and negotiate a commercial treaty with its ruler. He was at the same time to make careful observations on all interesting subjects. On his staff were to be Robert Leech, John Wood and P. B. Lord. Mohan Lal also was to place himself under his orders.³⁹ The Ludhiana Agent was urged "to explain particularly to Ranjit Singh that Burnes' mission is strictly of a commercial character and its object is to make known to the merchants residing beyond the Indus the measures which have been adopted with a view to the establishment of the trade formerly carried on by that river."⁴⁰

Continued from page 200.

Durand describes the nature of the mission : " Nominally commercial, the mission was in fact one of political discovery, and its real object was to sound the state of affairs in the countries to which it was deputed." (*The First Afghan War*, p. 39).

Burnes himself wrote : " Various hints and letters, together with the chain of events now in progress, have served to convince me that a stirring time of political action has arrived." (Masson, *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the Punjab*, Vol. III, pp. 436-37).

39. 107/13. Macnaghten to Wade, September 5, 1836. P. G. R.

The mission was given no authority to make replies in case specific political propositions were made to it, but simply forward them through Wade to the Government. The British though anxious to see peace established on the borders of their dominions did not want to commit themselves to any definite promises. The two Chiefs must come to a spontaneous agreement. They believed that the best means of resistance to aggression " lay in peace, independence, acknowledgment and respect of mutual rights, a confined social compact and a sense of common interest between the Sikhs and the Afghans ".—119/18. Macnaghten to Burnes, May 15, 1837. P. G. R.

40. 107/13. Macnaghten to Wade, September 5, 1836. P. G. R.

Burnes left Hyderabad on November 26, 1836.. Leaving him on the way to Kabul we might examine how the Sikh-Afghan relations were shaping after the battle of Jamrud. Enraged by the death of his general, Hari Singh Nalwa, Ranjit Singh led a strong army towards Peshawar and carried fire and sword wherever he went. He crushed all insurrectionary elements mercilessly⁴¹ He sent every soldier he could spare to Peshawar,⁴² and there was every possibility that provoked by the imprudent demonstrations of Dost Mohd., he might institute offensive operations, and although the Sikh position in Afghanistan was none too strong yet Ranjit Singh "may not be without the hope of bringing Kabul and ultimately perhaps Kandhar under his supremacy."⁴³ At the same time, there was the fear of the proposed expedition of Kamran against the Kandhar chiefs, who in turn were instigating the Shah of Persia to make an attack on Herat.⁴⁴

The Government was convinced that it was not conducive to its intrerests to have a state of hostilities on the frontiers of India, which compelled the Afghan chiefs "to place themselves in dependence on the court of Persia, and thus smooth the way for the advance of the arms and influence of that power into their country."⁴⁵

41. Kanhaya Lal, *Ranjit Nama*, p. 502.

همه مفسدان شر انگیز را که بودند با شور شر جا بجا
شهنشاه عالم که تیغ کرد بزود، زیشان برآورد کرد

(All the evil-minded mischief mongers who were creating disturbances every-where, the World Ruler (Ranjit Singh) put them to sword, reducing them to dust).

42. 143/59. Wade to Government, May 13, 1837. P. G. R.

43. 119/18. Macnaghten to Wade, May 15, 1837. P. G. R.

44. 119/22. Macnaghten to Wade, April 10, 1837. P. G. R.

45. 119/18. Macnaghten to Wade, May 15, 1837. P. G. R.

Wade was, therefore, instructed to inform Ranjit Singh that the Government could not view his bellicosity with indifference as long as there was any hope of effecting a reconciliation with the Amir.⁴⁶ Wade, accordingly brought home to the Maharaja the futility of holding Peshawar in the face of such vigorous opposition, and carrying on interminable wars against the Afghans.⁴⁷ He condemned the ill advice of his counsellors who were for continuance of hostilities, and who goaded him on to further conquests. He advised the Maharaja to abandon hostile designs against the Amir in the interests of the well-being of the Sikh nation itself.⁴⁸ In justification of this he pointed out "that the sincerity of a true friend was tried by his candour which prompted him to speak the truth even when it might be disagreeable to his friend."⁴⁹

Wade had by now gained great influence over the Maharaja, and the latter reposed implicit confidence in his counsels and con-

46. 107/10. Macnaghten to Wade, August 22, 1837. P. G. R.

47. Sohan Lal, *Umdat-ul-Tawarikh*, Vol. III, Part IV, p. 443.

دسترسله کپتان صاحب بمطالع عنایت-ساطح فرآمدہ کہ سرکار والہ اقتدار
اخراجات کثیر و مصارف خطیر در سہم پشاور سے فرمائید و ہر سال افواج جدید
نے فرستند و سرکردگان عالم، شان در باب روانگی آنطرف لیت و لعل می سازند
و در باب اقامت آن ملک راضی می باشند فی الواقع فسق و نظام آن ملک بہ
نکصد ہزار آدم سے شونہ-این قدر فوج چہ ضرورت است-ممانع اتھکان و ثمرہ دان
آن وقت مرقوم خواہد شد کہ سرکار والہ را ازین اخراجات نسلی خواہد گردید،

The letter of the Kaptan Sahib (Wade) was brought for the perusal of the Bright Presence (Ranjit Singh). It said that His Exalted Highness spends large sums and incurs great expenditure for expeditions to Peshawar. Every year fresh forces are sent. The noble chiefs hesitate from going in that direction and feel reluctant to settle down in that country. In fact, that country is menaced, and kept under control with a hundred thousand men. What is the need of so much army? His Majesty would realize the real benefit only when he is relieved of all this expense.)

48. 143/26. Wade to Macnaghten, July 9, 1837. P. G. R.

49. *Ibid.*

sidered him to be his sincere friend and "the medium of promoting friendship between the two States".⁵⁰ It was Wade's personal influence with the Maharaja, which, more than any other factor, checked further aggression on the Afghan territory. The Maharaja, on his persuasion, ordered Faqir Aziz-ud-Din to write to Raja Dhian Singh and Jamadar Khushal Singh to address a letter on their own behalf to Dost Mohd, inviting him to depute an agent to the Sikh court to treat for peace.⁵¹ Hostilities were suspended in the meantime.⁵² Dost Mohd. withdrew the main body of his army to Kabul, leaving behind a garrison of 400 only in the frontier fort of Ali Masjid.⁵³

To Wade the Maharaja addressed a cordial letter and asked him to suggest the best mode of effecting a peace with the Afghans with "due deference to his honour and credit."⁵⁴ Wade, therefore, advised the Government to modify its attitude of strict non-intervention in face of such a letter from the Maharaja and the altered situation in Afghanistan. Dost Mohd., too, had already written letters to the Government in the same strain. All this induced a change in the policy of the Government which judged that the time had come when political interference would no longer be embarrassing, but on the contrary, highly advantageous to its interests.⁵⁵

50. 144/22. August 23, 1837. (Notes from a conference between Wade and Ranjit's agent). P. G. R.)

51. 141/19. Wade to Macnaghten, August 18, 1837. P. G. R.

52. 143/26. Wade to Macnaghten, July 9, 1837. P. G. R.

53. 100/84. Macnaghten to Wade, September 16, 1837. P. G. R.

54. 143/26. Wade to Macnaghten, July 9, 1837. P. G. R.

55. Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 217.

Fresh instructions were, therefore, issued to Wade according to which he was desired to impress upon the Maharaja to moderate his demands upon Dost Mohd., at the same time assuring him that the Government entertained friendly feelings to both without being disposed to favour the unreasonable demands of either.⁵⁷ Should he find that "the delay of a reference was injurious and that the Maharaja was inclined to offer reasonable concession to Dost Mohd.," he was authorised to communicate with Burnes who could then enter into negotiations with the Afghan Ruler.⁵⁷ He was to explain to the Maharaja that the Government wanted to see peace and tranquillity established everywhere.⁵⁸ He, however, was expected to exercise special care in not committing the Government by pledging its guarantee either directly or indirectly for the stability of any engagement that might be entered into by the contending parties.⁵⁹

Burnes was similarly instructed to impress upon Dost Mohd. a just sense of his critical position, and try to dissuade him from the assertion of all unreasonable pretensions.⁶⁰ The question of Peshawar seemed to offer some difficulty but the Government believed that some arrangement could be found for a compromise either by an enhanced subsidy to be paid by Dost or by some other similar means suitable to both parties.⁶¹ Again like Wade, Burnes was also to see that Dost Mohd. came to an agreement with Ranjit Singh without in any way committing the Government to "the exercise of direct influence." He was further to observe the "general feeling towards the British Government and the Russian Government and to watch the influence of the supposed Russo-Persian alliance."⁶²

56. 119/31. Macnaghten to Wade, July 31, 1837. P. G. R.

57. *Ibid.*

58. 119/18. Macnaghten to Wade, May 15, 1837. P. G. R.

59. 119/40. Macnaghten to Wade, August 7, 1837. P. G. R.

60. 119/37. Macnaghten to Burnes, July 31, 1837. P. G. R.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

It was at this time that the Maharaja received a letter from Dost Mohd. asking for cessation of hostilities.⁶³ Ranjit replied that if he wanted a truce or treaty he should proceed in a proper manner and send agents with horses.⁶⁴ This reply was first forwarded to Wade for approval. Wade was greatly delighted and at once apprised Burnes of the new turn the matters had taken. As for the settlement regarding Peshawar, he wrote to Burnes that the question could be decided either by the two Chiefs coming to a spontaneous arrangement amongst themselves or by his (Wade's) exerting his influence with the Maharaja to restore the city to Sultan Mohd.⁶⁵ To impress upon the Maharaja the need for an amicable settlement, Wade informed him of the designs of Persia in Afghanistan and of the readiness of the Barakzais to get Persian help against him.⁶⁶

Dost Mohd. anxiously awaited Burnes' arrival in his capital, for he believed that the British would be able to afford him much help in attaining his objects.⁶⁷ Burnes was also sure that if Wade could persuade the Maharaja to agree to his proposal he himself would be able to bring the Amir round, for then it would be a "voluntary sacrifice of what was by conquest and right the possession of the Lahore Chief."⁶⁸

63. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part IV, p. 483.

64. 144/18. Wade to Burnes, August 17, 1837. P. G. R.

65. 144/18. Wade to Burnes, August 17, 1837. P. G. R.

66. 144/22. Wade to Macnaghten, August 23, 1837. P. G. R.

67. 144/9. Letter of Mohd. Akbar in Wade's despatch to Macnaghten. July 19, 1837. P. G. R.

68. 108/36. Burnes to Macnaghten, September 10, 1837. P. G. R.

One useful result of the suspension of hostilities on the part of the Maharaja was that Dost Mohd. withdrew all his troops from the Khyber Pass, stationing only a few at Jallalabad.⁶⁹ He instructed his son, Mohd. Akbar, to receive and escort the British mission through the Pass.⁷⁰ But through a misunderstanding Mohd. Akbar could not meet the mission and Burnes proceeded through the Pass unescorted but was helped by the Afridis inhabiting it.⁷¹ Before crossing the Khyber, he heard that an embassy from Bokhara had arrived at Kabul and another from Persia was on its way.⁷² This news caused some embarrassment to him, and aroused the Government to action.⁷³

Wade commented at length on the dangers to the Indian Empire arising from the presence of a Persian agent at Kabul, and urged upon the Government to instruct Burnes to inform the Amir that "the exertion of our good offices with the Sikh Government on his behalf depends on the relinquishment of his connections with all the powers west-ward."⁷⁴ Auckland accepted his suggestion and

69. 144/12. Wade to Macnaghten, July 24, 1837. P. G. R.

70. 144/26. Wade to Macnaghten, August 25, 1837. P. G. R.

71. 144/43. Burnes to Macnaghten, September 4, 1837. P. G. R.

72. 108/28. Burnes to Macnaghten, August 1, 1837. P. G. R.

These missions were avowedly of a political nature, their efforts were to be directed to range the Chiefs of Afghanistan by the side of the Shah of Persia in his schemes of war and conquest.

73. It became obvious that, with war waging on its eastern frontier and intrigues rife on its western, the country of Afghanistan could not be in a fit state to welcome the British plans of trade and commerce. Trouble was everywhere sniffed in the air and, "in the existing state of excitement", as the Government itself admitted, it was impossible for Burnes to confine himself "to matters of a commercial nature"—Macnaghten to Burnes, September 11, 1837. (Parliamentary Papers 1839, *ut supra*.)

74. 144/28. Wade to Macnaghten, August 25, 1837. P. G. R.

directed Burnes on September 11, that "he, instead of being merely the bearer of an invitation to the Amir of general friendship and for a cordial interference in matters of commerce, was to be looked upon as an arbiter of peace. But the indispensable condition of the of the British friendly intervention in the affairs of Dost Mohd. was to be cessation of any alliance with the Western powers."⁷⁵ Thus Burnes' mission, even before entering Kabul, ceased to be commercial. Commerce was no longer the primary object, but politics became the chief motive power of the ensuing negotiations. The Governor General addressed Ranjit Singh also, apprising him of the change in the circumstances and inviting him to act in concert with the Government.⁷⁶

Burnes reached Kabul on September 20, 1837, before receiving the Governor General's instructions of September 11.⁷⁷ The Amir received him most cordially and lodged him in the Bala Hisar. The next day Burnes delivered his credentials which the Amir received in a very flattering manner with many expressions of his high sense of honour which had been conferred upon him, and expressed his grateful satisfaction at the new means of contact with the British Government. Burnes displayed the presents brought for the Amir describing them as "some of the rarities of Europe." Though the Amir's dignity was ruffled by their paltry character, yet he diplomatically explained them away by observing: "You yourselves are the rarities, the [sight of which best pleases me."⁷⁸

75. 119/55. Macnaghten to Wade and Burnes, September 11, 1837. P. G. R.

76. 119/55. Auckland to Ranjit Singh, September 11, 1837. P. G. R.

77. 108/37. Burnes to Macnaghten, September 24, 1837. P. G. R.

78. *Ibid.*

These presents consisted of pins, needles, scissors, pen-knives, silk handkerchiefs, toys, watches, musical snuff boxes etc., for the Zanana and a pair of pistols for the Amir himself. These formed a ■ aring contrast with the costly gifts which had been showered on Shah Shuja by Elphinstone. Harlan says that the Amir threw them aside and exclaimed with a pish! "Behold! I have feasted and honoured this *Feringee* to the extent of six thousand rupees, and have now a lot of pins and needles and sundry petty toys to show for my folly"—*Memoir of India and Arghanistaun*, p. 130.

Three days later, Burnes had his first private interview with the Amir when he explained the views of his Government with regard to the opening of the Indus to commerce. "The British Government," he said, "had for some years past been thinking of the promotion of trade by that river; for this purpose it had entered into treaties with the powers on its banks, and his mission was intended to secure the Amir's active co-operation in a scheme, which could not but lead to the commercial prosperity of his subjects."

The Amir unhesitatingly promised his full co-operation but complained that his war with the Sikhs on account of their occupation of Peshawar was a constant pre-occupation, it crippled his resources, it dissipated his finances, and that while it lasted he could not give to the commercial objects of the British all the attention and co-operation which he otherwise would. Burnes urged him to reflect on the uselessness of contending with the powerful Maharaja, and advised him to seek for such an adjustment of differences as would preserve his honour and that of his countrymen. The Amir assented and asked Burnes' advice. He replied that his Government had sent him to Kabul for commercial and not for political purposes, but still he would do he could for the peaceful adjustment of both, if Dost would acquaint what him with all his sentiments and demands. At this the Amir said that the Government had saved Shikarpur from the aggression of the Sikhs. Could not similar motives induce them to interfere in the affairs of Peshawar? Burnes replied that Shikarpur was the possession of the Amirs of Sind, while Peshawar was an undoubted conquest of the Sikhs made by the sword and preserved by it, and to interfere in that would be a violation of justice and the integrity of Ranjit Singh's dominions.⁷⁹

79. 108/39. Burnes to Wade, October 5, 1837. P. G. R.

At a subsequent interview on October 4, Dost Mohd. anxiously desired to see his differences with the Sikhs terminated, and said that if advised, he would even send his son to Lahore to ask the Maharaja's forgiveness for what had passed, and if he (Ranjit Singh) would agree to give up Peshawar, he would be prepared to hold it as a tributary to Lahore, and send the requisite present of horses, rice, etc.,⁸³ Burnes, on the strength of the letter from the Governor General of September 11, 1837, where such an arrangement was envisaged, asked whether it would be equally advantageous to the Amir's reputation if Peshawar was restored to his brother, Sultan Mohd. To this the Amir replied that it was all the same for him whether Peshawar was under Sultan Mohd., or Ranjit Singh, as the former had been to him both a treacherous friend and a bitter enemy. Moreover, that could never mean that the Maharaja had withdrawn from the countries westward of the Indus.⁸⁴

In addition to a verbatim account of what transpired at the various interviews with Dost Mohd., Burnes sent to his Government a report giving the history of Kabul, dealing at length with the power and character of Dost Mohd's rule, and the chances which Shah Shuja had there. He also reviewed the uncertain position of the Punjab after the death of Ranjit Singh, and concluded by suggesting that the Government should bring about an adjustment of differences between the Amir and the Sikhs, and help the former with money etc., to exclude the Persian and the Russian influence from Afghanistan, and to place the resources of Kabul and Kandhar in one hand.⁸⁵

83. 144/49. Wade to Macnaghten, November 7, 1837. P. G. R.

84. 108/30. Burnes to Wade, October 5, 1837. P. G. R.

85. 108/59. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 3, 1837. P. G. R.

Extracts of this very important letter (so far unpublished) are reproduced in Appendix XI.

As Burnes' communications passed through Wade, the latter freely commented upon them. He invariably invalidated Burnes' opinions by contradicting his facts by making bold counter-assertions, and suggesting all kinds of plausible arrangements which greatly influenced the Governor General. The proposal of Dost, wrote Wade, showed his desire to recover Peshawar with a view to aggrandise himself at the expense of his brothers. To Ranjit it would mean that he would have to forsake that part of the Barakzai family which had been attached to him without getting any substantial benefit in return. Besides, Ranjit might think, continued Wade, that it would be more safe for him to place Peshawar in the hands of a weak ruler like Sultan Mohd. instead of resigning it to an already powerful chief like Dost Mohd., who thereby would become a great menace to Sikh dominions. Wade did not send Dost Mohd's proposals to the Maharaja. He further argued that such negotiations could only be advantageous to the British interests if they did not involve a weakness of the Sikh Government on the side of Peshawar, which might expose the Punjab more than ever to the invasion of the Afghans. He thought that the augmentation of Dost Mohd's power resulting from his re-occupation of Peshawar would be less compatible with British interests than the preservation of the existing subdivided state of authority in Afghanistan. He further reasoned that with the accommodation of Dost's differences with the Sikhs, Sultan Mohd. and his brothers would be reduced to his authority, and feeling that the British were on his side, he would first of all reduce Kandhar. This would make him the enemy of all Barakzais who, if they found themselves incapable of resisting his encroachments either by their own means or those of the Sikhs, would look either to Persia or Herat. This would revive those military enterprises which the British were trying to counteract. Wade, therefore, advised Auckland to be on his guard against an undue use being made of British connection with Dost Mohd., because there was every chance that in rescuing the Amir from an impending danger, there might arise a state of affairs more pregnant than ever with mischief to the peace and tranquillity of Afghanistan. In short, Wade's definite opinion was that an alliance with the

Sikhs was much better than one with Dost Mohd., who had very high ambitions, and wanted to bring his brothers under his own sovereignty.⁸⁶

Wade disagreed with Burnes' proposal to give pecuniary aid to Dost to ward off the Russian danger. Burnes' view was that the power of Dost in Afghanistan was unchallengeable, whereas Wade asserted that Shah Shuja too had many adherents there, and that though the Barakzais had usurped the greater portion of the power of the Sadozais, yet the latter family still maintained itself in Herat and had a strong hold on the prejudice, if not on the affection, of a large portion of the Durranis. Moreover, the elevation of Dost could not be palatable to Ranjit as well, and so it was better to leave things as they were. If at all the consolidation of the Afghans became a measure of indispensable necessity to the establishment of peace on the frontiers of the Indus, the selection of Shah Shuja in preference to Dost Mohd. was bound to be more popular with the Maharaja as it would only be in fulfilment of the pact which he himself had formerly made with the Shah.⁸⁷

Wade also disagreed with Burnes regarding his views about the Kandhar chiefs. He said that those chiefs who were very jealous of the power of their brother at Kabul must have been offended at the exclusive nature of the intercourse that Burnes was holding with Dost Mohd.⁸⁸

86. 144/40. Wade to Macnaghten, November 7, 1837. P. G. R.

87. *Ibid.*

88. 146/24. Wade to Macnaghten, January 7, 1838. P. G. R.

He had earlier impressed upon the Government that those chiefs considered themselves a separate entity under their eldest brother, Kohin Dil Khan, and ought to be treated as such.⁸⁸

He further emphasised that the British interests lay in strengthening and preserving the existing division of power in Afghanistan and not in destroying it.⁸⁹

Auckland came to adopt Wade's view that the division of power among the several chiefs of Afghanistan was conducive to the interests of British India.⁹¹ He definitely announced that the British policy was to preserve unimpaired the existing state of affairs in Central Asia and to refrain from doing anything which might give to any chief undue preponderance over others.⁹² Thus we see that Auckland was following the suggestions of Wade to the very letter. He, too, like Wade was thinking of the balance of power among the different independent states in and around Afghanistan.

In order to translate this policy into practice, however, it was necessary to safeguard the peace of Kandhar and Herat by not allowing the Persian and indirectly the Russian designs to fructify in that quarter. So Auckland, agreeing with Wade's view that the preservation of the integrity of Herat was an object of first magnitude,⁹³ cautioned McNeill to be very careful about Kandhar's relations with Persia.⁹⁴ With this object in view, Burnes was also authorised to proceed to Kandhar, should he consider it necessary.⁹⁵

89. 144/45. Wade to Macnaghten, October 8, 1837. P. G. R.

90. 145/16. Wade to Macnaghten, December 21, 1837. P. G. R.

91. 119/69. Macnaghten to Wade, November 13, 1837. P. G. R.

92. 119/72. Macnaghten to Wade, November 25, 1837. P. G. R.

93. 119/69, Macnaghten to Wade, November 13, 1837. P. G. R.

94. *Ibid.* and 119/84. Macnaghten to Wade, December 11, 1837. P. G. R.

95. 119/84. Macnaghten to Wade, December 11, 1837. P. G. R.

In the meantime, a Persian *elchi*, who had been received with *éclat* at Kandhar,⁹⁶ set out from there towards Kabul, but was recalled by the Kandhar chiefs who wanted to form an alliance with Persia, independently of Kabul. The *elchi* returned to Kandhar and thence to Persia.⁹⁷

In November, 1837, Burnes urged his Government to decide upon the extent to which it would go in its offers of money, recognition and protection to detach the Afghan chiefs from a Persian alliance.⁹⁸ He, it seems, did not consider this either impossible or difficult, for the Kandhar Sirdars had accepted his friendly promises in return for compliance with the wishes of the Amir and himself. He justified his action by urging the view that "there is no step calculated to defeat the designs of Persia, if she moves eastward, but to array Kabul and Kandhar against her."⁹⁹ For this undoubted step in the right direction Burnes was called over the coals and instructed to repudiate his promises to Kandhar. The Government re-affirmed its policy of recognising existing divisions as decidedly most beneficial to its interests and "the strict avoidance of positive engagements to assist resistance to invasion from the west by arms or subsidies."¹⁰⁰

Thus the British policy at the very end of 1837 was to maintain the existing balance of power in Afghanistan, to assure Dost Mohd. that he would gain from the friendship of the British a similar boon of safety from the attacks of the Sikhs as he would from Russia or Persia or any other power,¹⁰¹ and to dissuade

96. 108/34. Burnes to Macnaghten, September 9, 1837. P. G. R.

97. 108/48. Wade to Macnaghten, October 31, 1837. P. G. R.

98. 108/56. Burnes to Macnaghten, November 19, 1837. P. G. R.

99. 108/60. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 22, 1837. P. G. R.

100. 121/1. Macnaghten to Wade January 1, 1838. P. G. R.

101. *Ibid.*

him to have any pretensions to supremacy over the chiefs of Kandhar.¹⁰²

On December 20, a notable and almost unexpected event occurred which was to prove a potent force in the subsequent shaping of the issue. A Russian agent, Captain Vickovich¹⁰³ announced himself at Kabul, bearing letters to the Amir from the Czar, the Shah of Persia and the Russian Ambassador at the Court of Tehran.¹⁰⁴ Before receiving him the Amir went to Burnes with a letter from his son conveying, that a Russian agent was on his way to Kabul. He sought Burnes counsel as to whether he should receive him or not. He told the British Envoy that "he wished to have nothing to do with any other power than the British.....and that he would order the Russian Agent to be turned out; detained on the road or act in any way Burnes desired him."¹⁰⁵ Burnes' reply was that according to the laws of nations, the Amir could not refuse to receive an accredited agent of any power with whom he was at peace, "but he had in his power to show his feeling on the occasion by making a full disclosure to the British Government of the errand on which the individual had come." The Amir most readily assented.¹⁰⁶

102. 119/21. Macnaghten to Wade, December 27, 1837. P. G. R.

In fact the British policy at this time was nothing but the different suggestions of Wade translated into practice.

103. He was a native of Poland and a Lieutenant in the Russian Army. — 108/65. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 22, 1837. P. G. R.

104. 108/66. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 22, 1837. P. G. R.
According to Kaye, Vickovich had been sent to Kabul, probably as a counter-stroke to Burnes' mission, for as the Russian Minister observed, with some justification, that England had no monopoly of intrigue in Central Asia. — *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 297.

105. 108/64. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 20, 1837. P. G. R.

106. *Ibid.*

But the arrival of the Russian agent completely overpowered Burnes. Masson, who was at the place, says that the English Envoy bound his head with towels and handkerchiefs and took to a smelling bottle.¹⁰⁷

On regaining his equilibrium, Burnes pressed on his Government the absolute necessity of an immediate settlement of the Sikh-Afghan feud. He wrote: "M. Vikovitch informed Dost Mohd. that the Russian Government had desired him to state its sincere sympathy with the difficulties under which he laboured, that it would afford it great pleasure to assist him in repelling the attacks of Ranjit Singh on his dominions, and that it was ready to furnish him with a sum of money for the purpose and to continue its supply, expecting in return the Amir's good offices."¹⁰⁸ These terms were definitely much more tempting than anything which the British had offered to the Amir. In face of these strong demonstrations on the part of Russia to interest herself in the affairs of Afghanistan, Burnes added: "it will not, I feel satisfied, be presumptuous to state my most deliberate conviction that more vigorous proceedings than have hitherto been exhibited are necessary to counteract Russian or Persian intrigue in this quarter.....For the last six or seven years I have had my attention directed to these countries and I profess myself to be one of those who do believe that Russia entertains designs of extending her influence towards India." After making these remarks Burnes sounded a strong note of warning, saying: "It is a true maxim that prevention is better than cure, and now we have both in our hands. We might certainly wish to delay a little longer before acting but it is now

107. *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 463.

Such disconcertment must have increased Dost Mohd's determination to profit by English fears and thereby obtain his own terms.

108. 103/65. Burnes to Maenaghten; December 22, 1837. P. G. R.

in our power by the extended and immediate exercise of already established influence to counteract every design injurious to us."¹⁰⁹ He believed that "it was not surely asking too much of Ranjit Singh to act with promptitude in the adjustment of a matter which, while it hangs over, brings intrigues to our door, and if not checked, may bring enemies instead of messengers."¹¹⁰ He felt convinced that Dost Mohd.'s position was not hazardous, though the Government considered it so, and that he had nothing to fear from the Sikhs.¹¹¹ He strongly urged upon the Government to offer pecuniary grants to the Amir for the defence of his territory and the consolidation and extension of his power.¹¹²

Burnes further reported after a week: "Russia has come forward with offers, which are certainly substantial; Persia has been lavish in her promises, and Bokhara and other states have not been backward. Yet, in all that has passed or is daily transpiring, the Chief of Kabul declares that he prefers the sympathy and friendly offers of the British to all these offers, however alluring they may seem, from Persia or from the Emperor."¹¹³

To Wade, strangely enough, the arrival of the Russian agent meant nothing, for on January 13, 1838, he wrote to the Government: "Instead of regarding the arrival of the Russian envoy as a motive for departing from the policy which the Government has already laid

109. 108/55. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 22, 1837, P. G. R.

110. (Parl. Papers, 1859, *ut supra*.) Burnes to Macnaghten, December 23, 1837.

111. *Ibid.*

112. *Ibid.*

113. 108/68. Burnes to Government, December 30, 1837, P. G. R.

down, it ought, I think, to be a strong additional reason for us to adhere to its principles." "Any mark of deviation," he emphasised, "would convince the Amir that we are alarmed at his means of doing some serious injury, while in reality he possesses no such power." "It is not by yielding to the ambitious views of Dost Mohd." he argued, "that we are likely to keep off the invasion of his country or to counteract Russian and Persian intrigue, but by keeping him and the other powers of Afghanistan in a just sense of their position." He was equally averse to the grant of subsidies to Dost Mohd. because such aid "would be viewed with strong feelings of jealousy and distrust, not merely by the Sikhs, but the other chiefs of Afghanistan and those of contiguous states." If the suggestions of Burnes were accepted, he thought "it would directly tend to the subversion of that divided state of authority among the Afghans, which, there can be no doubt, is the best suited to our present policy." He stressed that Dost Mohd. should be brought "to a just estimate of his situation, and that it would be as imprudent as unnecessary to purchase his seperation from the alliance which he has been courting with such avidity with Russia and Persia by any other price than our mediation to settle his dispute with the Sikhs." Regarding the choice for alliance to be made between the Sikhs and the Amirs of Sind on one side, and the Afghans on the other, he observed: "Few persons will I presume be found to place an alliance with the Afghans on an equality with that of the Sikhs and the Amirs of Sind, situated as we are with reference to these powers. and, unless, therefore, Captain Burnes can show some sure and certain advantage from the British Government becoming a party to a change in the political condition of the Ruler of Kabul, which while it tends to increase his power would diminish our means of restraining him and disturb the well being of our relations east of the Indus, it would be impolite to expose the safety of our present system to the hazard of an experiment."¹¹⁴

114. 145/20. Wade to Macnaghten, January 13, 1837. P. G. R.

This important letter is reproduced in *extenso* in Appendix XII.

The Government accepted Wade's views *in toto*, and, incorporating all his suggestions, addressed a despatch to Burnes on January 20, 1839. It laid down: "His Lordship attaches little immediate importance to this mission of the Russian Agent, although he will bring all the circumstances connected with it to the notice of the Home authorities..... but if he be not already gone from Kabul you will suggest to the Amir that he be dismissed with courtesy..... His mission should be assumed to have been as represented, entirely for commercial object,¹¹⁵ and no notice need be taken of the messages with which he may profess to have been charged." It indicated that there was no need to consolidate Dost Mohd's power, "as the existing division of authority in Afghanistan was decidedly the most beneficial for the British interests." It stated categorically that Dost Mohd. must give up all hopes of personally obtaining Peshawar and was to be told to effect a settlement with Ranjit Singh. Nevertheless British "good offices" were being employed on his behalf and it was claimed "that the Maharaja had acceded to the Government's desire for the cessation of strife and promotion of tranquillity." To encourage him to hope for more than this would be to deceive him. Further, if he was eager to receive this boon of peace he was expected to abjure all connection with Western powers. Should he not, Burnes was to make him understand distinctly that his mission would be compelled to retire and that he would be deprived of the Government's influence with Ranjit Singh in his favour.¹¹⁶

115. Palmerston, in a note to be presented by the British Ambassador to Nesselrode, detailed the activities of Russian Agents in Persia and Afghanistan, and pointed out that they were contrary to the assurances given to Great Britain earlier. Nesselrode in reply stated that the mission of Vikovitch was purely commercial and that it did not contain the smallest design hostile to the English Government, nor the least idea of injuring the tranquillity of the British possessions in India—Sykes, *History of Afghanistan*, Vol. I, pp. 404-5.

116. 121/3. Macnaghten to Burnes, January 20, 1839. P. G. R.

The ground upon which this lofty stand was taken was built upon stray letters to Ranjit Singh in which the Governor General had served him with bloodless homilies on the blessings of peace in general as a rule of state-craft. His replies "faithfully enumerated the advantages of peace, and uniformly watered the blest garden of friendship in which roses had been effortlessly blooming for the past thirty years or so."¹¹⁷

But the worst of it was that not a word had yet been said on the possible nature of the Peshawar settlement, and while the thread of friendship was being thus rudely severed by the shears of uncertainty Burnes was left in do doubt as to the actual extent of these "good offices."

The Envoy informed the Amir that "in the opinion of the Governor General the Maharaja would not be disposed to surrender Peshawar on the terms proposed," though he might consent to vest its government in Sultan Mohd.¹¹⁸ This certainly did not suit the Amir, who had many a time suffered from the intrigue of his brother.¹¹⁹ Sultan Mohd., the Amir said, was a devoted servant of the Maharaja; Peshawar under him, he apprehended, would become a rallying-point of his enemies, and a hot-bed of conspiracies directed to his ruin.¹²⁰ He, therefore, could not be thankful to the British Government for exercise of its "good offices," which in reality would be only a "ratification of the mistakes of the Maharaja". "Of Ranjit's power," he added, "to invade me in Kabul, I have little fear; of his power to injure me if he reinstates Sultan Mohd. in the government of that city, I have great apprehensions."¹²¹

117. 143/12. Wade to Burnes, June 3, 1837. P.G.R.

118. Burnes to Macnaghten, January 26, 1838. (Parl. Papers, 1859, *ut supra*).

119. At this interview the Amir revealed to Burnes a fresh intrigue of Sultan Mohd. who had recently written a letter to Shah Shuja offering him his help against him (the Amir) and promising to secure that of the Sardars of Kandhar. How could he "place a snake in his bosom"?

120. Burnes to Macnaghten, January 26, 1838. (Parl. Papers, 1855), *ut supra*.

121. *Ibid*.

At this point it appeared as if the negotiations were at an end, but Nawab Jabbar Khan, who was also present, suggested that "since the Afghan nation could not afford to lose the sympathy which had been exhibited by the British Government," the district of Peshawar might be divided between the Amir and Sultan Mohd., Ranjit Singh receiving equally at their hands a fixed tribute.¹²² With good logic he pointed out the manifest advantages of such a scheme: it would be acceptable to the Maharaja who would get the oft-desired tribute from the Amir; it would remove his apprehensions, as his friend and underling, Sultan Mohd., would still hold half the territory, and it would win for the British the gratitude of the Afghans, who would be freed from the intolerant Sikh tyranny. On January 26, 1838, this fresh proposal agreed to by the Amir and recommended by Burnes, was submitted for the Governor General's consideration.¹²³

To Wade this proposal did not appear unreasonable. Commenting on the relevant despatch of Burnes, he observed that "though the Maharaja's opinion.....remains to be disclosed, I am ready with the sanction of the Governor General to communicate the proposition now made to Ranjit Singh and to support by every argument that I can use the expediency of its acceptance by him, provided also that His Lordship desires no other security than the verbal assurances given by the Amir of Kabul of his relinquishment of all connection with the powers to the westward, and sees no occasion to await the issue of the instruction lately sent to Captain Burnes in consequence of the arrival of the Russian envoy in Kabul....."¹²⁴ He pointed out that "any desire that may be manifested by us to direct the settlement of their (the Sikhs') quarrel with

122. Jabbar Khan proposed this compromise on the basis of a treaty which had once been entered into by Ranjit Singh with the Amir and his deceased brother, Yar Mohd. Khan.

123. Burnes to Macnaghten, January 26, 1838. (Parl. Papers, 1859, *ut supra*).

124. Secret and Separate Consultation, October 17, 1838 No. 68, Wade to Macnaghten, March 3, 1838. (Captain Wade's Letters to the Government of India in the Secret and Separate Department, January to June, 1838. P. C. R.).

Dost Mohd. Khan in a manner that may not be consonant with the judgment of their ruler may make His Highness impatient of our control and render the loss of cordiality with him from our interference in the dispute far more detrimental to us than the same result could possibly prove from the disappointed expectations of the Ruler of Kabul in the assistance preferred to him by our Government." He reminded the Governor General that "it is the maxim of our Government that our wish to benefit the Afghans must be subservient to the obligations of our relations with the Sikhs and we shall do well never to lose sight of that principle, or we incur the risk of finding ourselves in an equivocal position more prejudicial to our interests than the sacrifice of alliances at best but experimental with the weak princes of Afghanistan."¹²⁵

No attempt, it appears, was made to bring about a settlement of the Peshawar question on the basis of the above proposal,¹²⁶ and Burnes was informed that "the relinquishment of Peshawar upon any terms must depend upon the pleasure of the Maharaja whose right to that possession appears to be admitted even by the Amir and cannot be questioned".¹²⁷ He was instructed to bring home to Dost Mohd that he should rest satisfied with an arrangement which would leave him in the enjoyment of his existing possessions "under the assurance of the continued exercise of our good offices for his security from further attack, the Sikhs remaining, as at present, in the immediate occupation and management of the Peshawar territory."¹²⁸

125. Political Consultations, No. 68, Wade to Macnaghten, March 3, 1838. I. R. D.

126. *Kaye op cit.*, Vol. I, p. 201.

127. 121/21. Macnaghten to Wade, March 7, 1838. P. G. R.

128. *Ibid.*

Dost Mehd. now lost all patience and declared that he could not wait longer than "the feast of Nauroz" (about the vernal equinox) for an adjustment regarding Peshawar.¹²⁹ He laid before Burnes the terms upon which he could accept a British alliance—a promise to protect Kabul and Kandhar from Persia, the cession of Peshawar by Ranjit Singh, or the protection of immigrants supposing it to be restored to Sultan Mohd,—but the Envoy refused to agree to any one of them and recapitulated what was to be expected of him. He was to receive no agents from, nor hold any correspondence with the West; dismiss Vickovitch; respect the independence of Kandhar and Peshawar, and surrender personal claims to the latter, admitting the right of Ranjit Singh to dispose of it as he wished. The British Government would then consider itself free to interpose its good offices to remove the causes of difference between the Sikhs and Afghans. Burnes, whose hands were empty, declined to commit these terms to writing, preferring a settlement "hereafter."¹³⁰

The Amir who had been hoping for ever so much from the British was sorely disappointed and turned for aid to other powers.¹³¹

129. Burnes to Macnaghten, March 13, 1838. (Parl. Papers, 1859, *ut supra*).

130. *Ibid*,

131. According to Mohan Lal, who accompanied Burnes to Kabul, the Amir was guilty of double crossing the English. All the time while he was negotiating with them he was corresponding with the Shah of Persia and also with the Czar. He had sought the Shah's help against the Sikhs and the Czar's alliance of the type he (the Czar) already had with the Shah. (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 190). Again, soon after Vikovitch's arrival Dost wrote to Count Simonich, the Russian Ambassador in Persia as follows: "I thank you very much for the offer you made me to arrang my affairs. I expect much more from your Government and my hopes have been increased. Though the distance between us is great, it does not prevent an approach in heart" and so on. (*Idem*, p. 326).

His indignation was most justified, and his remarks most apt, when he declared that while the British expected him to desist from all intercourse with Persia, Russia and Turkistan, they did not even offer any security against the consequences of detaching him from those powers.¹³² Having despaired of any hope of help from them, he opened an intercourse in person with Vikovitch (hitherto he had been received by the amir in "a scurvy and discouraging manner"). On April 21, 1838, he sent for him publicly and after parading him through the streets of Kabul received him with a great degree of respect.¹³³

As for Burnes, he felt that to remain there any longer fettered the Amir and discredited the British Government.¹³⁴ As he could not shift his ground, and the attention paid by the Amir to Vikovitch continued to be augmented, he left Kabul on April 25, 1838,¹³⁵ smuggling his Government's discredited toy of "good offices" over the frontier in a huff.¹³⁶



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One does not know how far Mohan Lal is correct but even if he be right in what he says, such letters, according to Sykes (*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 304), merely represented the customary policy of the rulers of Persia, Bukhara and Afghanistan and might be termed a policy of "feelers".

132. 121/20. Burnes to Macnaghten, March 7, 1838. P. G. R.

133. Burnes to Macnaghten, April 25, 1838. Letter No. 24, (Indian Papers, 1839, Correspondence relating to Afghanistan).

134. Burnes to Macnaghten, March 13, 1838. Letter No. 21 (*Idem*).

135. Secret and Separate Consultation, October 3, 1838. No. 75. Burnes to Macnaghten, April 25, 1838 (Abstract). (Captain Wade's letters, *ut supra*).

136. Thus ends the story of a British mission to Afghanistan, which having embarked upon its voyage under purely commercial auspices, was, in an unfortunate hour, carried away from its course by a terrific gale into the stormy sea of politics. There it foundered on the rocks on the intricate question of Peshawar.

The failure of Burnes' mission and the Government's inability to accommodate Dost Mohd. were mainly occasioned by two chief considerations : in the first place, the British were not prepared to enter into any definite engagement which might prove embarrassing to them in the long run ; secondly, their whole attitude towards Afghanistan and its rulers was underlined by their determination to maintain unimpaired the existing relations of friendship with the " old and faithful ally " at Lahore. The English mediation in the Sikh-Mazari dispute in 1836 had imposed a limit on Ranjit Singh's ambitions towards Sind. It had, therefore, become a nice point whether the British could either in propriety or even in expediency check his ambitions in the direction of Afghanistan also. The diplomatic reticence on this question had already hardened into a convention not to interfere in his Afghan policy. One buffer in hand being decidedly more secure than the desire for two, the Government's policy, as Wade put it, was to preserve its relations with Afghanistan in subservience to "the obligations of our relations with the Sikhs."¹³⁷ Therefore, its interposition in the present dispute on the Sikh side could hardly extend beyond a formal representation in favour of peace in general. And to Ranjit Singh, Auckland voiced his "earnest desire for the maintenance of tranquillity, not in British India alone, but among all the neighbouring nations,"¹³⁸ without in the least pretending to interfere in his Afghan policy. Organically Peshawar belonged to the Punjab rather than to Afghanistan, and while the Maharaja held the province by the unquestioned right of conquest, its

137. Secret and Separate Consultation, October 17, 1838. No. 68. Wade to

Macnaghten, March 3, 1838. (Captain Wade's letters, *ut supra*).

138. 119/23. Macnaghten to Wade, June 5, 1837. P. G. R. Also 119/37.

Macnaghten to Wade, July 31, 1837. P. G. R.

continued possession was fitfully calculated to provide a sop to Sikh racial pride. It is, therefore, improbable that the Sikh Ruler would have agreed to part with it under any circumstances, least of all to the Afghans. Indeed, as Wade said, he would have regarded even its restoration to Sultan Mohammed as a sacrifice of his interests.¹³⁹ Thus the Government could not possibly have succeeded in bringing the two Rulers to a settlement, for their interests in Peshawar were well-nigh irreconcilable.

The Amir's volte-face in favour of the Perso-Russian party was, in the circumstances, natural. This party became in the ascendant at Kabul in no time as it held out lavish promises for fulfilling every purpose of the Amir. After the fall of Herat, a portion of the Persian army, or in lieu thereof a grant of money, was to furnish him with means to expel the Sikhs from Peshawar—a compact for which Vickovich undertook to obtain the seal of Russian guarantee. Meanwhile, missions were to be sent from both Kabul and Kandhar to wait upon the Shah, whose orders Dost Mohd. would in future obey.¹⁴⁰

At the climax of this new situation, it became more manifest than ever before that the responsibility most prominent in the eyes of the British Government, of securing India from the danger of Russian invasion, must be met by means altogether different from those projected earlier.

139. Secret and Separate Consultation, October 17, 1838. No. 68. Wade to

Macnaghten, March 3, 1838. (Captain Wade's letters, *ut supra*).

140. Burnes to Macnaghten, April 30, 1838. (Parl. Papers, 1838, *ut supra*).

CHAPTER XII

THE TRIPARTITE TREATY

An important Minute written by the Governor General on May 12, 1838, reviewed the practical implications of the failure of Burnes' mission and the aggravated menace from the west. "Direct aid to Herat," wrote Auckland, "was impracticable, and assistance in arms and money to the present chiefs of Afghanistan would probably be employed against the Sikhs rather than the Persians, and would result in the destruction of cordiality with the Maharaja." The policy of contracting independent alliances with the Afghan chiefs had already evoked the Government's unmistakable censure and Burnes' promises to Kandhar had been cancelled. Re-opening parleys with the Amir himself, in view of the Government's former uncompromising attitude, would inevitably impair its prestige. Hence the only two courses apparently left to the Government were either to leave things as they were, or to venture upon some other bold action with a view to "sweeping away the protagonists of turmoil in Afghanistan, and substituting in their place a single ruler bound closely to its interests."

The Minute emphasized the importance of acting in the closest harmony with Ranjit Singh. Should Heart stand out, it added, the Maharaja might venture to aid Shuja in regaining his throne, alone or in concert with the British. But its fall would enable Persian and Russian influence "to take up a threatening attitude towards our Indian possessions", in a manner "injurious in intention and effect to ourselves, which we are warranted in repelling by all means in our power". Auckland, in that event, considered his choice of policy limited to one of the three following courses of action: (1). to confine defensive measure to the line of the Indus; (2). to aid the existing chiefships; and (3). to "act in the closest harmony with Maharaja Ranjit Singh in organising resistance to Persia in the east of Afghanistan". A plan "which is decidedly the most deserving of attention" was to jointly support Shah Shuja. Though there were "difficulties of a secondary, though

not of inconsiderable kind " in co-operating with the Sikhs, nevertheless it was of the greatest importance to act in concert with them. Either of the first two were at this stage deemed impracticable, and the third, it was thought, was most expedient irrespective of whether Herat fell or not. It would of course be undertaken under conditions that would conciliate Ranjit Singh, and at the same time bind the restored monarch to British interests. Success in a cause which was believed to " have many partisans in Afghanistan " would be ensured by " our active sanction and support." The Government would then "permit or encourage the advance of Ranjit Singh's armies upon Kabul under counsel and restriction and (as subsidiary to his advance) organize an expedition headed by Shah Shujaool-Mulkh " to re-establish his sovereignty in the eastern division of Afghanistan.¹ Official touch was thus given to the birth of the Tripartite Treaty policy.

At Ludhiana, as we have seen, Wade had a constant opportunity of establishing a close association with Shah Shuja. In 1826, he was apprised of Ranjit's advances to the Shah by the latter for the purpose of securing British mediation and cognizance in any engagement he might have with that Ruler.² Likewise, he was well acquainted with the Treaty of March 12, 1833, between the two. Thus the possibilities of their acting in unison, and the emergence of the western menace had suggested an idea to Wade which he duly laid before the Government as early as June 1836. Should a more direct interest in Afghan affairs be demanded, wrote Wade, he could only repeat an opinion that he had already

1. 122/1. Macriaghten to Wade, October 18, 1838. Enclosure. P. G. R.

2. 95/29. Wade to Metcalfe, July 25, 1826. P. G. R. See p. 149, *supra*.

expressed, namely, that "the British Government has in its power at any time by the restoration of Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul in concert with Ranjit Singh.....to counteract any designs inimical to its interests from the westward."³

By January 1, 1838, Wade had made out a convincing case for the policy of supporting Shah Shuja.⁴ He referred to reports formerly submitted by Masson and McNeill in which they considered that the Suddozai family, of which Shuja was a member, retained a strong hold on the affections of "a large portion" of the Afghans. The Shah's failure in 1834 was, according to Masson, "most sincerely lamented" since all classes desired his restoration. Success in the venture would have been assured by the simple presence of a British officer, not necessarily as an ally, but merely as a reporter of proceedings. Wade felt that to assist the Barakzais would be to force their rule upon an unwilling people, while for the opinion that "Dost Mohd. is not to be trusted" he had the authority of Masson and some of the Amir's own countrymen. By their dissensions the Barakzais had come to be considered as "pests to the country", and Shah Shuja under the auspices of the Government "would not even encounter opposition." Should the consolidation of Afghanistan be at present considered necessary, Wade favoured the plan of supporting Shuja under his pact with Ranjit Singh of 1833. Least violence would thereby be done to the interests concerned and success would not be difficult to achieve for he had it on the same authority that during the intensity of feeling caused by the recent Sikh-Afghan warfare Shah Shuja might have made himself master of Kabul in

3. 142/36. Wade to Macnaghten, June 7, 1836. P. G. R. See p. 198, *supra*.

4. 145/21. Wade to Macnaghten, January 1, 1838. P. G. R.

two months. In his opinion, however, the championship of Shuja could only be justified, or demanded of the Government, in the event of the capitulation of Herat to Persia.⁵ This crisis appeared more imminent than ever, and since by April 30 events at Kabul had hurried to a *denouement*, Burnes urged "a prompt, active and decided counteraction" of Dost Mohammed.⁶ These ideas had so well taken root in the Simla Council that the cautious Auckland embodied Wade's proposals *mutatis mutandis* in his Minute of May 12. This Minute, it is important to remember, did not envisage the possibility of the Government's direct military participation. The British would appear as a partner in the scheme only to "permit or to encourage the advance of Ranjit Singh's armies", and to "organise" Shuja's expedition. More at this stage was not contemplated. The plan as projected *prima facie* had much to recommend it: Ranjit Singh's friendship far from being lost would probably be strengthened; a friendly ruler would replace an enemy in India's most threatened rampart; and the end which the Government sought in its Afghan policy would be achieved with little expense and no actual military effort. Deviation from this plan towards loading the dice with 20,000 of its own troops was a later, though very much inevitable development, and was the prelude to the disastrous Afghan War.

Auckland's despatch of May 22, 1838, solicited the views of the Secret Committee on the Afghan question and warned them that "the emergency of affairs may compel me to act"

5. 115/21. Wade to Macnaghten, January 1, 1838. P. G. R.

6. Burnes to Macnaghten. April 30, 1838. (Parl. Papers, 1859, *Correspondence of Sir Alexander Burnes with the Governor General of India during his mission to Kabul in 1837-38*, Ungarbled edition).

without waiting for any such intimation. In anticipation of such emergency "I have deemed it expedient to put matters in train by previous negotiation, in order to render whatever measures of direct interference I may be obliged to adopt as effective as possible."⁷ Indeed, matters were "put in train" by Macnaghten, who accompanied by Wade, Osborne, M'Gregor and Drummond left for Lahore on a mission that was originally intended to be of a complimentary nature.⁸ But in view of the "important intelligence recently received from Captain Burnes"⁹ political discussion was expected to be raised. Instructions were therefore given to the Envoy embodying the principles of the Minute of May 12. On May 30, Macnaghten arrived at Adinanagar where the Maharaja was in camp, and where the actual negotiations that led to the Tripartite Treaty were almost immediately entered into. Wade was present with Macnaghten at all the meetings held with Ranjit Singh and his officers. The Envoy bore with him the Governor General's instructions written by Torrens on May 15, with his usual magniloquence. Two plans were to be laid before His Highness: (1). that the British recognize the treaty concluded between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja on March 12, 1833, and that acting on this new basis while the Sikhs "advanced cautiously" on Kabul accompanied by British agents, a demonstration would be made at Shikarpur by an occupying division of the British army with Shah Shuja in their company. Thence the Shah would proceed to Kabul by way of Kandhar supported by his own troops, levied on financial assistance being advanced to him by the Government. British officers

7. Governor General to Secret Committee, May 22, 1838. No. 1 (Indian Papers, 1839, Correspondence relating to Afghanistan).

8. 122/2. Torrens to Macnaghten, May 15, 1838. P. G. R. See p. 94, *supra*.

9. It was not yet known in Simla that Burnes had left K. ul.

would be lent to drill and officer such troops and also to establish a connection between the two branches of the expedition; and (2). His Highness may "take his own course without reference to us."

Primarily on the ground of its being more acceptable to the Sikhs "His Lordship on the whole is disposed to think that the plan which is second in order is that which will be found most expedient." But should the Maharaja "cheerfully give his approbation and concurrence to the first described course of proceeding" Macnaghten was authorized to act in reference to it. Overwhelming benefits, it was to be stressed, would accrue to Ranjit Singh by its acceptance—a friendly power would replace an enemy in Afghanistan; the fruits of his 1833 treaty would be guaranteed and the Government would mediate his customary claim upon Sind. In the prevailing circumstances it was claimed there was an identity of interest between the two powers. Should Ranjit Singh, therefore, approve of this convention the Governor General would be prepared to enter into a general defensive alliance with him against all enemies from the North-west. Auckland would then ratify the treaty "unless circumstances should intermediately have occurred to induce His Lordship to alter his views as to its expediency." This done, "a temporary occupation of Shikarpur would be directed as soon as preparations and the season permitted."¹⁰

At Macnaghten's first interview with Ranjit Singh on June 3, he attentively considered the Envoy's recital of the first plan and interposed spontaneously, without even wishing to hear the second, "that to act in concert with the British Government must be the

10. 122/2. Torrents to Macnaghten, May 15, 1838. P. G. R.

course best for his own advantage." When it was suggested that the British would become a party to the 1833 Treaty, the Maharaja declared that "this would be adding sugar to milk." To the plan of a joint movement by way of Kandhar and Peshawar he "yielded a most cheerful and ready assent." Macnaghten then opportunely dwelt upon the benefits that would thus accrue to him. "Though the Government held moderate aims—limited to opposing aggression, extending commerce, and cultivating the friendship of such allies as His Highness," the Envoy made it clear that in case events occurred in the north-west bearing a threat of aggression to their dominions the need might arise for a further though temporary use of British troops along the Indus.¹¹

So far there did not appear to be more than the normal difficulties of delay arising in the way of Ranjit Singh's formal assent. But subsequently his rather sudden break up of the camp at Adinanagar¹² and his departure for Lahore on June 4, was strongly reminiscent of 1809 tactics marking his disinclination to adhere to the proposed alliance. A number of questions had arisen that might have urged this action—the relinquishment of the Maharaja's claim to Jallalabad, because Macnaghten wished to include that place in Shah Shuja's future kingdom; the article about Shikarpur; and "that about a reception of a Resident at his court," besides a few other minor points.¹³

The Envoy thereupon employed a refinement of coercion pointing out that the way was after all open for Ranjit Singh to act independently of the British.¹⁴ As a result, agreement was reached on all but the Jallalabad

11. 122/19. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 3, 1838. P. G. R.

12. 122/20. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 4, 1838. P. G. R.

13. 122/19. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 3, 1838. P. G. R.

14. 122/24. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 8, 1838. P. G. R.

and Shikarpur questions,¹⁵ and Macnaghten had "strong hopes" of the Maharaja's accession to the terms offered.¹⁶ Auckland, however, intimated to the Envoy that except in the event of receiving "a definite communication" from him he would prefer to await information from either Persia or England "which may enable him, with more surety than at present, to direct his course."¹⁷ In a step of the contemplated magnitude his anxiety to cover responsibility with Home sanction was very natural.¹⁸

15. Fakir Aziz-ud-Din said in a picturesque language "that if one object is yielded another should be obtained—that is if S is taken away J should be granted (alluding to Shikarpur and Jallalabad)".—122/24. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 8, 1838. P. G. R.
16. 122/32. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 20, 1838. P. G. R.
17. Governor General to Secret Committee, August 13, 1838. No. 2. (Indian Papers, *ut supra*).
18. Colvin (John Russell Colvin, pp. 109-112) says: Macnaghten pressed for leave to tell Ranjit that "with or without the co-operation of the Maharaja the Government of India will set up Shah Shuja". Auckland, however, in "the obscure responsibility of the Indian Government in regard to Persian and European politics" desired, "at least to see my way more clearly than I do at the present.....before I take the plunge to which you would urge me". The Envoy was told that "to arrest the Persian advance by our own troops and by the support of Shah Shuja are measures not which we are disposed to carry out at all hazards, but which we may be compelled to", should unforeseen emergencies arise. But, when all cause for hesitation is removed "I shall be with you for promptitude of action, and perhaps for greater promptitude of action than you may be." (Auckland to Macnaghten, June 10).

All that is very illuminating. It indicates that the Governor General was induced to adopt this policy almost against his will, and illustrates with what difficulty he restrained his Secretary from committing the Government to measures that were later unhappily adopted. The thin end of the wedge was working a cleavage in the British action being limited to a non-active participation in the expedition, and for this Macnaghten was largely responsible. One is led to infer that any move towards direct military participation would find him at its head.

Settlement on both issues was soon reached, and Auckland received the "definite communication" that he had been waiting for. Shah Shuja's claims to Shikarpur and the territories of Sind generally were to be arbitrated for a sum to be fixed in the future, but certainly at not less than twenty lacs. Out of this Ranjit Singh was to receive fifteen lacs, which would altogether release the Sindhians from his claims upon them.¹⁹ Mackeson, who on July 22, was deputed to confer with the Maharaja on the Jallalabad question, told him that the possibility might occur of the Government being compelled "in self-defence to take our own measures to ward off approaching danger and use our own troops to restore Shah Shuja to his throne."²⁰ On this he immediately yielded his assent and himself suggested that an annual tribute of two lacs would adequately compensate him for the relinquishment of his claims to Jallalabad. Macnaghten, who did not consider the demand unreasonable, and who realized the urgent need of preserving the Sikh Ruler's friendship, determined to accept it, but he regarded its payment as tribute as a nice point which he proposed "to put on such a footing as to be consistent with the dignity of the Shah." It was, therefore, suggested that Ranjit might maintain at Peshawar a body of 5,000 Mohammedan troops* for Shuja's aid, and "the annual subsidy of two lacs might be taken in the light of exchange for such aid that might at any time be required."²¹ When the Maharaja was at length brought to agree to this article, he declared "that every point of difference between himself and the British Government was for ever removed, and that he would be prepared with confidence and cordiality to take the part which he had

19. Governor General to Secret Committee, August 13, 1838. No. 2. (Indian Papers, *ut supra*).

20. 122/33. Mackeson's Memorandum Enclosure. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 23, 1838. P. G. R.

*. Hindu and Sikhs were to be excluded to prevent the Afghans from declaring a religious war.

21. Governor General to Secret Committee, August 13, 1838. No. 2. (Indian Papers, *ut supra*).

all along been desirous of taking in concurrence and co-operation with the British Government."²² These terms upon which the Maharaja was now wholly agreed were embodied in four articles forming a supplement to the original treaty which Macnaghten submitted for the Governor General's approval and ratification. The Envoy then left Lahore (July 13) for Ludhiana to obtain the Shah's assent to the draft, arriving there two days later.

The Shah was assured that, saving Shikarpur and the territories on the right bank of the Indus reserved in the Treaty for Ranjit Singh, he might consolidate his dominions to their proper limits; that his sovereignty would be unfettered; that the Government would not permit him to be in distress for money, and that on his reinstatement he might retain British officers to discipline his forces. He was brought finally to agree to the payment of two lacs to Ranjit Singh on the conditions proposed.²³ Within two days, the Shah fell in with the terms negotiated at Lahore, and then turned his attention to measures calculated to realize practically his long-cherished hopes. He was anxious to commence operations promptly, and was painfully surprised at early winter being announced as the time appointed for the commencement of the expedition. Despite the British assurances with regard to the supply of money and officers to discipline his forces, he wished to rely mainly on his own resources and strength because it would enhance his estimation in the eyes of his future subjects.²⁴

22. 122/33. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 23, 1838. P. O. R.

23. Governor General to Secret Committee, August 13, 1838. No. 2. (Indian Papers, *ut supra*).

24. *Ibid.*

Thus was concluded the Tripartite Treaty on the basis of the stipulations negotiated on March 12, 1838, and the four supplementary articles discussed recently. It was ratified by the Governor General on July 25, 1838.²⁵ Ranjit Singh, the British Government and Shah Shuja, the three signatories, bound themselves to support one of them, the Shah, in his effort to regain the throne of Kabul. The Shah was to use his own levies numbering about 7,000, and the Maharaja was to advance 5,000 troops by way of Peshawar.²⁶ In extent of active participation the British Government was the "sleeping partner" in the venture. It had stipulated nothing more in the Treaty than money for the Shah, British officers for his army and agents for accompanying the expedition.

After the unfruitful return of Burnes, it was the most expedient course to adopt, and one which he himself admitted was "not what was best, but what was best under the circumstances which a series of blunders had produced."²⁷ Indeed, the recent extension of Russia's sphere of influence in the vicinity of Herat had created an imperative need for re-defining the British relations with Afghanistan. The three protective buffers

25. Aitchison, *Treaties Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. I, pp. 41—44.

Kanhaya Lal (*Ranjit-Nama*, pp. 507-508) gives the terms in Persian verse as follows :

شود فتح کابل به فوج گواں	مگر کرد شرط آید که چو آن زمان
بغارد گوی شاه فرخنده کیش	بملک پشاور سروکار خویش
شود به عرض شاه والد صفات	هم از ملتان و هم قریه جات
که بود اندر دم نه جائے عدول	نمودند حکم شهنشاه قبول

26. Governor General to Secret Committee, August 13, 1838. No. 2. (*Indian Papers, ut supra*).

27. Burnes to Macnaghten, June 2, 1838. (*Parl. Papers, 1859, ut supra*).

that had been erected in 1809 had been reduced to two, at first by the relapse of Afghanistan into its perennial tradition of internecine conflict, down at least to 1826, and later by the loss of the Persian breastworks to Russia in 1828. The new British problem in the thirties was of creating and maintaining, respectively, the twin buffers of Afghanistan and the Punjab. Behind the deceptive play of apparent forces this was the dominant issue. Its solution was determined finally in the project of placing Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul in place of Dost Mohd. As to the friendship of Ranjit Singh and the reliance on the Punjab, that came to be judged as the cornerstone or the pivot upon which was to rest the additional buffer of Afghanistan. The first being constant, the second must be reconciled to the first, not the first to the second.²⁸

While the Government had not committed itself to promises of any direct military help, hints had occasionally been thrown out during the negotiations at Lahore of the likelihood of its employing its own troops along the Indus, or even on the expedition itself, should events on the North-west take a more serious turn.²⁹ Wade early awakened to the dangers of the situation and the necessity for precautionary measures. In a brilliant dispatch he acquainted the Government with the dangers they were thus courting. Persia,

28. The basic problem, therefore, which faced the Government was to reconcile Dost Mohd. with the Maharaja—to make their alliance with it compatible with the relations which must exist between them as neighbours. The failure to accommodate their differences, without compromising the British friendship with Ranjit Singh, demanded the substitution in the Amir's place of one who would enable this all important friendship to be preserved. Clearly Shuja was such a chief.

29. See pp. 233-34, *supra*.

he wrote, was evidently prepared to risk a rupture with them than retrace her recent step, as she could ill-afford to evoke the hostility of her formidable European neighbour. She herself could never have gathered enough courage to ignore the threats of the British Government. In reality Russia goaded her into rejecting the British offer of mediation. While the Government, he argued, wholly trusting to the success of their diplomatic efforts had been neglecting military preparations, Persia was trying to defer the zero hour until her military strength had reached a pitch as would enable her to throw off the mask of friendship towards them. The Russian troops had been posted at Khiva from which position they could more easily advance to the help of the Persian troops engaged in the siege of Herat. It would, however, be many weeks before the British troops could reach Herat from the banks of the Indus. If Shah Shuja were to proceed via Shikarpur an attempt might be made by the Persians to force the issue and storm Herat. From that place they could easily attack and capture Kandhar. If instead of the feeble Sardars, the Persians were to block the way to Kabul, the Shah would have to encounter a much more serious opposition. Again, the Russian troops moving to help Dost Mohd. against the Sikhs could easily reach the Khyber valley. There they could inflict a defeat on the Sikhs. In that case the Government would be placed in an unenviable position. On the one hand, they had declared to protect the Afghans against the foreigners, and, on the other hand, they might be called upon, by the desire to protect their own interests, to support the Sikhs in maintaining their possessions. This would render the plea of disinterestedness as mere farce and would make the Government very unpopular among the Afghans. With the whole Afghan nation turned hostile to him, the restoration of the Shah would be difficult to achieve. Wade, therefore, urged that the Government should hold in reserve a force of 15,000 men along the Indus ready "for every contingency". He thought that it should even be

prepared to resist directly by its own means the advance of the Persians aided by the Russians, as it also might find it necessary to directly support the cause of Shah Shuja.³⁰ Such irrefutable arguments could not fail to impress the Governor General who made up his mind to send a strong British auxiliary force with the Shah in addition to the liberal advances in money which were made to enable him to pay his disciplined troops.³¹

On August 13, 1838, the Home Government was informed that the Governor General had determined "to give the direct and powerful assistance of the British Government to the enterprise of Shah Shuja, in a degree which was not in the first instance contemplated by me, from a conviction, confirmed in a most decided manner by every opinion of authority on the subject, that the measure could not be trusted mainly to the support of the Sikh Ruler and his army, without imminent hazard of failure, and of serious detriment to the reputation of the British name among the Afghan people."³² A total of 27,000 men was employed, of whom 21,500 were actually brought into action beyond the Indus under Sir John Keane.³³ Such was the "direct and powerful assistance" which the British Government was to render Shah Shuja in excess of both its intentions and obligations. Auckland had decided to "go the whole hog."

As the territories of the Amirs of Sind lay in between the British frontiers and Afghanistan, Pottinger was sent to them to obtain their concurrence to the enterprise.³⁴ But, as usual,

30. 146/3. Wade to Macnaghten. July 8, 1838. P. G. R.

31. 121/163. Macnaghten to Wade, September 13, 1838. P. G. R.

32. Governor General to Secret Committee, August 13, 1838. No. 2
(Indian Papers *ut supra*).

33. *Ibid.*

34. 146/21, Wade to Macnaghten, August 17, 1838. P. G. R.

the Amirs proved contumacious, and began to evade the real issue. The Government became convinced of the unfriendly disposition entertained towards them by the principal Amir. At a critical juncture like the present one no opposition could be brooked. It seemed ridiculous that a petty chief whose very existence depended on the continuation of British favour should hinder the execution of its plan. Pottinger was, therefore, instructed to call the Bombay Force if he did not show a more conciliatory attitude. In that case he was to be excluded from all share in the government of Sind, and some other member of the Talpur family, more cordially disposed towards the British, was to be elevated to the dignity of the principal Amir.³⁵

In reality it was not necessary to go to such extremes. Whatever feelings the Amirs might have entertained towards the British, they were not prepared to offer any opposition to them. They were not capable of opposing the Shah either, particularly with the might of the Empire at his back. No wonder then that the Amirs gave way³⁶ literally and figuratively. They had, moreover, to acquiesce in the occupation of Shikarpur, and in the temporary suspension of that clause in their Treaty of 1832 which had closed the Indus to the passage of war materials.³⁷ A new treaty was concluded with the Amirs which virtually brought them into subordinate alliance with the Paramount Power.³⁸

Apprehending that any distortion of facts, fabricated deliberately to prejudice Shah Shuja's cause, might create an unfavourable opinion among the Afghan public, it was found expedient

35. 121/125. Macnaghten to Wade, October 4, 1838 P. G. R.

36. 146/98. Wade to Macnaghten, November 4 1838. P. G. R.

37. Governor General to Secret Committee, March 13, 1839. (Parl. Papers, 1859, *et supra*, pp. 303-314). See pp. 103 and 139, *supra*.

38. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 334-36.

to issue a declaration in his name which was to contain a statement of the aims and objects of the allies. To convince the Afghans about the justice of the Shah's cause, the copies of this declaration were circulated in Afghanistan through some secret agency. It declared that the Shah was going to regain his rightful heritage which for some years had been under "a slave of the Durrani Empire". It stated that the Persians were trying to destroy a "scion of the Durrani Dynasty," and that Dost Mohd. had entered into a treaty with them. Dost was described as a ruler, cruel and oppressive. It asserted that the Shah was actuated by his love for his co-religionists whom he wished to protect from the heretics. It then referred to the promises made by Elphinstone to the Shah in 1809 to help him against the Persians. These promises the British Government were then fulfilling. "We have discovered," the declaration pointed out, "that the wish and desire of the English is to see everyone established in his rights and tyranny and injustice banished from the earth. When the desired act is established, the British Government will not in any way interfere with the Afghans."³⁹

The Governor General himself issued from Simla a Manifesto of the causes which had mainly influenced the Government to espouse Shah Shuja's cause. The Government, it ran, were interested in extending the benefits of the Indus navigation scheme to the Afghan traders. They had sent Burnes to the *de facto* Chief of Kabul to invite his co-operation in that matter. As Dost had in the meanwhile attacked the Sikh forces and as Ranjit Singh was sure to avenge this unprovoked aggression, Burnes was invested with diplomatic power. The Sikh-Afghan disputes would have led to ceaseless warfare in the very regions where, for commercial reasons, the Government wanted peace. To avert this calamity their mediation had been offered. But by then the Government came to know of the Persian intrigues, having for their purpose the extension of the her influence to the very banks of the Indus. The Government could not possibly accept the unreasonable pretensions of Dost as they considered them to be in-

39. 121/104. Macnaghten to Wade, September 11 1838, P. G. R.

consistent with their policy of playing a fair game with Ranjit Singh. The Amir undisguisedly gave encouragement to the Persian designs, and even threatened to call in foreign aid against the Sikhs. Hence Burnes was recalled. It became evident to the Governor General that as long as Dost occupied the throne of Kabul, tranquillity could not be established on the Indian frontiers, which logically meant the defeat of the commercial policy of the Government. On the other hand, the Persians had been besieging Herat and the besieged were bravely defending their city. To arrest the rapid progress of the Persian arms it had been decided to send assistance to the Chief of Herat. As the disunited Barakzais could not co-operate with the Government for the defence of India, the attention of the Governor General had been drawn to Shah Shuja, who had willingly promised to offer a united resistance to external enemies when he was reinstated. The Manifesto laid down: "This (campaign) will promote commerce, gain us our due dignity in Central Asia, restore tranquillity on the most important frontier of India and raise a lasting barrier against hostile intrigue and encroachment."⁴⁰

21,500 men and a sum of money of corresponding magnitude, in Winston Churchill's phrase, were now being offered as "hostages to fortune". But the British Government had not irretrievably burnt the bridges they had so far crossed, and indeed events occurred that afforded them an excellent opportunity for retracting their steps and preventing the despatch of the expedition.

The Afghan policy of the British Government had been occasioned by the western menace and was the inevitable penumbra of the shadow that had fallen across the North-western frontier. In August, 1838, when it appeared that the influence of Persia and Russia had pervaded all Afghanistan except Herat, it was incontestably true, as

40. 121/123. Macnaghten to Wade, October 1, 1838. P. G. R.

The Manifesto is reproduced in full in Appendix XIII.

McNeill said, that no measures could be more unequivocally measures of self-defence than those which the Government were called upon to adopt.⁴¹ From this fact alone did they derive their sanction, and the submergence of such influence after September 9, was to deny them further *raison d'être*.

To induce the Persian Ruler to raise the siege of Herat, Wade had on March 7, suggested a naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf.⁴² Such advice did not pass unheeded, and on June 19, an expedition, bitterly described by the Shah as 387 "rotten Hindus," landed at Karrach (thirty miles north-west of Bushire), on the shores of the Gulf. The Shah thereupon agreed to make amends and apologize for the ill-treatment suffered by McNeill's couriers at his hands, and in consequence of the demands presented by the British on August 17, he raised the siege on September 9, and marched back towards Tehran.⁴³ The Russian menace subsided correspondingly, and a golden opportunity was offered to the authors of the Tripartite scheme to abandon it altogether, or withhold the expedition, or at least to review the whole situation. Indeed, before his ratification of the then projected treaty the Governor General had clearly indicated the possibility of events occurring that would induce him to alter his views as to its expediency.⁴⁴ This reservation could have been pleaded at this stage for revising the alliance without disgrace or injury to

41. McNeill to Palmerston, August 2, 1838, Letter No. 93. (Indian Papers, 1839, Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan).

42. Secret and Separate Consultation, August 2, 1838. (Captain Wade's letters to the Government of India in the Secret and Separate Department, January to July, 1838).

43. Stoddart to Macnaghten, September 10, 1838. Quoted in Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*. Vol. 1, p. 393.

44. 122/2. Torrens to Macnaghten, May 15, 1838, P. G. R. See p. 232, *supra*.

British good faith, for caution would have appealed to so prudent a ruler as Ranjit Singh and a pacification of Shuja could have been suitably devised. The way had been unexpectedly cleared for the Government to realize the end of its policy by means other than war. The Home Despatch of October 24, suggested a renewed attempt to detach the Amir from his western allies,⁴⁵ and the door to reconciliation had not yet been completely barred.

Disregarding the opportunity for such politic re-consideration, however, the Governor General on November 8, declared his intention "to prosecute with vigour the measures which have been announced, with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile power in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier."⁴⁶ The seal was thus unequivocally affixed to a plan that was to develop into the First Afghan War. This decision to persist indicates that the Government had confused the ends of its policy and gives the *promenade militaire* more the appearance of a grand enterprise vaguely to restore Shah Shuja than to effectively counter the Russian menace.

Since February, 1837, when Nesselrode had proved to the Earl of Durham that Simonich, the Russian Minister in Persia, had been instructed to dissuade the Shah from waging war against Herat, the activities of Simonich had in effect contradicted the Russian Chancellor's

45. Secret Committee to Governor General, October 24, 1838, para 19, (Colvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-27).

46. Orders by the Rt. Hon'ble the Governor General of India, Secret Department, November 8, 1838. (Reproduced in full in Kaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 383-84).

assurances.⁴⁷ His recall had been obtained under pressure,⁴⁸ but the despatch of his successor, Count Duhamel, had been delayed for a year.⁴⁹ Eventually in October, 1838, Palmerston was compelled to question the Russian Government whether its intentions were to be deduced from the declarations of Nesselrode and Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Simonich and Vickovich. It was thereupon declared that Vickovich's mission had been occasioned by the arrival in St. Petersburg in 1837 of an agent from Dost Mohd to from commercial relations with Russia,⁵⁰ and that for the future commercial rather than political interests would govern relations with Afghanistan. It was at the same time denied that in Russia's Afghan policy there existed any design hostile to the British Government or to its Indian possessions.⁵¹ With this response Palmerston declared himself to be "entirely satisfied" and hoped for a renewal of that understanding which since 1824 had been observed by the two Governments.⁵²

The outcome of these negotiations could not have been intimated to the Governor General in time to modify his plans and has, therefore, a purely academic interest. But since in February, 1838, he had suggested the advisability of "obtaining a pledge from St. Petersburg that the

4 Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 26, 1838. Letter No. 109. (Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*).

48. Palmerston to McNeill, June 10, 1837. Quoted in *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. II, p. 204.

49. Palmerston to Clanricarde, October 26, 1838. Letter No. 109. (Indian Papers, 1839, *ut supra*).

50. *Ibid.*


51. *Ibid.*

52. Palmerston to Fozzo di Borgo, December 20, 1838. Letter No. 111. (*Idem*).

proceedings of Simonich and Vickovich should not be persisted in,'⁵³ it would have been prudent to await news of the response to such representations. Likewise, before the Karrack expedition had been allowed to work the expected result the Government should not have committed itself to the Tripartite Treaty. Both these circumstances were in themselves sufficient for postponing for the present the incurring of binding obligations.



53. Governor General to Secret Committee, February 8, 1838. (Parl. Pap 1859, *ut supra*, pp. 273-80).



CHAPTER XIII

THE FORCING OF THE KHYBER PASS

An invasion of Afghanistan having been determined, it remained to work out a plan of operations. It appears that in this matter also, Wade played an important part. It was on his advice that Shah Shuja proceeded to Kandhar with the main army via Shikarpur. In Wade's own words: "The advantages of the Shah proceeding by Shikarpur are that he would pass to his country through Mohammadan states, which would not only facilitate the organisation of his troops but form a rendezvous for his friends and partisans, both near and remote, where they might assemble without danger of collision with the Sikhs—a power to whom they are opposed by a violent sense of religious animosity and the disgrace of continual defeats...Shah Shuja's actual presence in Sind or its frontiers, would also reconcile the Amirs to the contribution which has to be demanded from them.....By the line of Shikarpur he would also have the great advantage of entering Afghanistan in the heart of the Durrani territory among the tribes that are most hostile to the Persians and friendly to himself, where he would be instantly acknowledged as their rightful sovereign and be supported by an old adherent of his family in the Chief of the Birohees, who possesses the province of Kelat. It cannot be denied that the presence of the ex-King in the vicinity of Kandhar would also have an important effect at the present crisis in the affairs of Afghanistan, either in giving confidence to the defenders of Herat, or in checking the advance of the Persians, should that place fall, not to mention the strong sensation which would be excited in his favour among the Sunis from his arrival in the first instance, when they were most exposed to the threat of a Shia invasion. With reference also to the observance of his treaty with the Sikhs, there can be no doubt that the position of Kandhar would be more eligible for the future seat of his government than any other place.....In strength the city of Kandhar is only inferior

to Herat.....Without support from Dost Mohd. Khan who would be held in check by the Sikhs the Barakzai chiefs of that place, finding themselves incapable of offering a protracted resistance to the ex-King, would act, as they showed a disposition to do on the occasion of his last expedition. They would sue for terms with the Shah, when they find that he was accompanied by British officers, (together with Sultan Mohamad Khan,) who were ready to assure them of protection and an honourable provision from their former sovereign, if they declared their allegiance to him. When once in possession of Kandhar, there would be no difficulty in deposing Dost Mohd. or in making him feel the necessity of acknowledging his submission to Shah Shuja.....In selecting the route of Kandhar for the Shah's attempt the British Government secures to itself also the important advantage of being able, if necessary, to afford direct aid to the Shah without reference to the Sikh territory, in which we cannot command the same freedom of action that we have the power of exerting in Sind, where, in case of a reverse, the Shah may find a temporary asylum among a people professing the same religion."¹

At the same time a converging attack was to be made by the Mohammadan force to be provided by Ranjit Singh² through the Punjab and the Khyber Pass. Wade, who was promoted to the rank of Major on June 28, was put in charge of this subsidiary movement, and on September 29, was given the local rank of Lt. Col. "while serving beyond the Indus."³ This

1. 145/50. Wade to Macnaghten, June 20, 1833. P. G. R.

2. By the Tripartite Treaty the Maharaja was to provide a contingent of 5,000 Mohammadan troops. (See p. 235, *supra*).

3. Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XX, s.v. Wade, p. 413. Also

121/80. Torrens to Wade, December 23, 1833. P. G. R.

move gained additional importance from the presence of Taimur Mirza, the eldest son of Shah Shuja, to whom the British advanced a sum of Rs. 10,000 for raising levies.⁴

While the main army was being mobilized, Wade was told to arrange a rallying point for the adherents of the Shah's cause in the Khyber valley. When asked, the Shah had said that the Khyberees were his slaves and would be prepared to sacrifice their lives for him. But the actual position turned out to be quite different with the result that Wade had to face the double task of organizing an army and negotiating with the Khyberees. He was assisted by a small but capable force of eleven officers of whom the most distinguished were Dr. P. B. Lord, Lt. F. Mackeson and Lt. J. D. Cunningham,⁵ the historian of the Sikhs.

Meanwhile, Dost Mohd, had also sent his son, Mohd Akbar Khan, to Jallalabad for winning over the Khyberees, and had besides despatched a force to the Kandooz frontier for frightening its Chief. Akbar Khan invited the Khyber chiefs to meet him in a *Jirga* at Jallalabad. Wade met this situation promptly through the posting of a secret British agent to this *jirga*.⁶ It met actually, but bore no substantial results for Akbar.

4. 121/172. Macnaghten to Cunningham, November 26, 1838. P. G. R.

5. 121/83. Macnaghten to Wade, August 20, 1838. P. G. R.;

110/14. Lord to Wade, September 12, 1838. P. G. R.;

110/90. Mackeson to Wade, September 24, 1838, P. G. R. and

146/37. Wade to Macnaghten, September 5, 1838, P. G. R.

Lord was deputed to the frontier to gain adherents for the Shah from amongst the Khyberees and Mackeson from amongst the Afridis of the Derajat and Peshawar.

6. 110/23. Lord to Wade, November 14, 1838. P. G. R.

At the end of December, 1838, the Supreme Government appointed Sir John Keane to command the Army of the Indus *vice* Sir Henry Fane who had resigned. Maonaghten was appointed as Envoy and Minister at the Court of the Shah. Wade was directed to proceed to Peshawar with Taimur Mirza. He was to restrain the forces of Ranjit Singh from offensive action until advices would reach him from the Shah's camp indicating the expediency of taking such a step.⁷

Dost Mohd. was called upon to surrender, but he refused.⁸ His *Vazirs* still hoped that the British would not abandon their master for Shah Shuja, arguing that Burnes had left of his own accord.⁹ But this was a vain hope, as their armies were marching from all directions.

Wade, along with Taimur and his levies, reached Lahore in the beginning of January, 1839. Here the Shahzada received communications from several Khyber chiefs affirming professions of loyalty. The party left Lahore for Peshawar about the middle of the month.¹⁰

Lord had been all this time busy with the Khyberes. He had made such progress by January that he wrote to Wade that if he liked he could summon them to meet the Shahzada. Wade, however, did not like the idea,¹¹ as they wanted large sums as price of their alliance. Lord favoured acceding to their demand, but Wade thought that the time was not yet ripe for spending money and advised postponement.¹²

7. 121/180. Torrens to Wade, December 29, 1838. P. G. R.

8. 147/11. Wade to Torrens, January 1, 1839. P. G. R.

9. 104/151. Clerk to Maddock, September 14, 1838; also

123/111. Maddock to Clerk, October 14, 1838. P. G. R.

10. 126/17. Maddock to Wade, January 29, 1839. P. G. R.

11. 147/185. Wade to Maddock, December 18, 1839. P. G. R.

12. 47/196. Wade to Maddock, December 31, 1839. P. G. R.

Then arrived intelligence about the retreat of the Russians from Central Asia and the desire of the Afghans for a British alliance. The people of Afghanistan were rumoured to be preparing to rebel against Dost as soon as the Shah would reach Shikarpur and the Shahzada reach Peshawar.¹³ Kabul received exaggerated reports of the strength of the armies advancing on it. Dost grew so nervous as to send for his sons from different directions to gain allies. The Kandhar brothers fled from their place. The people seemed to be favouring Shah Shuja. The only course left to the Amir seemed to be to come to terms with the Sikhs like his Peshawar brethren, or flee from his capital.¹⁴

The nearer to Peshawar Wade arrived the more Afghans joined the Shahzada.¹⁵ Lord went on pressing him so to hasten his march as to reach Kabul before the Shah and to allow him to spend some money.¹⁶ To the second demand, Wade now readily agreed, but to the first he showed hesitation, for he thought that such a step would only compromise the Shahzada's dignity and the interests of his father as well as of the Government. It would deprive him, at the same time, of the power of assuming that decisive tone which enabled him to communicate with every party.¹⁷

It appears that the Khyberees were alarmed at a wrong report that the Pass would be forced and Ali Masjid garrisoned

13. 148/23. Wade to Maddock, January 11, 1839. P. G. R.

14. 147/23. Wade to Torrens, January 23, 1839. P. G. R.

Encl. Abstract of intelligence sent from Kabul by Qazi Ghulam Mustafa.

15. 147/33. Wade to Torrens, February 19, 1839. P. G. R.

16. 111/5. Lord to Wade, February 16, 1839. P. G. R.

17. 147/43. Wade to Maddock, March 8, 1839, P. G. R.

by the Sikhs¹⁸. To remove this impression an explanatory letter was written to Abdul Rahman Khan, the head of the Kukiknel tribe which occupied the Pass near its entrance between Jamrud and Ali Masjid. He was assured that agreeably to the Tripartite Treaty, the Sikhs could not interfere in any affairs beyond their boundary, that, if surrendered, Ali Masjid would only be garrisoned by Mohammadans from the Shahzada's force and that if the Sikhs, contrary to the Treaty, ever attempted to enter Khyber, it would be resented by the British as well as by the Shah. In case of Abdur Rahman himself joining the Shahzada, he was assured of the settlement on him and on his tribe of the allowances which they enjoyed from Dost Mohd., besides other royal favours with which he would be rewarded. On the other hand, if he held out, he was threatened with every misery which the invasion of a formidable army could inflict.¹⁹ Letters were also sent to other Khyber chiefs—Saadat Khan Mohmand, and Mir Alam Khan of Bajaur, warning them of the consequences which would attend a dereliction of their duty to the Prince when their services were actually required.²⁰ Alam Khan at once submitted and his offers for service were accepted.²¹ Abdul Rahman hesitated for a time, but seeing the futility of Dost Mohd's cause he, too, at last declared for the Shah.²²

The troops which Dost Mohd. had sent to Kandooz succeeded in obtaining the submission of its Chief.²³ The Amir who was mustering all his forces asked his son who was command their

18. 147/3. Wade to Torrens, January 3, 1839. P. G. R.

19. Shahamat Ali, *The Sikh and Afghans*, pp. 212-13.

20. 147/35. Wade to Maddock, February 25, 1839. P. G. R.

21. 147/36. Wade to Maddock, March 1, 1839. P. G. R.

22. 147/60. Wade to Maddock, April 3, 1839. P. G. R.

23. 147/37. Wade to Maddock, March 1, 1839. P. G. R.

to hasten back to Kabul.²⁴ But in a very short time the Kandooz Chief again rose against the Amir and allied himself with the Shah.²⁵

Ranjit Singh had as yet done nothing to show his willingness to aid the expedition. Wade wrote to him to issue orders to his officers to co-operate with him in his tasks, but the Maharaja remained quiet.²⁶ Seeing such an attitude of their superior the Barakzais of Peshawar also began to correspond with the Shah's enemies and seized the property of those who joined the Shahzada. Wade brought this fact also to the notice of the Sikh Ruler, but for the time being he paid no heed to it.²⁷

Undaunted Wade marched on. As he neared the Afghan frontier he issued a proclamation to the people, similar to the letters he had sent to Abdul Rahman Kukikhel and others, calling upon them to rally round the Shahzada and promising each one a "pecuniary present" from himself besides "being distinguished by the Royal bounty."²⁸ The time had come when money could be safely disbursed to them.

Wade and Shahzada reached Peshawar on March 15,²⁹ and were hospitably received by General Avitabile, the Governor. But the Political Agent was mortified to find that there was no reply from the Maharaja.

24. 147/37. Wade to Maddock, March 1, 1839. P. G. R.

25. 125/33. Maddock to Wade, April 4, 1839. P. G. R.

26. 147/38. Wade to Maddock, March 2, 1839. P. G. R.

27. 147/33. Wade to Torrens, February 19, 1839. P. G. R.

28. 147/40. Wade to Maddock, March 5, 1839. P. G. R. (The proclamation is reproduced in Appendix XIV.)

29. 147/51. Wade to Maddock, March 15, 1839. P. G. R.

to any one of his communications.³⁰ He felt apprehensive that he might be thinking of repudiating the Treaty. He himself could not go back to Amritsar where His Highness then was, and he, therefore, suggested to the Governor General to depute an officer thither to ensure his abiding by the provisions of the Treaty. On March 21, Wade established a well-ordered camp as "an irregular, ill-disciplined horde of people" made no deep impression on any body.³¹

Dost Mohd. now sent his son, Akbar Khan, to confront the Shahzada in the Pass. He encamped at Dakka.³² Wade had, therefore, to be extremely careful, for any check to the progress of the march might change the entire course of the expedition.³⁴ He proved equal to his task which was of considerable difficulty. On March 29, he held a Darbar at Peshawar to "fire the cupidity of the Afghans." To win over the Afridis he displayed the greatest splendour on the occasion. The chiefs were presented to the Shahzada and given *Khillats* according to their rank and means.³⁵

In the third week of March, the first instalment of two lacs received from the Sind Amirs was placed at Ranjit Singh's

30. 123/21. Maddock to Clerk, March, 15, 1839.

Avitabile informed Wade that he had received no instructions whatever to help him except giving him a *ziyarat*.

31. 147/51. Wade to Maddock, March 15, 1839. P. G. R.

Accordingly Clerk was sent on a mission to Lahore to urge Ranjit Singh to implement the Tripartite Treaty—123/30. Maddock to Clerk, April 8, 1839. P. G. R.

32. 147/58. Wade to Maddock, March 21, 1839. P. G. R.

33. 147/47. Wade to Maddock, March 13, 1839, P. G. R.

34. 125/25. Maddock to Wade, March 14, 1839. P. G. R.

35. Mohan Lal, *Life of Amir Dost Mohd. Khan*, Vol. 11. pp. 252-53, and references there cited.

disposal and produced a favourable effect on him.³⁶ He ordered the release of the families and *jagirs* confiscated by the Peshawar Barakzais,³⁷ and made Sultan Mohd. reiterate his allegiance to him.³⁸ He ordered a Sikh force under Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh to proceed to Attock. But he had done nothing so far to assemble or provide the stipulated 5,000 Muslim troops. Wade, therefore, considered it advisable to ask the Kanwar not to come beyond Attock.³⁹

It was on the morning of April 24, that Kandhar fell to Shah Shuja, the Sardars of that place fleeing precipitately.⁴⁰

Wade had been at Peshawar now for more than a month. To all superficial appearance he had been quite inactive. But, in reality, he had been busily engaged in conveying intelligence received through various sources to the Government, in successfully reconnoitring Ali Masjid—the fortress which commanded the Pass—and in completing his plans of attacking that place.⁴¹

Wade feared Ranjit Singh had again resorted to his old tactics of delaying compliance with his request hoping that he would gain more by their repetition. But he believed in following a policy of pertinacity to obtain his purpose. He continued to urge upon Ranjit that a further

36. 125/27. Maddock to Wade, March 25, 1839. P. G. R.

37. 147/58 Wade to Maddock, March 26, 1839. P. G. R.

38. 147/61. Wade to Maddock, April 4, 1839. P. G. R.

Sultan Mohd thus undertook to remain neutral in the contest. His neutrality proved of great advantage to the Government.

The pledge of allegiance to Ranjit Singh taken by Sultan Mohd. on remonstrances being offered by Wade is reproduced in Appendix XV.

39. 147/67. Wade to Maddock, April 19, 1839. P. G. R.

40. 111/17. Lord to Wade, April 26, 1839. P. G. R.

41. 147/83. Wade to Maddock, April 27, 1839. P. G. R.

delay in the execution of any part of his engagement might risk the advantages to be mutually derived from the alliance. As a result of Clerk's mission and Wade's repeated remonstrances the Maharaja issued orders to his officers to provide the stipulated number of Muslim troops.⁴² The Sikh force at Attock also advanced to Peshawar. This auxiliary force was now at Wade's disposal.⁴³

Leaving Peshawar on May 8, Wade encamped at Takhel, four miles away on the Khyber road, and on May 12, Mackeson also joined him.⁴⁴ Wade had with him now the whole of the force which was to accompany him, but he found that it formed a ' motley assemblage of Sikhs, Afghans and Hindus ' on the fidelity of a considerable part of which it was difficult to rely. Though individually the best fighting material these troops were the least dependable in point of discipline.⁴⁵ Moreover, Wade and Ranjit's officers did not pull on well, and then men under the latter's command would not listen to the former's instructions⁴⁶.

42. 104/86. Clerk to Maddock, May 19, 1839. P. G. R.

Also 147/99. Wade to Maddock, May 7, 1839. P. G. R.

43. 147/97. Wade to Maddock, May 19, 1839. P. G. R.

44. 107/94. Mackeson to Wade, May 14, 1839. P. G. R.

45. Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, Vol II, p. 5.

Details of forces at Wade's disposal :

	<i>Guns.</i>	<i>Artillery- men.</i>	<i>Cavalry.</i>	<i>Infantry</i>	<i>Pioneers.</i>
Shahzada Taimur's levies (4, 740)	4	40	1,000	3,500	200
Sikh contingent (6, 146)	12	100	1,067	4,929	50
	16	140	2,067	8,429	250

Total

16 guns and 10,886 men

(Hough, *A Narrative of the March and Operations of the Army of the Indus*, p. xxxiii).

46. *Akbarat-i-Sikhan*, Vol. 1, Chet 20, 1896. B. E.: " Captain Sahib asked the troops of the Ahluwalie Chief to camp near him. They replied that they were the employees of Dihal Singh, son of Fateh Singh, and wherever he would ask them they would stay."

Further, insubordination prevailed among the *Najib* or Muslim soldiers of the Sikh contingent. Ventura refused to punish them, explaining that "the regulations of the English were different from those of the Sikhs."⁴⁷ Consequently Wade had to write to the Maharaja even for small things.⁴⁸

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Wade was anxious to make a move, but as he had not yet received any intelligence from Kandhar he had to wait.⁴⁹ Hence he set about disciplining his forces. He also wanted to increase the Shahzada's levies, but was not allowed to do so as the expedition was already proving 'too expensive for its consequences.'⁵⁰ He appointed Lt. Ferris as the Quarter Master to the whole camp and Capt. Farmer as the General Commander of the Shahzada's levies.⁵¹

Akbar Khan, at the other end of the Pass, was also busy making his preparations for the ensuing campaign and gaining allies.⁵² He too had been advised to advance on Ali Masjid by his father before he himself proceeded to join his other son, Mohd. Afzal Khan, at Ghazni, but Akbar Khan for some reason made no move.⁵³

47. *Akhbarat-i-Sikhan*, Vol. I, Chet 26, 1896. B. E.

48. *Idem*, Baisakh 5, 1896. B. E.

49. 125/43. Maddock to Wade, May 16, 1839. P. G. R.

50. 147/99. Wade to Maddock, May 22, 1839. P. G. R. And
125/51. Maddock to Wade, June 3, 1839. P. G. R.

51. 147/98. Wade to Maddock, May 20, 1839. P. G. R.

52. 147/99. Wade to Maddock, May 22, 1839. P. G. R. Also
147/101. Wade to Maddock, May 29, 1839. P. G. R.

53. 147/103. Wade to Maddock, May 30, 1839. P. G. R.

At this time Wade received a report that the Persians were again mustering forces for attacking Herat. The Government were morally bound to assist Kamran. Wade apprehended that as the British army with the Shah would have to send a large reinforcement to Herat it would undermine its strength which was barely sufficient for existing needs. Hence he requested the Government to rush a brigade through the Punjab to reinforce him. He pleaded that he should be allowed to deviate from the original plan of marching on Kabul when Dost was weakened by a defeat at the hands of the Shah,⁵⁴ arguing that due to the Persian move the Shah would take a long time to march on Kabul. Besides, Ranjit Singh being in a precarious condition, his death would inevitably throw the Punjab into chaos. In that case there was every likelihood that all the terms of the Treaty would be repudiated and the Sikh forces might leave their allies in the lurch. In these circumstances, Wade's proposal was that the previous plan of marching upon Kabul only after the receipt of instructions from Kandhar should be abandoned and that he should be permitted to strike a decisive blow at Kabul before Dost could receive help from the Persians. This would have the double advantage of preventing the Persians affording help to the Afghans in time, and of making use of the Sikh forces before they deserted. His proposal, however, was turned down by the Government which had not received any report regarding the projected Persian attack on Herat. He was instructed to be cautious, particularly in his dealing with the Sikh forces. On June 27, Maharaja Ranjit Singh died,⁵⁵ and Wade realizing the full gravity of the situation kept a firm control over the army.

Wade was advised to inform the Muslim troops that the Government would be responsible for their pay provided they remained faithful,⁵⁶ and not to show any signs of his having relinquished the

54. 147/97. Wade to Government, May 19, 1839. P. G. R.

55. 147/116. Wade to Maddock, July 2, 1839. P. G. R. Also 104/110. Clerk to Government, July 2, 1839. P. G. R.

56. 125/57. Maddock to Wade, July 1, 1839. P. G. R.

main aim of his mission in any case, even if everybody deserted him.⁵⁷ But he was not the man to let people desert him. He kept them loyal by his tact and firmness. He showed no sign of wavering even on hearing the alarming news that Raja Gulab Singh, with the connivance of Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh, was in correspondence with the Khyberes to gain allies for the Sikh rather than the Shah's cause.⁵⁸ He addressed strong remonstrances to the Kanwar and the Raja even at the risk of losing their sympathy.

Undaunted, Wade reached Jamrud on July 20, when he was informed of the movement of the Army of the Indus from Kandhar. The hard work that the officers had to put in all this while had caused many of them including Wade himself to fall sick.⁵⁹ Besides, though some of the Afghan chiefs espoused the cause of the Shahzada, yet there were still many who would not pay homage to him and intended to resist. But still the indefatigable Political Agent started making preparations to force his way through the Pass. Dost Mohd had not been sitting idle either. Being fully alive to the danger to his capital in case the Khyber chiefs chose to identify their interests with those of Timur, he had strengthened the garrison at Ali Masjid with the Afridis.⁶⁰ His intention was to build an outer line of defence rather than to give battle when the enemy reached Kabul, for the Khyber Pass being a series of defiles overhung by lofty, rocky hills, an opposing army could be offered a most formidable obstruction to its advance.⁶¹

57. 125/58. Maddock to Wade, July 2, 1839. P. G. R.

58. 111/53. Mackeson to Wade, July 11, 1839. P. G. R.

59. Shahamat Ali, *op. cit.*, pp 370-71.

60. 147/85. Wade to Government, May 1, 1839. P. G. R.

61. For a contemporary *aperçu* of the Khyber Pass and of the tribes inhabiting it see Appendix XVI.

On July 22, the expeditionary force marched to enter the Pass. Wade, Mackeson, Cunningham and others ascended the heights from different positions. Akbar Khan, contrary to his father's advice, did not enter the Pass, being afraid that if routed by the opponents he would not be able to escape but would be captured and delivered to Wade. On the 23rd he (Akbar) broke his camp at Dakka, being summoned by his father, from whom Ghazni had been wrested, to join him.⁶² The brave Afridis seemed determined to oppose the invaders till the last, but so closely did Wade invest the defiles, so implacable an attitude did he assume, and so successful was the play of his guns that on the night of the 26th the Afghan garrison evacuated the fortress of Ali Masjid, which he occupied the following morning in the name of the Shah.⁶³ This fortress was considered impregnable by the Afghans, so that its reduction produced a strong effect on the minds of the Khyberees who looked upon it as the key to the occupation of their country.⁶⁴

This strategic manoeuvre was much appreciated by the Governor General, who in his report to the Directors, wrote: "I have deemed this, the most expedient occasion, for taking some direct notice

62. 111/24. Macnaghten to Wade, July 23, 1839. P. G. R.

63. Keyes, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 6-7. Also 147/124. Wade to Maddock, July 27, 1839. P. G. R. And 147/125. Wade to Maddock, July 29, 1839. P. G. R.

The casualties in Wade's contingent in the operations for the reduction of Ali Masjid on July 24, 25 and 26 amounted to :

Men.	{	Killed	22
		Wounded	130
Horses,	{	Killed	4
		Wounded	14

(147/125. Wade to Maddock, July 29, 1839. P. G. R.)

For details of the military operations of Wade see Barr, *Journal of a March from Delhi to Cabul with the Mission of Sir C. M. Wade*, pp. 322 *seq.*

64. 147/125. Wade to Maddock, July 29, 1839. P. G. R.

of the military operations of Lt. Col. Wade, who having been deputed to the Khyber Pass, succeeded on the 26th of July, in taking the fortress of Ali Masjid, and in opening that important passage, with the miscellaneous troops at his disposal in a manner to afford me much satisfaction."⁶⁵ Auckland further observed: "The best acknowledgment of the Government is due to Lt. Col. Wade, who was employed on the Peshawar frontier.....opened the Khyber Pass, and overthrow the authority of the enemy in that quarter at the moment when advance of the forces of Shahzada Taimur could most conduce to the success of the general operations."⁶⁶ The Directors also praised Wade's achievement.⁶⁷

After the capture of Ali Masjid, Wade and the Shahzada moved to Dakka,⁶⁸ where the behaviour of one of the Khyber chiefs—Saadat Khan Mohmand of Lalpura—produced suspicion in the mind of Wade, who invited him to wait on the Shahzada, but received no satisfactory reply. Next day it was reported that the Chief with his followers had decamped. The British officers crossed the Kabul river, seized the fort of the fugitive Chief and entrusted it to the care of Tura Baz Khan, an officer of the Shahzada.⁶⁹ This measure of dispossessing Saadat Khan and substituting Tura Baz instead was palatable neither to the Shah nor to the British at the time, for the former Chief incited several tribes, and troops had to remain constantly on the move in the whole vicinity. But in the light of later experience this measure has been duly commended.⁷⁰ In the

65. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol XX, s. v. Wade, p. 413.

66. Shahamat Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 517-18.

67. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol XX, s. v. Wade, p. 413.

68. 147/128. Wade to Maddock, August 7, 1839. P. G. R.

69. 147/148. Wade to Maddock, October 13, 1839. P. G. R.

70. Kaye styles the change as one of the few fortunate exceptions of "our entire connection with Afghanistan". — *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 7.

disaster of 1841-42, when all the Afghans deserted the British, Tura Baz stood alone by them and greatly helped in escorting supplies, etc. to the Jallalabad garrison.⁷¹

Dost Mohd was in the meantime being disillusioned. Having great confidence in the aid from Russia and Persia, he had written to both these powers to send him speedy help, but nothing had come except vague promises of money or of the renewal of the siege of Herat.⁷² At first, he had not felt much anxiety even at the peaceful occupation of Kandhar by the British, even though it constituted a serious blow to his position, but when, on the top of it, came the news that many neighbouring chiefs were won over by gold, and had joined his enemies, he was greatly perturbed. He promptly sent a force to subdue such chiefs who would repeatedly change sides as soon as his troops would turn their back.⁷³ Dost then tried to appeal to their religious feelings by telling them that they were fighting a man who was a most culpable traitor to Islam, a man who was being assisted by the despicable *farangnees*—the Afghan's most relentless enemies, a man whose very success meant the domination of the *Kafirs* over Afghanistan.⁷⁴ But all this did not prove of much avail.

Meanwhile, Ghazni had been stormed and captured on July 23, with great courage on the part of Sir Henry Durand. This success struck terror among the Afghans and paralysed the resistance of Dost Mohd⁷⁵ who fled towards Bohkara.⁷⁶ After a short stay at

71. Mohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 272.

72. 147/17. Wade to Torrens, January 18, 1839. P. G. R. Also 147/37. Wade to Maddock, March 1, 1839, P. G. R.

73. 125/37. Maddock to Wade, April 4, 1839. P. G. R.

74. 147/43. Wade to Maddock, February 19, 1839. P. G. R.

75. Sykes, *A History of Afghanistan*, Vol. II, p. 11.

76. 147/141. Wade to Maddock, September 4, 1839. P. G. R. Also 147/129. Wade to Maddock, August 8, 1839. P. G. R.

Ghazni, Sir John Keane marched on towards his goal. No further opposition worth the name was offered, and on August 7, Shah Shuja made his public entry into Kabul after a lapse of thirty years.

Wade, too, did not encounter any more resistance and reached Kabul on September 3," and thus brought his mission to a successful close.

Kaye, the historian of the First Afghan War, says truly that the operations of the heterogeneous force which Wade commanded "have been dwarfed by the more ostentatious exploits of Sir John Keane's bulkier army, but it is not to be forgotten that it was in no small measure owing to the operations of Wade's force that the resistance offered to Keane's army was so slight and so ill-matured.....Akbar Khan and his fighting men never met Wade in the field, but they were drawn away from the capital at a time when they might have done good service in the west, and it is in no small measure owing to this division of the Amir's military strength, that he was unable to offer any effectual resistance to the march of the British army from Kandhar." He further adds : "Nor, when we take account of the circumstances which facilitated our success at the outset of the war, ought it ever to be overlooked that Wade, from his forward position at Peshawar, was enabled to open a correspondence with parties at Kabul favourable to the restoration of the monarchy, and to win over many adherents to the Shah before he approached his capital. It was in no small measure owing to Wade's diplomacy,.....that the Kohistanes were induced to rise against the Amir. These were important services. Wade carried on the work with much address."⁷⁷

77. 147/141. Wade to Maddock, September 4, 1839. P. G. R.

78. *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 7-8.

For his brilliant services on this occasion Wade was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel receiving also the honour of Knighthood, the Companionship of the Bath, and the first class of the Durrani Order.⁷⁹

At Kabul as there was no place for him in the Political Department, Wade left for the Punjab on October 5.⁸⁰ After staying for a few days at Lahore, he returned to Ludhiana where he took charge of the Agency from his *locum tenens*, G. R. Clerk.



79. *Dictionary of National Biography*, s. v. Wade. Vol. XX, p. 413. Also

147/147. Wade to Maddock, September 25, 1839. P. G. R.

80. 147/148. Wade to Maddock, October 5, 1839. P. G. R.

CHAPTER XIV

REMOVAL OF WADE FROM LUDHIANA

The death of Ranjit Singh meant the removal of a great admirer and a sincere friend of the 'Kaptan Sahib' on the trans-Sutlej side, and was a great personal loss to him. With the Maharaja departed a mastermind among the Sikhs, and all the cohesion and wisdom of the Khalsa. Under the imbecile Kharak Singh who now ascended the throne,¹ factious parties arose and powerful chiefs came to the top in the kingdom.² Some of these men had always urged

1. At the accession of Kharak Singh, Wade considered it fortunate for the Sikh Darbar that Prince Nau Nihal Singh and several other influential Sardars were away to Peshawar, because, in his opinion, this stayed for the moment, at any rate, all chances of a contest between Kharak Singh and his son.—147/116. Wade to Maddock, July 2, 1839. P. G. R.
2. The observations of Osborne made in this respect while Ranjit Singh was still alive proved remarkably prophetic: "It is a melancholy thing to contemplate the future probable state of this beautiful country. On the death of Ranjit Singh, which in the common course of nature must take place in a very few years, his throne will become an object of contention between two rival candidates of equal power and pretensions — Sher Singh, his natural son, a good and proved warrior, supported by all the influence, wealth and talents of Ranjit Singh's present minister, Dhian Singh, and Kharak Singh, his rightful son and heir, with little talent or courage, but supported by all the Sikh chiefs, whom gratitude for past favours to Ranjit, and jealousy and hatred of his minister, would bind to the cause of his legitimate son and successor. The whole country between the Sutlej and the Indus must become the scene of a protracted and bloody war, only to be terminated by the interference of a third and stronger power, with an army and resources sufficiently strong to bid defiance to all hope of resistance, and that that army must be the British army, and that power the British Government, there can be little doubt." (*The Court and Camp of Ranjit Singh*, pp. 52-53.)

Continued on next page

upon Ranjit Singh the assumption of a stiff attitude towards the English, though he knew that their counsels carried no weight against the ascendant influence of Wade. They naturally judged him to be the man responsible for the limitation of the Sikh boundaries in various directions, being instrumental in stopping the Sikhs from marching upon Sind or overrunning Afghanistan. Moreover, such a man, they rightly thought, would not remain indifferent at their activities of self-seeking and lawlessness. It was no more in their interest, therefore, that the Political Agent at Ludhiana should be a man like Wade just as it did no longer suit them to have a strong ruler at Lahore. Indeed, Wade knew too much about these men and their antecedents to let them feel easy or satisfied in the new situation.

The Sardars, therefore, looked out for opportunities to undermine Wade's position with a view to getting him removed from his post. One such opportunity presented itself soon after the accession of Kharak Singh when the Lahore Darbar, in return for Oler's mission to the Sikh capital, sent a deputation to Simla consisting of Fakir Aziz-ud Din and Sardar Lehna Singh to reaffirm the treaty which Ranjit Singh had made with the British. The Sikh mission put into the ears of the Governor General on the

Continued from page 266.

Equally illuminating is the testimony of Hugel, a contemporary traveller: "The Malwa Sikhs, to whom Ranjit Singh belongs, acknowledge the rights of the first-born, giving jagirs or fiefs to the younger children. According to this, Kharak Singh's right to the throne is unquestionable, but Ranjit Singh has granted such large estates to his favourites, that it would demand more prudence than Kharak Singh possesses, to establish his power firmly, and at the same time keep the great men of the kingdom obedient to him" (*Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab*, p. 406.)

occasion that as Wade had made himself personally obnoxious to the Sikh Government he might be removed from Ludhiana.⁴ This complaint was repeated to Lord Keane when, in December 1839, he visited Lahore where he was given a warm welcome and shown profuse hospitality.⁵

Maharaja Kharak Singh, who did not entirely agree with the Sardars, was kept under such virtual confinement, that in November 1839, when Wade was on his way back to Ludhiana from Kabul, he was prevented from seeing the Ruler "on pretence of devotional observances, lest he (the Maharaja) should throw himself on the protection of one believed to be ill-disposed towards those who sought his (the Maharaja's) life or his virtual relinquishment of power."⁶

This was followed by a series of events which carried the estrangement between the Sikh chiefs and Wade still further. In December, Rai Govind Jas, the Sikh Agent at Ludhiana, was recalled by an order bearing the seals of Kharak Singh and Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh who had now usurped all the authority of his father.⁷ Wade suspected that the order was issued without the knowledge or consent of the Maharaja and so refused to comply with it. He informed the Kanwar of his action,⁸ and the previous order was cancelled.⁹ This incident enraged Nau Nihal Singh who was already feeling that he could not carry out his designs of acquiring all power in his own hands, and doing away with his father, so long as Wade was at Ludhiana.

4. 126/17. Maddock to Wade, January 29, 1840. P. G. R.

5. 147/185. Wade to Maddock, December 18, 1839. P. G. R.

6. Cunningham, *A History of the Sikhs*, p. 232, and references there cited.
See p. 256, *supra*.

7. 147/176. Wade to Maddock, December 11, 1839. P. G. R.

8. 147/184. Wade to Maddock, December 16, 1839. P. G. R.

9. 147/186. Wade to Maddock, December 18, 1839. P. G. R.

Then arose the question of the return of the British army from to Afghanistan. The Governor General had already talked this matter over with Ranjit Singh at the interview at Ferozepur, but nothing had been finally settled.¹⁰ Later, Clerk, who was acting for Wade, had visited Lahore on a mission of condolence and congratulation to the new Maharaja and to negotiate for the return passage of the army through the Punjab. The proposal was extremely distasteful to Nau Nihal Singh and the Minister, Dhian Singh, as they feared that the British army might take sides with one or the other of the claimants to the Sikh throne. The Lahore Darbar formally raised their objection against the proposal on the score of the Tripartite Treaty in which no such stipulation existed. The Sardars expressed their fears that such communications, if once allowed, would never to be stopped.¹¹ But they had finally to yield to the English proposal,* though apparently it was made to look as if a compromise was effected, for the army was to march through the route of Dera Ismail Khan, and the Sikh metropolis was to be avoided. At the same time the Governor General assured the Lahore Darbar that "he does not think himself justified in requiring a perpetual right of the passage across the Punjab at the mere discretion of the British Government."¹²

10. 123/86. Maddock to Clerk, August 20, 1839. P. G. R.

11. Wade wrote to Maddeok: "The Bhaïs also observed that it was quite optional with the Sikh Government, to allow the passage of the British troops or not, but that if the intercourse once became established it would be continued for ever. Sardar Attar Singh and Jamadar Khushal Singh represented that there was no mention in the Treaty regarding the passage of the British troops through the Punjab". (145/52. March 10, 1840. P. G. R.)

*. The Governor General acknowledged that "the Darbar had acted with honourable promptitude in affording the facilities required for the passage."—

123/116. Maddock to Clerk, October 24, 1839. P. G. R.

12. 123/111. Maddock to Clerk, October 14, 1839. P. G. R.

But when Shah Shuja had been restored to his throne, it was felt necessary to keep some of the British troops in Afghanistan for his security. Supplies of stores and ammunition had to be sent with the convoys of troops to this army of occupation, and the best route was considered to be though the Punjab. On hearing this the Darbar once again raised objections, pleading that it was not desirable to make their metropolis the highway of foreign armies.¹³ Wade was asked to negotiate with the Lahore authorities to waive their objections.¹⁴ He, accordingly, informed them that the Government had decided to send a convoy escorted by a small number of troops to Afghanistan and that such convoys would be sent in future as long as the British troops were stationed at Kabul.¹⁵ But they gave no reply. The announcement that a detachment of British troops was soon to pass through the Punjab caused a general consternation in the Darbar.¹⁶ Wade waited for a reply but the Darbar was reticent. Nau Nihal Singh and Dhian Singh determined to impede the transaction of business and to follow a policy of non co-operation towards the British. Fearing that the position might deteriorate,¹⁷ Wade deputed Dr. Reid to Lahore to arrange with the Sikh Government for the passage of the convoy.¹⁸

13. 148/21. Wade to Maddock, January 21, 1840. P. G. R.

Cunningham expresses the opinion that the Darbar's aversion to Wade "was mixed up with the general objection to making their country a common highway for foreign armies, and they thus ventured to offer obstructions to the speedy equipment of the isolated British forces, mainly with the view of discrediting Col. Wade". *op. cit.*, p. 232.

14. 124/15. Maddock to Wade, November 28, 1839. P. G. R.

15. 147/173. Wade to Maddock, December 9, 1839. P. G. R.

16. 148/4. Wade to Maddock, January 4, 1840. P. G. R.

17. 147/186. Wade to Maddock, December 18, 1839. P. G. R.

18. 148/1. Wade to Maddock, January 1, 1840. P. G. R.

The Barakzais of Peshawar (Sultan Mohd. and his brothers) were at that time writing letters to the chiefs of Bajaur containing grossly abusive epithets for the British Government. Wade was asked to bring this fact to the notice of the Sikh Darbar and urge the removal of the Barakzais from Peshawar.¹⁹ One of the ex-Kandhar chiefs joined Sultan Mohd. at Kohat and was hospitably received. Wade further learnt that Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh, though he saw the impropriety of holding an open correspondence with the fallen chief, had given him encouragement by verbal assurances.²⁰ Many of the Ghilzai chiefs who were hostile to the British were similarly treated. The Political Agent could not possibly sleep over the matter, or else, his silence would have been construed as acquiescence in the action of the Sikh Government. Therefore, he at once brought the matter rather unceremoniously to the notice of the Lahore Darbar stating that the 'secret and precipitate' mode in which the heir-apparent attempted to carry out his views was not proper.²¹ This further offended the Sikh Court. All parties at Lahore now began to think of securing Wade's removal from Ludhiana. The main topics of discussion in the Darbar at this time were: (a) the removal of Wade; and (b) the prevention of passage to British troops between Ferozepur and Peshawar.²² Clerk had assured the Darbar when he was sent on a mission to Lahore in September, 1839, that no British troops would be sent through the Punjab in future.²³ But here was a man who told them that it was absolutely necessary that they should be sent through their country and also that such despatches would recur in future. This was taken by the Lahore Court as a clear breach of the word pledged by the English. But Dr. Reid was there endeavouring hard to get the permission of the Darbar for the passage of the convoy, and in the end he succeeded in his purpose. The Darbar

19. 124/20. Wade to Maddock, December 18, 1839. P. G. R.

20. 148/10. Wade to Maddock, January 9, 1840. P. G. R.

21. 148/4. Wade to Maddock, January 4, 1840. P. G. R.

22. 148/14. Wade to Maddock, January 13, 1840. P. G. R.

23. 104/151. Clerk to Maddock, September 14, 1839. P. G. R.

issued orders ever so reluctantly to their officers to assist the Doctor, and appointed Col. Chet Singh to accompany him to Peshawar²⁴, and granted permission for the passage of the convoy.²⁵

Wade had antagonized practically every party at Lahore for one reason or another, because each party wanted to win over the support of the British which it thought it would not be able to obtain until Wade was removed from Ludhiana. Nevertheless, some hope still existed that the conditions might change in Wade's favour, as a few Sardars having no grudge of any kind against him expressed freely their view that he had issued no orders which in any way militated against the Darbar.²⁶ The influential parties at Lahore were, however, conscious of the necessity of the British appeasing them to get their approval for the transmission of convoys through the Punjab, and they felt they could demand the substitution of one Political Agent by another as a condition antecedent to the amicable adjustment of the vexed convoy question. A letter had, in fact, already been sent to the Governor General on behalf of the Maharaja wherein a demand had been made for the substitution of Wade by Clerk.²⁷

On January 29, 1840, the Governor General pressed upon Wade the desirability of accepting the Residency of Indore, the reasons for this suggestion being expressed fully in his letter conveyed to him by

24. 148/15. Wade to Maddock, January 15, 1840. P. G. R.

25. 148/20. Wade to Maddock, January 16, 1840. P. G. R.

The Governor General was much pleased when the Darbar gave way.

Maddock wrote to Wade : "The Governor General of India in Council has derived much satisfaction from the information that the Lahore Darbar no longer objects to the passage through the Punjab of the escort which it has been thought necessary to send with the convoy." (126/34. February 19, 1840. P. G. R.)

26. 148/14. Wade to Maddock, January 13, 1840. P. G. R.

27. 126/3. Maddock to Clerk, January 9, 1840. P. G. R.

the Secretary to the Governor General. It reads : " The receipt of this communication (the Maharaja's letter) has led the Governor General to review carefully the former correspondence affecting your position in regard to the Court of Lahore.

" It had long been known to His Lordship that from some unfortunate circumstances a feeling of extreme alienation towards you had arisen in the minds of nearly all the principal persons in that Court. Your letter of the 16th led His Lordship to hope that this feeling was subsiding and he anticipated from the renewal of the Maharaja's intercourse with you the returning of some cordiality towards yourself.²⁸ The receipt of the Maharaja's letter has dispelled these hopes and expectations.

" When this feeling was first stated to His Lordship by the deputation from Lahore which waited upon him at Simla, considering the matter to be one in which the British Government should exercise its own judgment, he gave no answer to the application intended to be inferred from the statement, and he continued to hope that an estrangement so much to be regretted would by time and conciliation on your part be gradually removed, and his official instructions to you have been framed with views which he had been led by this hope to adopt. But you have for some time been in possession of a confidential communication from His Lordship direct of his sentiments and unavoidable apprehensions on the subject.

" From these causes a serious degree of embarrassment has arisen in the conduct of very urgent business between the two States; such for instance, as the passage of the convoy proceeding to Afghanistan.

28. Wade had written : " The reply which I have received from the Maharaja to the letter which Dr. Reid delivered to him shows the anxiety of the Court to fulfil its engagements with our Government when reminded of its obligations to do so. The reply is also the proof of the desire of the Court to carry on business and renew its intercourse with me."—
148/20. January 16, 1840. P. G. R.

"The course of public events which now compels the Governor General to remove supplies etc. to a great distance from the North Western frontier renders it absolutely necessary that all difficulties of this kind, as opposed to the execution of the measures of Government, should be entirely removed.

"On all these considerations the Governor General feels that he has no other course left than to place these facts before you with the announcement of his opinion upon them. His Lordship imputes no blame to you. He knows not the occurrences which have given occasion to feelings of estrangement. They may have happened in the strict performance of your duty. But the effect is the same, and the public interests suffer the most grave detriment from personal causes and you are, His Lordship well knows, among the last of those who would look for favour to yourself to be purchased only at the sacrifice of the objects of the Government which you serve.

"Under these circumstances the course which in the Governor General's opinion would be most honourable to yourself and advantageous to the public is that you should at the earliest suitable period inform the Darbar of your own intention from personal feeling to retire, the Governor General having offered to place you in a position of higher rank than that which you hold at Ludhiana, namely, the Residency of Indore.

"His Lordship would hope that this course will not be disagreeable to you, but for the perfect settlement of all Sikh and Afghan differences, for the comfort of our troops at Kabul, and for the immediate maintenance of peace it appears to him that, though it may perhaps for a brief space be postponed, it will yet at no distant date be indispensable, and you will make all your plans so as to give effect to it.

"His Lordship wishes, however, that this should be done, and it may possibly be right as avoiding the appearance of vacillation and weakness in regard to the reasonable demands of the British Govern-

ment on the subject of the protection of its convoy, that the formal announcement of the measure should be delayed until after your negotiation on that point should be brought to a close—but you need not of course conceal the offer of promotion as made by His Lordship and your own intentions in respect of it.

"On quitting Ludhiana you will place your office in charge of Mr. Clerk, and you will of course in the event of any serious difficulty feel the advantage of calling in the aid of the information and influence of that officer who will best be able to satisfy the Darbar that the agreement which he made with it had no reference to the question of such guards as may be required for the security of convoys.

"I have only further to say that His Lordship has frequently borne testimony to your high merits and services and is ready on all occasions to acknowledge them, and it is with this feeling that he is now led to offer you a distinguished appointment in another quarter."

All details connected with the 'convoy question' having been satisfactorily settled—the Darbar allowed the convoy "bristling with bayonets," to pass through their country, and it safely crossed the Indus on March 22—Wade made over the charge of the Agency to Clerk on April 1, 1840. His last letter to the Governor General from Ludhiana shows how bitterly he regretted this decision of the Government. He asserted that the alleged letter from Kharak Singh was forged by his son, Nau Nihal Singh, and complained that "it has been out of my power to renew my intercourse with the Maharaja as he has been

29. 126/17. Maddock to Wade, January 29, 1840. P. G. R.

This very important letter is unfortunately not quite decipherable and contains some obvious mistakes of language. I have tried to reproduce it faithfully without alteration.

purposely kept out of sight, and prevented from holding any communication with me." He protested that there was no justification to conclude that something untoward would happen because of his not being in the good books of the Lahore Court, asserting that "there never was a time when they so entirely depended on the English alliance as the present in consequence of the conflicting party interests in that Court." His main contention was that "in estimating the feelings of certain parties at the Court of Lahore towards me," no due weight had been given to the circumstance "that Nau Nihal's party, struggling for power in the Punjab, were naturally desirous of freeing themselves from all connection with one who had intimate knowledge of their affairs, and who was considered favourable to the cause of Kharak Singh. Their purpose would be best served by putting a stranger in my place." He added that he had studiously tried to avoid any word or deed which could be construed as predilection for any party, that his correspondence with the Lahore Court had been of a guarded nature, and that he had been guided by a desire "of dispelling all apprehensions by an open, frank and friendly line of conduct towards everyone." He further added: "I have no personal interests separate from those of my Government to gratify. I bear ill-will to no party, and consider it no less necessary to preserve the friendly nature of our intercourse with the (Sikh) government as now constituted, than I have done for the last seventeen years.....In the course of my long connection with the Sikhs and of my service to Government an implicit obedience to its instructions and their fulfilment have always been considered by me as my first duty, in proof of which I may safely appeal to your Lordship's experience of my conduct, and to the records of the opinion of your predecessor; but if your Lordship conceives my removal as a concession due to the wishes of the Sikhs, I am ready to resign my agency of their affairs, and shall not consider it any loss of reputation to retire to the appointment to which your Lordship has proposed to nominate me." He concluded by saying: "Time will best prove the expediency of the course (his removal from Ludhiana) which the Governor General has deemed necessary for the preservation of our relations with the Sikhs to take.....The whole history of our connection with the Sikhs will show that it is not so much from a desire to conciliate them as the necessity

of making them sensible of their real position towards our Government that we have been able to preserve and improve our alliance with them,³⁰ and when no blame is attached to me and when my conduct is not open to any just ground of exception on the part of the Sikhs, it may, I think, be doubted whether the concession which His Lordship has deemed it his duty to make to them will in the end promote the real interest of Government."³¹

With this dignified vindication of his position ended the most important phase of Wade's career — the phase with which we are particularly concerned.

Wade, on his transfer from Ludhiana, was appointed Resident of Malwa with his headquarters at Indore. He held that office until his retirement from service on May 1, 1844. During his stay at Indore, he, besides other achievements, effected the settlement of the Bhils who were a source of much trouble. He served continuously in India for 35 years, longer than any of his contemporaries with the sole exception of Lord Metcalfe.

Wade remained a bachelor throughout his long tenure of office in India, and it was only after his retirement from the service that he—when a little over 51 years of age—married in August 1845, Jane Selina, daughter of Captain Thomas Nicholl of the Bengal Horse Artillery.

10. Wade was definitely of the opinion that the best policy for the Government to follow towards the Sikhs was not one of appeasement but one that would have the effect of maintaining their respect for the British power. But no heed was paid to his opinion with the result that within four years of the British reverses in Kabul, they crossed the Rubicon (the Sutlej) and declared war on the British, arguing in their minds that since they had routed the Afghans and the latter had routed the British, they could easily bring them to their knees.

31. 148/56. Wade to Maddock, April 1, 1840. P. G. R.

He was promoted to the rank of Colonel on November 28, 1854.

Architect of his own fortunes—rising with every opportunity, mastering every emergency, fulfilling every duty—he passed away on October 21, 1861, at the comparatively early age of 67, leaving behind him his only son, Claude Fitzroy Wade.²²



²² *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XX, s. v. Wade. p. 413

CHAPTER XV

WADE'S OBSERVATIONS ON THE COURT OF LAHORE

Wade's correspondence is replete with important observations about Ranjit Singh, his army, his courtiers and various administrative features developed in the Land of the Five Rivers by the Sikhs. Some of these are reproduced in this chapter.¹ It will be interesting to note the variations between Wade's accounts and those of contemporary travellers and others.

Wade frequently referred to Ranjit Singh and his personal traits in his official communications to the Government. When, on a mission to Lahore in 1827, he met the Maharaja for the first time, he gave the following description of his appearance: "Maharaja Ranjit Singh is diminutive in stature and of a very weak and emaciated constitution. He appeared to be about 50 years of age. His face is disfigured strongly by the small pox and from the effects of that malady he has lost his left eye. He wears a very long but scanty beard which has now become nearly white. The expression of his countenance is not of a prepossessing nature at first sight and forms a striking contrast to the noble and manly features of the Sardars who were seated around him. Neither his manners nor his conversation is dignifiedHis voice is dissonant and harsh. He becomes animated when he begins to speak and creates a favourable impression in spite of all his personal defects."² Later in life, Ranjit Singh's speech became

1. For observations made by Wade during his visit to the Punjab in 1831 see Appendix V.
2. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827. Letter reproduced in Chopra, *The Punjab as a Sovereign State*, pp. 283-329.
of. Burnes, *Travels into Bokhara, etc.*, Vol. II, pp. 150 *eqq.* ;
Eden, *Up the Country*, p. 198 ;
Gordon, *The Sikhs*, p. 113 ;
Hugel, *Travels in Kashmir and the Punjab*, pp. 288-89 ;
Masson, *Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan and the*
Osborne, *The Court and Camp of Ranjit Singh*, pp. 81 *eqq.*, and
Punjab, Vol. I, p. 443 ;
Prinsep, *Origins of the Sikh power in the Punjab*, p. 180.

defective through an attack of paralysis,³ and Wade noticed the defect in 1836, in spite of the Maharaja's best efforts to conceal it.⁴ The Maharaja's dress was extremely plain and unostentatious even on stately occasions.⁵ In hot weather he wore white Dacca muslin without being decorated with any ornament or jewel.⁶

In contrast to the simplicity of the Maharaja's dress "the brilliancy and the splendour of the Court attracted (Wade's) particular notice." He writes: "The place where the Court was held (at his reception in 1827) was an open portico on the eastern side of the edifice in the centre of the Rambagh garden. At each end of it were lofty canopies hung on golden pillars and made of the richest shawls. Rich carpets of shawl were also spread along the ground. The front was open towards a canal of water supplying several large fountains the spray of which diffused an agreeable freshness around the spot.....The Raja sat in the recess of the portico on a large golden chair of a circular form.....On the ground forming a semicircle to the right and left of the Raja sat the Sardars.....The Sardars were decorated with costly jewels and elegant dresses of yellow silk. Every one of them had a shield and sword and some

3. 141/78. Wade to Macnaghten, August 23, 1835. P. G. R.

4. 142/108. Wade to Macnaghten, December 27, 1836. P. G. R.

Wade wrote: "He (the Maharaja) opened his mouth so slightly as to mumble his words and make the defect more apparent."

5. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827, *ut supra*.

cf. Eden, *op. cit.*, p. 199; Hugel, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-80; Lowrie, *Two Years in Upper India*, p. 154; Masson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 443; Osborne, *op. cit.*, p. 73; and Prinsep, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

6. 138/16. Wade to Macnaghten, May 1, 1832. P. G. R.

Ranjit Singh procured, through Wade, in 1832, ten pieces of the finest Dacca muslin because he could not get the stuff of that kind in the Punjab.—Indian Political Consultation, Nos. 4, 7 and 8, June 4, 1832. Quoted in Abdul Ali, *Notes on the Life and Times of Ranjit Singh*, p. 24.

matchlocks. They had a very splendid appearance and it was impossible not to admire the order and regularity of the whole assembly, the deference with which the Sardars treated the Maharaja and the courtesy they observed towards each other. There was no rude familiarity and confusion, every one seemed to know his place and to be conscious of the station he filled."⁶*

Wade thus describes the Sikh Ruler's daily routine : " In the hot weather the Maharaja goes out about 5 a.m., spends an hour or two in riding and inspecting his troops, and then takes his first meal often without dismounting from his horse. About 9 a.m., he retires to his residence and holds a Court, receiving reports, issuing orders to his officers, and examining minutely the financial accounts of his government himself. At noon he reclines for an hour, having a secretary by his side to write from his dictation, as different things requiring execution cross his mind. At 1 p.m., he rises and spends an hour in hearing a portion of the *Granth* read to him, after which he resumes his Court which lasts till the day begins to close, when he either sends for a set of dancing girls to beguile the time or secludes himself in meditation until his second repast. He goes to bed between 8 and 9 p.m., a secretary still being in attendance to whom he frequently dictates his orders. In the cold weather he does not go abroad until nearly 9 a.m."⁷

From the daily programme of the Maharaja it may be safely concluded that he was not wholly "soaked in wine and sunk in debauch" as he is described by some writers.⁸

*. Wade to Mactear, August 1, 1827. *ut supra*.

7. Wade to Secretary of the Governor General, May 31, 1831. Quoted in Chopra *op. cit.* pp. 234-35.
of Shahamat Ali, *The Sikhs and Afghans*, p. 17.

8. See in this connection Steinbach, *The Punjab*, p. 112 ; and Masson, *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 435.

It was customary with Ranjit Singh to make distant excursions both for recreation and despatch of business. On such occasions he did not have in attendance all his Court, but took with him only one or two Sardars. In 1832, Wade had an experience of accompanying him to sport across the Ravi.⁹

Ranjit Singh had "a particular passion for horses, and when in health there is no exercise in which he takes so much delight as in that of riding."¹⁰ He maintained an enormous stud, collected from every part of India, Arabia and Persia.¹¹ From vanquished foes and refractory chiefs, he was in the habit of demanding horses essentially. The present of horses from King William IV pleased him immensely. Likewise, while negotiating terms with Shah Shuja in 1833, he stipulated, *inter alia*, for a number of horses to be sent to him annually.¹²

Wade found that the Sikh Ruler though illiterate was fond of discussing the manners and institutions of other countries, and never allowed any opportunity to pass unused for enlarging the sphere of his knowledge.¹³ During his visit to Lahore in 1836, the Maharaja subjected him to a volley of questions which showed his highly inquisitive nature. "Ranjit Singh enquired whether His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief was coming to Lahore? What troops he had with him? What were his objects? Then he made searching

9. 138/3. Wade to Prinsep, January 1, 1832. P. G. R.

10. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827, *ut supra*.

11. Prinsep, however, says that the Maharaja had no breeding stud. *op. cit.*, p. 152; cf. Hugel, *op. cit.*, p. 325; and Steinbach *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

12. Miss Eden also noted: "His (Ranjit's) strongest passion is for horses; one of these hit his fancy, and he quite forgot all his state, and ran out in the sun to feel its legs and examine it." *op. cit.*, p. 200.

13. 137/13. Wade to Prinsep, May 25, 1831. P. G. R.

enquiries about Pottinger and Burnes missions.....Not only this, he further asked questions regarding the conquest of Panjtar by the Sikhs.....etc., His curiosity is the most predominant feature of his character."¹⁴

Wade noticed that Ranjit Singh was acutely conscious of the status and dignity of every one. For instance, he would not have his French officers in the Court when the English mission was in attendance, or, if by chance, they happened to be there, he would not give them chairs so as to avoid the suspicion and jealousy of the British. In order to show his own importance, he did not allow seats to any Sardars, excepting Hari Singh and Kharak Singh, in the presence of British officials.¹⁵

Wade regarded the Sikh Ruler as a capable administrator. While negotiating terms on which the navigation of the Sutlej was to be started the Maharaja cautioned Fakir Aziz-ud-Din to note every one of them for future reference, and himself counted his different districts lying along the right bank of the river from Harikepattan to Mithankote, together with the names of local officials and the force stationed in each. This he did with a precision that strongly marked the vigour of his mind and the degree in which he depended on himself for regulating the affairs of his government.¹⁶ Wade also thought that he was an efficient financier who took every possible care both to improve his own finance and the pecuniary condition of the zamindars with whom he himself made settlements, besides checking the details of his exchequer.¹⁷

14. 142/108. Wade to Macnaghten, December 27, 1836. P. G. R., cf. Burnes, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-54; Hugel, *op. cit.* p. 302; Jacquemont, *Letters from India*, Vol. I, pp. 395-96; Lowrie, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-69; and Osborne, *op. cit.* pp. 70-80 and pp. 113 *sqq.*

15. 137/21. Wade to Prinsep, July 21, 1831. P. G. R.

16. 138/75. Wade to Macnaghten, December 21, 1832, P. G. R.

17. 138/67. Wade to Macnaghten December 5, 1832, P. G. R.

Ranjit Singh paid special attention to the welfare of his subjects. In 1831, Wade wrote about his care for preserving crops from the depredation of his moving columns: "His Highness said that he had ordered them to send their horses away that the country might not be distressed by supporting them, which led me to enquire whether he had any regulations to restrain the troops from destroying the crops in their line of march. He said that he had the most prohibitive orders in force on the subject and took prompt and severe notice of any infraction of them.....Few chiefs exercise a more rigid control over the conduct of their troops than he does."¹⁸

Wade's close contact with the Maharaja made him realize that he had an insatiable love of power,¹⁸ and that he was ever ready to usurp further territories by every sort of means.¹⁹ It was not the way of the Sikh Ruler to infringe any engagement with naked aggression, but he gratified his ambition by chicanery. This he would practise by instigating others to sow the seeds of dissension between him and his intended victim. He would direct his emissaries to incite border tribes to commit depredation on his territory, so that he might have an opportunity of

18 137/13. Wade to Prinsep, May 26, 1831. P. G. R. Rut Shahamat Ali, Wade's *munshi*, expresses a contrary view. He says: "There is nothing more formidable for a place than the arrival of the Maharaja's troops, because they no sooner encamp than they scatter themselves like a flight of locusts over the fields round their camp, and in one day produce great devastation in the cultivation on which so much labour and attendance of the husbandman had been expended. This is not the only mischief they commit, but they take by force the firewood, grass and other necessities, without paying a single farthing in return"—*Journal of a Tour in 1832*. (The Calcutta Monthly Journal, Vol. III, New Series, September to December 1833, p. 269).

19. 137/3. Wade to Prinsep, May 18, 1831. P. G. R.

making reclamations from them.²⁰ As an instance, Ranjit Singh trumped up a charge against Sher Mohd. Khan, the Dera Ismail Chief, of intriguing with Shah Shuja to create a pretext for depriving him of his jagir. Apparently the Maharaja promised him another for the one confiscated, but Wade had no faith in such promises, as similar ones had been made to the Nawab of Multan and others who had been likewise sacrificed to gratify his ambition without any intention on his part of fulfilling them.²¹ In fact, whenever any person of rank incurred his enmity or displeasure, it was customary with the Sikh potentate to invent some charge of treason against him in order to cover the glaring injustice of his own act.²²

The Maharaja, according to Wade, was full of greed. When the latter was about to proceed to Lahore to settle finally the question of custom duties in connection with the navigation scheme, the Maharaja despatched three messages one after another, enquiring from him as to what profits he would derive from the scheme. The messages went in succession so that Wade should be aware of the promises he had formerly made at Lahore, and to bargain for an improved share. The Maharaja's conduct did not surprise Wade who observed that there was nothing remarkable in that circumstance if it be viewed with the Sikh Ruler's love of money, and distrust which were natural to his character. Ranjit Singh would be full of suspicion on the most trifling occasions, and

20. 140/47. Wade to Macnaghten, June 17, 1834. P. G. R.

21. 142/46. Wade to Macnaghten, July 13, 1836. P. G. R.

22. 142/42. Wade to Macnaghten, July 7, 1836. P. G. R.

even "when there is no reason for indulging in that propensity he thinks that it would be a good policy to betray a doubt."²³

A great deal of Wade's correspondence bears on a comparison of the Khalsa army of the days of the Misls with that under Ranjit Singh, and reveals the radical change which the latter made in its composition, equipment and mode of fighting. The army of the Misls consisted of predatory horsemen. The foot-soldier was relegated to an inferior position, and was mostly employed for garrison and sentry duties. As horses were the tribute exacted from a conquered district the infantry soldiers were, after a successful campaign, generally transformed into troopers."²⁴ The artillery was "awkwardly managed and its use ill understood".²⁵ The army was not much disciplined. Its accoutrements were rather primitive, and it had no prescribed uniform. Its mode of fighting, generally speaking, was guerilla warfare.²⁶

23. 138/32. Wade to Macnaghten, July 23, 1832. P. G. R.

The character of Ranjit Singh has been differently depicted by Wade and Sohan Lal, the court chronicler, naturally according to their status and dealings. Sohan Lal knew the Maharaja mostly in his internal administration, just as Wade knew him mainly through his external dealings. The former describes Ranjit Singh as a compassionate, religious and hospitable ruler who was not addicted to licentiousness. He praises Ranjit Singh's large-mindedness, his constancy with regard to agreements, his courage, his martial equipment and organisation and prosperous condition of his people. (*Umdat-ul-Twarikh*, Vol. III, Part IV, pp. 505 *sqq.*) Wade, however, gives us an impression that the Sikh Ruler was a shrewd, superstitious and greedy Jat. (cf. Masson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 444; Burnes, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 167; Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 *sqq.*; and Prinsep, *op. cit.*, pp. 178 *sqq.*)

24. Griffin, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 86.

25. Forster, *A Journey from Bengal to England*, Vol. I, p. 331.

26. *Idem*, p. 332, and Francklin, *Military Memoirs of George Thomas*, pp. 71-78.

But the army under Ranjit Singh presented an entirely different picture. He began with the formation of a regular disciplined army in place of heterogeneous and part-time levies soon after the flight of Holkar to the Punjab in 1805.²⁷ He was afterwards unremitting in his efforts to keep his army up to a proper standard of training and equipment. In 1822, he employed the French generals, Allard and Venture,²⁸ who, in the same year, raised the *Fauj-i-Khas* or the French Legion.²⁹ Five years later, Wade witnessed the parades of this Legion at Amritsar, and recorded his impressions thus: "It appeared to be a remarkably fine body of men. In passing the camp of the Legion I noticed several standards with the Tri-coloured flag which the French officers, I find, adopted as the distinguishing ensign of their corps..... The corps was extremely well equipped, and very steady under arms.....The battalion performed several manœuvres executing them in a style of propriety that surpassed my expectations." The Legion consisted chiefly of Sikhs, but there were two companies of Purbiahs in the regular battalions. Ranjit Singh informed Wade that the reason of intermixing them with the Sikhs was to counteract any mutinous disposition which the one or the other might evince.³⁰

27. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827, *ut supra*.

28. They had previously served in the French army until the annihilation of Napoleon deprived them of employment.

29. The Legion comprised three regiments of cavalry under the command of Allard and five battalions of infantry under Ventura.

30. The policy of *divide et impera* in the army was followed by the British in India as late as 1861, after the terrible experience of the crisis of 1857-58, when the army was reorganized on the recommendations of a Royal commission (known as the Peel Commission) which was appointed in 1858 and which submitted its report in the following year.

The adoption of this policy by Ranjit Singh in 1827 speaks volumes for his sagacity and foresightedness.

The infantry section of the Legion attracted Wade's particular notice : " They are all dressed, armed and equipped (in the European fashion) like the Raja's other regular battalions but in a neater and superior style. The four Sikh battalions wear the Sikh turbans, the colour of which is different in each battalion.³¹ M. Ventura put his Legion through manoeuvres which the crops executed with a steadiness and precision it would be difficult to excel. Their formation into close column, and their march and deployment into line were performed with such closeness and accuracy as to surprise the whole party. It was indeed impossible not to admire the high degree of perfection to which M. Ventura had brought his Legion."

Regarding Ranjit Singh's *Ghorcharah Fauj* (or the Household cavalry) Wade writes : " there are altogether about 3,000 of them..... Generally they were well mounted and old looking men. Many of them had been in the Raja's father's service.....The crops had peculiar privileges of its own. The men are not paid in money. Every man has a jagir varying (in income) from 500 to 5,000 rupees a year and some less. They are chosen by the Maharaja himself from his personal guard and acknowledge no chief but him.....The Raja spoke of the *Ghorcharahs* in high terms of praise as a body of men very much attached to his interests." Wade, however, was not favourably impressed with Ranjit's cavalry and artillery,³² to which arms the Sikh Ruler did not pay the same assiduous attention as to his infantry.³³

31. cf. Masson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 432 *seqq.* and Osborne, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

32. cf. Barr, *Journal of a March from Delhi to Peshawar*, pp. 259-60 ; Osborne *op. cit.*, pp. 160 and 164-65 ; and Steinbach, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

33. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827, *ut supra*.

With the increase of infantry, observes Wade, the method of fixed salaries was adopted after the European system. The pay of the infantry *seghis* was Rs. 8 a month from which Rs. 2 were deducted for rations (of a promiscuous character) supplied by the state.³⁴ This new system of fixed emoluments did not, however, work well, as the salaries were never paid at regular intervals,³⁵ with the result that the troops became discontented and rose in revolt, and heavy fines were imposed on them.³⁶ Wade prophesied that the system was likely to affect the entire military organisation seriously "if Ranjit Singh does not refrain in time from the reckless disregard which he has begun to show to the claims and interests of his troops."³⁷

Wade mentions that it was usual with the Maharaja on the Dussehra festival (generally in October) to hold in one place big military parades to which he invited his Sardars and others. Such a big ceremonious parade he saw on October 16, 1831. The absence of any soldier from this annual muster was considered serious and visited with severer penalties than other minor breaches of discipline.³⁸

At his visit to Lahore in 1836, Wade noticed that the Sikh army had been formed into brigades, each consisting of three or four battallions of infantry and a portion of cavalry and artillery. The chief command of

34. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827, *ut supra*.

35. 140/68. Wade to Macnaghten, August 23 1834. P. G. R.
cf. Masson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 437.

36. For instance there was the desertion of Shamsah Khan from Allard's regiment for arrears of pay (140/68. Wade to Macnaghten, August 1834. P. G. R.)

37. (*Ibid.*)

38. 137/34. Wade to Prinsep, October 19, 1831. P. G. R.
cf. Masson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 437 and 445-46.

a portion of these troops was given to Ventura with the rank of a General and of another to Sardar Teja Singh, who had hitherto commanded the principal corps of infantry. The sons of the Sardars, trained in the European style of military tactics, were also appointed to each Brigade, and were generally speaking very young men, not more than seventeen.³⁹

It appears that a rot set in the Sikh fighting forces towards the very end of Ranjit Singh's reign, when he himself had become a physical wreck, and was, for all practical purposes, moribund, for Wade, commenting on the Sikh army in 1837, reported that "it lacked steadiness and fortitude before a resolute army. When once a panic has seized it then it is most difficult to preserve the least order in their ranks."⁴⁰

Of Wade's impression of the courtiers of the Sikh Darbar, those of Raja Dhian Singh, Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa and certain European officers are noteworthy.

Raja Dhian Singh,⁴¹ "a noble specimen of the human race, rather above the usual height of natives, with a quick and intelligent eye, high handsome forehead and aquiline features, dressed in a magnificent helmet and cuirass of polished steel, embossed with gold, a present of King Louis Philippe of France—a model of manly beauty and intelligence,"⁴² began his career in 1812 as a mere

39, 142/101. Wade to Macnaghten, December 26, 1836. P. G. R.

40, Political Consultation No. 59. Wade to Macnaghten, May 13, 1837 in 147/7. P. G. R.

cf. Osborne, *op cit.*, pp. 104-5.

41. Raja Dhian Singh was undoubtedly the most prominent figure at the Court of Lahore from the death of Ranjit Singh to his own death in 1843. He has not, however, received the consideration he deserves from historians. In fact lesser men among the Sikh courtiers have received far greater attention than he. An attempt is made here to give a connected account of his career up to the death of Kharak Singh in November, 1840,

42. Osborne, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

Ghorcharah sowar in Ranjit Singh's service, and by 1828, rose to be the first minister in the state with the distinctive title of Raja-i-Rajgan Hindpat Raja Bahadur.⁴³ Ranjit Singh thereafter sought his advice in matters which concerned the relations of the Sikh kingdom with the neighbouring powers. His counsel was taken in connection with Burnes' visit through Sind in 1830 and the discussions with Murray and Wade. In short, he became after 1828, one of the regular channels of communication between the Maharaja and the European emissaries.⁴⁴ In 1831, he made arrangements on the Sikh side for the historic Rupar meeting.⁴⁵ At the time of the negotiations of the Tripartite Treaty he prepared the draft on behalf of the Maharaja, and insisted that the British should keep their hands off Shikarpur and Jallalabad.⁴⁶

A week before his death, Ranjit Singh convened a meeting of his principal Sardars and officers, and proclaimed Kharak Singh as his successor and Dhian Singh as his Wazir.⁴⁷ At the Maharaja's death none of his courtiers was moved so deeply as his loyal and devoted Chief minister. So overcome with grief was Dhian Singh that he firmly resolved to throw himself on the funeral pyre. He was, however, dissuaded from taking this fatal step by the courtiers, the

43. Latif, *History of the Punjab*, p. 440.

44. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part I, pp. 181, 182 and 207.

45. *Idem*, pp. 83-91.

46. 122/19. Macnaghten to Torrens, June 3, 1838. P. G. R.

47. According to Wade the ordinary routine was to be carried by the Minister, while Kharak Singh was to give decisions in important matters—147/115. Wade to Maddeek, June 27, 1839. P. G. R.

Ranis and the heir apparent.⁴⁸ Wade mentions that mutual pledges of confidence and support were exchanged between Dhian Singh and Kharak Singh, both placing their hands on the body of the deceased in the presence of Rani Jindan, and pledging that they would abide by the wishes of the late Maharaja in directing the affairs of the kingdom.⁴⁹

The new Ruler, to begin with, leaned on the Minister for the conduct of state affairs, but before long it became evident that the latter was losing the former's confidence. A new influence had gained with the Maharaja—that of his brother-in-law, Sardar Chet Singh, who “had nothing to recommend him but arrogance and sycophancy”⁵⁰ Even as early as June 27, 1839, Wade had expressed his doubts if the new arrangement of Dhian Singh's acting as Wazir of Kharak Singh would work smoothly on account of Chet Singh's inordinate influence with the Prince. He wrote: “The influence possessed by Sardar Chet Singh over that Prince (Kharak Singh) is so great that it is doubted if Raja Dhian Singh will be able to pursue the salutary system which the Maharaja has in his present state had the wisdom to make for the conduct of his government.”⁵¹

It appears that Kharak Singh began talking in open Darbar that Chet Singh was qualified to be elevated to the position of minister. Dhian Singh, realizing the danger to his position, concerted with Nau Nihal Singh for assassinating the Maharaja's favourite,—and also for removing another throne by his side, the British Political Agent

48. 147/116. Wade to Maddock, July 2, 1839. P. G. R.

cf. Steinbach, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Some writers, however, believe that Dhian Singh acted hypocritically at the cremation. See Smyth, *A History of the Reigning Family of Lahore*, Appendix, p. xiii.

49. 147/119. Wade to Maddock, July 10, 1839. P. G. R.

50. M'Gregor, *The History of the Sikhs*, Vol. II, p. 5.

51. 147/115. Wade to Maddock, June 27, 1839. P. G. R.

who favoured Kharak Singh* — and the Minister himself perpetrated the crime on October 8, 1839.⁵²

Dhian Singh stained his hands with human blood, and what proved worse from the point of view of the welfare of the Sikh state, initiated a policy of personal violence which not only brought about his own ruin in the end, but also led to a succession of revolutions and assassinations,⁵³ which marked the subsequent history of the Sikh kingdom, and which led to its rapid dissolution.

Kharak Singh now became a *roi faincant*. Whatever semblance of power he had disappeared with the murder of his minion. All power now passed into the hands of his impetuous son, Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh, who had temporarily allied himself with Dhian Singh.⁵⁴ The Kanwar made it sure that no messenger approached Kharak Singh without his permission.⁵⁵ Smyth⁵⁶ and Latif⁵⁷ believe that the Maharaja actually abdicated, but Wade's writings do not support this view. According to him, Kharak Singh, though enjoying only nominal authority, was still the Maharaja. This is shown by the fact that when the heir apparent wanted the

*. See pp. 265, *seq.*, *supra*.

52. 147/149. Wade to Maddock, October 15, 1839. P. G. R.

The murder of Chat Singh confirmed Wade's "resolve not to identify the British with any party, as it might be misconstrued." The Government expressed its horror at the deed: "It could not but deeply regret the outrage with which it (the assumption of power by Nau Nihal Singh) has been attended."—124/8. Maddock to Wade, October 30, 1839, P. G. R.

53. Wade correctly prophesied that after Chat Singh's murder dissensions in the Darbar would be the only outcome. (147/176. Wade to Maddock, December 11, 1839. P. G. R.)

54. (*Ibid.*)

55. 141/1. Wade to Maddock, January 1, 1840. P. G. R.

56. *op. cit.*, p. 30.

57. *op. cit.*, p. 498.

charge of the *Tosha Khana* to be transferred to his own nominee, Teja Singh, the Maharaja got so annoyed that the former had to give in.⁵⁸ Again, when Dr. Reid came to Lahore, at the instance of Wade, to settle about the passage of the convoy,⁵⁹ Kharak Singh was present in the Darbar in the capacity of the sovereign and gave replies to the questions of the British emissary.⁶⁰

Dhian Singh's position at the Lahore Darbar, after his *coup*, was not strengthened as much as he might have expected. This was largely due to the fact that the Kanwar was more ambitious and spirited than the Minister, and as such, was likely to act independently of his advice. This happened actually in several cases. As an instance, Dhian Singh had been instrumental in bringing about the imprisonment of Misar Beli Ram and several members of his family, and the forfeiture of their jagirs, whereas the Kanwar favoured their release. The Minister himself realized soon after that he was being deprived of several of his own districts lying between the Jhelum and the Indus.⁶¹ Cunningham states that in carrying out his great aim of destroying or reducing to insignificance Dhian Singh's influence, the Kanwar "took advantage of the repeated dilatoriness of the Mandi and other Rajput chiefs around Kangra in paying their stipulated tribute, to move a large force into the eastern hills" with the intention of placing a substantial force to the north-east of Jammu. "The commanders chosen were the skillful General Ventura and the ardent young chief Ajit Singh Sindhanwala, neither of whom bore goodwill towards Raja Dhian Singh".⁶² Thus it became apparent that a rupture might at any time occur between Nau Nihal Singh and the Minister.

58. 148/17. Wade to Maddock, January 15, 1840. P. G. R.

59. See pp. 270, *sqq.*, *supra*.

60. 148/17. Wade to Maddock, January 15, 1840. P. G. R.

61. 147/176. Wade to Maddock, December 11, 1839. P. G. R.

62. *A History of the Sikhs*, pp. 224-35.

Matters now came to a pass, and leading men began to group themselves in parties. The Minister, his brother, Raja Gulab Singh, and Fakir Aziz-ud-Din began to avoid, as much as their position would allow, any active participation in the counsels of the heir apparent whose party consisted mainly of the two Bhaïs, Jemadar Khushal Singh, Tej Singh, and Attar Singh Sindhanwala.

Raja Dhian Singh found a real cause for annoyance at the release against his wishes of Misar Beli Ram and his family who began to attend the Darbar regularly.⁶³ According to Wade, the Raja believed that if the Bhaïs, with whom he was at cross purposes were allowed a free hand in the conduct of affairs, the administration of the kingdom would go to dogs, as they were secretly working to bring about its collapse. The Raja requested the Kanwar to invest him with a *Khillat* in token of his position as Prime Minister, adding that no body else should be allowed to meddle in the conduct of the government, or else, he would be compelled to retire to Jammu. The Kanwar replied that he was not in a position to act as he pleased, that he would give him leave to go back to his own province if he so desired, and that the Bhaïs could adequately guide him in the tasks of governance. Wade reported that "Kharak Singh sent for Dhian Singh and abused him exceedingly, saying that he wished to dictate to the government and commanding him never to appear again before the Maharaja." Consequently Dhian Singh prepared to repair to Jammu, but as soon as this came to Nau Nihal Singh's knowledge, he sent for him and tried to conciliate him by saying that it was not advisable that he should retire at a time when several important cases were to be decided by the Darbar, and that the administration would suffer considerably in his absence. Accordingly, the Raja agreed to delay his departure for a few days.⁶⁴

63. 148/17. Wade to Maddock, January 15, 1840. P. G. R.

64. *Ibid.*

It is clear from Wade's letters that although much distrust subsisted between the Raja and the Kanwar, the latter realized the folly of alienating the former altogether. This the Kanwar even expressed later in a private meeting with Bhai Ram Singh after Dhian Singh, accompanied by Sochet Singh, had actually left for Jammu. The Kanwar considered Dhian Singh an "intelligent and clever" man and said that he would endeavour to assuage the feelings of his father towards him by the time he returned in about twenty days.⁶⁵

Meanwhile, Nau Nihal Singh was finding it extremely difficult to carry on the administration without the counsel of Dhian Singh. Consequently, he summoned him back to the Court. So anxious did the Kanwar now grow for placating the Raja, in whose absence so many important matters had been bungled, that he bade Bhai Ram Singh to defer the matter of restoring Mir Beli Ram to his former position and the granting of *Khillats* to him and his family. In fact, the Kanwar was not inclined to act in any matter until the Raja's return, — is evidenced by the fact that he refused to accept the suggestion even of Raja Hira Singh about detailing Raja Gulab Singh to quell disturbances in the Poonch territory. The Kanwar thought that Gulab Singh's deputation would be inexpedient, as it would lead people to think that all the Jammu Rajas had been estranged.

Dhian Singh, always mindful of his dignity, was not, however, to be won over so easily, and wrote to his son, Hira Singh, to inform the Kanwar that he was not aware of any urgent business at the Court which could not be decided without his consultation, and that he would return at his own convenience.⁶⁶

65. 148/26. Wade to Maddock, January 22, 1840. P. G. R.

66. 148/42. Wade to Maddock, February 22, 1840. P. G. R.

Then arose the question of stationing some Sikh troops at Kasur as the British had established a cantonment at Ferozepur.* Although the Bhais and Fakir Aziz-ud-Din were in favour of taking this step, Nau Nihal Singh would not move in the matter without consulting Dhian Singh, and felt obliged to send Bhai Ram Singh personally to Jammu to bring him back.⁶⁷ All this shows Dhian Singh's pre-eminence at the Court of Lahore, and the recognition by the ruling authority that without him the machinery of the government could not run smoothly.

According to Clerk, who succeeded Wade at Ludhiana on April 1, 1840, Kharak Singh was fain to reinstate Dhian Singh in his former ministerial authority "under the promise of absolute powers," but the latter declined to accept the offer as he had no desire to become the virtual ruler of the state, but was only anxious to serve as a minister. The reason for his non-acceptance was the apprehension that his assumption of full powers might cause a recrudescence of earlier ills.⁶⁸

It might be observed that Clerk is hardly justified in interpreting this fresh eagerness of the Maharaja to exalt Dhian Singh as a proof of the former's "fickleness and instability."⁶⁹ It would be more correct to attribute it to Kharak Singh's true realization of the Minister's real worth and importance.

The rehabilitation of confidence and cordiality now appears to have been fairly complete between the Minister and the *faineant* sovereign

*. See p. 46, *supra*.

67. 148/52. Wade to Maddock, March 10, 1840. P. G. R.

68. 149/13. Clerk to Maddock, May 9, 1840. P. G. R.

69. *Ibid*.

and his son, even though the records of Clerk's Residency continue to make mention of occasional acts of these individuals which tend to betray their mutual distrust.

Thus did the administration of the Sikh kingdom drift on until the death of Kharak Singh on November 5, 1840.

Wade speaks of Hari Singh Nalwa as one of the best generals that Ranjit Singh had amongst the oldest and most faithful of his followers.⁷⁰ Commenting upon his administration of Kashmir, Wade wrote in 1831: "He was formerly entrusted with the government of Kashmir which he held for two years, proving himself one of the most able and popular Governors which the Sikhs have had."⁷¹ He was so successful on various occasions against the Afghans that they considered him their most formidable enemy. With a dread of his power they had imbibed a hatred of him from the great intolerance which he showed in interdicting the open observance of their forms of religion.⁷²

Hari Singh was 56 years old, when he was fatally wounded at the battle of Jamrud in 1837. Wade gives an account of his death: "He received four wounds, two sabre cuts across his breast, one arrow was fixed in his breast which he deliberately pulled out himself, and continued to issue his orders as before, until he received

70. Indian Political Consultation, No. 59, Wade to Macnaghten, May 13, 1837, in 143/7. P. G. R.

71. Wade to Governor General, March 13, 1831. (Chopra, *op. cit.*, p. 165 and reference there cited).

But Hari Singh's administration of Kashmir has been generally characterised as oppressive. Some of the Indian chroniclers express the same view. (*Ibid*).

72. Indian Political Consultation, No. 59, Wade to Macnaghten May 13, 1837, in 143/7. P. G. R.

a gun-shot wound in the side from which he gradually sank, and was carried off the field to the fort, where he expired, requesting that his death should not be made known until the arrival of the Maharaja's relief."⁷³

As to the European officers in service of the Sikh Government Wade has recorded interesting details: They had to sign an agreement which bound them "to domesticate themselves in the country by marriage, not to eat beef, nor smoke tobacco in public, to permit their beards to grow, to take care not to offend against the Sikh religion, and if required, to fight against their own country,"⁷⁴

The first foreigners to present themselves at Ranjit Singh's Court seeking military service were Allard and Ventura. They came in 1822. The Maharaja took them into his service after ascertaining that they were really French.⁷⁵ Allard took charge of the cavalry and Ventura was placed in charge of infantry.

73. Indian Political Consultation, No. 59, Wade to Macnaghten, May 13, 1837, in 143/7. P. G. R. See p. 191, *supra*.

74. 95/83. Wade to Metcalfe, April 1, 1827. P. G. R. of Osborne, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

75. At first the Sikh Ruler received these officers coldly, and his distrust of them was heightened by his Sardars, who were naturally jealous of the introduction of foreigners into the Sikh army. A submissive and judicious letter from these Frenchmen, however, removed the Maharaja's apprehensions, and they were admitted into his service. Their good conduct and wise management soon removed his prejudices against Europeans; and the door to employment being thus thrown open several other foreigners entered his service, and at the close of his reign there were not less than a dozen of these receiving his pay, and to use an Indian expression, "eating his salt."—Steinbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98.

After serving continuously for eleven years Allard, whose health had suffered from his long sojourn abroad, applied for leave in 1833 to visit his own country. At this the Maharaja directed Jamadar Khushal Singh and Bhai Gurmukh Singh to inform him that lakhs of rupees had been spent in disciplining the regiments, which after his departure would fall into disorder. They were to persuade him to put off his plans of returning to his country for the time being.⁷⁶ But Allard persisted and so he was allowed to go for a year and a half. He returned from France in 1835 with a complimentary letter from Louis Phillipe to Ranjit Singh. This greatly aroused the jealousy of the British, and Allard was compelled, through Wade, to disavow the intention of forming a connection between France and Lahore.⁷⁷

In the opinion of the Lahore courtiers, writes Wade, "Ventura was a man of bold and enterprising character," because he could confidently occupy Shikarpur with a force of 100,000, while Court (another French officer in the Khalsa army) hesitated to do the same with a force double in number.⁷⁸ Wade also thought of Ventura as the "only man exercising any (effective) control over the Sikh soldiers, and more to be depended upon than any other European officer in Sikh service."⁷⁹

Another foreigner figuring prominently in Wade's correspondence is Dr. Harlan. He rendered yeoman's service to Ranjit Singh when the latter was face to face with Dost Mohd. in the battle field at Peshawar

76. 132/7. Wade to Macnaghten, February 9, 1833. P. G. R.

77. 119/12. Macnaghten to Wade, April 3, 1837, P. G. R.

78. 140/87. Wade to Macnaghten, October 23, 1834. P. G. R.

79. 147/83. Wade to Maddock, April 27, 1839. P. G. R.

in 1835 by detaching Sultan Mohd from the Amir.⁸⁰ In 1836, Harlan, being estranged with the Maharaja, left to join Dost Mohd so as to avenge himself on the Sikh Ruler. Wade observes that Harlan was an eccentric though an enterprising man, but expresses his doubt whether he would be able to carry his threat into practice.⁸¹ Dost Mohd admitted Harlan into his service, thinking that his knowledge of the Khalsa army might stand him in good stead. He continually urged the Amir to measure his strength against the Sikhs but the latter could never pick up sufficient courage to do so.⁸²

Of the foreigners employed by Ranjit Singh, only one was imprisoned, namely Gordon an Indo-Briton. Wade thus describes

80. 141/40. Wade to Macnaghten, May 1, 1835. P. G. R. See p. 188, *supra*.

Harlan's own account of this episode is worth quoting: "On the occasion of Dost Mohd's visit to Peshawar, which occurred during the period of my service with Ranjit Singh, I was despatched by this Prince as ambassador to the Amir. I divided his brothers against him, exciting their jealousy of his growing power, and exasperating the family feuds, with which from my previous acquaintance I was familiar, and stirred up the feudal lords of his Darbar with the prospect of pecuniary advantages. I induced his brother, Sultan Mohammed Khan, the lately deposed chief of Peshawar, with 10,000 retainers to withdraw suddenly from his camp about nightfall. The chief accompanied me towards the Sikh camp, whilst his followers fled..... So large a body retiring from the Amir's control in opposition to his will, and without previous intimation, threw the general camp into inextricable confusion, which terminated in the clandestine rout of his forces, without beat of drum, or sound of bugle, or the trumpet's blast, in the quiet stillness of midnight. At day break no vestige of Afghan camp was seen, where, six hours before, 50,000 men and 10,000 horses, with all the busy host of attendants, were rife with the tumult of wild commotion."—*A Memoir of India and Afghanistan*, pp. 124-25, f. n.

81. 142/78. Wade to Macnaghten, October 17, 1836. P. G. R.

82. Political Consultation. No. 30, Wade to Macnaghten, June 17, 1837, in 143/15. P. G. R.

the circumstances of this action by the Sikh Ruler: "The Maharaja has discharged Mr. Gordon and sent him to the left bank of the Sutlej under escort of cavalry. The immediate cause of Mr. Gordon's discharge was that he used insolent expressions to the Maharaja at target practice. The Maharaja was displeased with his fire and ordered him to fire again, which he refused and used violent expressions to His Highness. In consequence he was severely reprimanded and sent to confinement for nine months. At the end of this time the Maharaja desired to take from him the cavalry regiment he had raised and give him an infantry battalion. Mr. Gordon rejected this, and was discharged."⁸³

Wade opined that the admission of Europeans in Ranjit's service had created a new era in Sikh history. At the same time he stated that his service, which was very attractive to them in the beginning, ceased to be so with the passage of time. As early as September, 1831, they were discontented and anxious to leave because of the insecurity of tenure.⁸⁴ Moreover, the Maharaja also was no longer anxious to keep or enlist them in his service,⁸⁵ because he now felt that his own Sardars were equally up to the mark. Hereafter only a few foreigners appeared at Ranjit Singh's Court, but they even had to go away disappointed because they could not find any employment.⁸⁶ This discontent and restless-

83. 97/136. Wade to Fraser, September 3, 1829. P. G. R.

84. 127/30. Wade to Prinsep, September 25, 1831. P. G. R.

85. Political Consultations No. 7, Wade to Macnaghten, April 20, 1827.

86. 127/30. Wade to Prinsep, September 25, 1831. P. G. R.

ness among the Europeans in the Maharaja's service was on the increase towards the later part of his reign, when even Ventura, the greatest well-wisher of the Sikhs, offered twice or thrice his services to the British.⁸⁷



87. 142/39. Wade to Macnaghten, June 25, 1836. P. O. R.

The same view was expressed by Osborne when he visited Lahore in 1838: "They (the Europeans) do not seem very fond of his (Ranjit's) service which is not to be wondered at, for they are both badly and irregularly paid, and are treated with little respect or confidence."—*op. cit.*, p. 151. Masson ascribes the discontent of the Europeans to their "being compelled to minister to the gratification of his (Ranjit's) caprice and vanity or become the instrument of his vengeance and exactions."—*op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 446.

CHAPTER XVI

RETROSPECT

"I am happy," wrote Seton to Metcalfe on December 4, 1808, "to find you are on the way to meet Polyphemus.....and long most impatiently for the result of your communication to him."¹ In the following April, the Resident's hopes came much near fulfilment, and his anxiety was turned into glee, when Metcalfe succeeded in bringing the youthful and intrepid Maharaja round to his own purpose, even through the manoeuvre of Ochterlony's detachment. Afterwards, when instigated by his turbulent Sardars, the high spirited Maharaja felt keenly the check imposed on his ambition by the presence of the British on the border of his kingdom, and we often find him pursuing towards them a 'Jack-in-the-box' policy right upto the beginning of the twenties, though he always took care not to offend them to the extent of causing an actual rupture.

Wade arrived at Ludhiana in 1823 when the Anglo-Sikh relations had progressed to an important stage. Ranjit Singh was no longer a minor chief who could be bullied or intimidated by the English, but by virtue of his extensive conquests had become a powerful potentate. He was, therefore, to be treated with adroit skill and diplomacy. Wade fully rose to the occasion and succeeded eminently in cultivating and fostering steadfast friendliness with the Sikh Ruler. Ranjit Singh soon became "the best of neighbours in the peace time," though representing a potentially dangerous ally on an occasion or two.² With the passage of time, however, the Maharaja came to repose such implicit faith in Wade that even while the British inaugurated and unfolded in stages their 'policy of encirclement' against his kingdom, the Political Agent was able to keep him in *sae* gear by means of diplomatic manoeuvrings.

1. Quoted in Thompson, *The Life of Charles, Lord Metcalfe*, p. 90.

2. The most notable occasion was the first Burmese War (1824-26), when the English had to keep a vigilant eye on the Sikh Ruler. See p. 22, *supra*.

Wade became a *persona grata* with Ranjit Singh to the extent of enjoying his unqualified trust. The Maharaja learnt to value his counsel highly. Wade's correspondence shows that this was due partly to an understanding on his part of the varying moods of the Sikh Ruler and the workings of his mind.

He eagerly strove to meet the Maharaja's personal wishes as far as possible and to provide all amenities to the visitors from the Lahore Court. For the convenience of the latter he constructed a *barahdari* at Ludhiana.³ In 1832, he supplied the Sikh Ruler with rare prescriptions for distilling wine.⁴ While at Lahore, Wade visited religious places and contributed money to the Sikh shrines.⁵ In 1837, he secured for Ranjit Singh the services of the British Commander-in-Chief for instituting the new "Order of Merit."⁶ As a channel of communication between the Maharaja and the Government, he represented the former's point of view with complete exactitude, sincerity and zeal.

He scrupulously avoided giving the slightest provocation to the Maharaja. As for example, he never showed eagerness for the refugees who escaped from beyond the Sutlej. In 1825, he refused to meet Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia when the latter fled from his country.⁷ In 1828, he tried his utmost in co-operation with the Maharaja's local Agent to awaken Hari Singh Kang to the need of conciliating his master.⁸ He composed the differences arising out of

3. 115/90. Prinsep to Wade, July 25, 1831. P. G. R.

4. 133/54. Wade to Macnaghten, October 15, 1832. P. G. R.

5. 137/6. Wade to Prinsep, May 15, 1831. P. G. R.

6. 119/13. Macnaghten to Wade, April 21, 1837. P. G. R.

7. 94/118. Wade to Metcalfe, December 29, 1825. P. G. R.

8. 93/3. Wade to Colebrooke, January 5, 1828. P. G. R.

the depredations committed by the Bahawalpurians in the Maharaja's territory, first in 1829 and then in 1833.⁹ He often reminded Bahawal Khan of his two-fold obligations, i.e., both to the Maharaja and to the British, and exhorted him never to give offence to the former.¹⁰ Ranjit Singh's expeditions against the refractory Sodhis and the Singh-purias were considered by Wade, contrary to Murray's views, as no infringement of the Treaty of 1809, and he held that the Maharaja's cis-Sutlej detachment was quite small and that it was absolutely necessary for protecting holy places against Akali incursions. Unlike Murray again, Wade regarded the Sodhis as a turbulent sect.¹¹ This solicitude of Wade for the welfare of the Sikh kingdom joined to his own personal qualities and attainments grew into a peculiar fascination with the Lahore Ruler. The Political Agent's successful career as a soldier persuaded him to value his suggestions in regard to military matters. Then, Wade being conversant with the spoken Punjabi¹² and Persian,¹³ this eliminated the chances of misunderstanding arising from incorrect versions of interpreters, and enabled both to appreciate correctly each other's view-points. Again, the ease with which Wade moved at the Sikh Court during his visits, joined the drinking parties, admired the dancing girls and enjoyed the excitement of hunting, ingratiated him with the Sikh Ruler.¹⁴

Wade proved to be a diplomat of a high order as is strikingly evidenced by the general attitude of suavity and forbearance which he uniformly sustained towards the Sikhs. The discrepancy in his own political views and those of his colleagues and superiors, like Murray, did not deter him from following his own honourable path of acting

9. 97/108. Wade to Colebrooke. July 17, 1829. P. G. R. Also 105/15. Mackeson to Wade, June 12, 1833. P. G. R.

10. 97/108. Wade to Colebrooke, July 17, 1829. P. G. R.

11. 97/149. Wade to Fraser, September 19, 1829. P. G. R.

12. Sohan Lal, *Umdat-ut-Twarikh*, pp. 342-43.

13. *Akhbarat-i-Sikhan*, Vol. I, Chet 12, 1896. B. E.

14. Wade to Metcalfe, August 1, 1827. (Quoted in Chopra, *The Punjab as Sovereign State*, pp. 283-329).

without prejudice to the Maharaja's interests. He was even gratuitously jibed at for engaging in "friendly evolutions" with Ranjit Singh, and had to fight hard against Murray for sustaining some of the Maharaja's claims. He remained averse to any premeditated plans of undermining the position of the Sikh monarch, or clipping his territory for the Company's benefit. In fact, he often pleaded with his own Government to honour the Maharaja's legitimate rights, and suffered the Resident's admonitions against such advocacy with extreme coolness.¹⁵ He felt that the officers of the Government were bound to preserve the integrity of the Maharaja's territory as much as that of any other independent state.¹⁶ His own practice accorded with this principle, and he repeatedly impressed upon the Government the desirability of putting an end to the continuous litigation of the *cis-Sutlej* states.¹⁷

Wade could accurately weigh the pros and cons of the moves on the chess board of Anglo-Sikh diplomacy. He was not one of those subordinate authorities immersed in details and local affairs, who are liable to be biassed by views which promise immediate advantage. He belonged to that school of far-sighted English statesmen who held the view that the friendship with the Maharaja was essential for the stability of British rule itself.¹⁸

5. 98/33. Wade to Hawkins, February 27, 1830. P. G. R.

116. 97/180. Wade to Hawkins, October 14, 1829. P. G. R.

17. 97/175. Wade to Hawkins, October 13, 1829. P. G. R.

18. Wade himself defined the policy which always guided him in his relations with the Maharaja: "I used my best endeavours to follow the example of Lord Metcalfe in balancing the interests of the two states, and identifying their policy, as paramount to every other object. In India, it is essential to the proper care and preservation of our system of alliances, that the British Agent should be regarded as a friend of the chiefs among whom he resides, rather than as a mere instrument for conveying the instructions and enforcing our rigid rule is not congenial the policy of their foreign masters. With their national habits, and a softening agency may wisely be exercised to inspire the confidence of our Indian allies, without losing sight of the views and interests of our country."—Wade, *A Narrative of the Services, Military and Political*, p. 19.

If Wade was discharging his duties honestly to win the goodwill of the Maharaja, the latter was no less ardent in vindicating his regards for the former. His sincerity and honesty of purpose had won Wade the heart of Ranjit Singh who regarded him as *Farzand-i-Dilband*¹⁹ (a worthy friend), and as "the medium of promoting friendship between the two states."²⁰ He had gained the confidence of the Sikh Ruler to such an extent that he was permitted to visit the Punjab freely at a time when it was rigidly closed to British officers.²¹

The Maharaja, although he had direct access to the Government through his Agent at Delhi, desired that Wade should be put in charge of the Lahore dependencies.²² He entrusted to him not only the collection of revenues from his cis-Sutlej territories but also part of the judicial and administrative work. Thus the territories which he would not yield, even under threat of force, came in effect under British control like any other Protected state,²³ and Ranjit Singh did it out of regard for Wade's friendship. Wade thus became a factotum of both the states and wrote to the Government that "the Maharaja has honoured me with a share of his confidence to which I can lay no pretensions. I cannot be insensible to the proof he has given of it in wishing the affairs of his territory on the left bank of the Sutlej in their relation to the Protected states, to be administered by me and it is a mark of distinction on which I trust, I may be allowed to congratulate myself without reproach, but, however gratifying and important

19. Sohan Lal, *op. cit.*, Vol. III, Part II, p. 220. Sohan Lal says at another place : " Kaptan Sahib is an old and sincere benefactor of the Princely Ruler and he has the greatest regard for him." *Ibid.* p. 235.

20. 144/22. Notes from a conference between Wade and Ranjit Singh's Agent, August 23, 1837. P. G. R.

21. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XX, s. v. Wade. p. 412,

22. 95/47. Wade to Metcalfe, December 3, 1826. P. G. R.

23. Jacquemont, *The Punjab a Hundred Years Ago*, p. 20.

it may be to my vanity, I beg to assure you that it can only serve to make me additionally desirous of meriting the good opinion and approbation of my own Government, by continually reflecting that my public obligations to both consist in disinterested and impartial discharge of my duty."²⁴

The proposal of the Government to transfer Wade to Ferozepore to superintend trade, when the negotiations with regard to the navigation of the Sutlej and the Indus had been successfully carried out,²⁵ was not liked by the Maharaja as he had no wish to part company with the Political Agent who had so deeply impressed him by his sincerity of purpose and other qualities.²⁶ The Government had, therefore, to yield to Ranjit Singh's repeated requests for Wade's retention at Ludhiana.²⁶

All through his long tenure of office at Ludhiana, Wade impressed upon the Maharaja the need for peace, and the latter often invited him to take counsel on urgent problems.²⁷ In July, 1837, he sought his advice on the best mode of effecting peace with the Afghans with due deference to his "honour and credit."²⁸ At the same time, Ranjit Singh wrote to the Governor General: "Praise is due to God that implicit confidence is placed in Captain Wade. He has always been and will remain a sincere and zealous promoter of the intimate relations which subsist agreeably to long established treaty between the two Governments."²⁹

24. 97/6. Wade to Colebrooke, January 1, 1829. P. G. R.

25. 139/2. Wade to Macnaghten, January 29, 1833. P. G. R.

26. 117/1, Macnaghten to Wade, February 4, 1833. P. G. R.

27. 97/27. Wade to Colebrooke, February 18, 1829. P. G. R. Also
97/38. Wade to Colebrooke, March 3, 1829. P. G. R.

28. 143/26. Wade to Macnaghten, July 9, 1837. P. G. R.

29. 144/23. Ranjit Singh to Auckland, July 24, 1837. P. G. R.

On William Bentinek realizing the Political Agent's influence with the Maharaja, he put him in entire charge of diplomatic relations with him. In that capacity he had several particularly difficult duties to perform. The first was in regard to the meeting of the Maharaja and the Governor General. No doubt both wanted to meet, but each wanted the other to take the initiative and made it a point of prestige. Besides, the Sikh Ruler still had his doubts about crossing the boundaries of his state and trusting himself to the British. Wade handled the situation adroitly and at last succeeded in persuading Ranjit Singh to agree to the Governor General's conditions of meeting, and the two met with all *empressement* at Rupar. The Maharaja wished to confer upon Wade a *jagir* in recognition of his services in this connection but he declined the offer.³⁰

Then followed the scheme for the opening of the Indus to navigation. Ranjit Singh was typical of oriental potentates in his disregard of the interests of commerce. It was a matter of mere vanity with him to be the possessor of some British goods, and his desire to see a steam-boat on the Indus was actuated by curiosity. The British did not have entirely philanthropic intentions either in opening the Indus to navigation. A political scheme was disguised in a commercial garb, and it was a tough job to make the Sikh Jat comprehend it without arousing his suspicion, and to create sufficient interest in him to offer active support for its execution. It speaks volumes for Wade's skill and negotiating capacity that Ranjit Singh agreed to sign the commercial treaties without being able to sense the political motives of the British.³¹

30. Wade wrote to Prinsep: "...I declined, observing that any services that I might have performed in that respect had their reward from the Government which I served. The intended *jagir* was the district of Mahil, south of the Sutlej, and valued at Rs. 15,000 a year."—137/35. November 15, 1831. P. G. R.

31. The Sikh Ruler's only worry was that the peaceful schemes of the British would hinder his designs upon Sind. Wade explained to him the friendly nature of the attitude and intentions of the British and their desire to encourage his commerce and to fill his treasury with custom duties. The Maharaja was quite satisfied with his *eclaircissement*.—138/60 Wade to Macnaghten, October 27, 1832. P. G. R.

In 1836, the British policy towards Sind changed radically. Ranjit Singh had in the mean time set his mind on Shikarpur, and the Mazari filibusters provided him with a *casus belli*. The Government advised Wade to employ all means, "short of actual menace", to dissuade the Maharaja from advancing towards Shikarpur, and authorized him even to declare that Sind was under British protection.³² Wade's full confidence in his persuasive warnings to succeed in deterring the Maharaja from pursuing his designs upon Sind was amply justified by the results.³³ Ranjit Singh on Wade's counsel sent orders to his officers that the Sindhians should suffer no injury at the hands of the Sikhs.³⁴ When, therefore, the Maharaja acquiesced in what the Government wished, Wade felt that it was neither fair nor wise to press for the relinquishment of what he had already conquered.³⁵ To Wade it seemed that for the time being it was more than sufficient to wring a pledge from the Maharaja not to proceed further,³⁶ because he knew that the latter would not withdraw his troops from the conquered territory. Through he had been given great latitude "in tendering a suitable and effective remonstrance to the Maharaja", he proceeded prudently, and by his peaceful exertions attained for the Government what it would have been obliged to win by costly and dangerous military action. By drawing a very colourful and attractive picture of the general advantages of British friendship and support, Wade skillfully dissuaded Ranjit Singh from his pet scheme of the conquest of Sind.³⁸

32. 107/16. Macnaghten to Wade, September 26, 1836. P. G. R.

33. 142/70. Wade to Macnaghten, October 5, 1836. P. G. R.

34. 142/84. Wade to Macnaghten, November 2, 1836. P. G. R.

35. 142/70. Wade to Macnaghten, October 5, 1836. P. G. R.

36. 142/84. Wade to Macnaghten, November 2, 1836. P. G. R.

37. 142/107. Wade to Macnaghten, December 27, 1836. P. G. R.

38. 142/72. Wade to Macnaghten, October 10, 1836. P. G. R.

Wade influenced the British policy towards Afghanistan considerably. While the Russian bugbear constantly haunted the British, it was he who suggested in 1836 the replacement of Dost Mohd by Shah Shuja on the throne of Kabul as the most feasible and advantageous counter measure against the Russian moves.³⁹ It is evident from his correspondence that he underrated the strength of the Barakzai family which, he held erroneously, had no hold over the Afghans. In his opinion he had been obviously influenced by Shah Shuja who persuaded him to believe that a large section of his countrymen was in his favour.⁴⁰

Wade regarded the annexation of Peshawar in 1834 as an egregious political blunder on the part of the Sikhs,⁴¹ and prophesied that it would lead to endless hostilities between them and the Afghans. This proved true by subsequent events.⁴² In pursuance of the British policy to see peaceful relations established between Dost Mohd and Ranjit Singh, Wade, after the battle of Jamrud, made a remonstrance to the Maharaja. In a very suitable language he told him that he had been surrounded by evil counsellors, that to sacrifice a man like the Nalwa Sardar was to depreciate his own strength, and finally that it would displease the British, if he gave loose reins to his lieutenants at Peshawar to engage Dost Mohd in battle. He propitiated the Maharaja in the end by saying that "the sincerity of a true friend was tried by his candour which prompted him to speak the truth even when it might not be agreeable to his friend."⁴³ As a result of this remonstrance, the Maharaja suspended hostilities against Dost Mohd. and he openly declared that he had declined to march to Kabul out of deference to Wade's opinions and against the insistent pleadings of Kanwar Nau Nihal Singh and other Sardars to proceed at once.⁴⁴

39. 142/36. Wade to Macnaghten, June 7, 1836. P. G. R.

40. 145/21. Wade to Macnaghten, January, 1, 1838. P. G. R.

41. 144/80. Wade to Macnaghten, September 21, 1837. P. G. R.

42. What happened between the years 1835 and 1837 on the Peshawar frontier has been sketched in Chapter X.

43. 143/26. Wade to Macnaghten July 9, 1837. P. G. R.

44. *Ibid.*

Wade, however, was not in favour of putting any pressure on the Maharaja to relinquish Peshawar to Dost Mohd, as he was apprehensive that any further demand might lead to an unfortunate war with him. The Sikh Ruler was already confined to the north of the river Sutlej, he had been restrained from advancing towards Sind in 1836, and if arrested in his course of expansion to the North-west, he might even take up arms against the British. The character of the Maharaja was well-known to Wade who declared that the former never contemplated the cession of Peshawar to any of the Barakzais.⁴⁵ It was this irreconcilability of the conflicting interests of Ranjit Singh and Dost Mohd, and the desire to remove friction between the Punjab and Afghanistan that made Wade advocate the policy of the Tripartite Treaty. He contrived by all possible means to prove that Dost Mohd was a common enemy, and Shah Shuja a common friend, and that the restoration of the latter was a panacea for all the ills of the North-west frontier. Lord Auckland completely identified himself with his views.

The complete success of the Political Agent's diplomatic dealings with the Maharaja was repeatedly acknowledged officially in letters from the Governors General under whom he served to the Court of Directors, and in the replies received from the latter.⁴⁶ Bentinck openly avowed that the enthusiastic reception accorded to Burnes at Lahore was all due to his influence and proper handling of the situation.⁴⁷ Auckland amply recognized his services in averting a serious crisis in Sind.⁴⁸ He accepted Wade as one of his chief advisers on the North-western policy. In 1837, he got a little apprehensive when Ranjit Singh was negotiating an

45. Secret and Separate Consultations, October 17, 1838. No. 68. Wade to Macnaghten, March 3, 1838.

46. *Dictionary of National Biography*, Vol. XX, s. v. Wade, p. 412.

47. 115/97. Prinsep to Wade, October 10, 1831. P. G. R.

48. 119/89. Macnaghten to Wade, November 13, 1837. P. G. R.

alliance with Nepal, but Wade reassured the Governor General with the following sane and shrewd observations : "Ranjit Singh has hitherto derived nothing but advantage from his alliance with us. While we have been engaged in consolidating our power in Hindustan, he has been extending his conquests throughout the Punjab and across the Indus, and as we are now beginning to prescribe limit to his power, which cannot be supposed he will regard with complacency, he is now more likely to encourage than withdraw from alliances which may hold out to him a hope of creating a balance of power."⁴⁹

Wade had judged rightly. The Maharaja knew the limits of his power, and in the interests of the security of his dynasty he would not disturb his friendly relations with the British. He manifestly betrayed his feelings on this point when he said : "I might perhaps drive the British (or the Ungreerz Behadur, as he styled them) as far as Allighur, but I should be driven back across the Sutlej and out of my kingdom."⁵⁰

Herein lies Ranjit Singh's greatness as a statesman. Unlike Hyder Ali or Tipu Sultan, he knew the depth of the English power and the comparative limitations of his own resources, and the futility of measuring swords with the English. All through his life, therefore, he remained anxious to be on friendly terms with that power. It was not timidity, but a true realization of the whole situation, which led him to accept the Treaty of Amritsar (1809) and so forfeit for ever his right of expansion in the cis-Sutlej area, or later, in 1827, to suffer the British refusal to admit his claim to Ferozepur, or to forgo the enforcement of his demands upon the Amirs of Sind

49. Political Proceedings, October 20, 1837. No. 61. Quoted in Sinha, *Ranjit Singh*, p. 60.

50 M'Gregor *The History of the Sikhs*, Vol. II, p. 35.

in 1836, or to become an unwilling ally to the Tripartite Treaty of 1838. It was the recognition of the logic of hard facts and of the necessity of putting on as good a face as possible over an unpleasant reality.⁵¹ For this recognition on Ranjit Singh's part which spared him much loss of life, treasure and prestige, Wade, more than anybody else on either side of the Sutlej, was responsible. The British officers must have chuckled in their sleeves when towards the close of 1836, Ranjit Singh asked Auckland for a supply of muskets and pistols from the Delhi magazine.⁵²

The Governors General, advised by Wade, were equally anxious to show to the world that the British were united by close friendship to the Lahore Darbar. Without exception they would receive with distinction all the presents sent, and invitations extended, by the Maharaja. If Lord Bentinck was often seen praying to the Almighty to "keep the garden of friendship blooming and strengthen the roots of the tree of mutual regard,"⁵³ Lord Auckland warned his subordinates that "in consideration of all these questions, you will bear in mind that the Sikhs are always our first friends and steadfast allies."⁵⁴ If Ranjit Singh was afraid of their superiority in the field and kept up neighbourly relations with the British on that account, the latter were equally keen to maintain a faithful ally on their North-west frontier owing to their Russophobia. Thus the mutual regard of the two states was sustained through equally weighty considerations on either side.

51. *Maharaja Ranjit Singh*, Centenary Volume, p. 174.

52. Macnaghten wrote to Wade in this connection: "The long and uninterrupted amity which has subsisted between the two Governments.....entitle him (Ranjit Singh) to every consideration and His Highness's wishes in the present occasion will, therefore, be compiled with."—107/40. December 10, 1836. P. G. R.

53. 116/3. Macnaghten to Wade, May 6, 1832. P. G. R.

Quoted in *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, Vol. II, p. 205.

On June 27, 1839, the Maharaja disappeared from the stage of history. Nine months later, Wade quitted the Land of the Five Rivers. Thus both their friends, i. e., Ranjit Singh and Wade, left the Sikhs almost abruptly to political disintegration and ultimate extinction. If the Sikhs needed the leadership of the one to control their affairs in their own land, they certainly would have benefited from the experience of the other in the continuation of a peaceful adjustment of their policies in the years to come. But Fate willed otherwise.



APPENDIX I

List of places on the left bank of the Sutlej over which Ranjit Singh preferred his claims.

(See pp. 30, 31 and 62)

- *1. Sanewal, incharge of Lala Ram Dial, the Maharaja's Agent stationed at Ludhiana.
- *2. Bhurtgarh, Bulolpur, Chamelgarh, Labangah farmed by Jamadar Khushal Singh.
- *3. Fattehgarh, Gungrana farmed by Polah Singh and Tikka Singh.
- *4. Dharankot, farmed by Hakim Rai.
- *5. Chuhar Chak, farmed by Sodhi Jawahar Singh.
- *6. Behekbodla, Kot, Kapura, Sree Muktsir, Bhigtah, Jinwar, Hitahwat incharge of Kawner Sher Singh, the Maharaja's second son.
7. Pattoki, Himmetpore, Wandi, the Ilaqqa of Mai Sada Kaur, the mother-in-law of the Maharaja and grand-mother of Kanwar Sher Singh.
8. Jughraon Guru, Tehra, Kot Isa Khan and Sedder Khan, Melanwala, Bussi, Naraingarh, Bhirogh, Mohani Khowas Poora, Ilaqa of Sardar Fateh Singh Abluwalla.
- *9. Bajrah se Howab, Shujatwala, Sehera, Goewal, Karesh, held in Jagir by Desah Singh.
- *10. Mehlan, Jagir of Sada Singh.
- *11. Saholi, Jagir of Dolah Singh Malwai.
- *12. Nurpore, Jagir of Maanh Singh Kakkar.
- *13. Dependency of the district of Phillaur situated on the bank of the Sutlej, held in Jagir by the sons of Koor Singh Kakkar, Mai Rupah Jamadar Pir Buksh.
- *14. Sohala and Toderpur, Jagir of Megh Singh Kakkar and Jamadar Pir Buksh.
- *15. Kotaiah, Jagir of Gujjar Singh Kakkar and Jamadar Pir Buksh.

- *16. Motiwala, Jagir of Daya Singh, Chhiman Singh and Sardar Singh.
- *17. Talwandian Seyeedan, Dhilon, Jagir of Sodhi Jawahar Singh.
- *18. Boother, Jagir of Sodhi Jugeh Singh.
- *19. Rasulpur, Jagir of Diwan Ranghi Dass.
- *20. Aitiana, Jagir of Ram Singh.
- *21. Khairah, Jagir of Megh Singh Kakkar and Jamadar Pir Buksh.
- 22. Sialbah, Ilaqa of Sardar Dewa Singh Doabiah.
- 23. Machhiwara, Jagir of Sodhi Faujdar Singh.
- 24. Chamkour, Jagir of Sodhi Uttam Singh.
- *25. Zirah, Jagir of Sarbillind Khan.
- *26. Kenean, Jagir of the Sikhs of Bhandhichte.
- *27. Melwal, Jagir of Yusuf Khan.
- 28. Ferozepur, Possession of S. Dhanu Singh, held by his widow, Lachman Kaur.
- *29. Mamdot and Bamniwala, Jagir of Kuttubudin Khan.
- 30. Fethgarh, Jagir of Sardar Hari Singh Kang.
- *31. Khaee, Wazidpur, Muedkoh, Jagir of Dharam Singh.
- *32. Mari, Jagir of Fateh Singh Sirhaliwala.
- *33. Kaonki, Jagir of Dharam Singh Attariwala.
- 34. Amrala.
- 35. Kulal Majra, conferred by Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia on Sardar Himmat Singh Jehlawala.
- *36. Jhendienah, Jagir of Sardar Jiwand Singh.
- 37. Kot Gura Harsahai, held by Gulab Singh Sodhi.
- *38. Renian, Jagir of Khazan Singh.
- *39. Singhanwala.
- 40. Mottewala, Jagir of Sodhi Uttar Singh.
- 41. Rajwana, in alms to Hari Singh and Karora Singh.

42. Tughal, Jagir of Moher Singh.

*43. Aklampur.

*44. Puwa Want, Kotari, Jagir of Lala Gobind Jas, the Maharaja's Agent at Delhi.

45. Sri Anandpur, Jagir of Sodbi Achel Singh, Tirlok Singh, Ram Singh and Chet Singh.

*46. Mokhowal.

47. Suhwaran.

115/22. Colebrooke to Wade, March 17, 1828—Punjab Government Records.

Note.—The places marked with an asterisk were included in Murray's list No. 1 and the other places in his list No. 2.

74/202 Murray to Colebrooke, December 18, 1827—Punjab Government Records.



APPENDIX II

**Statement showing the number of districts and villages held by
Sardar Fateh Singh and his Jagirdars on the left bank of the Sutlej.**

(See p. 36)

<i>Name of district,</i>	<i>No. of villages in Sovereignty.</i>	<i>No. of villages in possession of Jagirdars.</i>	<i>Total.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Naraingarh.	41	5	46	Received by grant from Ranjit Singh in Samvat 1864 (1807 A. D.) in lieu of a <i>nazrana</i> of Rs. 15,000.
Bhuroag.	—	62	62	In possession of Maha Singh.
Suhur and Alampur	15	10	25	Ancestral.
Boondallah.	—	28	28	In possession of Boondalliah Sikhs.
Bussi.	15	5	20	Decreed by Sir David Ochterlony in 1817 on ejection of Sahib Singh.
Eesuroo ...	31	29	60	Ancestral.
Jugraon ...	50	16	66	From Ranjit Singh in Samvat 1864 (1807 A. D.) for Rs. 80,000.
Bhoondree and Bulleepore ...	35	5	40	Ancestral.
Kote Tese Khan and Dalewal...	39	3	42	do
Mullawala ...	23	—	23	do
Mukhoo ...	12	—	12	do
Pir Muhammed.	30	—	30	do
Total.	291	163	454	

72/474. Murray to Metcalfe, January 8, 1826—Punjab Government Records.

APPENDIX III

Murray on the importance of Ferozepur.

(See p. 44)

This place is held by Lachhman Kaur, the widow of late Dhanna Singh and is a square *pacca* brick fort of considerable extent with numerous bastions and a narrow ditch, crowded in the interior with buildings and inhabitants. The view is extended over a wild and dreary plain from the bastions. The ferry on the Sutlej is six and a quarter miles from the fort and here the river is nearly 790 yards wide running with no velocity and from October to April is fordable. The town of Kasur is five *kos* from the opposite bank and thence to Lahore 25 *kos*.

This point of the Protected states may be well termed the key to Hindustan from the facility it affords to an invading army whether it be composed of Sikhs or Afghans. The capital of Lahore state is distant only 40 miles with a single river to cross, fordable for six months in the year and the whole country from Ferozepur to Hansi Hissar is unprotected and open to an invader. The fort of Ferozepur commands the passage to Harika Pattan, the confluence of the Sutlej and the Beas and in every point of view seems of the highest import to the British Government, whether as a check to the growing ambition of the Chief of Lahore or as a fort of consequence to have in our power or that of our allies. The present proprietress being a daughter of the Sardar of Burya on the bank of the Jamna expressed her strong desire to give up the fort of Ferozepur and receive in lieu a Jagir near her own country and this wish was reiterated through the Burya agent to me.

71/231. Murray to Elliot, December 12, 1823.—Punjab Government Records.

APPENDIX IV

Statement of the Jind possession

(See p. 76).

(i) To be restored to Sarup Singh

<i>Purgannahs.</i>	<i>No. of villages.</i>	<i>Estimated Revenue.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
		Rupees.	
Jind proper	140	1,20,000/-	The estimated revenue has been taken from Mr. Clerk's report of 10th November, 1935.
Sufidun.	25	42,000/-	Not given in Mr. Clerk's report of 29th December, 1834. The revenue is much below what has shown
Assundh.	26		
Salwan.	8		
Ballawali.	108	30,000/-	This estimate is shown as comprising only of 13 villages in Mr. Clerk's report of 29th December, 1834.
Sumgrai.	11	50,000/-	
Jichewal.	1	4,000/-	This is taken from the report of 29th December, 1834.
Bhowki.	1		
Samout.	1		
Mhelum.	1		
Total.	322	2,46,000/-	

(ii) To be restored to Maharaja Ranjit Singh.

Hulwara.	1	9,000/-	Only 1/4th of these estates appear to have been granted by Maharaja Ranjit Singh agreeably to the translation of the <i>sanads</i> received with the Agent's letter of 30th January, 1837.
Talwandi.	1		
1/2 Mudkee.	-		
1/2 Gyaspurah.	-		
Total,		9,000/-	

(iii) To be retained by the British Government.

Bassia.	...	16	16,000/-	If any of the places in this list are beyond the Sutlej, they are not of course to be retained by the British Government.
Ludhiana.	...	77	85,000/-	
Morinda.	...	36	44,000/-	This is grant from Ranjit Singh made in 1807. It is not included in Mr. Clerk's report of 10th Nov. 1835.
½ Mudki.	...	8	10,000	
Jandiala	...	11	11,000/-	
Total.			1,66,000/-	
Chahal.	...		2,000/-	It does not appear how these estates were acquired and by whom.
Dialpurah.	...		3,000/-	
Scattered villages.	...		11,000/-	It is doubtful, therefore, whether they are to be retained or restored.
			Rs. 16,000/-	

G. A. Bushby,
Secretary.

109/2. Metcalfe to Clerk, Officiating Political Agent, February 14, 1837.—Punjab Government Records.

APPENDIX V

Letters of Wade in which he made close observations about the territory through which he passed and the persons he met with during his visit to the Punjab in 1831.

(See pp. 83 and 279)

I. Wade to Prinsep, May, 12 1831. (137/5. P. G. R.)

I arrived at Ludhiana on the 7th instant. Sardar Hari Singh, Dewan Moti Ram and some other members of the Maharaja's mission having left me at the base of hills, some to visit the city of Anandpur in the valley of Mukhowal, sacred to the Sikhs, and others to Hardwar. I found it necessary to halt at Ludhiana until they should rejoin.

Hence to-day, the 12th instant, I crossed the Sutlej, and encamped at Filor. At that post I was met by Jagat Singh, one of the sardars of Attari, and Faqir Shah Din, the son of Faqir Aziz-ud-Din, who have been deputed by the Maharaja to conduct me to Adinanagar, where it is his intention to receive me. In passing the fort of Filor, I was received by the garrison with a salute of 11 guns, and *Zasafats* were presented in money and sweatmeats.

Within the last year Ranjit Singh has ordered a second broad ditch to be made to the fort which is to be connected by a canal with the river and to be filled from it. The garrison which consists of two companies is in charge of Sardar Desa Singh Majithia and the adjacent country is held by Moti Ram in Jagir.

Two routes have been offered for my choice, one by Hoshiarpur and along the hills, the other by Kartarpur. I have chosen the latter, it being shorter than the former by one march, while in passing through Kartarpur I shall have an opportunity of seeing a place of some interest in Sikh history, it being the seat of one of their greatest priests, a descendant of Guru Gobind Singh.

2. Wadda to Prinsep, May, 15 1831. (137/6. P. G. R.)

I marched on the 13th to Phagwara. At a short distance from the town I was met by a deputation of the local officers headed by Faqir Shah Din, who conducted me to my tents and took their leave. In the afternoon they visited me again to present me with usual *Zeqfats* on the part of Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia, by whom the place is held in Jagir.

After the Faqir and the Sardar's people had gone away I received a visit from Charan Singh Bedee, one of the proprietors of Phagwara. He has an eleemosynary grant of two villages in the vicinity from the Maharaja, and the moiety of a third from Kanwar Sher Singh. The Bedees among the Sikhs are treated with the same distinction and respect, as the Sayads among Mohammadans. They are descended from the tribe of their prophet, Nanak, hold extensive estates in free gift, and are the sole carriers of the trade of the Punjab, the holy character which they possess protecting them from many of those vexatious exactions to which other persons are exposed. The practice originated in times of anarchy and trouble, times when religious men could alone traverse the country without fear of molestation.

Phagwara was originally the property of Chuhar Mal. It was seized by the Maharaja in 1805, it being left without a direct heir. Ranjit Singh assigned it for a *nazrana* of Rs. 12,000 to Sardar Fetteh Singh with whom it was retained until the flight of that Sardar in 1826 across the Sutlej, when the Maharaja resumed it. In 1827, a reconciliation having occurred between the Sardar and him, by Fateh Singh's return to his allegiance, the place including a district of 75 villages (45 entire and the moiety of 30) were restored to him in Jagir at a valuation of a lakh of rupees. It is a considerable town, with a fine large garden and a tank founded by Phooloo Mal, a merchant of the place.

On the 14th I arrived at Jullundur, and was received with the same forms as I had been at Phagwara. In the evening Faqir Aziz-ud-Din visited me. I learned from him that His Highness had left Amritsar yesterday for Adinanagar, and the temporary bungalows had been ordered to be erected there for our accommodation.

Jullundur belongs to the state of Lahore and comprehends a district of 131 villages, 19 of which are equally divided with Sodee Sadhu Singh of Kartarpur and 9 granted in alms. It is a large place and was the chief seat of authority in the time of Mohammadan Governments in the Doab of Beas and Sutlej, called Bist Jullundur. There are twelve suburbs to the town, and several tanks now in ruins and some fine groves of mangoes. After the extinction of the Mughal Empire and the partition of the country by the Sikhs, Jullundur and its dependencies fell to the power of Sardar Khushal Singh Faizulpuria, from whose son, Sardar Budh Singh, it was taken in 1811 by Dewan Mohkam Chand after a siege of 7 days and annexed to the dominion of Ranjit Singh. The Sardar fled to some ancestral possessions which he had on the left bank of the Sutlej and received the protection of the British Government.

To-day I came to Kartarpur. When within a mile of the town, I was met by a deputation from Sodee Sadhu Singh, the proprietor of the place, to greet my arrival. The leader of the party informed me that the Sodee having heard of my approach only the day before, had that night made journey of 25 *kos* to see me at his residence. He had been absent in a hunting excursion. The usual *zeafats* were sent and in the evening I proceeded with Sardar Jagat Singh, Faqir Shah Din and the members of the Maharaja's mission to visit the Sodee. He received me in his castle situated in the centre of the town and was seated on the ground. Every one made a low obeisance to him as he approached and sat down before him in a circle. He presented each of the party with a *Teherook* or *Khillat* varying in the number of *parchehs* according to the rank of the person. I offered him a double barrelled gun and taking my leave went to see the shrine of Guru Arjan, the fifth in succession of the Sikh priests, but the first who collected the sayings of Baba Nanak and completed the celebrated book of the Sikhs called the Granth. Sodee Sadhu Singh inherited the original copy. Ranjit Singh who had evinced a strong desire to get possession of it succeeded two years ago in inducing the Sodee to cede it to him and the Maharaja proceeded in great state some distance from Amritsar to receive it. It was stipulated that the old guardians of the book should be retained and that it should be sent at the festivals of *Besakhi* and *Diwali* to its ancient seat at Kartarpur,

when crowds of people assemble to pay their devotions and present their offerings to the only symbol of idolatry which the Sikhs possess.

Following the practice observed by me in visiting similar holy places in my mission to Amritsar in 1827, and in deference to the expectation of my conductor, I appropriated a part of the money received in *Zeafat* to the shrine of Guru Arjan.

3. Wade to Prinsep, May, 19 1831, (137/9 P. G. R.)

Leaving Kartarpur I arrived on the 16th at Tandah, a large village situated in the alluvial land of the river Beas. It is farmed by the Maharaja to S. Fateh Singh whose officers received me with usual attention.

The next day marching parallel to the river at the distance from four to five *kos* I encamped at Desoocha, held in Jagir by Kanwar Tara Singh, said to be the twin brother of Sher Singh by Matab Kaur, the daughter of Mae Sadda Kaur, the mother-in-law of Ranjit Singh, but both believed to be supposed children. I heard that the Kanwar was at the place but receiving no communication from him I did not invite him myself. Desoocha is one of the oldest towns in the Punjab. It stands on an eminence in the midst of a moist and fertile tract. The air at night was remarkably cool. At day break the thermometer stood at 68. Both Tandah and Dasoocha were formerly a part of the possessions of S. Jassa Singh Ramgarhia, the head of a powerful Sikh confederacy which became extinct with the death of his son, Jodh Singh, when the Maharaja assumed the territory. He farmed Desoocha for some time to farmers of the revenue and then conferred it in Jagir to Tara Singh, who drives Rs. 12,000 from the land and Rs. 1,000 from the *sayer* collection of the town. It has a large brick fort at its northern angle, to the south there is an extensive piece of water. *Zeafats* were presented here as at the other states.

On the 18th I proceeded to Mookerian, the estate of Kanwar Sher Singh, whose manager received me with the customary marks of

hospitality. Immediately after reaching the camp, the Maharaja's agents announced the arrival of His Highness at Adinanagar. Mookerian and the adjoining territory were originally held by a considerable Mohammadan tribe called Awan, who asserted their independence with success for some time against the Sikhs, and were famous for their predatory habits. They were obliged at length to yield to the power of Jai Singh Kanaya, the founder of another confederacy of Sikhs. There is a mud fort with a double line of works about half a mile from the town on an open place. It is the usual residence of Kanwar Sher Singh. The place remained till 1821 in the possession of Mae Sada Kaur the lady whom I have already mentioned, who succeeded to the Kanaya estates in right of her husband, Gurbux Singh, the son of Jai Singh. In that year a disagreement arose between the Mae and Ranjit Singh which led to the seizure of her territory and her own confinement. Mookerian and Batala, estimated at one and a half lakh of rupees a year, were subsequently granted, and Khenah, the original seat of the family whence Kanaya came, was assigned at the same time for the Mae's support. It comprised 11 villages valued at an annual revenue of Rs. 17,000. Mae Sada Kaur is one of the most remarkable women of her time. To a severity and enthusiasm of character are added the higher attributes of fearless and enterprising valour. After the death of her husband, she connected herself with the rising dynasty and by marrying her daughter to Ranjit Singh whom she not only assisted by her counsels but by her presence in the field where she always appeared at the head of her troops and distinguished herself by feats of bravery seldom found in one of her sex.

The town of Mookerian is populous and surrounded by gardens. There is an extensive trade between it and Amritsar in ginger, turmeric, rice etc., which are brought from the hills situated at a convenient distance from the base, to form an *entrepot* for the commerce of the hills in its vicinity.

Three *kos* north-west of Mookerian, I passed the Beas or Hyphasis and encamped at Talabpur three *kos* beyond the river. The stream flows in one deep rapid channel with low shelving banks. About five hundred yards below the ferry is an inviting green spot shaded with large trees where the Maharaja has lately built a *Bāradari*. He makes frequent excursions to the place from

Adinanagar to enjoy the sport of hunting. Talibpur is included in the Jagir of Kanwar Sher Singh. It is a large village and a place of note among the Hindus as the chief seat of a tribe of *Bairagees* who hold extensive free lands and claim supremacy over 22 separate fraternities situated in different parts of India. The Kanwar's manager presented the usual *Zaafte*. In the evening I received a message from His Highness expressing his gratification at my approach and that a deputation would proceed half way to my camp tomorrow and escort me to Adinanagar distant five kos.

4. Wade to Prinsep, May 22, 1831. (137/11. P. G. R.)

I left Talibpur on the evening of the 20th instant and at half way to Adinanagar was met by Raja Sochet Singh, Jamadar Khushal Singh, Sardar Jawala Singh Bherania and Fateh Singh of Man, sent by the Maharaja to conduct me to the place fixed for my residence, after arriving at which I received a *Zaafat* of Rs. 5,000/- and 101 pots of sweetmeats besides bags of rice, ghee and other articles of entertainment. I am lodged in a garden belonging to Kanwar Kharak Singh in which there are *baradarees* and three small temporary bungalows for my accommodation by the side of a canal.

At 9 o'clock the next morning Faqir Aziz-ud-Din came to me with message from His Highness that Sardar Dasa Singh Majithia, Dhana Singh Malwee, and, Gujar Singh the son of Desa Singh would attend immediately to conduct me to him. On their arrival I proceeded towards the Maharaja's residence near the entrance to which I passed through two companies of Infantry and was saluted with 11 guns. I was met and conducted by Raja Dhian Singh and Jamadar Khushal Singh to the presence of His Highness who rose and led me advancing several paces from his chair, embraced and led me to a seat placed directly before him.

After some complimentary enquiries I presented the Governor General's letter (it is reproduced in full in Appendix

VI)* which Faqir Aziz-ud-Din was desired to read. The contents to which he listened with great intention appeared to please the Maharaja. I then explained the reason which had prevented His Lordship from making an immediate return mission. His Highness replied that it did not signify. The subject seems, however, to have previously laid hold of his mind, for the news-writer reported that the Maharaja being perplexed to account for the delay had early that morning sent Rs. 1100/- to the Kartarpuria Garanth and directed Shankar Nath Jotishi to send an offering of Rs. 125/- to the shrine of Jawalamukhi, Kangra and Permendel, and consult the aspect of the stars. I have since ascertained that the perusal of the Governor General's letter and my explanation have restored his confidence.

His Highness held his court on a terrace adjoining a *baradari* and complaining now of the heat led me into inside of the building where he was only followed by Rajas Sochet Singh and Hira Singh and Faqir Aziz-ud-Din. After conversation on different subjects for about half an hour during which he referred several times to the friendship existing between the two states he called for *atar* and gave me my dismissal. As I rose to go away I mentioned to the Faqir that I had brought a present of double barrelled gun and a pair of pistols of which I requested the Maharaja's acceptance from myself. I had done the same thing before in my mission to Amritsar and was expected to conform to a practice which is invariably observed in introductory visits to his court. In the evening *zeafats* of money and sweetmeats were sent. I thought it proper to return the money but keep the sweetmeats.

Adinanagar, which is near the hills of Noorpur is a town founded by Adina Beg Khan the last of the Mohammedan Governors of Lahore. Ranjit Singh has made it his retreat for some years past in the hot months having been attracted to the place by umbrageous groves with which it abounds and the freshness of the air imparted by the canals which pervades them. In the centre of these groves is the Maharaja's residence. The rest are occupied by the Sardars of the court and beyond them there are encamp-

* See pp. 338-40, *infra*.

ments of troops on all sides consisting of the *Ghoreherahs*, his principal camp of Infantry of eleven battalions. several brigades, of Horse Artillery and Corps of Messars Allared and Court. His Highness's chief motive in keeping them assembled here is, I believe, to exhibit them before me.

In the course of my audience I took an opportunity of conveying to the Maharaja the satisfaction which the Governor General had derived from the general appearance and conduct of of the troops which accompanied his mission to His Lordship. He said that the reports made by the envoys of the reception which the Governor General had given them had been gratifying to him. I congratulated His Highness on the decisive victory which his troops had gained over the fanatics in the vicinity of Attock. He replied that it was a subject of mutual congratulation as he considered the interests of the two states to be one and the same. The other part of the conversation consisted chiefly of enquiries regarding the French Revolution, the military strength of France and Russia, the political relations between Russia and China and those between the British Government, Ava and Nepal. The Maharaja appears in excellent health and in complete possession of that activity of mind and body which have always been the prominent feature of his character.

5. Wade to Prinsep, May, 25 1831. (137/13. P. G. R.)

On the evening of 22nd instant agreeably to invitation, I went accompanied by Jamadar Khushal Singh to the Maharaja and found him seated in a shady spot by the canals attended by a few Sardars and a set of about 30 dancing girls, richly dressed in yellow silk garments and armed with bows and arrows in men's attire. Some fountains were also playing by his side which diffused a cool and refreshing air and he appeared in an easy and affable mood.

After some conversation he gave the Sardars, with the exception of the two, their leave and called to the dancing girls who were

asked to come forward, shortly after which wine was introduced and drinking some himself he asked me and Dr. Murray to follow his example, which we did. He repeated his libations every quarter of an hour measuring the quantity which he took in a small cup containing about liquid ounce. Sir David Ochterloney had, he said, attended similar orgies in his visit to the court observing that he could take more wine then than he could now and that he had asked Sir David over their libations whether the British Government had any design of extending its possessions who said, "No, the Company was satiated" (*Sair hogia*). He enquired of me if it was still the case. Then dilating on the satisfaction which he had derived from his alliance with the Company, he said that when Sir Charles Metcalfe had received his leave at Lahore, he was surprised to see him come back and asking the reason Sir Charles remarked, "The Sardars who are now around you imagine or say that my mission to your court will be the cause of detriment to you. Be assured that such is not the case. You will find your advantage in the Treaty 20 years hence." In the course of evening he also spoke a good deal about Lieut. Burnes' journey, the navigation of the Indus and the state of his relations with Sindh. He informed me that the Amirs opened a communication with him after his first expedition to Multan when he sent a *Vakil* to them, that he had proceeded to Hyderabad by water, that the tribes on each bank of the Indus fired at him as he went down, but the river was so broad that by keeping in the middle of the stream, he found himself entirely beyond reach of their shots.

Trays of confectionery dressed in different ways to give a relish to the wine were brought of which we partook and after a sitting of more than three hours he desired Raja Sochat Singh to see us to a boat which was in attendance to convey us home. I was particularly struck with the combination of ease and propriety which he exhibited during the novel scene to which we had been invited.

About 7 o'clock on the morning of 24th His Highness sent Raja Dhian Singh to bring me to his presence. He was

seated on the top of the gateway leading to the garden in which he has his residence and was commencing to take a muster of the troops commanded by Jamadar Khushal Singh, Raja Sochet Singh and the corps of *Ghorcherahs* forming his personal guard. Carpets were spread at the foot of the gateway and in passing by each man deposited a *nazar* of a rupee.

The Sindhian *Vakils* came while we were sitting. The Maharaja introduced them to me and enquiring of them whether they had any intelligence of Lt. Burnes, they replied that he would be here immediately. There were upwards of Rs. 5,000 collected in *nazars* from which I infer that more than that number of persons must have passed in review. He said that he had heard that corporal punishments were discontinued in the British service, and asked me whether the information was correct. The *Ghoacherahs* and others were almost all dismounted. His Highness said that he had ordered them to send their horses away that the country might not be distressed by supporting them which led me to enquire whether he had any regulations to restrain his troops from destroying the crops in their line of march. He stated that he had the most prohibitory orders in force on the subject and took prompt and severe action and notice of any infraction of them. His attention to the preservation of the crops from the depredation is remarkable. Few chiefs exercise a more rigid control over the conduct of their troops than he does.

He talked of the distant predatory expeditions which the Sikhs were formerly in the habit of making, their mode of warfare, absence of discipline when he began to organize them into regular corps, and their endurance of privations and the severe contests in which they were engaged with the Afghans, before they succeeded in securing their independence. Speaking of Shah Zaman's last invasion of the Punjab in 1799, he said that the Shah had ordered a contribution of thirty lakhs of rupees to be levied from the city of Lahore, and left a garrison at Gujrat which the Sikhs attacked and killed the Commander and since then the ascendancy of the Sikhs had been progressive.

Amar Singh Thappa and the Gurkhas then became the topic of observations. He extolled the military character of the Gurkhas, spoke of the defeat which the Sikhs had given them at Kangra and that they had in their hostilities with the British Government sought his aid which he refused, and in compliance with the expressed wish of Sir David Ochterloney prohibited the conveyance of any supplies to them from his territory of Anandpur Makhwal. "Amar Singh Thappa proposed the partition of Kashmir and the hills of Kangra with me", the Maharaja said, "but they appeared to me to be a very designing and faithless race of people, and my object was to make them retire across the Sutlej which I effected." Two sons of Thappa and a battalion of Gurkhas are in the service of His Highness and within the last two days a son of Balbheder Singh has come for employment and been admitted. He encourages the Gurkhas to enter his army. Messrs Allard and Court presented themselves before the Maharaja while I was in conversation with him and he addressed them in a kind and familiar manner. I now took my leave. It is impossible to keep in mind the infinity of questions which His Highness asks in my interviews with him, but I endeavour to record some of most prominent, in order to convey an idea of the inquisitive nature of his character whenever an opportunity occurs of enlarging the sphere of his knowledge.

6. Wade to Prinsep, June 5, 1831. (137/14 P. G. R.)

I have the honour to inform you that adverting to the near approach of the rains and the difficulty of travelling at that season I deemed it expedient to apply to the Maharaja for permission to return and that after some solicitations he has appointed the day after tomorrow to give me my leave of audience.

Since my last letter to you I have seen His Highness at another review of troops Having already described my former interviews with him I need not detail what passed at the last. It has been to exhibit the Maharaja in the three different situations, of state, retirement, and at the head of his troops, in which he has appeared to me that I have entered

into details which possess no other value than that of giving an insight into the forms of his court, his character and mode of life.

I shall leave this place on the morning of the 8th and weather permitting expect to be at Ludhiana on the 13th instant, when I will do myself the honour to transmit the report of my final audience accompanied by an account of the receipts and disbursements attending my journey.

7. Wade to Prinsep, June, 19 1831, (127/17. P. G. R.)

Agreeably to the intimation conveyed in my letter of the 5th instant I beg leave to report that I had my audience of leave from Maharaja Ranjit Singh on the morning of the 7th and proceeded the next day to Ludhiana where I arrived on the 13th instant.

His Highness received me with nearly the same ceremonies and in the same place as in my introductory visit to him.

Immediately after my arrival he introduced me to Kanwar Sher Singh who had just come to the court. When enquiring of me in the interview of the 26th ultimo whether the British Government rewarded the special services of the troops, the Maharaja observed that he had sent Kanwar Sher Singh a present of Rs. 50,000 after his late victory over Sayad Ahmad and that instead of appropriating it to himself, he had distributed it among his forces besides Rs. 25,000 of his own money. Sher Singh partakes largely of that spirit of liberality which characterises His Highness's disposition towards his troops whether for distinguished conduct against an enemy or pre-eminence in military exercise while practising his Sardars and *Ghorcherahs* in firing at marks which the Maharaja is often in the habit of doing. The names of those who are the most expert are at once taken down in writing and successful candidates are rewarded by shawls, horses and golden bracelets of various value varying according to the rank and skill of the receivers. In imitating those popular qualities of His Highness Sher Singh has more than a common motive. Independently of his predilection for military fame, he is ambitious and bears a high character among the Sikhs for his intelligence, activity and courage.

They consider him as the most likely person to obtain eventually the sovereignty of the Punjab to the exclusion of Kanwar Kharak Singh. The French officers entertained the same disposition.

Five Sardars who were in action with the Sayad were also present at court. The Maharaja pointed them out to me by name, mentioned their families and spoke of their respective merits. He then addressed me regarding Lt. Burnes, said that his progress was very slow, four or five *kos* a day, and that his long confinement to a boat must be very irksome. An idea had entered His Highness's mind that the party would disembark at Multan. I stated that they had not, I believed, any tents or equipage for marching; and besides, the journey by water was more practicable in the rainy season (when the Lt. would be entering the Ravi) than one by land, to which he readily assented. "I hope," he added, "that you will join me at Lahore when Lt. Burnes arrives. I have written to the Governor General that I wish for your attendance and shall give you timely notice of his approach. My intention is to pass away the time in the vicinity of Adinanagar until I hear that the party has reached Multan and then I shall descend by the Ravee in a boat forthwith to Lahore."

He now presented me with the letter for the Governor General in reply to the one which I delivered from His Lordship and began to expatiate on the great friendship which subsisted between the two states, that the advantages foretold by Sir Charles Metcalfe had in reality come to pass. The Maharaja had made the same observations to me before in speaking of Sir Charles, his confidence in him and his rise in the Hon'ble Company's service. "I expect," His Highness continued, "that you will assure the Governor General that I am actuated by the most cordial sentiments of attachment for him and his Government and that I have nothing more at heart than the desire of improving and perpetuating the relations which exist between me and the British Government."

The Maharsja then enquired if I was going immediately to His Lordship. He said, "I hear the Governor General has gone to Kot Garh. What stay does he make there? How far has the road which passes

Simla been extended and where it is intended to be carried ?” There is an opinion in the Punjab that the British Government is desirous of opening a communication with Kashmir by the route of Sanower and the Sikhs imagine that the road in question is projected with that view.

A person was now desired to bring *Khillats* for myself, Dr. Murray and some of the public servants attached to me including His Highness's resident agent at Ludhiana and the commandant Chet Singh. The *Khillats* having been presented, the Maharaja informed me that he had ordered Fateh Singh of Maneh with a troop of Cavalry and a company of Infantry to escort me to Filor and that Faqir Shah Din would also attend. Then embracing me, he gave me my leave. He had forgotten the presentation of *atar* and recollecting it called me back to go through that ceremony.

During the duty on which I have been employed I have exchanged visits with some of His Highness' principal Sardars on which and other occasions, presents have, in conformity with the established practice of his court, been received and given.

The Governor General will perceive that in his reception of me His Highness has evinced every desire to do credit to the dignity of the British Government and the satisfaction which he feels in the increased friendly relations which have lately distinguished the intercourse of the two states.

APPENDIX VI.

Letter from the Governor General to Ranjit Singh dated the 27th April, 1831

(See pp. 83 and 329-30).

After compliments——Your Highness's letter, received on the 23rd instant (recapitulating contents) was delivered to me in a happy moment and gave me extreme satisfaction. Of a truth the garden of friendship and cordiality and the rose beds of unanimity and concord between the two states of exalted dignity have been watered by the bounty of the Deity and carefully tended by the wisdom and foresight of those who have had the direction of affairs on both sides so as in the fragrance and luxuriance to be the envy and admiration of all, and the foundations of the exaltation and splendour of the two Governments, have, through the same causes attained a permanence and stability beyond the reach of accidents. May God be thanked for this. I trust Your Highness is thoroughly convinced that agreeably to the conditions of subsisting engagements and in conformity with the relations established, the leaves of the flowers (enjoying ever lasting spring) of the garden of friendship and affection will be adorned by the verdure of perpetuity and the partners of cordiality and mutual good understanding will always be cultivated with augmented care, and that I personally shall continually make it my study to increase the subsisting friendship, and tie closer the bonds of amity, so that the appearance of difference or alienation, or estrangement or separation of interests shall no where find entrance, but on the contrary the radiant (*sic*) of the unanimity established from old shall shine forth like the sun enlightening the world and give brilliancy to the page of history, while the relations of long standing friendship without interruption of any kind will become a bye-word among the noble and distinguished persons of the age and be talked of amongst men of all ranks in all parts of the world, and the friends of each at seeing the fruits and results of this happy state of things will derive satisfaction in proportion as the enemies and evil disposed sink into shame and suffer mortification.

My friend ! Sirdar Hari Singh and the other persons deputed by Your Highness, who, through the wisdom of your arrangements, are men of understanding and discernment, arrived with the presents and were received by me at Simla, when they delighted me with their assurance of Your Highness's cordiality and good feelings. The presents sent by Your Highness were laid out before me, and the horses of high breed and fine paces and the shawl goods of rare quality and texture, and the sword of high temper and the dagger with jewelled hilt, excited my particular admiration ; indeed all the articles sent by Your Highness were gratifying to me in a high degree. May the Deity long preserve Your Highness in this friendly disposition and with increased honour and exaltation. My friend ! Although the relations of friendship which subsist between the two Governments of high dignity, allow not a shade of alienation to appear and have removed all ordinary sources of trouble and inconvenience, still a regard to the magnificence and exalted state of the two Governments requires that appearances towards the world should be kept up and the performance on my part of the duties of friendship ought to proceed with all possible despatch, it is my wish and would be source of great joy to me, that this should be so ; but the season of the hot winds has arrived when travelling is inconvenient—nay impossible—, and on this account my wishes (in regard to the return mission) cannot be accomplished. Besides, I have come up to Simla in mountains without equipage or attendants and in consequence of the difficulties of the roads, have left all my retinue behind me in the plains. It is my intention to remain until the end of the rains in this retirement. Hence the accomplishment of the purpose I have in view must unavoidably be deferred. God willing, when the proper time shall arrive I will endeavour to execute my friendly attention in such a manner as to give Your Highness satisfaction and display the footing of unanimity on which the two Governments stand in a proper light before the world.

At present I have given audience of leave to the Deputies sent by Your Highness, bestowing on them the usual marks of favour and satisfaction due to the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.

This letter will be delivered to Your Highness by Captain Wade, the officer through whom the communications with Your Highness are usually made and who will proceed to Your Highness's Court for the purpose. This officer will make known to Your Highness the sincerity of my feelings towards you, and will represent also other matters more explicitly.

I trust Your Highness will believe me to be always desirous of hearing etc., etc.,

115/76. Prinsep to Wade. April 28. 1831. Punjab Government Records.



APPENDIX VII

List of persons composing the suite of Maharaja Ranjit Singh at the Rupar meeting.

(See p. 90).

Kanwar Kharak Singh.	...	His Highness's son.
Sardar Atar Singh.)	
Sardar Bessowah Singh.)	...	Brothers of the Sendhan branch
Sardar Lehna Singh.)		of the Maharaja's family.
Rajah-i-Rajahgan Raja Dhian Singh.		Raja Heera Singh, his son.
Raja Sochet Singh.)	
Raja Gulab Singh.)	...	Brothers of Dhian Singh.
Udham Singh	...	Gulab Singh's son.
Jamabar Khoshal Singh.		
Sardar Fateh Singh Ahluwalia.	...	Nau Nihal Singh, his son.
Sardar Desah Singh Majithia.	...	Sardar Lehna Singh, his son.
Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa.		
Sardar Jawala Singh Bherania.		
Sardar Jewend Singh Mokol.		
Sardar Dhannah Singh Malwae.		
Sardar Fateh Singh Manh.		
Sardar Sham Singh.)	
Sardar Jagat Singh.)	...	Atarewala.
Sardar Jai Singh.)		
Sardar Chattar Singh.)		
Dewan Moti Ram.		
Faqir Aziz-ud-Din.		
Lala Kishan Chand.		
Sardar Kishan Singh Jalewalia.		
M. Allard.		
M. Court.		
Raja Sangat Singh of Jind.		
Raja Jeeth Singh of Ladhwa.		
Faqir Shah Sin, son of Faqir Aziz-ud-Din.		

Note :—The following is the note about this letter in the Punjab Government Records: Pages 135-36. Undated and Unsigned.

137/36. Wado to the Secretary to the Governor General.

APPENDIX VIII

Translation of the paper delivered by the Governor General to Ranjit Singh containing assurances of perpetual friendship, dated the 31st October, 1831.

(See p. 90)

In these days of auspicious commencement and happy close, while the sound of rejoicing has gladdened the firmament, a meeting has been arranged at a fortunate moment and under favourable circumstances between the heads of the two exalted Governments, on the terms of reciprocal friendship, and in all cordiality with reference to the relations established of old between the two States, and many interviews and conversations have been held with mirth and joy and mutual satisfaction, the rose buds of our hearts on both sides having expanded, and garden of our sensations being in blossom from the exceeding joy and good feeling that prevailed. Of a truth the growing friendship and cordiality which subsisted between the two Darbars of exalted dignity have been watered and fostered by the hand of Providence, and by the showers of the Divine grace, so as to have reached a maturity and strength for which God be praised. Nevertheless, Your Highness may derive further satisfaction from the assurance that, agreeably to the relations of friendship which have been thus established, in the same manner from generation to generation, as settled by reciprocal engagements, shall the growth of this friendship continue and increase, and the materials of the existing good understanding be sought and extended at all times and at all places. There shall never at any time, or on any account whatsoever, be any difference or estrangement, nor shall such feelings in any way find entrance. But on the contrary, the example of the unanimity and long standing friendship shall like the sun shine glorious in history, and the reputation of it shall become a bye-word amongst the princess and rulers of the earth and be a subject of conversation to all ranks of men in all countries and at all times, so that, observing the fruits of this long standing friendship, the two Governments shall rejoice, and their enemies and those who envy their good fortune shall be downcast and repentant.

Hereafter all the gentlemen and authorities of the British Government will study to maintain in perpetuity the relations which exist, as established by mutual engagements of long standing, so as to raise and display to the world the standards of the mutual good faith, fidelity and cordiality of the two Governments.

These few lines have been committed to writing, as a testimony of friendship at Rooper, and have been signed and sealed by me, to be delivered in person at this last interview on the 31st October, 1831, corresponding with the 24th of Jumadee-Oss Sane, 1247 Hegiree, to His Highness Maharaja Ranjit Singh Behauder.

W. C. BENTINCK.

Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads*, Vol. I, p. 35.



APPENDIX IX

Letter from Wade to Pottinger, Resident in Cutch, explaining the British attitude towards the Indus trade scheme and the Amirs of Sind, dated the 22nd October, 1831.

(See pp. 79 and 102).

The Secret Committee of the Hon'ble Court of Directors have expressed great anxiety to obtain the free navigation of the Indus with a view to the advantages that must result from substituting our own influence for that derived by Russia through her commercial intercourse with Bokhara in the countries lying between Hindustan and the Caspian sea, as well as because of the great facilities afforded by this river for the disposal of the products of manufacture of the British Dominions both in Europe and in Asia.

2. You will have been aware that the determination to send the present of His late Majesty to Maharaja Ranjit Singh by water up the Indus was adopted mainly to ascertain the real facilities offered by that river, and the causes why it was at present so little used as a route of commerce, seeing that heretofore, there is reason to believe that the boats upon it were as numerous and that it was as much used by merchants and travellers as the river Ganges is at present.

3. The result of Lieut. Burne's survey proves this river to be much better adapted to every purpose of commerce, to be more navigable and for a longer distance, and to have greater and more uniform depth and less opposing current than any of the rivers of India further east. Consequently the causes of the departure of commerce from the banks of the Indus and of its tributary streams must be sought in the political circumstances of the countries through which they flow, in the want of security of person and property, in the exactions practised by the petty chiefs or by the officers of the larger powers, and in the jealousies and mutual distrust which exist among the chiefs and prevent any consistent principle being adopted for the regulation of duties and to protect and cherish the commerce carried up and down this noble stream.

4. It has seemed to the Governor General that by the mediation of the British Government, many of these obstructions to commerce might be in a great part lessened, if not totally removed, and moreover that in the existing relations between the states through which the Indus and its tributary streams pass from the mountains to the sea, and again between all those states and the British Government there happens to be a combination of circumstances most favourable to the accomplishment of the views of the Secret Committee.

5. His Lordship has accordingly watched with considerable interest the progress of Lieut. Burnes in his late voyage and has waited for its issue to determine on the proper course to be followed in order to accomplish the purposes in the view of the Secret Committee in full confidence that the zeal, prudence and intelligence of that officer would overcome any temporary obstacles and furnish all the materials and information required for forming a mature judgment. The result has justified His Lordship's most sanguine expectations.

6. The Governor General has now received and considered the report of Lieut. Burnes and having invited this officer to Simla and communicated fully with him on the subject of his recent successful voyage up the Indus to Lahore, has determined that an effort to procure the opening of the navigation of that river to the commerce of India and of Europe should be made without delay. Confiding, therefore, in your experienced judgment and talents His Lordship has resolved to entrust to you this important negotiations.

7. The river Indus from the ocean nearly to its point of junction with the united streams of the Punjab rivers runs exclusively within the limits of the territories of the Amirs of Sindh—Meer Morad Ali Khan, the Chief of the Talpur family, having his capital at Hyderabad, possesses both banks as far as Shwan, Rustam Ali, the second in rank and having his capital at Khyrpur, possesses both banks also from Shwan to the northern extremity of Sindh. These chiefs are independent of each other but though mutually jealous they make common cause against all invaders. The Indus north of the Sindh states, together with all the rivers of the Punjab, excepting the Sutlej, is, with the intervention of an inconsiderable

trust (*sic*) in the possession of the Daoodputras and governed by Bhawal Khan under the dominion of Ranjit Singh—of the Sutlej he holds the right bank, and the states belonging to the Sikh protected chiefs, with which the British possessions are intermingled, together with those of the Nawab of Bhawalpur, occupy the left.

8. On referring to the map, it will at once appear, that the portion of the Indus comprised within the territory of the two Amirs of Sindh above mentioned alone offers almost every facility which could be desired for transporting all the commerce coming from seaward, as well as by the great land route from Palee to Shikarpur which is the great emporium of the western trade, and through which also via Kandhar are the principle routes to be found for an invasion of India. The free navigation of the Indus, north of Sindh as far as Attock, and of all the other rivers of the Punjab would advance the general advantage and more specially the prosperity of Ranjit Singh's dominions, but the opening of these rivers is not necessary to the main object in view nor could it be demanded of Ranjit Singh as a matter of right. The Sutlej alone is an exception. The possessors of each bank have a common claim to the navigation and it is not anticipated that any objection will be raised by Ranjit Singh to the principle, or any difficulty be found in the arrangement of the duties to which the chiefs on each side may have a well-founded claim. The arbitration of the British Government will in all probability be willingly acquiesced in by all the respective parties.

9. It is His Lordship's intention to communicate to Ranjit Singh the proposition that has been made to the Amirs of Sindh and to invite him to be a party to a general measure for establishing a secure and uninterrupted navigation of the Indus and of all the rivers of the Punjab and for fixing the duties by a moderate and well defined tariff. This negotiation is to be conducted separately from that with which you are entrusted and it is unnecessary at present to speculate upon the view Ranjit Singh may take of an arrangement which commercially would greatly add to his revenue, but politically may not be regarded with the same favour, in as much as he may think that it will connect our interest and our power with those of Sindh and thus create an obstacle to his design of future aggression upon the Amirs, a design which he frankly acknowledged to Lieut. Burnes, and the alarm that the advance of Ranjit

Singh's troops towards the Sindh frontier and the progressive and systematic reduction of every neighbouring state under his dominion must be considered as one of the favourable circumstances which may be expected to have the greatest influence upon our ultimate success.

10. The navigation then, as far as all the objects contemplated by the instructions of the Secret Committee are concerned, is limited to the two Amirs of Sindh, Meer Morad Ali of Hyderabad and Meer Rustam Ali of Khyrpur. The report of Lieut. Burnes describes the very friendly reception he met from the Amir of Khyrpur. He attests the anxious desire of the Chief to be in alliance with the British Government and to be placed in the same manner as the Raja of Bikaner (Bikanir) and Jesselmeer and the other Rajput States under British protection, and his readiness, as the price of this benefit, to agree to any terms that might be asked of him. There can be no doubt therefore of the cordial assent of this Amir to the free navigation of that part of the Indus within his territory. There then only remains to be obtained the consent of the principal Amir of Hyderabad. It is the opinion of Lieut. Burnes, drawn from the distrustful character of this Prince and from its having been always his policy, like that of the Chinese, to consider his security as best effected by the exclusion of all foreigners from his dominions, that he will reject the proposition. Supposing this opinion to be well-founded, as I am much inclined to believe it is, the question then arises whether he or any other state possessing only a portion of a stream, has a right, either by prohibition, or what is tantamount to it, by the impositions of excessive duties, or by a connivance at a system of plunder by his subjects on the traders, to deprive all other people and states of an advantage which nature has given to all. In this particular case, the Amir of Hyderabad possesses the mouth and an extent of not more than 150 miles of the course of the Indus. Many of the rivers of the Punjab, all of which disembody by this outlet, are navigable to the extent of 1,000 miles and upwards. Has this chief alone the right to seal hermetically its mouth, to arrogate the sole and exclusive dominion of its navigation and to deny the right of an innocent use and passage of this great natural channel of the commercial intercourse?

11. His Lordship is aware that a chief bigotted and ignorant like Morad Ali will be little inclined to listen to any argument except that which his distrust and the supposed security derived from the policy which he has hitherto pursued may suggest. But it will be important to set before him the principles which have regulated the practice of other countries in similar cases and which may be said to constitute the Law of Nations.

12. The following passage is taken from Vattel (page 120.8261) upon the right of passage through the strait connecting two seas the navigation of which is common to many nations. The case here described seems to form an exact parallel with that under consideration, and the reasoning of that celebrated author seems to place the question of right beyond all doubt and controversy. It must be remarked with regard to the straits that when they serve for a communication between two seas, the navigation of which is common to all or to many nations, he who possesses the strait cannot refuse others a passage through it, provided that passage be innocent and attended with no danger to the state. Such a refusal without just reason would deprive these nations of an advantage granted them by nature, and indeed the right of such a passage is a reminder of the primitive liberty enjoyed in common. Nothing but the care of his own safety can authorize the master of the strait to make use of certain precautions, and to require the formalities commonly established by the custom of nations. He has a right to levy small duties on the vessels that pass on account of the inconvenience they give him by obliging him to be on his guard, by the security provided them in protecting them from their enemies, and keeping pirates at a distance, and the expense he has to incur in maintaining light houses, seamarks and other things necessary to the safety of the mariners. Thus the king of Denmark requires a custom at the Straits of the (illegible). Such rights are to be founded on the same reasons, and to be subject to the same rules as the tolls established by land or on a river.

13. Such being His Lordship's views both of the justice of the claim, and of the advantages that the present opportunity offers to the

negotiation, he has determined to address letters to the three Amirs of Sindh, the heads of the Hyderabad, Khyrpur, and Meerpur families, expressive of his desire that the routes of commerce through their territories should be opened and put under regulation and that the navigation of the Indus in particular should be placed on such a footing as to render that river, as in ancient times, the highway of commerce for the interchange of commodities between upper Hindustan and Central Asia on one side and Dukhun and countries beyond sea on the other.

14. Enclosed are the letters of the Governor General on this subject with copies for your information. His Lordship desires that you should deliver them in person as the special Agent of the Governor General, empowered to explain his wishes and to receive any communications and propositions that the Chiefs may desire to submit either as the condition of their agreeing to open the navigation of the Indus under state regulations or otherwise.

15. You will of course first address yourself to the Chief of Hyderabad. It is desirable that his assent should follow his own perfect convictions, that his own country would derive the greatest benefit from the increased duties from an increasing commerce, the necessary result of security and protection, and from the establishment within his own dominions of the principal port of deposit and of interchange of all the trade of all the countries between the Jamuna and the Persian Gulf. You will use your best endeavours to impress their obvious truths upon his understanding. His Lordship, however, entertains little hope that his prejudices will yield to those better principles which even the most uncivilised nations have not been so backward to acknowledge. Failing in these representations you will content yourself with stating strongly and decidedly the right possessed by the British Government and by all other states situated and bordering upon the many streams which concentrate in the Indus. His Lordship is desirous that nothing like menace should accompany this latter declaration and that the whole of your negotiation should be conducted in the most friendly and conciliatory spirit. His Lordship is of opinion that the acquiescence of this Chief, however reluctant he may be, will be extorted ultimately by the force of circumstances, and His Lordship

is anxious that time should be given to these to operate and to work their own way. The circumstances referred to are his own isolated position, and his absolute helplessness when put in the balance against the designs of Ranjit Singh, against the aspirations of his own partners in the dominion of Sindh, and against the power of the British Government with whom it cannot be unknown to him that the other Ameers are most anxious to enter into alliance. His Lordship, therefore, is of opinion that should your exertions meet the direct rejection which he expects, you will state that you are about to proceed by Governor General's order to make the same propositions to Rustam Ali of Khyrpur, and that Ranjit Singh has been similarly invited to a general arrangement for a free navigation of that part of the Indus running through his dominions and of all the rivers in the Punjab.

16. It is possible at the same time, that Morad Ali convinced of his inability to oppose the wishes of the British Government may propose certain stipulations as the conditions of his acquiescence—an acknowledgment of and promise to respect the independence of the Hyderabad state. The aid of the British power to secure the succession of his second and favourite son to the *Musnud*, a defensive alliance against Ranjit Singh and the Afghans, or perhaps an annual pecuniary payment. To all these propositions our general remark is applicable that when there exists a natural right and the power to enforce it, both justice and reason reject all title to concession of compensation in return. To the first condition there could be no objection, an obvious answer to the second would be that a grant of the assistance here asked would involve a positive interference in the internal affairs of the state and consequently a violation of the independence which the British Government is for ever desirous of holding sacred.

17. The third condition—a defensive or protecting alliance—may not be asked by Morad Ali but certainly forms the main and anxious desire of Rustam Ali. How far it may be a good policy or otherwise to bring all the states east of the Indus within the protection of the paramount power of the British Government at their own special request, is a question that demands serious consideration, and upon

which His Lordship will forbear for the present from giving any opinion. But this and all other propositions that may be made by these Chiefs, you will submit to the Governor General stating that you have no authority to agree to them.

18. From the annexed note of Lieut. Burnes relating to a communication received by him at Lahore from the *Vakil* of the Amir of Meerpur, a counterpart of which had been already made, as stated by an emissary of this Chief to the Political Agent at Ajmeer, it will be seen that this Chief is equally desirous with the Amir of Khyrpoor to place himself under British protection. His territory however does not lie upon the Indus nor is there any great commercial route through it to that river. The Amir desired that his proposition for an alliance if not agreed to, should be kept secret, as it might excite the displeasure of the Amir of Hyderabad whose superior power he fears, and whom he is said personally to dislike. Any communication with this Chief with whose country and interest the professed object of the negotiation has no connection whatever might possibly add to the distrust that the Amir of Hyderabad will be too well inclined to indulge, as well for our own intentions as those of his nearer neighbours. His Lordship therefore leaves it to your discretion to present or withhold this letter and to make any communication or not direct from yourself as you may deem expedient.

19. There is another point to which His Lordship wishes to direct your particular attention, *viz.*, the projected marriage between the second son of Murad Ali with a Princess of Persia. It is probable that the honour of this connection may have been the sole motive on the part of the ruler of Sindh, and the large sum of money said to be demanded by the Shah of Persia would sufficiently explain that the latter is an avaricious sovereign. But it is not impossible that this connection may have been suggested by Russia with a view to future political alliance and to the establishment of an immediate relationship through Persia with an Indian State by means of which, whether for intrigue or for actual attack a ready access would be afforded to our Indian Empire. The information received by Lieut. Burnes relative to this marriage has been already communicated to the Governor General.

20. The Right Hon'ble the Governor-in-Council at Bombay will be requested to relieve you from your present charge at as early a date as possible in order to permit your proceeding on the mission assigned to you in the course of ensuing months. The Governor-General will be at Ajmir towards the end of January, so that he will have the advantage of viewing immediate intelligence of the progress of your negotiations.

21. This despatch will be forwarded under a flying seal through the Governor-in-Council at Bombay with a request that His Lordship will furnish you with any paper or information and with any suggestions that in His Lordship's opinion may forward the object of your mission.

22. A separate communication will be made to the Government of Bombay upon the subject of your allowance.

(98/101. Punjab Government Records).



APPENDIX X

Letter from Macnaghten, Secretary to the Government of India, to Wade, dated the 26th September, 1836, on the British attitude towards Sind and Ranjit Singh's designs in that direction.

(See p. 140)

I am desired by the Right Honourable the Governor General of India in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated the 19th 29th and 30th ultimo.

2. His Lordship in Council having naturally considered the several circumstances detailed in the above communications has desired me to convey to you the following orders :

3. His Lordship in Council entertains the conviction that the Government of India is bound by the strongest considerations of political interest to prevent the extension of the Sikh power along the whole course of the Indus. It cannot also view with indifference any disturbance of the existing relations of peace between the several states occupying the banks of that river. The first effect of hostilities between the Governments of Lahore and Sind must be to postpone for a period the limit of which cannot be foreseen, the attainment of the object to which the British Government attaches so much importance of again rendering the Indus the channel of a safe and extensive commerce. The position likewise of Sind in reference to the British territories, to Afghanistan and the Punjab, and to the share which it possesses in the command of the Indus, must ever induce the Government of India to watch the political condition of that country with anxious attention, and dispose it to cultivate a close connection on terms which may be beneficial to both parties with the Sind Government.

4. It is at the same time the anxious desire of the Governor General in Council that the important object of maintaining tranquillity and the present distribution of power along the line of the Indus should

be attained by the recourse to no other means than those of amicable negotiation.

5. The advance of Ranjit Singh's army towards Shikarpur is an event which calls the immediate attention of the Governor General in Council to this subject and you have already been authorized by my letter of 22nd ultimo to use all your influence with the Maharaja in the way of friendly remonstrance with the view of inducing His Highness to abandon any hostile intentions which he may have entertained towards the territories of the Amirs of Sind.

6. His Lordship in Council will be rejoiced to find that your remonstrance has been attended with success, but as the result may have been different, I am now desired to instruct you to use every means in your power short of actual menace to keep His Highness at Lahore, and to prevent the further advance of his army for a period sufficient to admit of your receiving a communication from Lieut. Col. Pottinger to whom I have this day addressed a letter by order of His Lordship in Council, a copy of which is herewith sent for your information and guidance.

7. Should you be of opinion that pending the communication from Lieut. Col. Pottinger by which your ulterior proceedings will be guided, your influence is likely to be more efficacious if exercised in person than by letter, you are authorized to repair to the Darbar of the Maharaja marking over the temporary change of your duties at Ludhiana to be Commanding Officer of the station.

8. You will be pleased to report to Lieut. Col. Pottinger and to the Lieut. Governor, North Western Provinces, direct and without loss of time the result of the measures which you are now authorized to adopt, and the effect which may have been produced by them on the movements of His Highness's army.

9. With regard to His Highness's application for medical aid, I am directed to desire that you will avail yourself of the services of my Assistant Surgeon who can be most conveniently spared from his duty,

and that you will direct him to repair to Ranjit Singh, expressing to His Highness the same time the great gratification derived by His Lordship in Council from being able to meet his wishes in his instance, as the preservation of the health of so old and sincere a friend as the Maharaja must always be an object of earnest solicitude to the British Government.

10. At the same time that the Governor General in Council cordially and without hesitation accedes to this wish of Ranjit Singh, I am desired to instruct you that, in the event of the Maharaja's proceeding on any expedition contrary to the expressed wishes or policy of the British Government, you should withdraw from attendance on His Highness's person any officer bearing a Commission from the Hon'ble Company.

11. Adverting to the rumour alluded to in your letter of the 19th ultimo, that Shah Shuja is mediating a movement towards Sind and that this circumstance has probably influenced the proceedings of Ranjit Singh, I am directed to desire that you will cause it to be intimated to Shah Shuja that should he again quit Ludhiana without the express sanction of the British Government, he will no longer be allowed an asylum within the British territories nor will any maintenance be granted to himself or his family.

12. It occurs to the Governor General in Council that in your communications with the Maharaja this view of what is due to the maintenance of amicable (relations) in all countries may be made by you a further ground of conciliation with the sovereign of Lahore—not that the admonition to Shah Shuja be treated in the light of a concession to Ranjit Singh. Conduct such as that of the exiled monarch, so directly tending to the disturbance of the neighbouring and friendly states, ought under any circumstances to be prevented, and it is due to ourselves that measures should be taken for that purpose.

13. In all your communications with the Maharaja you will maintain the most friendly tone towards himself and the Sikh nation, and you

will afford him every assurance that the British Government scrupulously adheres to all its pledges of totally abstaining from interposition in regard to the acknowledged dominions of His Highness. It will be the spirit of your negotiations that the British Government thinks itself entitled to ask from His Highness that he will show to the neighbouring states with which it is intimately connected the same tenderness by which His Highness is well aware that it is itself uniformly guided in the conduct of its external relations.

14. It is probable that His Highness will urge that he has received provocations from the rulers of Sind which demand redress. If, in the issue of negotiations now authorized, it should be your duty to announce to him that the Amirs have formally placed themselves under the British protection, it will of course be an obligation attaching to the Government of India to obtain from him redress for real wrongs. In any event, you will state that the British Government is ready to interpose its good offices for the equitable settlement of all matters which have given rise to differences between the two states.

15. It is reported that the troops of His Highness have occupied the country of the Mazaris a predatory tribe nominally subject to Sind. In repressing these plunderers His Highness has effected an object of general benefit. To that measure, therefore, the British Government takes no objection. The arrangements to be made for the permanent control of the Mazaris will become a subject of future negotiation.

16. His Lordship in Council will await with much anxiety the report of your proceedings under the instructions above conveyed to you.

(107/16. Punjab Government Records.)

APPENDIX XI

Burnes on the political state of Kabul

(See p. 210)

In treating on Kabul it is necessary to guard the mind from including under that head the vast kingdom which once extended from Mesbid to Delhi and from the ocean to Kashmir.....we are only to speak of the small and flourishing territories which surround the capital of that decayed monarchy though we shall not fail to be struck with the miniature resemblance which it still bears to the Empire of the Doranis.....As a city, Kabul owes more importance to its position, which is central for commerce than being the seat of a government, and it has therefore stemmed with success the various revolutions which have disturbed the general peace of this country. Invigorated as it is by this independence, there are few positions in the East better adapted for a metropolis.....Its political advantages, though in a degree inferior to its commercial, are enhanced by them since Kabul has a rapid and regular communication with the countries adjacent, and is supplied at the same time with accurate information of what passes in them,..... nor has it the exuberant productions of India or even Bokhara but it has a race of people for more hardy who have for the last eight or nine centuries enabled the possessors of Kabul to overrun the surrounding countries.....Dynasty after dynasty has issued from their mountains and usurped in succession as trophies of their valour and success the riches and the revenues of the lands which they subdued. The last race of their kings the Suddozie descendants of Ahmed Shah, a General of Nadir, have also been swept away and in their place arises the tribe of Barakzai, who rule their native soil, and will in time like their predecessors extend the circle of their power.

The present Ruler of Kabul is Dost Mohd Khan, the first of his tribe, who assumed a few years ago the title of Amir.

The chiefship comprehends the country extending from Bumean to the mountains of Khyber. The eastern portion, or Jallalabad, is an addition, since I wrote in 1832, and has increased this Chief's revenue from eighteen to twenty four lacs of rupees per annum. This territory is apportioned in separate governments to the different sons of the Amir, a policy which is more wise than popular. The brother who ruled Ghuzni, Amir Khan, is dead and that district is also held by one of his own family.....

The Amir himself governs Kabul where he usually resides and along with him is his brother, Nawab Jabbar Khan, he has a pack of 45 guns all of which are serviceable, about 2,500 "Suzzalohis" or infantry armed with a musket as large as a well piece, which is used with rest, and twelve or thirteen thousand horse, 1/12 of which are Kuzailbashas, about 9,000 of these are highly efficient: Three thousand ride the Government horses and receive pay,—a system of raising troops called "Umlace", new in Afghanistan and in which Dost Mohammed Khan considers a great portion of his strength to lie. Such is a brief account of the means of offence and defence possessed by the Chief of Kabul.

From no direction but the east, however, has Dost Mohammad Khan to fear an opponent and a diminution of his enemies will have the same effect as an actual increase to his resources, and with an improvement of these, there cannot be a doubt of his power being considerably enlarged. Such indeed is the military position of Kabul, that if the Governor of the city has any stability a sum of money placed at his disposal can always command the presence of good troops, and the service performed will of course be to the advantage of the donor. In the time of monarchy the benefit of the money thus used resulted to the state, in the present condition of the chiefship, it would fall to the power that advanced it, which gives the Ruler of Kabul no small influence in this part of Asia.

Quandhar to the west is still held by the brothers (of the Chief of Kabul) who offer homage to him if they do not at all times exhibit it. It 1832 the ex-King, Shuja ul Mulk, sought to regain

his lost empire near Qandhar, the Chief of Kabul promptly quitted his own frontier, combined with his brothers and saved them and himself by victory. The common interest dictated these proceedings, and on matters which relate to the family and the Barakzai ascendancy in Afghanistan the conduct and the professions of the Qandhar chiefs towards Kabul tally with one another. They address Dost Mohammad Khan as inferiors, they seek his counsels as the head of their family, and they follow it when given. Such however is not altogether the case in their relations with foreign states.....A desire to avert evil from Sikh encroachment lately led the chiefs of Afghanistan to sue for a renewal of it (an intercourse with Persia) but, at no time, were the feelings between the Afghans and Persians cordial and their sympathy for one another, considering their differences of creed.....The Afghans would have been conquered by those whom they sought as auxiliars, for, though each chiefship has a ruler, the country is without one head, and the natural jealousy and inveterate hatred to which divided power give rise, would have made it appear as an unoccupied land and hastened its fall. Interested persons urged the Afghans Chief to this line of policy, Persia saw the advantage with which she could enter the land, and counselled by Russia, speedily responded to their call with abundance of promises, which the same advisers pronounced to be the signs of favour and condescension. The style of address, however, asserting claims which are not without weight and might unsettle these countries. Herat itself is not likely to strike a decisive blow at any part of the Afghan dominions, but Candhar is, and if the Ruler of cabool is freed from his fears of the Sikhs, that Chiefship will not only be secure against the inroads of Kamran and his family but Herat itself now threatened from the west may be united to Cabool.

For the last eleven years Dost Mohammed Khan has gathered strength as he goes, but the additions to his power have brought with them cares and anxieties which have of late been unfavourable to his popularity.....laws are not carried on without money and an increase of duties and taxes, a resumption of some lands, assigned for charity...together with loans and fines, somewhat arbitrarily taken, and a reduction of allowances, are the means which the Ameer has

resorted for increasing his army which is now too large.....He cannot be long deceived, he listens to every individual who complains and with a forbearance and temper which is more highly praised than his equity and justice.....His caution is extreme and his suspicion so easily excited as to amount almost to infirmity, tho' self-reflection brings back with it his self-confidence. A peace with his eastern neighbours would certainly render the power of this man durable, and enable him to reduce his army and expenses.

The system of government among the Afghans is too well known to require any recapitulation from me. The republican genius which marks it is unchanged and whatever power a Sudozye or a Barakzae may require, its preservation can only be ensured by not infringing the rights of the tribes and the laws by which they are allowed to govern themselves...Nothing but his limited revenues prevent his being a most popular ruler and with this disadvantage even his name is seldom mentioned beyond the precincts of his court.....

Having thus embodied most of what seems necessary to convey accurate ideas of the power of the Ruler of Cabul we pass from particular to general observations—No policy would perhaps be wiser than to maintain Sikh influence between India and Cabul and to place the Punjab in the balance against that country.....The supreme power of their nation depends upon the individual who wields it, the Afghan tho' stripped of some Indian provinces admits no sovereignty of the Sikh and watches with vigilance for an opportunity to inflict injury and assert his rights. The wealth of the Ruler of Lahore and the discipline and number of his troops enabled him to keep under these aspiring (?) to recover lost power but his single mind effected it—where superior force is unable to subside and can only keep in check, it would be imprudent to reckon on tranquillity when the disappearance of one man shall have ceased to bridle zeal stimulated as it is by religion and the hope of political greatness. The successor of Ranjit Singh may certainly possess the elements of character which so distinguished himself but the state of parties in this country forbids the hope and the time may not be distant when his now consolidated territories eastward of the Indus may be overrun and perhaps

dismembered into small states like Cabul. Th o' the Afghans are without a common king yet they repel the attacks of the Sikhs and countenance the opinion that they may be heirs to a share of their power and exercise no shall influence over their lands and probably the adjacent empire of India. Neither the Tartars nor the Afghans may long rifle that country. The supremacy of the British hems them within their own limits and the power which it has raised in India brings the nations on and beyond the Indus as suitors for alliance instead of the invaders of its soils. The lawless inroads of former days are thus effectually prevented even without an active interposition of British power and an opportunity is now happily presented of moulding these frontier states by friendly sympathy and conciliation into a shape which must contribute to the glory of Britain and the duration of its empire in the East.

A. Burnes

(On a Mission to Cabul).

Cabul.

20th November, 1837.

(108/59. Burnes to Macnaghten, December 3, 1837. P. G. R.).*



*. This important document is not decipherable and contains a number of obvious mistakes of language. It is reproduced without alteration,

APPENDIX XII

Letter from Wade to Macnaghten dated the 13th January, 1838, giving his views about Dost Mohd. and Burnes' mission to Kabul.

(See p. 218)

By the accompanying letters to your address dated the 20th and 22nd ultimo from Captain Burnes the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India will be informed of the arrival at Kabul on the 19th ultimo of the Russian Envoy Captain Vikowitch bearing letters for Dost Mohd. Khan from the Emperor of Russia, the King of Persia and the Russian Ambassador at Tehran.

2. In a private letter received from Captain Burnes I learn that the envoy in question is charged with an offer of money to the Amir to wage war against the Sikhs. The mission of Kambar Ali Khan did not proffer any pecuniary aid and the letter of His Imperial Majesty merely states that he will feel always happy to assist the people of Kabul who may come to trade with his country while in the letter of Count Simonich it is desired that the envoy may on his arrival be treated by Dost Mohd with consideration and entrusted with his secrets. It is no doubt possible that Captain Vikowitch may have authority for offering the chief of Kabul the pecuniary aid of Russia against the Sikhs, but as the object of the Amir is money, if from the Persians or Russians to combat the Sikhs, if from the British to aggrandize himself at the expense of the other rulers of Afghanistan. Instead of supposing that the Russian envoy is empowered to make much an offer I should rather be inclined to believe that Dost Mohd Khan finding himself wooed on the one hand by the British Government and on the other by an Agent from the Emperor of Russia would give out that if the British would not assist him with money the Russians would, in the persuasion that between the hopes and the fears of the two parties he would at length be able to attain his ends.

3. Captain Burnes having sent me only the subjoined portion of his confidential letter to His Lordship the Governor General on the occasion

of Captain Vikowitch's mission to Kabul I cannot of course judge fully of the expediency or otherwise of any measure that Captain Burnes may have recommended in consequence of the present event but in the several reports that I have submitted I have explained my views as to the true policy of the British Government in every probable contingency at such full length that little remains for me to say on the subject now brought forward to which my previous observations do not equally apply.

4. It is undoubtedly the policy of the British Government to exclude the influence of Persia or Russia or both from Central Asia and if I understand Captain Burnes rightly he proposes as a preliminary measure that we should not only agree to adjust the dispute between the Sikhs and Afghans but aid the Chief of Kabul with money to resist the designs of Persia or Russia. Were the British power fixed on the line of the Indus I should be disposed to concur in his proposition though not to the extent of aiding Dost Mohd with our means to overthrow his neighbours, but in the actual case, with the Sikhs and the Sindhians intervening it may be asked if it would be a proof of sound discretion on the part of our Government to loosen to their foundations the stability of our present relations on the frontier of the Indus and Sutlej in the attempt to consolidate a weak government by forcing to subjection a people whom we have no means of controlling to a ruler whose authority is inimical to them. Such is not the course by which the Russian Government seeks to effect its objects. She identifies her policy with that of her principal neighbour, the Persians, and endeavours through their agency to create a distraction of interests in Afghanistan to promote the introduction of her ascendancy in that country; and to pursue a policy opposite to that could only result, in my opinion, to weaken the strength of the British Government in India and facilitate the attainment of the views and wishes of the other party.

5. Persia accepted the alliance of Kabul and Kandhar to gratify her desires of possessing Herat which she knows to be the key to the prosecution of her designs on Afghanistan. The importance of preserving the integrity of Herat is acknowledged by every party

to be superior to the preservation of either Kandhar or Kabul. If Herat falls any aid that we can afford to extend to Dost Mohd Khan with a view to resist the progress of Persia would be ineffectual in itself and give rise to a complication of new relations with bordering tribes which would embarrass and perplex the operations of the British Government both within and beyond the Indus while new elements of intrigue and disturbance would arise from the effects of which we should not have the same power of defending ourselves that we have at present. To deprive ourselves, therefore, of the means which we at present possess of rendering the different rulers of Afghanistan subservient to our purpose by contemplating exaltation of one of them to the prejudice of the others and the neglect of our relations with intermediate powers would be to play into the hands of our rivals and to sow the seeds of fresh dissensions and disorders.

6. The demonstrations of Russia are not stronger than our own while the parties whom she is striving to secure in her interests are too well aware of the superiority of the means that we possess of injuring or benefitting them to lend themselves to her designs. Instead therefore of regarding the arrival of the Russian envoy as a motive for departing from the policy which the Government has already laid down it ought, I think, to be a strong additional reason for us to adhere to its principles. Any inclination that might now be evinced to relax from the line of conduct marked out by the Government would only betray a weakness on our part and convince the Amir of Kabul that we are alarmed at his means of doing some serious injury, while in reality he possesses no such power. It is not by yielding to the ambitious views of Dost Mohd that we are likely to keep off the invasion of his country or to counteract Russian and Persian intrigue, but by keeping him and the other powers of Afghanistan in a just sense of their position. Few persons will I presume be found to place an alliance with the Afghans on an equality with that of the Sikhs and the Amirs of Sindh situated as we are with reference to these powers and unless therefore Captain Burnes can show some sure and certain advantage from the British Government becoming a party to a change in the political condition of the ruler of Kabul, which while it tends to increase his power would

diminish our means of restraining him and and disturb the well-being of our relations east of the Indus, it would be impolitic to expose the safety of our present system to the hazard of an experiment.

7. With these views Captain Burnes should not hesitate, in my opinion, to make a plain and open avowal of the declaration of his Government to Dost Mohd. that the British Government can only engage to use its good offices for the adjustment of his differences with Maharaja Ranjit Singh on the execution of a formal pledge by him to relinquish all connection with the powers to the westward. It would seem that even now the Amir wished to avoid the reception of an envoy from Russia, and I am perfectly satisfied from any knowledge of his sentiments and the state of parties in Kabul that a steady perseverance in the demand of the Government is alone required to bring him to a just estimate of his situation, and that it would be as imprudent as unnecessary to purchase his separation from the alliances which he has been courting with such avidity with Russia and Persia by any another price than our own mediation to settle his dispute with the Sikhs.

8. There is no occasion that I can discover to expend the funds of the Government in subsidizing one section of the chiefs of Afghanistan to oppose the advance of Persia. Herat is not likely to be an easy conquest to that government. Supposing, however, that it were subdued any efforts which the Barakzais could make with our assistance would not stop the progress of the Persians to Kandhar and Kabul, for without Herat the rulers of these two places have not the power of preserving the independence of their country, and, on the other hand, were Persia in possession of Herat the Barakzais could not expect to combine the strength of their nation to recover that important post.

9. If the Persians should take Herat, the first object of Persia will be to renew those diplomatic relations with the Barakzais the

growth of which we have in the meantime been preventing. She would temporise with them in the first instance and direct her arms against Turkaman tribes, and having either conquered them or weakened their power of opposition and assured herself of the security of her own kingdom and her new acquisition in Afghanistan from the inroads of these people, she would advance against Kandhar.

10. On the contrary, should Herat be again saved from the subjugation of Persia, that government finding itself incapable of effecting the reduction of that place, and defeated in the design of extending its dominion to Afghanistan by the effect of our interference, is still likely to be incited to a repetition of her project either by her own restless ambition or the intrigues of Russia, and in order to carry it out Persia, in her blindness to her own real interests, might possibly have recourse to the Russian Government for that aid which has hitherto been withheld to destroy Herat. If Persia has been engaging in her present expedition against Herat by the secret advice of Russia, of which there appears no doubt, the Persian Government will naturally look to Russia for support to accommodate its object and in the event of Persia receding from her purpose the Government of Russia would be able to intimidate her to adopt her own line of policy by declaring that Persia could not rely on the friendship of the Russian Government for her welfare and property or the integrity of her territory if she desisted from her attempt to conquer Herat.

11. From these probable speculations on the success or failure of Persia to subvert that bulwark of the Afghan nation, I am again at a loss to discern what solid benefit would result to the British Government from promoting the views which the ruler of Kabul hopes to realize by receiving pecuniary aid from our Government. It seems to me that while a compliance with such an expectation would be viewed with strong feelings of jealousy and distrust, not merely by the Sikhs, but the other chiefs of Afghanistan and those of contiguous states, it would directly tend to the subversion of that divided state of authority among the Afghans which, there can be no doubt, is the best suited to our present policy. If pecuniary aid be given to one it ought to be afforded to all or we

become the active instrument of destroying that very sub-division of power which we have discovered and admitted to be the true policy of our Government.

12. It may be said that the advantage which we are ready to confer on the chief of Kabul, if he will withdraw from his intercourse with the powers to the westward, is not a just return for so great a boon, but looking to the distance of Afghanistan from our resources, the importance of preserving unimpaired our present friendly relations with powers near at hand, of whom we cannot act independently, and whose alliance it is the first duty of the Government to consider, and also to the untried character of Dost Mohd who though the most able is known to be the least trustworthy of his family, I can not concur in that opinion nor recognize the force of that policy which would take away from us the only means that we have left in reserve not only of being the arbiters of the fate of Afghanistan but of checking the intrigues of its present rulers.

13. I would go no further than the contents of Dost Mohd Khan's own letter to the Emperor Nicholas to convince you of the inexpediency of relieving the Amir from those checks that we can at present exert over his conduct with respect to other powers. In soliciting to be numbered among the friends and allies of His Majesty Dost Mohd, observes: 'There have been great differences and quarrels between myself and the royal house of the Sadozais. The English Government is inclined to support Shuja ul Mulk. The whole of India is governed by them and they are on friendly terms with Ranjit Singh, the Lord of the Punjab which lies in their neighbourhood. The British Government exhibit no favourable opinion towards me. I with all my power have been always fighting against the Sikhs. Your Imperial Government has made friendship with the Persians, and if Your Majesty will graciously be pleased to arrange matters in the Afghan country and assist this nation, which amounts to 20 lacs of families, you will place me under obligation.' If we take into account that while the Amir was writing this letter he was not less earnest than he has ever been to acknowledge his

dependence on the favour of the British Government and that he had been apprised by the Governor General in the reply that was sent on the 11th February, 1835, to the application then preferred by the Barakzais to interfere in the quarrel between themselves and the Sikhs that His Lordship "would have great pleasure in attending to any suggestion which they might have to make on the best means of promoting commerce between the British nation and their own, and in short that there was no question in which the prosperity of their nation and the exercise of a mutual friendship were concerned without its interest to the British Government," the document now produced evinces restlessness of his mind and that his object from the beginning in opening a communication with other powers has not alone been the settlement of his differences with the Sikhs but the gratification of his ambition and the means of controlling the power of the British Government and its ally.

14. It is not the least remarkable fact connected with the present subject that while the letter addressed to Lord William Bentinck was a conjoint production, bearing the signatures of himself and his brothers and nephews, Nawab Jabbar Khan, Nawab Mohamed Zaman Khan, Sardar Sultan Mohd. Khan and Sardar Mohd. Usman Khan, the Amir should have acted without their knowledge or consent in throwing himself on the protection of Russia and implied, in the expression of his own views, the concurrent wish of his whole nation. In speaking of the close relation between the British and the Sikh Governments and his dread of Shah Shuja, the Chief of Kabul makes a direct admission of his danger from the attack of the Sikhs and the use that may be made of the ex-King to counteract his power. The removal of one or both of these checks is accordingly the object which he is desirous of obtaining above all others, that he may be at liberty to prosecute his schemes of ambition in other quarters.

15. With regard to the concluding part of the annexed extract from Captain Burnes' letter to Lord Auckland I need not add that until we have secured Dost Mohd Khan in that course of policy which we wish him to follow in a manner that shall be satisfactory, it would as

events have transpired be hazardous on our part to exert the good offices of the British Government to adjust the Amir's cause of dispute with the ruler of Lahore.

(145/20. Punjab Government Records).



APPENDIX XIII

Declaration issued by the Governor General of the causes which led the British Government to espouse the cause of Shah Shuja and assist him to regain his kingdom.

(See pp. 242-43).

The Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India having, with the concurrence of the Supreme Council, directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus, His Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure.

It is a matter of notoriety that the treaties entered into by the British Government in the year 1832 with the Ameers of Sindh, the Nawab of Bahawalpore and Maharajah Ranjit Singh, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British nation in Central Asia, that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce.

With a view to invite the aid of the *de facto* rulers of Afghanistan to the measure necessary for giving full effect to those treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mohamed Khan, the Chief of Caubul. The original objects of that officer's mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Caubul, information was received by the Governor General that the troops of Dost Mohamed Khan had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally, Maharajah Ranjit Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that His Highness the Maharajah would not be slow to avenge the aggression, and it was to be feared that, the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Govern-

ment would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Governor General resolved on authorizing Captain Burnes to intimate Dost Mohamed Khan, that if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maharajah, His Lordship would exert his good offices with His Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two powers. The Maharajah, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor General to the effect that in the meantime hostilities on his part should be suspended.

It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor General that a Persian army was besieging Herat, that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan for the purpose of extending Persian influence and authority to the banks of and even beyond the Indus, and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of Her Majesty's Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.

After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Caubul, it appeared that Dost Mohamed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, in respect of his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions such as the Governor General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Maharajah Ranjit Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of His Highness, that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition, injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India, and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian design in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprized, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to leave Caubul without having effected any of the objects of his mission.

It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mohamed Khan, and the hostile policy of the latter Chief showed too plainly that, so long as Caubul remained under his Government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interest of our Indian Empire would be preserved inviolate.

The Governor General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause; and the Governor General would yet indulge the hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government, have been by a succession of events more and more openly manifested. The Governor General has recently ascertained by an official Despatch from Mr. McNeill, Her Majesty's Envoy, that His Excellency has been compelled, by the refusal of his just demand, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed, of regarding the present advance of the Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah under the express order of Her Majesty's Government.

The chiefs of Kandhar (brothers of Dost Mohamed Khan of Caubul) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British nation in India, and have been openly assisting in the operations against Herat.

In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our Envoy from Caubul, the Governor General felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories. His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture by the position and claims of Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, a monarch who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary to the British Government, and who, on his empire being usurped by the present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British Dominions.

It had been clearly ascertained, from the information furnished by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the Barakzai chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British Government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interests and security, the British Government acknowledged and respected their authority. But a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our Western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquillity in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement.

After serious and mature deliberation, the Governor-General was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved to His Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Governor General was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maharajah Ranjit Singh than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that His Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations.

Mr. Macnaghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the Court of His Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a Triplicate Treaty by the British Government, the Maharajah and Shah Shoojah-ool Moolk, whereby His Highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all. Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subjects of discussion between the British Government and His Highness the Maharajah, the identity of whose interest with those of the Honourable Company has now been made apparent to all the surrounding States. A guaranteed independence will upon favourable conditions be tendered to the Ameers of Sindh, and integrity of Herat, in the possession of the present ruler, will be fully respected; while by the measures completed, or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted, that the name and just influence of the British Government will gain their proper footing among the nations of Central Asia, that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India, and that a lasting barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment.

His Majesty Shah Shoojah-ool Moolk will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army. The Governor General confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents, and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn. The Governor General has been led to these measures by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the security of the possessions of the British Crown, but he rejoices that, in the discharge of his duty, he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Afghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, the British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Afghans have been

impaired. Even to the chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honourable treatment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to that course of measures, which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country.

By order of the Right Hon'ble the Governor General of India.

W. H. Macnaghten,

Secretary to the Government of India,

With the Governor General.

(121/123. Macnaghten to Wade, October 1, 1838. P. G. R.).



APPENDIX XIV

Translation of a proclamation issued by Wade to the people of Afghanistan, dated the 1st March, 1839.

(See p. 254)

Camp Rawalpindi

Be it not concealed from all those who are devoted and attached to Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk that at the present auspicious period His Majesty has raised his victorious standard in the direction of Afghanistan for the recovery of his throne and to exterminate his enemies from that country, while his son, Shahzada Taimur is proceeding to Peshawar. Now is the opportunity for every true and sincere servant of royal family to give proof of his loyalty by performing service to justify the favour of His Majesty. He who is distinguished by his acts of devotion and attachment, and is actuated by a truly sincere sentiment to serve the Suddazai family, will join the Shahzada, as the time for action and the demonstration of his fidelity and sincerity has arrived. Any one who presents himself before the Shahzada either of his own accord, or through myself shall be introduced to the Shah and confirmed in his ancient privileges, and besides being distinguished by the royal bounty and consideration shall receive a pecuniary present from me according to his merit. Let every one be fully assured on that point and may consider the present proclamation as a pledge for these intentions. In the event of an opposition the result will not be favourable but prodetive of ruinous consequences. It is optional to every one to follow whichever of these two ways he may deem beneficial to his interests. A cordial good-will to the Afghans has induced me to make this communication. It remains for each to make his own selection.

(A true translation).

Sd/- C. M. Wade,

Political Agent, etc., etc.,

(147/40. Wade to Maddock, March 5, 1839. P. G. R.).

APPENDIX XV

**Translation of a pledge of allegiance to Maharaja Ranjit Singh
taken by Sardar Sultan Mohd. Barakzai.**

(See p. 256).

I, Sardar Sultan Mohd. who am the old dependant of the Sikh Government bind myself by the present deed in writing that being fully sensible of the kind consideration and favour which has been shown to me by that Government in the *jagirs* which I have received, I will never swerve from my allegiance and submission to the Maharaja, that with my brothers, sons and relatives I will always endeavour to serve him to the best of my ability with loyalty and devotion to his Government, and that I will desist from holding correspondence with Dost Mohd. Khan or his sons and dependants or any other person who is the enemy of the Sikhs and the British, in proof of which I have written and delivered these lines as a perfect pledge of my intentions.

(True translation).

Sd/- C. M. WADE,

Political Agent etc., etc.,

(147/61. Wade to Maddock, April 4, 1839. P. G. R.).

APPENDIX XVI

Extracts from a description of the Khyber Pass and the tribes inhabiting it.

(See p. 260)

Strength of the Pass. This Pass would always be the door-way or rather more appropriately the key-hole of either Hindustan or Afghanistan. It would not however long be kept shut by the latter, as it now is, if any other Hindustan power holding the advanced position the Sikhs now have, were to apply the infalliable golden key. But owing to an unfortunate policy pursued by the latter of non-toleration towards their Mussalman subjects, the minds of all the neighbouring Muslim nations are inflamed with such an implicable hatred towards them, not only because in their eyes they are infidels, but because they are active as persecutors of the "true religion" that they would refuse the most splendid offers for that passage which they might not be paid for keeping by their own rulers.

Entrance. The Pass is 24 miles long extending from Kadam to Lalpoorah. Then the road up to $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles to Decca is the bed of a torrent which is full of water after a rainfall.

Difficulties or Facilities. 1st. Though not a mercantile facility, a decided advantage for military defence, viz., inconsiderable heights, for when high in the extreme, the road becomes out of musket shot, as is the case at the fort of Ali Masjid.

2nd. Width,

3rd. Few descents.

4th. Smoothness of roadway.

5th. Few ascents.

In forcing the Pass, opposition would only be found at certain stages, for men collected on the detached heights could not keep up with the body below in the road so as to continue annoying their flanks. The extreme inequality in the numbers of parties attacking and those defending the Pass when the latter are said to have been successful have, I should think, been greatly exaggerated in most cases.

Different characteristics assumed by the Pass. The Pass of Khyber runs through straight, and throughout its length assumes three different characteristics. First, a flat road between two scraps not so much varying in perpendicularity as in height and covered with loose stones and gravel which becomes coarser as the bed approaches the sources of the stream. Second, a steep road much narrowed and very winding cut up by protruding pieces of rock and slippery—the most difficult portion abounding in natural obstacles and facilities for the party on the defensive. Third, a made road running down the side of steep hill safe except where the small rivulets have been blocked up, which if not kept in constant repair would be very dangerous points.

Ali Masjid. The fort of Ali Masjid is situated at a distance of $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Kadam. This fort, so called from a mart in the neighbourhood now in ruins, is of mud. During the late engagement with the Sikhs it had a garrison of 200 rudely disciplined men and 200 *Jazalchees*. It is situated at too great a height to be of much service in stopping a force passing below, while at the same time the steepness of the hill on which it is built would be a great obstacle to the same force storming it which would be absolutely necessary to secure the passage of the main body or luggage in safety.

Water. It is not supplied with water, and the garrison is obliged to descend to the hill below for it.

Difficult Gorge. There is no cover for men inside, and the walls seldom withstand the casual showers of rain that fall here. Immediately after

passing the fort the road narrows excessively, and extends for $9\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Ali Masjid to the top of a descent called Landi Khana. For the next $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile, from the top of Landi Khana, is the most difficult part of the Pass, a steep narrow rugged descent.

Position for a fort. The next $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile is an ascent along a road in good repair whence into the plain is a descent along the side of a hill of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles, the top of which hill would be an admirable position for a fort which could enfilade with the most destructive effect both the roads from Decca and that from Lalabeg, but this position, has escaped the eyes of the rulers of Afghanistan. Indeed, a view of the entire Pass and the means adopted for making it a barrier to an invading force would serve to convince any one passing through, that Dost Mohd. does not regard it as a possession of the

Value of the Pass under-rated by the Rulers. importance which is attached to it by the world, or perhaps he relies too much on its natural strength.

Parallel Passes. There are three others passes which are connected with this one in as much as a simultaneous passage would most likely be attempted by an invading force through more than one.

- 1st. The Tatara Pass.
- 2nd. The Kadapa Pass.
- 3rd. The Abkhana Pass.

Roads joining the Pass. 1st. A foot-path leading from Jamrud to Tangee, 2nd. The Bagadee path, the first gorge or tangee of which situated to the north of Jamrood they call Kafer tangee, next comes the Shadee gorge and then the Bagadee one which leads to the fort of Ali Masjid. The whole distance is 9 miles. It is a gun road, for guns were taken by Shah Zaman by it, laden camels also go by this road.

3rd. From Shalaman to Tatara road to Luadgai—a distance of 3 kos inhabited by Peroo Khel, Khuja Khel and Mudad Khel, the Shanwarees.

4th. The Afreedee road from Terra meeting the Khyber Pass at Tangee Ali Masjid ang Lalak some times called Lala Cheena.

5th. There is a road called the Dad Ghala road that branches off between Bazar and Chora (from the latter place there is a cut into Khyber at Lalak difficult for laden camels, though they can go) and leads to Dur Baber's shrine, a distance of 7 kos.

6th. There is a foot-path from Pesh Bulak to Lalabeg.

Tribes inhabiting the Pass. The tribes inhabiting the Pass, and hence called Khybarees, are Shanwarees and Afreedees, the former are divided into Peroo Khels, Khuja Khels, Mudad Khels and Ghanee Khels.

Divisions of Khybarees. The latter into Kukee Khels, Zaka Khels, and Mulukdeen Khels.

Sub-Divisions. Sepa and Karnar Khels. The Kukee Khels are again subdivided into Sher Khan Khels, Mashoo Khe's, Abdul Khels, Katee Khels (notorious cheats) Tar Khels (good swordsmen) and Sikandar Khels. The Mommands inhabiting the other Passes are divided into Barhan Khels, Alangzais, Tragzais, Bazais, Khivazais, Kuda Khels, Mocha Khels, Hasanzais and Hazar boos.

Number of Afreedees. There are said to be 40,000 houses of the Afreedees, this must be a gross exaggeration unless it be a muster of the whole tribe in or out of the Pass. 3,000 of which are the Kukee Khels. The

Kukee Khels. Malaks of the Kukee Khels are Abdul Rahman and Jangee, both of the Sher Khan Khel, they hold the Pass from Jamrud to Lalak, they could muster 2,000 matchlocks and Jazal

Zaka Khels. From Lalak to Kata Kuhata and Lalabeg are the Zaka Khels, thence into the south of Decca which belong to the Mommands are the Shanwarees.

Mommands There are 18,000 Mommands under Sadat Khan who resides at Lalpoor and 7,000 under Khalid Khan who resides at Geshta.


The Khels and Zais among the Pathans are like our families in England. I was once informed that Khel was a more general term than Zai, which in Pushto signifies a collected body and

that the former was derived from the father and the latter from the mother, but I have had reason since to doubt the correctness of the information.

Tolls in Khyber. There are seven tolls in Khyber, 4 belonging to the Afreedees and three to the Shanwarees who divide the collections equally.

Pay of the Khyberees in the time of the kings. In the time of the kings the Malaks of Khyber received very huge sums as their pay, but the body of the Khyberees supported themselves on theft and when called into service only received rations.

Pay at present. Before the late engagement with the Sikhs, Khyber did not cost the Ameer more than 10,000 rupees a year, now he distributes 20,000 in the following way:



	<i>Rupees.</i>	<i>No. of sword- and matchlock men.</i>
Alladad Khan and Faiztallah Zakekhel.	4,000	3,000
Khan Bahadur Malak Deen Khel.	5,000	4,000
Abdul Rahman Khan and Janger Khan Kukee Khel.	3,000	3,000
Salem Khan Sepa, Sadullah Khan Jango and Amar Khan Shanwarees.	5,000	6,000
Noor Mohd. Kamar Khel.	750	1,500
Samandar Khan and Bakar Khan Aka Khel.	750	1,500
Alif Khan Kamber Khan.	1,500	3,000

Instance of Dissensions. The Khyberees are not always a connected body as was found to be the case the year after the death of Vazir Fateh Khan when Alladad Khan for 3,000 rupees bought Yar Mohamed Khan and Azam Khan though against the will of the Mulukdeen Khels, and a part of Kukee Khels,

Instance of bribery. They refused refuge also in the case of a Molvee, the nephew of Sayad Ahmed, who had retired among them from the pursuit of Sultan Mohamed for a bribe of 2,000 rupees given by the latter. They made him decamp and join the Esafzais by discharging muskets nightly over his camp.

Sd/- *R. LEECH.*

Corps of Engineers.

Kabul.

October 1, 1837.

(144/51. Burnes to Macnaghten, October 5, 1837. P. G. R).



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Zafar Nama-i-Ranjit Singh by Diwan Amar Nath.

Like Sohan Lal's *Umdat-ul-Tawarikh* it is a very important

source of information concerning the reign of Ranjit Singh. The author was for some time a paymaster of the Irregular cavalry forces of the Lahore Darbar. The book was edited with notes and introduction by Sita Ram Kohli in 1928.

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Kandhar.

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Herat.

Shah Kamran.

Persia.

Fateh Ali Shah.

Mohd. Shah.

* Shah Shuja lived at Ludhiana as a pensioner of the British Government between 1816 and 1838.

Chief Secretaries to the Government of India.

G. W. Swinton.

H. T. Prinsep.

Secretaries to the Government of India.

W. H. Macnaghten.

Secretary.

H. Torrens.

Deputy Secretary.

H. T. Maddock.

Secretary.

J. R. Colvin.

Private Secretary to the Governor General.

Residents at Delhi.

C. T. Metcalfe.

E. Colebrooke.

W. Fraser.

Hawkins.

Ambala Agency.

- (a) Deputy Superintendent of Hill and Sikh affairs:
Capt. W. Murray, 1823—27.

- (b) Political Agents:
Capt. Murray, 1827—31.
G. R. Clerk, 1831—40.

Ludhiana Agency.

- (a) Assistant to the Agent to the Governor General,
N.W.P., Delhi.

C.M. Wade, 1823—27.

- (b) Political Assistant;
C.M. Wade, 1827—32.

- (c) Political Agent;
C.M. Wade, 1832—40.
G. R. Cleak, appointed on April 1, 1840

Captain Alexander Burnes led the Commercial Mission to Lahore (1831) and to Kabul (1837).

British Resident at Teheran : Ellis,

British Agent in Persia : J. McNeil.

Russian Agent at Kabul : Capt. Viekovich.



GLOSSARY OF INDIAN WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS

Abkari	Tax on spirits.
Arzi	An application.
Barahdari	An open hall, a summer-house with twelve doors.
Chaprasi	A messenger, or an attendant so-called from his wearing a <i>chapras</i> (a sort of buckle or breast-plate).
Darbar	Court, hall of audience. In this thesis it signifies the Lahore Government.
Granth	The sacred book of the Sikhs.
Istaqbal	To go forward and receive.
Jagir	The assignment of the Governments' share of the produce of a district to a person as an annuity either for his private use or for the maintenance of a military establishment. Also the district so assigned, or the income from it.
Jagirdar	The holder of a <i>Jagir</i> .
Kharita	Letter or letter bag.
Kos	A measure of distance of march varying from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{3}{4}$ miles in different parts of India.
Munshi	A clerk, writer, or a secretary.
Parwana	A written order or requisition.
Sayer	A general term denoting a variety of taxes other than the land revenue,
Thana	A police station.
Thanadar	A subordinate police officer in charge of the <i>thana</i> .
Tosha-Khana	A place where furniture is kept, a wardrobe.
Vakil	An agent or a representative.

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